This is a quote from his chapter on The Mortain Counter-Attack in "Steel Inferno".

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“RAF pilots claimed a total of eighty four tanks destroyed and twenty one damaged, plus a further 12 other vehicles destroyed and twenty-one damaged. The IXth US Tactical Air Command, which flew 441 sorties over the period of the 7th to 10th August, made claims of sixty nine tanks destroyed, eight probably destroyed and thirty-five damaged and 116 other vehicles destroyed or damaged. Confirmed results on the ground were somewhat different. Between the 12th and 20th August 1944, operational research teams from both the 21st Army Group and Second Tactical Air Force conducted separate investigations in the battle area and than compared and collated their results. They found thirty-four Panthers destroyed, ten MkIV’s, three SP guns, twenty-three armored personnel carriers, eight armored cars and forty-six other vehicles. Of the forty-six tanks they concluded that twenty had been destroyed by ground fire (sic. ATG’s, tank fire, etc), seven by air force rockets, two by bombs, four from multiple causes, and eleven by either abandoned or destroyed by their crews…seventeen additional Panthers were found in the area over which the LAH Panzer Division had operated, and of these six had been knocked out by Army ground fire, four by air force rockets and the reminder were destroyed or abandoned by their crews.”

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So without going into the specific locations of where those 400-odd Typhoon sorties went and what there target reports were, it is simply impossible to say what percent of them were equivalent to modern CAS.

Which means that a large percent of the Allied air forces were tactical, it does not mean that a huge number of their missions or targets were CAS or tanks. Most of the missions were actually battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and were directed at transportation bottlenecks like bridges and railyards (about one-third of all Ninth Tactical Air Force missions were interdiction). About another one-third could be termed strategic, they were either in support of the Combined Bomber Offensive (fighter escort, sweeps, and airfield attacks) or were directly tasked as strategic missions (the continued support of the staretegic mission by the tactical air was -- I suspect -- tit for tat in exchange for the tasking of the strategic air forces to tactical missions for OVERLORD). The remaining third were directed at various installations, depots, signal communications, headquarters, troops, motor vehicles, and tanks -- among others. That makes it rather hard to say what proportion of the effort directed to CAS was effective, but I would 'guesstimate' that it was about one-third of the total missions/sorties. But we can say that, proportional to conventional ground weapons, air delivered weapons caused relatively few losses.

Well I'm not sure what I was asking initially , other than this was a rather enlightening bit of information. I don’t have the actual reports only the notes from Reynold’s “Steel Inferno”. Thanks for the quick reply. I was hoping to touch on some additional material on this subject over the next week or two.

Regards

Further good readying would be "Monty's Scientists" by Terry Copp.

Kursk (Soviet tanks from 1st Tank Army):
Lost: 648 (82 "breakdown")
Air: 11

Normandy (German Armor losses, 6 June - 7 August):
Lost: 108 (11 "abandon" 15 "unknown")
Air: 10

Normandy (German Armor losses, 8 - 31 August):
Lost: 222 (171 "abandoned", 13 "unknown")
Air: 10

Falaise Pocket (German Armor losses, Aguust 1944)
Lost: 90 (tanks) (65 abandoned, 9 unknown)
Air: 6 (tanks)
Lost: 177 (all AFVs) (101 abandoned, 17 unknown)
Air: 36

Ardennes (German armorlosss, 16 December 1944 - 16 January 1945):
Lost: 101 (39 "abandoned", 10 "unknown")
Air: 6

Krinkelt (German armor losses, 17-20 December 1944)
Lost: 77
Air: 0

Dom Butengenbach (German armor losses, 19-21 December)
Lost: 51 (7 "unknown")
Air: 0

Total:
Lost: 1384
Air: 73 (5.27%)

Total (less 82 "breakdowns", 322 "abandon", 62 "unknown")
Lost: 918
Air: 73 (7.95%)

It is difficult to shake away some of the older historical assessments (perhaps myths?) of Allied Tactical Airpower and its impact on the battlefield (particularly Normandy). I have no doubt about the impact of air interdiction on logistics and maintaining flow of ammunition, food etc to the front line or in Tactical Air Powers ability to retard or slow operational\strategic movement of troops (perhaps even tactical movement). Certainly there is a fear factor at work.

German newsreels of Panzers operating in Normandy consistently show tanks covered in generous portions of the local vegetation. Same time period on the Eastern Front German Newsreels reveal a different looking picture, in that Panzers are not typically depicted with large quantities of foliage bristling from deck and turret. This is pretty subtle and may infact have no correlation to the effects of tactical air…just something curious I have noted. But given the low loss statistics resultant from tactical air attacks why wouldn’t German tank crews simply ignore the presence of “Jabos” after awhile? Or are the low loss rates somehow a reflection of the extreme precautions the Germans were taking in Normandy to circumvent Allied Tactical air presence (i.e. restricting movement to night marches, hiding in woods and orchards during the day, etc)?

I obtained a rather interesting study from TDI several months ago entitled “German Evaluation of Allied Air Interdiction in World War II”.

From: “German Evaluation of Allied Air Interdiction in World War II” Sub-Study II. A Study prepared for Headquarters of USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Oct 1969.

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“Evaluations of German officers, almost universally and most emphatically, credit Allied air power with their defeat in Western Europe. First they cite Allied air superiority in the overall sense, as it permitted Allied freedom of action on the ground and in the air. More specifically, they cite air interdiction as the factor that led directly to their defeat on the ground. This testimony must be discounted as to some extent as self-serving, coming as it did mostly from Army officers who were searching for an excuse for the failure of the German Army on the ground and finding in the failure. But this testimony is corroborated by Luftwaffe officers themselves. Furthermore, specific accounts of interdiction against German units and logistical operations in which damages are given and results assessed amply testify to the efficacy of interdiction.”

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I am sorry, but in the process of posting a reply to your excellent post, I somehow or the other managed to delete it. Could you re-post it.

Well, my usual mantra is never trust intelligence reports, but this appears to not be always the case with German estimates on the Eastern Front.

For my "Kursk Air Campaign" work, I did compare German claims of Soviet air losses to actual Soviet air losses. On any given day the Germans claims were + or - 50% of the actual Soviet losses. Oddly enough, they tended to underclaim losses on those days when there were high losses. Overall, for the two week period studied (4-18 July 1943), German claims were actually very close to actual Soviet air losses. The reverse was definately not the case.

I have also done an eyeball check of German claims of tank losses on the ground to actual Soviet tank losses and this also appears to be in the ballpark.

I have not yet done a comparison of the German claims of tank losses due to air action (in particular the 8th of July).

All this will be discussed in detail and depth in my book. It would appear, that at least for part of the time on the Eastern Front, German intelligence claims of enemy losses were more accurate that what we usually see from other armies.

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I have been by struck by some of the more recent uncovering of statistics which attest to how low the number of AFV kills via Tactical Air actually were.

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The statistics, like the British Operational Group reports, were known at the time and have always been availible.

quote:

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It is difficult to shake away some of the older historical assessments (perhaps myths?) of Allied Tactical Airpower and its impact on the battlefield (particularly Normandy).

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The question becomes, who said it, why and what was the basis for the claims? As a lot of books are written primarily from other books, there is a tendency to repeat and eventually codify viewpoints that may not be solidly established in fact, or were based upon the original author's bias.

Of course, no one should question the importance of airpower....but it does need to be put into its proper context and its role in the combined arms battle. Trying to measure the efficacy of tactical airpower by looking at tank kills is probably the wrong approach. Tanks do tend to be hard targets to kill from the air. Furthermore, there is considerable suppressive effect to tactical air.

quote:

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German newsreels of Panzers operating in Normandy consistently show tanks covered in generous portions of the local vegetation. Same time period on the Eastern Front German Newsreels reveal a different looking picture, in that Panzers are not typically depicted with large quantities of foliage bristling from deck and turret.

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Soviet airpower was not nearly as dominent as Allied air power. At least through the middle of 1943 on the Eastern Front there was considerable threat from fratricide by the German airforce (resulting in the German armor wanting to be visible and identifiable to the air). On the other hand, there was considerably less threat from fratricide in Normandy. Your impression on camoflouge probably reflects the real differences in the air threat.

quote:

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Niklas,
I am sorry, but in the process of posting a reply to your excellent post, I somehow or the other managed to delete it. Could you re-post it.

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quote:

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Chris Said: The question becomes, who said it, why and what was the basis for the claims? As a lot of books are written primarily from other books, there is a tendency to repeat and eventually codify viewpoints that may not be solidly established in fact, or were based upon the original author's bias.
Of course, no one should question the importance of airpower....but it does need to be put into its proper context and its role in the combined arms battle. Trying to measure the efficacy of tactical airpower by looking at tank kills is probably the wrong approach. Tanks do tend to be hard targets to kill from the air. Furthermore, there is considerable suppressive effect to tactical air.

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Agreed. Thanks for your insights Chris.

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Nikklas Said: It must be remembered that destruction of equipment is not the only way of conducting war. It can be more important to affect the enemy’s behaviour, tactics, morale, plans or decision-making.

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Agreed and also thanks for your insights. I guess that is sort of what I was indirectly driving at with:

But given the low loss statistics resultant from tactical air attacks why wouldn’t German tank crews simply ignore the presence of “Jabos” after awhile? Or are the low loss rates somehow a reflection of the extreme precautions the Germans were taking in Normandy to circumvent Allied Tactical air presence (i.e. restricting movement to night marches, hiding in woods and orchards during the day, etc)?

German tank crews are clearly being affected by Allied Tactical air attacks…if not in material losses certainly in their precautions regarding conduct of movement as well as the extra care being focused on daytime cover and concealment.

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I am also curious as to any reactions you folks might have regarding surficial damage occurring to AFV’s as a result of Tactical Air Attacks. Damage to running gear, optics, weaponry etc. Not k-kills out right, but damage, which would effectively remove an AFV from a fight for a period of time. Is it possible that battlefield recovery and repair activities were masking or skewing the actual effects of tactical air attacks on AFV’s?

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It may very well be true, but I have not seen any evidence suggesting that this was more pronounced for air power than for other weapons. However, given the inability of the air weapons with sufficient precision to engage armour (primarily machine-guns and light automatic guns) to penetrate even the thinner parts of a tanks armour, this can be true. It must be remembered that for every German tank destroyed by enemy fire, there were several who received slight damage or mechanical breakdowns that were eventually repaired. But again, I have no evidence supporting any tendencies for the ratio between destroyed/damage to be greater or smaller for air attack compared to ground fire. I am also sceptical to the possibilities to find such data, as normal reporting do not give any information that allows for conclusions in this field. Perhaps there exist some Operations Research report that can shed light on this issue, but we probably have to consider us lucky if such a report shows up.

Niklas Zetterling

Regarding the use of camoflage on tanks in Normandy. The air threat was probably part of the reason, but only part of it. The Germans were badly outnumbered and fighting almost wholly on the defensive. Camoflage works very well in the norman countryside while on the defensive. In Russia, especially when on the offensive -- which is what many of the newsreels show -- it would be less advantageous and/or workable.

The standard German tactic when under air attack if in a tank was to disperse (if part of a unit) and drive at top speed ffor the nearest cover. The idea was that it prevented the aircraft from being presented with massed targets and it also made aiming much more difficult. Plus, ground targets are very hard to see from aircraft, even under the best of circumstances, so usually the pursuing aircraft would break away and go after a visible target.

It was found that bombs up to 500 pounds had little afect against hard targets like tanks, even when dropped within 15 yards. OTOH, in one case in England when a bomb being loaded on an aircraft exploded, vehicles up to 600 yards (IIRC) away were destroyed and exposed personnel were struck up to 1800 yards away. A few examples of this occuring in combat would make anyone wary of air attacks.

Numerous accounts of the Mortain Offensive comment on a thick morning fog condition existing during the German offensive. This could potentially account for some of the low kill tallies from Allied Tactical Air efforts during this period.

What struck me most are statistics provided in Richard Anderson’s article “Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor” TNDM, June 1997. In the article several tables outline German tank losses vs. cause for the Normandy Campaign. The tables provide tank losses for two separate Normandy phases as well as a Falaise Pocket Phase. In the two respective Normandy phases examined tank loss as a function of air attacks account for approximately 10% and 19% of overall tank losses respectively.

However during the Falaise Pocket Phase of the campaign air inflicted tank losses account for a full 47.4% of overall tank losses. The point here being that Falaise surely represents a period in which German tactical\operational movement could not be selectively limited to night marches, or halted in hopes that inclement weather would ground allied air assets. The Germans were forced into "broken field running" during daylight hours in order to escape the rapidly tightening noose forming around Falaise.

Just a final thought for this particular post. Tactical air during the opening phases of the Korean War (while NKPA still possessed armor assets) accounted for the lion’s share of NKPA tank losses. “The Employment of Armor in Korea” Vol. 1 (Operations Research Office, Far East Command, April 1951) indicates that of the 175 NKPA tanks\assault guns knocked-out and examined by UN forces during the period of the study, 102 were lost due to tactical air action (rocket fire, strafing, napalm, bombs, etc). 58% of total losses attributed to tactical air efforts.

Numerous accounts of the Mortain Offensive comment on a thick morning fog condition existing during the German offensive. This could potentially account for some of the low kill tallies from Allied Tactical Air efforts during this period.

What struck me most are statistics provided in Richard Anderson’s article “Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor” TNDM, June 1997. In the article several tables outline German tank losses vs. cause for the Normandy Campaign. The tables provide tank losses for two separate Normandy phases as well as a Falaise Pocket Phase. In the two respective Normandy phases examined tank loss as a function of air attacks account for approximately 10% and 19% of overall tank losses respectively.

However during the Falaise Pocket Phase of the campaign air inflicted tank losses account for a full 47.4% of overall tank losses. The point here being that Falaise surely represents a period in which German tactical\operational movement could not be selectively limited to night marches, or halted in hopes that inclement weather would ground allied air assets. The German were forced into broken field running during daylight hours in order to escape the rapidly tightening noose forming around Falaise.
[END QUOTE]

Of course German preventive measures contributed to the miniscule number of tanks destroyed from the air, but I do not think that the Falaise figures can be interpreted in the way you do. Percentages mean relatively little if the overall numbers are low. Furthermore, the effectiveness is, at least in this case, better measured as function of the number of targets presented and the effort in terms of sorties conducted. Given the very favourable circumstances, I still think that, had the aircraft been effective, a much larger number of tanks had been destroyed. The reason for the high percentage you site is that the number of "kills" by other weapons were low.
Furthermore, there is good reason to consider other vehicles too. I discuss this in my book on the German forces in Normandy, on pages 50-51. There are also several other situations when German formations move in the open, without suffering major losses to air.

The Normandy Phase I and Phase II statistics represent similar magnitudes of total AFV’s lost and subsequently examined by Allied ground elements. The Normandy Phase I total being 108 KO’d AFVs examined. Normandy Phase II being 222 AFVs examined. Again abandoned vehicles were excluded from percentage lost vs. causation.

I don’t disagree that looking at percentage kills should be taken with a large grain of salt when a very small sample of a much larger statistical population is represented. Weather 76 AFV casualties are statistically significant or not should obviously be a function of total German AFV strength at the time of the Falaise period encompassed by Richards’s tables. It is unclear from the article what the exact dates the Falaise Phase encompasses…footnotes indicate casualty numbers were originally derived from “ORS Report No. 15” (Richard's article indicates only that the time period encompassed was sometime in August of 1944, and I don't think I have ORS 15 in any of my piles).

Presumably a more precise time period can be determined from the original operational research report. Once the time period is determined it should be possible to back out German operational AFV strengths at the beginning of the period being assessed from your book (Nikklas Zetterling's "Normandy 1944"). This would clarify weather the 76 total AFV casualties assessed are statistically significant or not.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Sample size for the Falaise Phase was apparently 177 AFV’s, although Richard's notes indicate "abandoned AFV’s" were excluded from the percentage lost relative to the causation tables. 101 AFV’s examined apparently fit into the "abandoned" category. The percentage table was therefore inclusive of 76 AFV’s. KO'd stats as a function of tactical air was apparently 36 tanks\self-propelled guns\Armored Car\Armored Personnel Carriers.

The Normandy Phase I and Phase II statistics represent similar magnitudes of total AFV’s lost and subsequently examined by Allied ground elements. The Normandy Phase I total being 108 KO’d AFVs examined. Normandy Phase II being 222 AFVs examined. Again abandoned vehicles were excluded from percentage lost vs. causation.

I don’t disagree that looking at percentage kills should be taken with a large grain of salt when a very small sample of a much larger statistical population is represented. Weather 76 AFV casualties are statistically significant or not should obviously be a function of total German AFV strength at the time of the Falaise period encompassed by Richards’s tables. It is unclear from the article what the exact dates the Falaise Phase encompasses…footnotes indicate casualty numbers were originally derived from “ORS Report No. 15” (Richard's article indicates only that the time period encompassed was sometime in August of 1944, and I don't think I have ORS 15 in any of my piles).

Presumably a more precise time period can be determined from the original operational research report. Once the time period is determined it should be possible to back out German operational AFV strengths at the beginning of the period being assessed from your book (Nikklas Zetterling's "Normandy 1944"). This would clarify weather the 76 total AFV casualties assessed are statistically significant or not.

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 08-02-2001).]

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I think we must not speak of AFV, but separate tanks and assault guns on one hand and APC on teh other hand. One major problem for the air craft was that they had two systems, heavy bombs and rockets, that had sufficient destructive power, but lacked the accuracy to obtain the direct hits needed, and also two systems, small-calibre cannon and machineguns, that had the accuracy but not the destructive power to destroy tanks. Open-topped vehicles, like SPW, Marder etc. were much more susceptible to serious damage from the air, because the more accurate machin-guns and cannon could easily cause vital damage.
In the sample presented by Richard there are eleven tanks and assault guns destroyed by air, four by artillery, ten by AP shot and eleven unknown. According two the ORS teams, those it was usually easy to identify those vehicles fired upon from the air. If we look at all the data assambled by the ORS teams, we find that they found 46 tanks and assault guns in the Mortain area, 121 in the Falaise pocket area, 187 in the Shambles area and 150 in the Chase area, for a total of 504 tanks and assault guns. Since the German units in Normandy had approximately 1,500 tanks and assault guns on 1 August, the sample made by the ORS teams is quite considerable, especially if one considers that the German tank strength given above includes vehicles sent to workshops in the rear. The vast majority of teh vehicles exampined by the ORS teams were from situations when the Germans were forced to utilize daylight movement.
Consequently, even though German contermeasures contributed to teh small number of tanks and assault guns destroyed from the air, my conclusion is that even during virtually ideal circumstances, air units were not capable of destroying considerable number of tanks.

Niklas Zetterling

How many times did the plane delivering the bomb accompany it all the way to the target, fully fueled and with full ammo load ?

I think that occurance in England has to be ruled out as an anomaly. The bomb was being loaded on a plane: the plane was propably tanked up with fuel (with reserve drop tanks ?) and 50cal (?) ammo (judging from the destruction the explosion caused).

Are there any narratives about (fully ladden) B17's/B-24's exploding on the ground and what kind of havoc that caused ?

>A few examples of this occuring in combat
>would make anyone wary of air attacks.

They had (most of them anyway) propably seen Stukas in action so they had a reference point they could compare their situation to. Knowing what a precision hit by a bomb can do must have increased the psycholigical impact of the CAS (even if the actual effectivness of it proved to be not as great as the pilots talked it up to be).

>The effects of Allied air power were both
>cummulative and synergistic.

Only up to a point. Their [QB]supposed[/QB] effects also caused some miscalculations and misconclusions to be drawn.

The German economic "miracle" soon after the war has never been attributed to poor results the strategic bombing effort yielded. But could it be a factor in the rise of the (West) German economy ? Marshall aid went only so far in helping them rebuild their economy.

To date VERY few of the big companies that ran the Reich industries have disappeared (even right after the war) because of bankrupcy or insurmountable problems with the rebuilding of their production facilities.

Were the Communists right, was the war only a capitalist plot to renovate and envigorate the economy ?

>Allied strategic bombing reduced German
>production to bare essentials

When ? And how ? The German industrial output increased all the way to 1945. As for the dropping quality: the Soviets produced huge quantities of poorer quality weapons and it did them no real harm as they had enough to go around. The Germans just made the mistake of not gearing up for total war until it was too late.

>and made distribution more difficult,

I'd say the interdiction effects in disrupting the transport were more effective and productive in short and long term than the actual hits on the factories. For example the Schweinfurt raid allerted the Germans to the vulnerability of their ball bearing production. Had the powerplants and fuel resources been hit hard earlier they would have paralyzed the entire country, perhaps even driven them into surrender VERY early on.

Hindsight is 20/20 but.... How much did the strategic analysts have a say in the target selections and according to what criteria were the target classes prioritised ? Were there any hindrances in the target selection (like bans to hit factories owned by companies with British/US connections) ?

>so the SS AFVs broken down on the road form
>Paris were more difficult to repair or even
>recover.

How many AFV's did the Germans lose in the west and can it be determined how many were lost in combat and how many to collateral causes ?

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Originally posted by Tero:

How many AFV's did the Germans lose in the west and can it be determined how many were lost in combat and how many to collateral causes ?

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Documents from the Inspector-General of Panzer Troops (NARA T78, R145) shows losses of 245 tanks and assault guns in June 1944 in the west, 351 in July, 210 in August and 1,655 in September. While the figures for June and July are probably close to reality, there is a major case of delayed reporting for the losses in August, most of which are obviously placed in September. Probably the losses for August should be increased by about 1,000 and the losses for September should be reduced accordingly.
The single most common cause for German tank losses in France 1944 was abandonment of vehicles not damaged by combat. Possibly as many as half the losses were simply abandoned. A British study of 176 Panthers found on the battlefields in France (thus representing about one quarter of all Panthers sent to Normandy) half were just abandoned or destroyed by their own crews. By comparison 6 % had been hit by aircraft weapons. The remainder had mostly been hit by ground weapons. To what extent the abandoned/destroyed by crew had been lost (directly or indirectly) to air action is impossible to tell with certainty. Probably air interdiction of supply routes played a role here, but also the combat situation on the ground could cause such losses.

However I can only speculate that pinning the cause of abandoned vehicles solely upon air interdiction would be difficult at best. With respect to the large numbers of Abandoned German vehicles showing up in August and September, presumably we are talking about fuel shortages combined with simple mechanical breakdowns that could not be addressed by an army in retreat.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_list_of_tables_operations.html

(I have not been able to reach this site this week BTW: can anybody tell me if they are experiencing major problems or is it just me ?)

lists the targets destroyed by USAAF during Normandy (I could not verify the timeframe they used in the table) as:

Motor transports 1,945; AFV's 155; locomotives 194; rairoad cars 2,117; bridges 32; gun emplacements 34; dumps 4; factories et al 42; railroad cuts 107; vessels and barges 3; horse drawn vehicles 365.

The number of bombing and strafing sorties flown by USAAF fighters in ETO during June and July (as the site seems to be off line I have to limit the timeframe to what I used earlier to calculate them) was 20,418 sorties.

The total number of USAAF bombing and strafing sorties in 1944 in ETO was 79,590 and 87,244 in 1945.

Another source I found but which I can not retrace (at http://militaryhistory.education.webjump.com/ ) stated the stats for both RAF and USAAF CAS as follows:

Fighter-bomber sortie claims in Normandy.
...................2 TAF.....9 AF....Total
Sorties flown......9,896.....2,891...12,787
Claims for
motor transport
destroyed..........3,340.....2,520...5,860
Claims for
armor destroyed....257.......134.....391
Total claims.......3,597.....2,654...6,251
Claims per
sortie.............0,36......0,92....0,49

The claims per sortie is counted as 0,92 for USAAF in the latter site (which relied IIRC on a "valid" source, a histroy book of some sort) but the "real" ratio is 0,103 if we count only the cathegories mentioned in both sources (AFV + motor transports). If we take all target cathegories in the USAF history branch list into account the "real" kill per sortie ratio during Normandy is close to 0,24.

That would mean that anywhere between 75 - 90 % of USAAF bombing and strafing sorties flown by fighters, apparently both as CAS and interdiction since the source does not differentiate them, were non-effective in terms of actual damage inflicted.

I would have liked to compile a more thorough comparative table on sorties and kill claims (with ordnance expended) and how they compare to the interdiction sorties flown by the 8th AF and bomber command heavies. I hope I can reconnect to the USAF historical branch source soon.

>The single most common cause for German tank
>losses in France 1944 was abandonment of
>vehicles not damaged by combat.
>Possibly as many as half the losses were
>simply abandoned.

That is interesting. Have you been able to reconsile the actual losses (both combat losses and abandoned) with claims made by the Allied air forces and the ground forces and if so how many were KO'd by "regular" tanks and how many by TD command in the case of the Americans ? I have seen claims that credit the M18 TD alone with 2 000 KO'd AFV's (both in ETO and MTO). If up to 50% of the German tanks lost in 1944 were abandoned there must (still) be a significant amount of hot air in the Allied AFV kill claims IF both the air and the ground forces are on record as killing scores of German AFV's most of which were in fact abandoned by their crews either before or during the actual ground combat.

>A British study of 176 Panthers found on the
>battlefields in France (thus representing
>about one quarter of all Panthers sent to
>Normandy) half were just abandoned or
>destroyed by their own crews. By comparison
>6 % had been hit by aircraft weapons.

Did the British get to study the battlefield gone over by the Americans and vice versa ? Or did the armies study only the terrain they went through themselves. 2TAF flew supposedly the majority of CAS missions at some point but did the Americans get tibs to study the results as many were flown over American area of operations ?

>The remainder had mostly been hit by ground
>weapons.

But there is no way of telling how many mobility kills due to fuel starvation or crew panic transformed into combat kills when the British tankers shot the hulks up.

>To what extent the abandoned/destroyed by
>crew had been lost (directly or indirectly)
>to air action is impossible to tell with
>certainty. Probably air interdiction of
>supply routes played a role here, but also
>the combat situation on the ground could
>cause such losses.

I found an interesting thesis on the British CAS at

http://home.istar.ca/~johnstns/tacair/ass.html

When it came to the actual attack of ground targets contemporary British doctrine distinguished between "indirect support" and "direct support.

Indirect Support was defined as "attacks on objectives which do not have an immediate effect on the land battle, but nevertheless
contribute to the broad plan." Typically this involved attacking enemy lines of communication, shipping, bases, rail targets and the like by heavy or medium bombers, but fighter-bombers were used against such targets as well.

Direct Support was defined as "attacks upon enemy forces actually engaged in the land battle." Typical targets included defensive
positions, hostile batteries of artillery or concentrations of armour. This was generally the province of the composite groups, but any aircraft, from heavy bombers to fighter bombers, could be empolyed for direct support.

Armed Recce. Armed reconaisance, or "armed recce" as it was commonly known, was a mission type in which a group of fighter-bombers were given a route or area behind German lines to patrol. They would then range over this area, collecting valueable intelligence and attacking any targets of opportunity, with either bombs, rockets or straffing. This was the mission type that led to so many shot-up German columns on the Norman roads, and it came to be perhaps the most important mission type of the campaign.

Impromptu vs Pre-arranged Requests: Unfortunately it is not clear from the records, but probably about 60% of the Composite Groups' sorties were consumed by armed reconnaissance, 25% by pre-arranged targets, and 15% by impromptu requests.

Armed Reconnaissance There was a slowly dawning realization during the campaign that of all the mission profiles flown by 2nd TAF, "armed recce" was doing the most damage to the Germans. However, there is little discernable pattern to where the armed recces were sent. In large part, they appear to have been simply "shotgunned" out on the basis of availability and what were perceived to be fertile hunting grounds.

It seems that in the heat of battle practice ran away from doctrine. Arguably this reflected the difficulty of the moment, and the limitations of the doctrine in the first place. Certainly the Army critics would view it that way. However, the one thing the Allied armies were not short of was fire support. Indeed, it seems quite clear that the artillery was the most effective of the combat arms by far in all of the Western Allies' armies. This, and the fact
that Armed Recce rather than close support proved to be the most fruitful mission profile suggests that close suport was indeed, in most cases, a dispersion of effort.

In retrospect, Slessor's original arguments would seem to have been right all along --
tactical air power should concentrate upon operational level targets, rather than tactical ones. Sometimes, in crucial battles, the operational level targets may lie right upon the front lines, but generally they do not.

I think that has to be separated into short term and long term impacts. The field units carry a certain amount of supplies which is required to sustain it for a predetermined period of time.

Even if the synergistic impacts are there it does not mean that the force being interdicted out of supplies becomes less effective instantaneously because the supply route is cut.

Also, attrition means there are less mouths to feed so the demand for supplies grows less. That in turn means that even if less supplies get through to the receiver the amount they can distribute per receiver stays within acceptable limits in terms of sustaining acceptable combat effectivness. Up to a point. Needless to say this state of affairs can not last for long. But it does mean that an army being interdicted is not up the creek just because. What has not been taken into account is the fact that the effects of CAS on troop morale greatly outstripped the effects of materiel losses. The German memoires give vivid accounts of CAS inflicting casualties and destroying equipment but looking back the "actual" materiel losses were not as significant as the losses in morale. Had the German troops not been demoralized they could (and propably would) have performed at least as well they did IRL.

>However I can only speculate that pinning
>the cause of abandoned vehicles solely upon
>air interdiction would be difficult at best.
>With respect to the large numbers of
>Abandoned German vehicles showing up in
>August and September, presumably we are
>talking about fuel shortages combined with
>simple mechanical breakdowns that could not
>be addressed by an army in retreat.