10% Part II

With the budget resolution voted in by congress that runs until the September of this year (end of the fiscal year), I gather the defense budget is the Obama proposed 2017 defense budget plus $15 billion (which is half of the additional budget that Trump requested for 2017)….so total budget of around $583 (2017 request) or $596 (actually spent) + $15 billion: https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/lawmakers-common-ground-1t-plan-201456675.html

Also see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_budget_of_the_United_States

The big increase will have to wait for the FY 2018 budget, proposed to be $639 billion (I gather, although the figure $603 was put out when Trump first announced his 10% increase). Of course, they did not fully sort out the FY2017 budget until five months before fiscal year 2017 ended, so I am not giving much of chance that they will get the FY 2018 budget sorted out before the start of the next fiscal year (this coming October), as I gather there a few controversial expenditures and cuts in the next government budget. So defense spending will remain fairly level for some months to come.

P.S.: The 15 billion increase is an additional 12.5 billion  for this fiscal year (ends Sept. 30) and “…an additional $2.5 billion contingent on Trump delivering a plan to Congress for defeating the Islamic State militant group.” This last part seems a little odd: http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2017/0501/To-avoid-government-shutdown-negotiators-reach-deal-on-1-trillion-budget

The U.S. Army’s Identity Crisis: Optimizing For Future Warfare


As the U.S. national security establishment grapples with the implications of the changing character of warfare in the early 21st century, one of more difficult questions to be addressed will be how to properly structure its land combat forces. After nearly two decades of irregular warfare, advocates argue that U.S land forces are in need of recapitalization and modernization. Their major weapons systems are aging and the most recent initiative to replace them was cancelled in 2009. While some upgrades have been funded on the margins, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps leaders have also committed to developing a new warfighting doctrine—Multi-Domain Battle (MDB)—to meet the potential challenges of 21st century warfare.

Because conflicts arising from Great Power rivalries and emerging regional challenges pose the greatest potential strategic danger to the U.S., some have called for optimizing the Army to execute combined arms maneuver warfare against peer or near-peer armies. Recent experience suggests however that the most likely future conflicts the U.S. will engage in will involve ongoing post-Cold War ethnic and nationalist-driven political violence, leading others to support a balanced force structure also capable of conducting wide-area security, or stabilization operations and counterinsurgency.

The Army attempted in 2011 to define wide-area security and combined arms maneuver as the two core competencies in its basic doctrine that would allow it to best prepare for these contingencies. By 2016, Army doctrine abandoned specific competencies in favor of the ability to execute “unified land operations,” broadly defined as “simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action.”

The failure to prioritize strategic missions or adequately fund modernization leaves the Army in the position of having to be ready to face all possible contingencies. Gates Brown claims this is inflicting an identity crisis on the Army that jeopardizes its combat effectiveness.

[B]y training forces for all types of wars it ends up lessening combat effectiveness across the entire spectrum. Instead of preparing inadequately for every war, the Army needs to focus on a specific skill set and hone it to a sharp edge… [A] well-defined Army can scramble to remedy known deficiencies in combat operations; however, consciously choosing not to set a deliberate course will not serve the Army well.

The Army’s Identity Crisis

To this point, the Army has relied on a balanced mix of land combat forces divided between armor (heavy tracked and medium wheeled) and light infantry formations. Although optimized for neither combined arms maneuver nor wide-area security, these general purpose forces have heretofore demonstrated the capability to execute both missions tolerably well. The Active Army currently fields 10 divisions comprising 31 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) almost evenly split between armor/mechanized and infantry (16 armored/Stryker and 15 infantry).

Major Nathan Jennings contends that the Army force structure should be specifically reorganized for combined arms maneuver and MDB.

Designed to maximize diverse elements of joint, interorganizational and multinational power to create temporary windows of advantage against complex enemy systems, the Army’s incorporation of the idea should be accompanied by optimization of its order of battle to excel against integrated fire and maneuver networks. To that end, it should functionalize its tactical forces to fight as penetration, exploitation and stabilization divisions with corresponding expertise in enabling the vast panoply of American and allied coercive abilities.

This forcewide realignment would enable “flexible and resilient ground formations [to] project combat power from land into other domains to enable joint force freedom of action,” as required by Gen. David G. Perkins, commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. While tailored brigades and battalions would feature combined arms with the ability to maneuver in a dispersed manner, optimized divisions would allow functional expertise in rear, close, deep and non-linear contests while maintaining operational tempo throughout rapid deep attacks, decisive assaults, and consolidation of gains. The new order would also bridge tactical and operational divides to allow greater cross-domain integration across the full range of military operations.

On the other hand, Lieutenant Colonel Jason Nicholson advocates heeding the lessons of the last decade and a half of U.S. experience with irregular warfare and fielding an upgraded, yet balanced, force structure. He does not offer a prescription for a proper force mix, but sees the recent Army decision to stand up six Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) as an encouraging development.

The last sixteen years of ongoing military operations have been conducted at the expense of future requirements of all types. The modernization problems presented by “small wars” challenge the Army as surely as those related to high-intensity conflicts. While SFABs are a step in the right direction, greater investment is required to maximize the lessons learned after sixteen years of counterinsurgency. Training for specific missions like combat advising and security force assistance should be institutionalized for tactical units beyond the designated SFABs. The need for additional capabilities for operating in austere environments will also drive equipment requirements such as lighter power generation and enhanced tactical mobility. Greater expeditionary logistics, armor, and fire support assets will also be critical in future operations. Hybrid warfare, from the Russian campaign in Ukraine to the French campaign in Mali, will continue to change the nature of “small wars.” Megacities, climate change, and other similar challenges will require the same attention to detail by the Army as near-peer conflict in order to ensure future operational success.

No Simple Answers To Strategic Insolvency

Decisions regarding the Army’s force structure will be in the hands of senior political and military decision-makers and will require hard choices and accepting risks. Proponents of optimizing for combined arms maneuver concede that future U.S. commitments to counterinsurgency or large-scale stabilization operations would likely have to be curtailed. Conversely, a balanced force structure is a gamble that either conventional war is unlikely to occur or that general purpose forces are still effective enough to prevail in an emergency.

Hal Brands and Eric Edelman argue that the U.S. currently faces a crisis of “strategic insolvency” due to the misalignment of military capabilities with geopolitical ends in foreign policy, caused by the growth in strategic and geopolitical challenges combined with a “disinvestment” in defense resources. They contend that Great Powers have traditionally restored strategic solvency in three ways:

  • “First, they can decrease commitments thereby restoring equilibrium with diminished resources.”
  • “Second, they can live with greater risk by gambling that their enemies will not test vulnerable commitments or by employing riskier approaches—such as nuclear escalation—to sustain commitments on the cheap.”
  • “Third, they can expand capabilities, thereby restoring strategic solvency.”

Brands and Edelman contend that most commentators favor decreasing foreign policy commitments. Thus far, the U.S. has seemingly adopted the second option–living with greater risk—by default, simply by avoiding choosing to reduce foreign policy commitments or to boost defense spending.

The administration of President Donald Trump is discovering, however, that simply choosing one course over another can be politically problematic. On the campaign trail in 2016, Trump called for expanding U.S. military capability, including increasing U.S. Army end strength to 540,000, rebuilding the U.S. Navy to at least 350 vessels, adding 100 fighter and attack aircraft to boost the U.S. Air Force to 1,200 aircraft, and boosting the U.S. Marine Corps from 24 battalions to 36. He signed an executive order after assuming office mandating this expansion, stating that his administration will pursue an as-yet undefined policy of “peace through strength.”

Estimates for the cost of these additional capabilities range from $55-$95 billion in additional annual defense spending. Trump called for an additional $54 billion spending on defense in his FY 2018 budget proposal. Secretary of Defense James Mattis told members of Congress that while the additional spending will help remedy short-term readiness challenges, it is not enough to finance the armed services plans for expansion and modernization. As Congress wrangles over a funding bill, many remain skeptical of increased government spending and it is unclear whether even Trump’s proposed increase will be approved.

Trump also said during the campaign that as president, he would end U.S. efforts at nation-building, focusing instead on “foreign policy realism” dedicated to destroying extremist organizations in conjunction with temporary coalitions of willing allies regardless of ideological or strategic differences. However, Trump has expressed ambivalent positions on intervention in Syria. While he has stated that he would not deploy large numbers of U.S. troops there, he also suggested that the U.S. could establish “safe zones” His cabinet has reportedly debated plans to deploy up to tens of thousands of ground troops in Syria in order to clear the Islamic State out, protect local populations, and encourage the return of refugees.

It does not appear as if the Army’s identity crisis will be resolved any time soon. If the past is any indication, the U.S. will continue to “muddle through” on its foreign policy, despite the risks.


So, Who’s Your Favorite Admiral?

Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice by Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., (USN, ret.)

Over at Tom Ricks’ Best Defense blog at Foreign Policy, Captain Wayne Hughes (U.S. Navy, ret.) has written an entertaining and informative series of posts about four of his favorite U.S. Navy admirals and why he finds them notable.

Hughes is a familiar figure to TDI; he was a colleague and contemporary of Trevor Dupuy and a long-time member of The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI). Currently a Professor of Practice in the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, California, Hughes is a U.S. Naval Academy graduate with 30 years of active duty service. He is perhaps best known for authoring the seminal volume Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (1986), Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (2000), and Military Modeling for Decision Making (1989). In 1997, he co-authored A Concise Theory of Combat with Edmund Dubois and Lawrence Low for TMCI.

Hughes selected some familiar names, World War II stalwarts Raymond Spruance and Chester Nimitz; another, lesser-known figure from World War II who had a greater impact on the post-war Navy, Arleigh Burke; and an obscure individual who had an outsized influence on the Navy’s transition from steam to iron, Bradley Fiske. The common thread Hughes identifies that links these admirals was a grounding in a technological understanding of ships and how that related to naval warfare. Hughes credits that deep knowledge of naval technology and warfare as the basis for strategic and operational brilliance, as well as successful political and bureaucratic management of periods of great change in sea power. The pieces are insightful and a delight to read. I well recommend them.



We do like to claim we have predicted the casualty rates correctly in three wars (operations): 1) The 1991 Gulf War, 2) the 1995 Bosnia intervention, and 3) the Iraq insurgency.  Furthermore, these were predictions make of three very different types of operations, a conventional war, an “operation other than war” (OOTW) and an insurgency.

The Gulf War prediction was made in public testimony by Trevor Dupuy to Congress and published in his book If War Comes: How to Defeat Saddam Hussein. It is discussed in my book America’s Modern Wars (AMW) pages 51-52 and in some blog posts here.

The Bosnia intervention prediction is discussed in Appendix II of AMW and the Iraq casualty estimate is Chapter 1 and Appendix I.

We like to claim that we are three for three on these predictions. What does that really mean? If the odds of making a correct prediction are 50/50 (the same as a coin toss), then the odds of getting three correct predictions in a row is 12.5%. We may not be particularly clever, just a little lucky.

On the other hand, some might argue that these predictions were not that hard to make, and knowledgeable experts would certainly predict correctly at least two-thirds of the time. In that case the odds of getting three correct predictions in a row is more like 30%.

Still, one notes that there was a lot of predictions concerning the Gulf War that were higher than Trevor Dupuy’s. In the case of Bosnia, the Joint Staff was informed by a senior OR (Operations Research) office in the Army that there was no methodology for predicting losses in an “operation other than war” (AMW, page 309). In the case of the Iraq casualty estimate, we were informed by a director of an OR organization that our estimate was too high, and that the U.S. would suffer less than 2,000 killed and be withdrawn in a couple of years (Shawn was at that meeting). I think I left that out of my book in its more neutered final draft….my first draft was more detailed and maybe a little too “angry”. So maybe, predicting casualties in military operations is a little tricky. If the odds of a correct prediction was only one-in-three, then the odds of getting three correct predictions in a row is only 4%. For marketing purposes, we like this argument better 😉

Hard to say what are the odds of making a correct prediction are. The only war that had multiple public predictions (and of course, several private and classified ones) was the 1991 Gulf War. There were a number of predictions made and we believe most were pretty high. There was no other predictions we are aware of for Bosnia in 1995, other than the “it could turn into another Vietnam” ones. There are no other predictions we are aware of for Iraq in 2004, although lots of people were expressing opinions on the subject. So, it is hard to say how difficult it is to make a correct prediction in these cases.

P.S.: Yes, this post was inspired by my previous post on the Stanley Cup play-offs.


Hockey Play-off Games 6 & 7

I was watching the first round of the Stanley Cup play-offs tonight (Capitals versus Maple Leafs) and they posted a stat that when the seven-game play-off rounds are scored three won games to two, then the leading team wins 78% of the time.

This really is not all that surprising. To win four games out of the seven, the team trailing must win the next two games. If the two teams were even in ability, then the odds of trailing team winning both games would be 0.50 (50 percent) times 0.50 or 0.25 (25%). So if the score is 3-2 and both teams were equal in ability, then the odds the leading team will win the play-off round is 75%. This is not that far from the 78% they quoted. To get to the 78% they quoted, then the difference in winning ability between the teams would be very slight, 53% for the leading team vice 47% for the trailing team.

Not sure how this translates into anything useful, but at least the Capitals won the fifth game.

Economics of Warfare 13-2

Continuing the examination today of the thirteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

My last post didn’t get past his second page as I ended up pontificating about his two rather significant statements on data. They were:

  1. To get anywhere with empirical research you need to have a reasonably large number of data points. (This is a basic fact about empirical analysis that many students beginning research projects overlook)
  2. So we need to ask ourselves — where are all of these data points going to come from?

The lecture then looks in depth at one country: Colombia. He ends up looking at a paper that measured “commodity prices” compared to civil intensity. They looked at two issues 1) Do higher wages reduce conflict in coffee-growing municipalities (as measured by increased prices in coffee) and 2) does wealth attract violence from armed groups (as measure by oil prices in those municipalities that have oil).  Anyhow, they do find higher levels of violence in coffee growing regions compared to other regions during the time when international coffee prices fell. It also indicated that increases in oil prices did lead to some higher levels of violence for the paramilitaries in Colombia, but these effects were not very large. The rather interesting conclusion (slide 18) is “Dube and Vargas [the study authors] calculate that the fall in coffee prices between 1997 and 2003 translates into an additional 1013 deaths in coffee growing areas….”

Hmm…..I wonder if any of this could apply to growing opium poppies in Afghanistan?

Anyhow, still not finished with this particular lecture, and will pick up discussing the rest of it later. The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2013.pdf

Cartography And The Great War

Detail of “Die Schiffsversenkungen Unserer U-Boote.” Carl Flemming (Firm), 1918. [Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress.]

There is no denying it: maps are cool. National Geographic’s All Over The Map blog has another cool story about advances in cartography during the First World War. Greg Miller summarizes some new work by Ryan Moore, a specialist in the Geography and Map Division of the Library of Congress. Moore recently updated a 2014 publication of his, “Maps of the First World War: An Illustrated Essay and List of Select Maps in The Library of Congress.”

Moore’s paper and accompanying blog posts cover aspects of military cartography from mapping enemy trench lines, layouts of minefields, naval blockade zones, interpreting aerial photography, and more. The information is interesting and the maps are fascinating. Take a look.

Economics of Warfare 13 – 1

Hope you all have your taxes done….speaking of economics. Anyhow, picking back up on the Economics of Warfare posts by Dr. Spagat. The good news is that these blog posts by me apparently inspired (read: forced) Dr. Spagat to post all 20 of his excellent Economics of Warfare course lectures on his blog.

Starting an examination today of the thirteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

The lecture looks in depth at one country, Colombia. Dr. Spagat has done a lot of work there, and even helped set up a non-profit to analyze the Colombian civil wars. These have been the bloodiest series of conflicts in the western hemisphere in the period after World War II. It was through his work on Colombia, and our related work on insurgencies, that we first became acquainted.

Slide two of his lecture starts with the statement that: “To get anywhere with empirical research you need to have a reasonably large number of data points. (This is a basic fact about empirical analysis that many students beginning research projects overlook)”

Actually, it is a basic fact that many in the Army and Defense operations research community overlook!!! I remember getting into discussion with a senior OR practitioner, a retired corporate president who once shared an office with Geroge Kimball of Morse and Kimball fame (Methods of Operations Research, 1951), who tried to make the argument that all you need to 15 good data points. This was at the time we were doing the Bosnia Casualty estimate (see America’s Modern Wars, Appendix II). Needless to say, I strongly disagreed, especially as we were looking at “social science” type data.

The next line in Dr. Spagat’s presentation is: “So we need to ask ourselves — where are all of these data points going to come from?”

This is the issue, and quite simply, the gap that The Dupuy Institute has attempted to fill. For example, Dorothy Clark’s seminal study on Breakpoints (Force Changes to Posture) was based upon only 43 cases [Dorothy K. Clark, Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat Effectiveness of an Infantry Battalion (Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1954]. This is not a lot of data points, which of course, she understood. But, producing “data points” requires research, which takes time and money. There are some existing databases publically available that can help with some problems, but for many problems, there is simply not enough data points assembled for any meaningful analysis. There does not seem to be the mechanism in place to make sure that the Army or DOD has the data that it needs for all of its analytical work.

After starting page 2 with two rather significant statements, Dr. Spagat then goes into discussing Colombia in more depth. I will pick this up in a post tomorrow, as this blog post has already gotten long (and preachy).

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2013.pdf

The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force Debate Future Air Superiority

F-35C of Strike Fighter Squadron 101 (VFA-101) flies in formation with a Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet of VFA-122 near Eglin Air Force Base, Florida (USA) on 22 June 2013. (USAF via Wikimedia)

The U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) are concerned about the ability to achieve and retain air superiority in future conflicts. In 2008, with the F-35 program underway, the USN issued a new requirement for an air superiority platform, the F/A-XX. The USAF, looking at its small fleet of F-22 Raptors–187 total, 125 combat-ready–and the status of the F-35 program, kicked off its own F-X program or Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) in 2012.

In 2015, Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s “acquisition czar” combined these two programs into Penetrating Counter-Air (PCA) to be run by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). This means that some basic requirements will need to be agreed upon, such as stealth or low-observable characteristics. The USN and USAF have some differing viewpoints on this particular topic.

USAF Air Combat Command (ACC) chief Gen. Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle says stealth will be “incredibly important” for the F-X aircraft that the USAF is pursuing as an eventual F-22 replacement. This viewpoint is reinforced by statements that the USAF’s fourth-generation fighters, F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18, are “obsolete” even after upgrade, and “they simply will not survive” against the threats of the future, such as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

Meanwhile, USN Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert, has said that “stealth may be over-rated.” In a speech at the Office of Naval Research Naval Future Force Science and Technology Expo in Washington, D.C., Greenert said “I don’t want to necessarily say that it’s over, but let’s face it, if something moves fast through the air and disrupts molecules in the air and puts out heat–I don’t care how cool the engine can be–it’s going to be detectable.”

Aviation Week detailed these advances in counter-stealth capability, including both radars and Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST):

U.S. Air Force is the latest convert to the capabilities of IRST. The U.S. Navy’s IRST for the Super Hornet, installed in a modified centerline fuel tank, was approved for low-rate initial production in February, following 2014 tests of an engineering development model system, and the Block I version is due to reach initial operational capability in fiscal 2018. Block I uses the same Lockheed Martin infrared receiver—optics and front end—as is used on F-15Ks in Korea and F-15SGs in Singapore. This subsystem is, in turn, derived from the IRST that was designed in the 1980s for the F-14D. 

While the Pentagon’s director of operational test and engineering criticized the Navy system’s track quality, it has clearly impressed the Air Force enough to overcome its long lack of interest in IRST. The Air Force has also gained experience via its F-16 Aggressor units, which have been flying with IRST pods since 2013. The Navy plans to acquire only 60 Block I sensors, followed by 110 Block II systems with a new front end.

The bulk of Western IRST experience is held by Selex-ES, which is the lead contractor on the Typhoon’s Pirate IRST and the supplier of the Skyward-G for Gripen. In the past year, Selex has claimed openly that its IRSTs have been able to detect and track low-RCS targets at subsonic speeds, due to skin friction, heat radiating through the skin from the engine, and the exhaust plume.

Are Fourth and Fifth Generation Fighters Comparable?

Then on 21 December 2016, in the middle of this ongoing debate, president-elect Donald Trump tweeted: “Based on the tremendous cost and cost overruns of the Lockheed Martin F-35, I have asked Boeing to price-out a comparable F-18 Super Hornet!”

Many have asked, can an upgrade to a “legacy” fighter like the Super Hornet be comparable to a fifth-generation fighter like the F-35? Some have said that an advanced Super Hornet is an “Impossible Magic Fantasy Jet.” Others flatly state “No, Mr. Trump, You Can’t Replace F-35 With A ‘Comparable’ F-18.” More eloquently stated: “In this modern era of stealth combat, there are two kinds of fighters. Stealth fighters and targets.”

The manufacturers of the two aircraft mentioned in Trump’s tweet have been debating this topic over the past few years. In 2014, Boeing questioned the relative capabilities of the F-35C and the E/F-18G “Growler”, an electronic attack variant of the Super Hornet. “Stealth is perishable; only a Growler provides full spectrum protection.”

Indeed, that same year, Boeing developed an Advanced Super Hornet. The idea was basically to enclose the weapons that current Super Hornets sling beneath their wings into a low-observable pod and thus bring the overall radar cross section (RCS) i.e. the main metric of stealth, down to a level that would provide some of the penetration capability that a fifth generation fighter enjoys.

F/A-18 XT Block III Advanced Super Hornet [GlobalSecurity.org]

The current version of the advanced Super Hornet has “matured” after additional conversation with their primary customer, and low-observability has taken a less important role than range, payload, and battle-network capability. Indeed, Mr. Trump responded “We are looking seriously at a big order.”

For the USN, the F-35 seems to have evolved from a strike fighter into a platform for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (C4ISR). This is an important role to play, undoubtedly, but it may mean fewer F-35Cs on carrier decks, which puts more money back into the pocket of the USN for other purposes.

Boeing’s sixth-generation fighter concept. Notable features are the optionality of the pilot, the lack of visibility from the cockpit which indicates some sort of “distributed aperture system” a la the F-35, and lack of a tail, which might limit air combat maneuverability. [Aviation Week]

Of course, Lockheed is not resting still – they’ve recently demonstrated a manned and unmanned teaming capability, working with the Air Force Research Laboratory.

What both companies and both services state publicly must be taken in the context of politics and business, as they are in constant competition, both with each other and potential opponents. This is a natural way to come up with good concepts, good options, and a good price.

More on autonomous capabilities to follow.

Nuke Counts

Nuke Counts….seeing how weapons of mass destruction are all the rage these days: http://www.businessinsider.com/nuclear-weapons-stockpiles-world-map-2017-4

Note that these numbers are not operational weapons. For example, we don’t think that North Korea has an operational nuke. Their count is based on “bomb-grade material North Korea is likely to have.”

The reliable counts are US, Russia, England, France and to a much lesser extent, China. Israel is an estimate and I have seen claims of 100-200. Usually the lower estimate is more likely to be correct. India and Pakistan figures are way too high. Their operational nukes may not number more than a dozen (if that, for Pakistan). North Korea is most likely 0.