This is the follow-up post to “Morning Reports LSSAH”: Morning Reports LSSAH – 12 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The original plan on 12 July was for the Fifth Guards Tank Army to launch it attacks from in front of Prokhorovka at 1000 AM (Moscow time). At the last minute, the Voronezh Front command moved the time up of the attack to 0830. Both the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the Fifth Guards Army stated that they attacked at 0830. The Fifth Guards Army was to the northwest of the Fifth Guards Tank Army and was engaged with Totenkopf SS Division in addition to other German units. The Fifth Guards Tank Army was primarily engaged with the Adolf Hitler SS Division (LSSAH), although it was partly engaged with its neighbor on the left, Totenkopf, and its neighbor on the right, the Das Reich SS Division.

Berlin time is one hour ahead of Moscow time, so a 0830 attack (Moscow time) occurred at 0730 (Berlin time). Added to that, the times listed are the times the reports were sent or filed, not when they occurred. In some cases, they report the time the event occurred. So for example, at 0740 Totenkopf reports an event at 0630 and another event at 0705. The same occurs at 0822 (event was at 0745), at 0825 (event was at 0740),  at 0955 (event was at 0930), and so on.

So at 0500 (Berlin time) they report hearing “tank noises.”

At 0600 they received a regimental strength attack along the line of Prochorowka-Petrowka. See map below. 

I have no idea what generated this report. This attack is at least a hour-and half before the Soviets claim they attacked. If could be a small recon in force not otherwise reported, a false report and a confused time. 

At 0630 Totenkopf is being infiltrated and fired on (at 0630 or 0740?) and under a very heavy infantry attack at 0705.  Again the 0630 and 0705 Berlin times do not match with the Fifth Guards Army 0830 Moscow time start time.

At 0822 Totenkopf, which can see most of the XVIII Tank Corps attack positions, reports “two enemy regiments and about 40 tanks from the northeast, observed entering Michailowka and hills to the southeast at 0745.” This is clearly the XVIII Tank Corps attack. The report almost perfectly matches with a 0830 Moscow time. Assuming it takes a few minutes from when the orders are given to everything gets moving, spotting this movement at 0745 Berlin time pretty much confirms that the XVIII Tank Corps attack started at 0830 Moscow time. Rotmistrov was at his command post at height 252.4 (it is on the map on the road between Prokhorovka and Voroshilov Sovkhoz). Marshal Vasilevkii, the Stavka representative, was there with him. The XXIX Tank Corps was supposed to start its attack at the same time. From height 252.4, Rotmistrov could see most of the XXIX Tank Corps and parts of the XVIII Tank Corps. So, I am guessing that the XXIX Tank Corps attack also started at 0830.

Just for reference, the Germans held height 252.2 and Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz opposite the XXIX Tank Corps.

Now, I gather one could put together an argument of a later attack by the XXIX Tank Corps from the 1000 hours report from LSSAH that says “Enemy attacks on all fronts (At 0915 hours, 40 tanks from Jamki against Swch. Stalinsk, 35 tanks from Prochorowka along the road to the southwest, 40 tanks from Petrowka against Swch. Iktjabrskiy, and the heaviest artillery support. But… I don’t think this report really does indicate that the XXIX Tank Corps attack started at 1000 Moscow time.

Anyhow, I still don’t see a strong reason to overrule multiple reports by both the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the Fifth Guards Army that they initiated the attack at 0830 Moscow time. It does seem that these German records report spotting the XVIII Tank Corps attack at 0745 Berlin time, which would be 15 minutes after the Soviets said they attacked.

Seems like I never quite get away from the Battle of Kursk and move onto other work. As a result of piece I was working on, I ended up checking back in my files. This material below is quoted (translated) from a narrative of events kept by the SS Panzer Corps (file T313, R368). For 12 July 1943 they report:

0500 hours: Morning reports
LSSAH: Contact with Totenkopf established. Numerous tank noises along our front. Heavy enemy air activity.
Das Reich: Night passed quietly. Regiment Deutschland is ready to follow the right wing of LSSAH’s attack.
Totenkopf: Strong artillery and small arms harassing fire, heavy enemy air activity.

0600 hours: Enemy attack in regimental strength along the line Prochorowka-Petrowka drive off on LSSAH’s front.

0740 hours from Totenkopf:
0630 hours slow infiltration of the flank positions at the barracks (west of Klljutschki). Very heavy artillery and salvo-gun fire. Advance to the northeast still not specified.

0740 hours from Totenkopf:
0705, very heavy infantry [attack?] 3 km east of Petrowka.

0822 hours from Totenkopf:
Two enemy regiments and about 40 tanks from the northeast, observed entering Michailowka and hills to the southeast at 0745.

0825 hours from Totenkopf:
0740 hours, an enemy battalion attacking into the Psel area from the north.

0900 hours from Totenkopf:
Last elements crossed over into the bridgehead at 0900. Using the panzer battalion that crossed over yesterday, began advancing against the barracks at 0400 hours. Barracks captured by 0715.

0910 hours from VIII Air corps:
Two Stuka groups have been dispatched against the enemy group moving southwest from Petrowka.

0955 hours from Totenkopf:
Enemy attacking west from Michailowka with tank support.
At 0930 hours our armored group jumped off from Hill 226.6 to the northeast.

1000 hours from LSSAH:
Enemy attacks on all fronts (At 0915 hours, 40 tanks from Jamki against Swch. Stalinsk, 35 tanks from Prochorowka along the road to the southwest, 40 tanks from Petrowka against Swch. Oktjabrskij, and the heaviest artillery support).

1110 hours from Totenkopf:
Enemy attack in regimental strength out of Wassiljewka to the southwest. Additional attacks south of Wesselyj and Ilinskij.

Aerial reconnaissance reports the advance of additional enemy forces, predominantly infantry, in the area south of Oboojan.

1115 hours from Totenkopf:
We will attempt to cross the Psel at Michailowka and move in behind the enemy that is south of the river.

1130 hours from LSSAH:
Localized enemy breakthrough at Hill 252.2

1145 hours from Das Reich:
Enemy attack against Kalinin and west of Storoshewoje. After repelling this attack, we plan to counterattack to seize Storoshewoje.

1315 hours from LSSAH:
[Enemy] breakthrough taken care of, all infantry attacks driven off.

Just for reference: The LSSAH is the Adolf Hitler SS Panzer Grenadier Division. It was located to the southwest of Prokhorovka. The Das Reich is the Das Reich SS Panzer Grenadier Division which was located to the south (right flank) of LSSAH. Totenkopf is the Totenkopf SS Panzer Grenadier Division which was located to the north (left flank) of LSSAH and was across the Psel River. The Russian names above are as transliterated into German (vice English).

German records were reported in “Berlin time” while Soviet records were reported in “Moscow time.” It is my understanding that at this time of the year in July 1943, Berlin time was one hour behind Moscow time.

Now, I ended up looking this back up because there is an author (Toeppel) who claims that the Soviet attack that their records state occurred at 0830 (Moscow time) actually occurred at 1000. I have in the past been dismissive of this claim, but wanted to make sure I properly examined it. I will address this in more detail in a post tomorrow morning.

We usually don’t place any restrictions on incoming remarks. So far, this has not been an issue except for one remark a while back that looked suspicious. Our commentators on this blog have always been very respectful. We received another comment the other day that seemed odd. It referenced a paper on Kursk by an author I was not familiar with. A quick glance at the paper clearly showed that this was a bizarre piece not worthy of further attention. So, do I post the remark and let each person make their decision on the referenced paper, or do I decide that this should get no more attention and not post the remark?

Let me quote the third paragraph from the paper which will show why I really don’t want to bring any attention to it:

“To support his enunciation, Kellerhoff quotes only one source – an obscure British historian Ben Wheatley, who allegedly found some obscure aerial photographs in American archives 75 years after the war. And those photographs, allegedly made by the Luftwaffe planes, are Kellerhoff’s only argument for what he called the “disastrous defeat of the Red Army at Prokhorovka.”

Now, I have not read the referenced article by Kellerhoff, but I am familiar with Dr. Wheatley’s work and have blogged about it before. I also went into those same photo files over a decade ago and there is a 32-page aerial photo section in my big Kursk book. He did not reference my work in his paper. I found out about these aerial photo files from John Sloan, a retired Sovietologist who runs the Xenophon Group (link is in our sidebar). So, these files are certainly not “allegedly found” and “allegedly made by Luftwaffe planes.” They are also not that “obscure” (nor is Dr. Wheatley). A couple of Italian Advanced Squad Leader module designers are currently developing their game map sheets from these Luftwaffe aerial photos. See: http://advancingfire.com/

The rest of the article is filled with similar crap. It was bad enough that if I posted it, then I would be obligated to immediately respond to it.  A point-by-point refutation of a ten-page paper would take a while. It sometimes takes more time to refute bad “research” then it takes for the author to make their claims. I do have better and more important, things to do with my time right now. Therefore, I decided not publish the remark and give the referenced article any visibility.

It does appear that the comment is from Russia or a Russian although they use a Chinese appearing name. We will, with some judiciousness, not publish remarks that are obviously deceptive, propaganda-like and based upon poor data. The one other such remark that we did not publish was similar.