This was the first virtual presentation of the conference. It happened after lunch, so we had resolved some of our earlier issues. Not only was Dr. David Kirkpatrick (University College London) able to give a virtual presentation, but Dr. Robert Helmbold was able to attend virtually and discuss the briefing with him. This is kind of how these things are supposed to work.
Anyhow, the presentation was “How important are Superior Numbers?” and it is posted to our YouTube channel here: (8) How Important are Superior Numbers: Kirkpatrick (version 2) – YouTube
There is an earlier version on the channel that is 1:10 longer. That was uploaded first, but I decided to edit out a small section of the presentation.
The briefing ends at 40:20 and discussion continues for 12 minutes afterwards.
The slides for the briefing were previously posted here: Presentations from HAAC – How important are superior numbers? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
I have been quiet about the books that I am working on and publishing because some of them have been slower to release than expected.
I have three books coming out this year. The UK hardcover release dates are:
Aces at Kursk: 30 July 2023
The Battle of Kyiv: 30 August 2023
The Hunting Falcon: 30 September 2023
The U.S. hardcover release dates according to Amazon.com are:
Aces at Kursk: 30 September 2023
The Battle of Kyiv: 30 October 2023
The Hunting Falcon: 31 October 2023
So for a brief moment in time I will be pumping out a book a month. I am currently working on two other books (they might be released in 2023) and I have one other listed on Amazon.com (UK) called “The Other Battle of Kursk” with a release date of 16 July 2024. This is the book “The Battle of Tolstoye Woods.” This has been discussed with the publisher and I may get it published in 2024.
Of course, the only way one gets a book done is to ignore everything else. If some people feel I should be responding in a timely manner to their emails or requests, there is a reason I have not been. Sorry. Three books coming out in one year is evidence that there is some validity to that.
Some relevant links related to Aces at Kursk:
Aces at Kursk – Chapter Listing | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Aces at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Is this my last Kursk book? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org): The answer is no. I will be working on (and maybe completing) The Battle of Tolstoye Woods in 2024.
145 or 10? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
So did Kozhedub shoot down 62, 64 or 66 planes? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
5th Guards Fighter Regiment, 7 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
The 728th Fighter Regiment on 16 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Soviet versus German kill claims at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
So What Was Driving the Soviet Kill Claims? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Aces at Kursk – Chapters | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
And related to The Battle for Kyiv: most of this blog from December 2021 through April 2022:
December | 2021 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
January | 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
February | 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
March | 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
April | 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
And related to Hunting Falcon:
Award Dates for the Blue Max (1916) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Thanks to Russell1200 (see comments to Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)), I now found out about a report “The Relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance” by Leonard Wainstein of IDA prepared back in April 1986. Both the report and Wainstein are unknown to me.
The abstract of the report says
The purpose of this study is to investigate the historical basis for the assumption that a military formation will cease to be effective after having lost a pre-ordained percentage of its strength. Battles from the First World War to the 1982 Falklands campaign are reviewed for insight into the validity of this assumption.
The effect of heavy battte damage on units has been both variable and unpredictable. There is a relationship between losses and the continued willingness to fight, but it defies precise definition. So long as some men in the formation continue to fight as an organized entity, either in attack or defense, for whatever reason, the formation they represent cannot be termed ‘ineffective.”
My notes made while reading it:
- Page v: Contents: section on earlier studies references ORO report of 1954 (known to me… the Dorothy Clark report on Breakpoints) and an RAC report of 1966 (not known to me).
- Page 1: “The battle cases cited run from army level to battalion level, from single day engagements to those lasting several months” – my bias is to collect and analysis data based upon the same level of combat, i.e. division-level, battalion-level, etc.
- Page 1: Only 54 actions were examined (this seems small) and “only 11 represent cases where a formation collapsed, surrendered, was repulsed, was stalemated, or had to be taken out of the line after suffering some degree of damage.” (this seems like a really small sample).
- Page 2: “Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, in describing the 1973 Middle East War, has written ‘The human element has always been important in war, and despite the technology available to both sides, the human element was undoubtedly the most significant feature in this war.’ The same comment could obviously be made about all the actions described in this paper.”
- Page 3: “There is no agreement among national armies, combat commanders, military historians or defense analysts as to the point when battle damage renders a formation impotent.”
- Pages 1-5, Summary: This is worth reading in its entirety.
- Page 6: “The modeling community have developed a set of formulae for use in this determination, but it is not clear to what extent these formulae reflect actual battle experience.” (stated in 1986… pretty certain the “modeling community” has not taken significant corrective action).
- Page 8: Paragraph on perceived resistance is interesting.
- Pages 1-10: No mention of artillery.
- Page 11: “Despite the interest in and significance of the subject, relatively little research has been done across the years on casualty-effectiveness relationships.”
- Pages 11-12: Description of the Dorothy Clark 1954 ORO report, measuring 44 battalions. To quote Clark “the statement that a unit can be considered no longer combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by combat data.”
- Pages 12-13: Description of Robert Best 1966 RAC report.
- Page 23: Trevor Dupuy quoted again.
- Page 24: “Oriental fanaticism.”
- Page 44: HERO report from 1967 is referenced (HERO became TDI).
- Page 69: Trevor Dupuy is referenced.
- Page DL-2: A copy of this report went to CAA (Concepts Analysis Agency, now Center for Army Analysis).
- Page DL-3: A copy went to HERO. I was there in 1987, do not recall seeing this report.
The IDA report is here: TheRelationshipBetweenBattleDamageAndCombatPerformance.
A few related past posts:
Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Breakpoints | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Historians and the Early Era of U.S. Army Operations Research | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
We have discussed on this blog before our analysis for the Gulf War, the casualty estimate for Bosnia peacekeeping mission, and the casualty and duration estimate for Iraq. In each case, we were either the closest public estimate or pretty much dead on. Just as a reminder:
Predictions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Now, back in late 1990 Trevor Dupuy made his predictions on the Gulf War. They are discussed here:
Forecasting the 1990-1991 Gulf War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Assessing the TNDA 1990-91 Gulf War Forecast | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Assessing the 1990-1991 Gulf War Forecasts | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
In 1995 we provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) with our predictions for Bosnia. This was, as far as I know, the first formal attempt to make a prediction of casualties for an “operation other than war.” This prediction is in Appendix II of America’s Modern Wars and is discussed here:
Forecasting U.S. Casualties in Bosnia | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
In 2004 we provided the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) and OSD Net Assessment our predictions of casualties and duration for the war in Iraq. Again, as far as I know, this was the first formal attempt to make an analytically based prediction on casualties and duration for a insurgency. This prediction is discussed in depth in Chapter 1 and Appendix I for America’s Modern Wars and is discussed here.
Forecasting the Iraqi Insurgency | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
And then there are these posts:
President Obama’s Casualty Estimates | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Casualty Estimates for a War with North Korea | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
The CRS Casualty Estimates | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran – Killed and Wounded | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
How Common are Casualty Estimates? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran – Summation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
I always like to claim that we are three-for-three, in that we have published three predictions before conflicts occur that are fundamentally correct. As significant, in my mind, is that we were correct, based upon historical analysis and using combat models build upon history for not only a conventional war, but for an unconventional or guerilla war and for a peacekeeping mission. This is a wide range of scenarios. We are not aware of anyone else who has done this.
A friend just sent me a recent article from the Strategy Page that mentions Trevor Dupuy’s work: Leadership: Meaningful Measures of Military Might
Trevor Dupuy is mentioned four times in the eleventh paragraph of the article:
- “One notable practitioner of this was military historian and World War II artillery officer Trevor Dupuy.”
- “For example, Trevor Dupuy undertook a closer examination of combat records and found, and documented, that German troops generally outfought their opponents.”
- “If it hadn’t been for the research of American historian Trevor Dupuy in the 1970s and 80s, these critical differences might still sit unnoticed in musty archives.”
- “Dupuy’s calculations brought forth the reasons why some allied, German, Russian and Japanese divisions were better than others:”
Anyhow, don’t know who the author is, but appreciate the mention. The Strategy Page is run by Jim Dunnigan, Austin Bay, Al Nofi, Dan Masterson and Stephen V. Cole and others.
The Military Conflict Institute shut down early 2020. An associate of mine has been trying to chase down all of their work.
There are these three reports:
The Three TMCI Reports | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
There was this brief 20-page paper written by the late Roger Mickelson: /tardir/tiffs/a396349.tiff (dtic.mil)
One notes that Roger Mickelson titled this report “War on Terrorists” vice the “War on Terrorism.”
The fifth report or book is not known to me. Is it “The Classics of Military Thought: Appreciations and Agenda.” published in 1985 by John E. Tashjean under the name of the Military Conflict Institute. John Tashjean had written a number of articles on Clausewitz from 1979-1992.
The classics of military thought : apreciations and agenda (Book, 1985) [WorldCat.org]
There is a copy at University of Oxford, only some 3,600 miles from here. Apparently no one else on this planet has a copy. Could any of our UK readers by so kind as to scare up a hard or electronic copy of this?
P.S.: TMCI is officially closing this year | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
In a conversation I was having yesterday, I had actually forgotten that I had done this. There are 1,164 posts on this blog. I do forget about a couple of them now and then.
The Three TMCI Reports | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
This bibliography on Carl von Clausewitz, a name that I assume is known to most of our readers, was just brought to my attention. It was assembled by Christopher Bassford, who is not known to me.
Clausewitz Bibliography (English) (clausewitzstudies.org)
A few comments:
- He does not list Understanding War by Trevor N. Dupuy. That is kind of big shortfall, especially I think it was the best book of the 90+ that Trevor Dupuy authored or co-authored.
- He does not list my War by Numbers, which is built upon Trevor Dupuy’s work and of course, a little of Clausewitz’s.
- There are a number of other articles and books by Trevor Dupuy that reference Clausewitz and it applications. Some of these should probably also be picked up, depending on what his standards are for inclusion in his listing.
The U.S. Army Staff Reference Guide, Volume I: Unclassified Resources, December 2020, ATP 5-0.2-1 has been released.
Link to it is here: https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31193-ATP_5-0.2-1-000-WEB-1.pdf
There are ten references to “Dupuy” in the guide, which I believe is a first. I do not recall any previous Army manual referencing Trevor Dupuy’s work, even though I have seen his work in a manual or two without reference. It is nice that they have properly acknowledged his work.
The references are on:
- Page xi: “Acknowledgements”: four references, two for Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy and two to his son Arnold C. Dupuy,. Ph.D.
- Page 220: Table D-6. Division opposed rates of advance (km/day). I will have more comments about this table later.
- Page 285. Paragraph G-162, Casualty Estimates: Two references. I will probably have a blog post about this later.
- Page 402. References: Three references. I will probably have a blog post about this later also.
The two Trevor N. Dupuy books referenced in the Staff Reference Guide are the still out of print Numbers, Predictions & War (1979) and Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War (1995). We still have 40 or so copies of Attrition for sale. See http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/booksfs.htm