The U.S. Army’s revised Field Manual FM 3-0: Operations

The new revision of the U.S. Army’s Field Manual FM 3-0: Operations is out. It is dated October 2022 and is here: FM 3-0_WEB_Working.pdf (army.mil)

I have not read it yet and certainly will not do so this year. I did take a moment to word search its 280 pages. Found one reference to Trevor Dupuy’s work. It is a footnote for page 6-26 (page 154) discussing the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. They reference on page 242 and in the bibliography on page 264: Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Analysis of Factors that have Influenced Outcomes of Battles and Wars: A Data Base of Battles and Engagements, Vol. VI (report prepared for the U.S. Army Concepts and Analysis Agency, June 1983), 203–221. Available at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/b087722.pdf.

The Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) was one of Trevor Dupuy’s companies and a division is his later companies. Their reports are listed here: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications and here TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications and here: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications (report no. 95 is the one listed above). 

Anyhow, not sure why they did not reference his book Elusive Victory, which was built from those reports. See: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org)

Presentations from HAAC – Contentious Issues in Syria

The sixth presentation of the second day was Contentious Issues in Syria: the Alawi Religion, their Political Struggles, Chemical Warfare in Syria and a Hypothesized Religicide of the Alawis by Jennifer Schlacht. It is here: Alawis. Slide Deck

The first presentation of the day was my monstrosity, Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (which I later turned into the book America’s Modern Wars): NIC Compilation 3.1

The second presentation of the day was Lessons Learned from Haiti 1915-1934 by Dr. Christopher Davis of UNCG: History as an Enemy and Instructor

The third presentation of the day was Estimating War Deaths (in Iraq) by Dr. Michael Spagat of Royal Holloway University of London: Iraq Deaths

We then had a group discussion on whether we could have won the war in Afghanistan. I opened the discussion with a brief 12-slide presentation, built from my original presentation that morning. It is here: Could We Have Won

This was followed by presentation by Joe Follansbee (Col. USA, ret) on a proposed Close Combat Overmatch Weapon.

——

We had a total of 30 presentations given at the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We have the briefing slides from most of these presentations. Over the next few weeks, we are going to present the briefing slides on this blog, maybe twice a week (Tuesdays and Thursday). In all cases, this is done with the permission of the briefer. We may later also post the videos of the presentations, but these are clearly going to have to go to another medium (Youtube.com). We will announce when and if these are posted.

The briefings will be posted in the order given at the conference. The conference schedule is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The nine presentations given on the first day are all here: Presentations from HAAC – Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

A story about planning for Desert Storm (1991)

In an email exchange with retired DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) analyst, William (Chip) Sayers, he sent me this account. I asked him if we could publish it, as I think it is a wonderfully unfiltered account. He agreed, although pointed out that he would also be covering some of this in his presentation this fall. It is on Day 2 of HAAC and is on “The Combat Assessment Technique.” See: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 4 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

In early 1989, I went to work at an office at DIA that specialized at looking at the world through the eyes of the Soviet General Staff. In particular, we used the Soviet’s Correlation of Forces Methodology. However, we only partially understood it and needed some data to close gaps for us. I cast around for something that would plug these holes and settled on the QJM as the best candidate. It was my belief that both models had approached the subject from the same standpoint and therefore the one could help inform the other.

This paid off — to an extent — in the run up to the ground campaign of Operation DESERT STORM. Gen. Schwarzkopf desperately wanted to know at what point he should let loose his ground forces and so had his staff casting about for a methodology that would give him a way to measure the success of the air campaign in softening up the Iraqis. You would think that after the years we put into WEI/WUVs and all the various models that J-8 and others used, we would have had a good basis for solving his problem. Well, you’d be wrong. Very wrong. As an illustration, Schwarzkopf claimed after the war that, in the summer of 1990, CENTCOM had gamed out the exact scenario that actually occurred and got the exact same results. Schwarzkopf was channeling his inner Nimitz, but I guarantee you that was impossible. I spent several years in the bowels of the Pentagon gaming the Soviet problem with J-8 using the same model and I can truly say that the model itself was geared toward making it absolutely impossible for the attacker to win. I promise you, there was no possible way that Schwarzkopf’s troops got the results he claimed unless he disregarded the output and simply directed the outcomes, himself.

In any event, in the weeks running up to the ground campaign, he didn’t have anything — much less a full-scale model — that could answer his question. I saw a bunch of Majors and LTCOLs running around like chickens with their heads cut off, without coming to any useful conclusions. We ran through exceptionally complex pseudo-science formulae and we saw some so simplistic, my third-grader grandson could have done better. None of it, however, satisfied Schwarzkopf because no one could agree on an approach. In the end, Schwarzkopf threw up his hands and directed that we simply let him know when the air forces had attritted the Iraqis by 50%, and then he’d send in the ground troops. My job at that moment, was to pretty much figure this out for DIA, and given my possession of the QJM and my hybrid methodology, I felt I could be very confident in making the call that CINCCENT needed. Unfortunately, we were on opposite sides of the impenetrable G2/G3 no-go zone, so they weren’t interested in listening to my opinions.

I knew from my historical studies that 50% attrition was massive overkill and that we could go long before we reached that lofty — and probably unobtainable — goal. What Schwarzkopf didn’t know, and I did, was that the agreements set out to decide who did what to whom did not allow DIA access to the data collected by our tactical recce jets. In other words, DIA was going to have to do all its BDA analysis using less useful means. There was simply no way our guys could see a small hole punched through the top armor of a tank from the means we had at hand. Thus began the great BDA war between CENTCOM and Washington. We knew that we didn’t have the proper resources to do the job right, but were told to get on with it, anyway. On the other hand, CENTCOM had a formula of how many “kills” to award according to the in-flight pilot reports given the type of airframe flown. F-16s were heavily discounted, while A-10s were believed as though their claims were coming down from Mt. Sinai on stone tablets. I’m a former USAF pilot and I know that the last guy to ask is the one who just came through the gauntlet.

I vividly remember running my final calculations on Friday night before the attack kicked off the next day (Washington time) and being very satisfied that Schwarzkopf could go at any time he wanted. Interestingly enough, none of this had any input into his decision to go. Few people remember it, but Gorbachev was negotiating with Saddam and had successfully convinced him to pull out of Kuwait. The agreement they came up with would give the Iraqis three weeks to pull out. At this point, it had become a major goal to eliminate the Republican Guard and we didn’t want them to pull their head out of the noose, so President Bush turned down the compromise and ordered the ground forces in.

Ok, so here’s the point: Despite all the big talk and incredible claims, when push came to shove, the Army had nothing/NOTHING to use as a basis for planning. Lord knows we threw enough time and money at the problem, but in the end, Schwarzkopf just had to pray that we had enough combat power when our troops rolled across the line. He would have given anything up to half his kingdom for the QJM at that moment. He had a lot of opinions to choose from, but nothing solidly based on history. And frankly, I don’t think the situation has changed in the intervening 30 years. Now that the chips are down, people aren’t likely to care WEI/WUVs were developed by the opinions of various branch influence groups. But a model with an historical basis would be worth its weight in gold.

Glossary:

QJM = Quantified Judgment Model, Trevor Dupuy’s earlier combat model. The TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model) is Trevor Dupuy’s update of the QJM.

WEI/WUVs = a weapon scoring system developed by CAA and used by RAND.

This email exchange was part of a discussion of what TDI could be doing, if properly budgeted. 

Variable 4: Is there a problem with internal turmoil and unrest in China?

Depressions begat revolutions. Now it ain’t so simple as that, but there is a big enough correlation here that every time there is a economic downturn, a nation’s leaders should be looking over their shoulder in concern. If they are a democratic government, it probably means they will now have time to write their memoirs. If they are a dictatorship, they could end up dangling from a meat-hook.

The seminal quantitative work on this subject was two separate studies done in the 1960s by Ted Gurr and the couple Ivo and Rosilind Feierabend. Ted Gurr’s work was summarized in his book Why Men Revolt, while the Feierhabend’s never issued out a book (which is a shame as their work was as significant). There has not been much of significance done since then (which I think is fairly bizarre actually… it is not like revolutions are a dead subject).  We have blogged about this before.

So Variable 3 is “How is the economy of China doing?.” As long as the China economy is growing and thriving over the next 20 years, then this only increases the danger to Taiwan. On the other hand, there are lots of reasons to doubt that their economy will continue to thrive over the next 20 years. If the economy is not growing, then this fourth variable comes into play: Is there a problem with internal turmoil and unrest in China?  This affects the odds that China will decide the invade Taiwan in five ways:

  1. The reduced economic growth probably reduces their “defense” budget.
  2. If there is unrest or political turmoil, it probably distracts the government to worry about internal issues, vice invading their neighbors (although it some cases, it can actually do the reverse).
  3. It may result in a leadership change:
    1. This leadership could be even more internally absorbed.
    2. This leadership could be even more nationalistic.
    3. This government could be unstable.
  4. It may result in a change of the form of government:
    1. Communism collapses.
      1. It becomes a democracy
      2. It becomes a dictatorship.
      3. The new government could be unstable
      4. Central government may collapse entirely.
    2. Communism is reinforced (sort of another cultural revolution)
    3. Communism is de-stabilized, but returns back in control.
  5. It may result in no government at all (more on this later).

So, what are the odds that China will have a economic slow-down in the next 20 years? Is it 25%, is it 50%, is there no chance at all? 

If there is an economic slowdown, what is the chance of political turmoil, and then what is the extent, nature and virulence of this political turmoil? Is it a bunch children of “princelings” that can be run over with tanks, or is something more broadly based.

The problem with revolutions, is that once they start, they gets pretty hard to predict where they are going to go. For example, when the Shah of Iran abdicated in 1979, much his vocal opposition came from the left, often college students. The country ended up being taken over by Ayatollahs. The Russian revolution started in 1917 with the moderately liberal Cadet Party and Alexander Kerensky running the country in a somewhat democratic manner and ended up with Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin in charge. The Russian revolution of 1991 ended up with Boris Yeltsin in charge of a developing democracy and ended up with Vladimir Putin in charge. The Arab Spring of 2010-2012 resulted in demonstrations and revolts in 17 or so different countries. In four of those countries the governments were overthrown (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen). Only one ended up with a democratic government in its aftermath. 

And then there is always the possibility that China could end up with no central controlling government at all. This is not all that far-fetched. China has spent almost of much of its history broken up into smaller states as it has spend unified as a single state. There is no strong reason to assume that over the next decades that China will remain unified. There is no history that suggests such a pattern.  

Modern countries do break up. Yugoslavia comes to mind. There are significant independence movements in Catalonia (Barcelona) and Scotland. So the image of China as a dominating unified state may not be the image moving forward.

Anyhow, I suspect we are looking at maybe a 50% chance of a major economic slowdown in the next 20 years (this is just a wild guess, I have no idea what the odds of such an event are). If there is an economic slowdown, then I am guessing maybe a 50% change of unrest and turmoil. So….there is no guarantee that China will be in a position or place to even consider invading Taiwan in the next 20 years. Maybe a 50% chance that this is the case.

 

Related blog posts:

Why Men Rebel? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Why Are We Still Wondering Why Men (And Women) Rebel? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Quote from America’s Modern Wars | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Ted Gurr Has Passed Away | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Mortality Rates of the Coronavirus by Country

In my morbid fascination with casualty rates it is hard for me not look at the statistics on the coronavirus and not calculate morbidity rates. Here are the stats:

Country…………………….Cases……..Deaths………Rate

World Wide…………………82,548…….2,810……………3.41%

China………………………..78,497…….2,744……………3.50%

S. Korea……………………..1,766…………13……………0.74%

Italy……………………………..528…………14…………..2.65%

Iran……………………………..245…………26…………10.61%

Japan…………………………..189…………..3……………1.59%
Singapore………………………93

Hong Kong……………………..92……………2……………2.17

United States…………………..60

Kuwait…………………………..43

Thailand………………………..40

Bahrain…………………………33

Taiwan………………………….32……………1…………….3.13

Germany……………………….26

Australia………………………..23

Malaysia……………………….22

France………………………….18……………2…………….11.11

Vietnam………………………..16

Philippines………………………3……………1…………….33.33

Cruise ships…………………705……………4………………0.57

Other countries……………..117

 

Data is from Johns Hopkins CSSE as of 9:03.03 this morning. It is here: Johns Hopkins CSSE

Now, it is suspected that the number of cases are underreported. There are people that get sick and recover that are never reported. Don’t know how many this is. Suspect that the population of unreported cases exceeds the population of reported cases. Have no data to support that suspicion.

A few takeaways are:

  1. Mortality rate worldwide is around 3.49%
    1. If the number of unreported cases is equal to the number of reported cases, then the real mortality rate is half that.
  2. Mortality rate is China is 3.50%
  3. Mortality rate in South Korea is 0.74%.
    1. This is a significant difference
    2. It may be a result of better health care
    3. It may be a result of early detection and quick treatment
    4. It may be a result of better statistical collection on number of cases.
    5. Is probably a combination of all three.
    6. The point it, it is less than 1% with a significant number of cases. So this is the standard that is achievable.
  4. Mortality rate of Italy is 2.65%
    1. Italian health care is good…so…
    2. Does this mean that there are still a lot of unreported cases out there?
      1. So Italy may have over a 1,000 cases?
  5. Mortality rate of Iran is 10.61%
    1. Now the Iranian health care system may not be as good as S.Korea and Italy…but….
    2. This strongly indicates that there is a large number of unreported cases.
      1. Maybe also over a 1,000 cases?
  6. Just for reference the mortality rate of the flu is something like 0.1%.

 

While S. Korea and Italy are tragic and concerning, what really scares me is the uncontrolled outbreak in Iran. If there are over a thousand cases and it is not locked down and controlled, then it can spread, both in Iran and out of Iran. Iran’s neighbor to the west in Iraq (which reports 6 cases). Iraq is a country that is not always in good order. To their west is Syria, which is in civil war. What happens if the coronavirus arrives in a country in civil war. What containment is there? What government run health care is there?

To the east of Iran is Afghanistan (which reports 1 case) and Pakistan (which reports 2 cases). What happens if it spreads there? Afghanistan is in civil war as are parts of Pakistan. Are the Taliban really going to implement thorough and complete containment and provide proper healthcare?

So while the virus may be able to be contained in places like S. Korea and Italy, is it going to be contained in places like Iran, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan? Will this then become a permanent source of further transmission of the virus to the rest of the world, generating periodic outbreaks elsewhere and forcing systematic containment efforts for years to come?

Current Deployment of Patriot Missile Battalions

Our air defense artillery assets consists of Patriot, THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and the SHORAD (Short Range Air Defense) battalions and batteries, among other elements.

A Patriot Missile Battalion consists of four or five Patriot Missile Batteries. A Patriot Missile Battery consists of four or six launchers, each with four missiles. The United States has 16 Patriot battalions. There is one battalion in Germany and three battalions in South Korea and I gather at least one battery in the Gulf (not sure which). I gather the most elements of the other 11 battalions are in the U.S. As of 2010 it was reported that the U.S. Army operates a total of 1,106 Patriot launchers (1,106/16 = 60 launchers per battalion). According to a count developed from multiple open sources, our air defense battalions and batteries are located at:

Baumholder, Germany

5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriots)

5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (equipped with 36 Avenger SHORAD systems, with 36 in prepositioned storage).

 

Fort Bliss, Texas:

1st Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

2nd Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

3rd Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

5th Battalion/52rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

Battery A, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery B, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery E, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery A, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

 

Guam:

Battery A, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

3rd Battalion, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

4th Battalion, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

5th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar)

2nd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (C-RAM, Sentinal, Stinger/Avenger)

3rd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Hood, Texas

4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

1st Battalion, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

3rd Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot/Avenger?)

1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Campbell, Kentucky

2nd Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Rgt  (Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar)

 

Suwon Air Base, South Korea

6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

2nd Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

D Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THADD)

1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Location unknown:

B Battery, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD) – activated 2016

 

This listing does not include National Guard units. It is also not definitive.

So Where are the Patriots?

We just got “shelled” by a dozen ballistic missiles fired from Iran to Iraq. These are the type of things that could be stopped by Patriot surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. Apparently we were given a heads up that the missiles were coming.

Not sure if we have any Patriot missile batteries deployed in Iraq. During the build up in May and June, we did deploy at least one Patriot battery to the Gulf. I assume they are still there defending facilities in the Gulf States. Do we have any Patriot missile batteries in Iraq?

Current U.S. and Allied Forces in the Gulf (mid-June 2019)

And:

Did The Patriot BMD Miss Again In Saudi Arabia?

One notes that the recent Iranian attack on the Saudi oil facilities on 14 September 2019 was not intercepted even though Saudi Arabia has six battalions of Patriot missiles and we also have at least one battery in the Gulf.

So did we have Patriots deployed in Iraq? If we did have them available, then did we decide not to use them?

 

 

P.S. (added at 1:40 9 Jan 2020): 3 Hours from Alert to Attacks

  1. We had a three hour alert
  2. There were no Patriot batteries deployed to protect the Ain Al-Asad base
  3. 16 missiles were fired at Ain Al-Asad base.

Size of Theater

Seeing how Iran and Iraq are back in the news (as I suspect so will be the Persian Gulf), let me just remind everyone the size of these “theaters.”

………………….Iraq………….Iran…………Persian Gulf……Texas……Lake Superior
Area (sq. km)…437,072……..1,648,195……251,000…………..696,241…….82,000

Population…….38,433,600…82,531,700……N/A……………..28,995,881…….N/A

GDP …………..$250 Billion…$458 Billion……N/A……………..$1,819 Billion….N/A

Texas is the second largest state in the U.S. (behind Alaska) and the second most populous state in the U.S. (behind California). Lake Superior is the largest fresh water lake in the world. Or to put it relative to Europe:

………………….Iraq……………Iran………..Persian Gulf…….France……..Baltic Sea
Area (sq. km)…437,072……….1,648,195…251,000……………551,695……..1,641,650

Population…….38,433,600……82,531,700….N/A………………64,834,000…….N/A

GDP ……………$250 Billion…$458 Billion….N/A………………$2,707 Billion….N/A

The area and population given is for “Metropolitan France,” meaning those parts of France that are in Europe.

Force Ratios in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1956-1973)

An Egyptian Su-100 in Suez City, 1973

We see a similar disparity in results between the Israeli Army and the various Arab armies they engaged. The Arab armies include Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi. To simplify we have just lumped the engagements involving these four armies together, although we are certain that there differences between these various armies. The data includes two engagements from 1956, 16 from 1967, one from 1968 and 32 from 1973 for a total of 51 division-level engagements. None of the engagements were coded as “limited action” or “limited attack.”

This database of only 51 engagements has 33 Israeli attacks and 18 attacks by Arab armies. It produces similar lop-sided results:

Israeli Army attacking the Arab armies (33 cases)

Force Ratio………………….Percent Attacker Wins ………………..Number of Cases

0.54 to 0.97………………………81%……………………………………………..16

1.00 to 1.47………………………90………………………………………………..10

1.51 to 1.99…………………….100………………………………………………….2

2.04 to 2.17…………………….100………………………………………………….2

2.90……………………………….100………………………………………………….1

Gap in data

3.50 to 3.96………………………..0………………………………………………….1

4.11 to 5.87………………………..0………………………………………………….1

 

As can be seen, the Israeli’s are wining 81% of the time that they attack at odds of less the one-to-one. Out of the 33 engagements where they are the attackers, they lose four and draw two. They are winning 82% of the time. Most of their attacks (79% of them) are at low odds, between 0.54- to 1.47-to-one. They win these attacks 80% to 90% of the time. They have two defeats at high odds, but in both cases, they advanced during the battle. At Jebel Libni in June 1967 they attacked at 3.60-to-one odds and advanced five kilometers. The engagement is coded as a draw because the Egyptian forces were able to successfully withdraw, as they were intending, while the Israeli forces had to rest and regroup. Both sides claimed victory. At Abu Ageila in October 1956, thee Israelis attacked at 4.57 odds and advanced 15 kilometers. This three-day engagement was coded as a defeat because the Israeli mission was to advance to Port Suez to support the Anglo-French operations there, and they were effective delayed by the Egyptians. The outcome of the engagement was coded as “attack advances” even though is a defender victory based upon the mission accomplishment scoring. The data in these tables could change slightly depending on how one chooses to code or interpret the outcome of the engagements.

When the Arab armies attacked, the results were very different.

Arab armies attacking the Israeli Army (18 cases)

Force Ratio…………………….Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases

0.87……………………………………..0%………………………………………………..1

1.05……………………………………..0…………………………………………………..1

1.75 to 1.80…………………………..0…………………………………………………..2

2.22 to 2.25…………………………..0…………………………………………………..2

Gap in data

3.03 to 3.49…………………………..0…………………………………………………..2

3.50 to 3.96…………………………33…………………………………………………..3

4.11 to 5.87…………………………50…………………………………………………..4

6.06………………………………….100…………………………………………………..1

8.12 to 12.18……………………..100…………………………………………………..2

 

One notes that the Arab armies lose all engagements below 3.94-to-1. This is some ten of the 18 engagements. Overall, they win only one-third of the time (six engagements out of 18). All victories are at roughly four-to-one odds or higher and even then they win 71% of time. This cannot more sharply demonstrate the performance differences between some armies. This was also examined in my previous book, primarily looking at casualty exchange ratios.

Finally, there is a 1991 Gulf War, where the differences in the performance between the two armies were far greater than either the German army versus the Soviet Union in 1943, or the Israeli Army versus the various Arab armies. We have 11 engagements from the odds of 0.64- to 3.26-to-one. The U.S., UK and French win them all. We have four Iraq attacks from odds of 0.21- to 3.00-to-1. All the Iraqi attacks fail. The Gulf War is a very unusual case.

An Israeli M4A3 Sherman near Suez, 1973

Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran

Saudi Fires From Outerspace (picture from NASA)

There are four countries have been in the news lately, intertwined in a complex little dance that had resulted in the temporary shutting down of 5% of the world oil production. Lets us look at the four countries for a moment:

………………………………………Iran……….Iraq……….Saudia Arabia……..Yemen
Population (millions)……………….83…………37……………..33………………….28
GDP (billions)……………………..484………..250……………762………………….28
Per Capita Income……………..5,820………6,116………..23,566………………..925
% Shiite……………………………..90+…………60…………10-15%…………….35-40%

Now, there are also five other states in and around the Persian/Arabian Gulf (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE and Oman. The most populous and richest of these is UAE with 9.6 million people and a nominal GDP of 433 billion. Some of these states, like Bahrain, are majority Shiite.

While there might be some retaliatory strikes in response, this simple comparison shows that:

  1. Iran is the big guy in the region.
  2. Saudia Arabia is probably not in position to wage war against Iran. It may conduct a military response, but nothing pushing towards something that looks like full-scale war.
    1. Especially as they do not have a common border except over the Gulf.

P.S. Based upon Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)

………………………………………Iran………..Iraq…………Saudia Arabia……..Yemen
GDP (billions)……………………….484…………250…………..762……………………28

Per Capita Income………………..5,820………6,116……….23,566………………….925

GDP PPP………………………….1,540…………734………..1,924……………………73

Per Capita Income………………18,504……..17,952………56,817………………..2,380

 

P.P.S. A related relevant earlier blog post:

Air Forces in the Persian/Arabian Gulf