True, but there may have been some.

[QUOTE]
I maintain that it is a major difference if a tank is destroyed, rather
than damaged and subsequently recovered and repaired.
[QUOTE]

Yes but if a tank was knocked out, the party which caused it should
have gotten credit. Pilots and ground forces on both sides should have
used the term "knocked out" instead of "destroyed" which is a difficult
judgment to make unless the vehicle exploded violently.

And, I think it's reasonable to say that if a panzer crew permanently
abandoned their vehicle because they were afraid of air attack then
the Jabos should have gotten credit for knocking out that tank, even
if the pilots did not press the trigger.

[QUOTE]
The issue is then how much can the actual outcome have differed
from this. The ORS teams reported they had found 9 tanks hit by
air weapons. What would you suggest is the likely actual outcome,
10, 15 , 20 , 30 , 50 or anything else?
[QUOTE]

If you meant burned out tanks, there would be no difference
in outcome unless some were missed during the search process.
I would rather not try to guess at the possible numbers of AFVs
hauled away by the Germans. Or overlooked by the ORS.

Ian Gooderson approached the topic correctly as he reminded
his readers that the record might be incomplete, and for that
reason one should be careful not to make too many assumptions.

[QUOTE]
By the way, does anyone have the number of sorties flown and the
number of rockets fired at Mortain. It is also said that US Air fired
some 600 rockets, but I can not ascertain whether this refer 7 August
only or includes the following days too.
[QUOTE]

Not sure about that but one of the pilots of 513th Fighter Squadron
(the unit in question) published a data sheet for 406th Fighter Group
operations up to 1 September 1944.

Sorties: 5,006
Flying Hours: 13,847
Rockets fired: 914
Caliber .50 ammo fired: 1,967,607 rounds
HE bombs dropped: 905.9 tons
Frag bombs dropped: 68.5 tons

Claims: Destroyed/Probably Destroyed/Damaged
Military vehicles: 943/16/397
Tanks: 168/24/112
Locomotives: 55/11/87
Railway cars: 820/90/873
Bridges: 12/5/28
Gun emplacements: 60/20/52
Fuel & ammo dumps: 20/2/3
Aircraft hangars: 8/1/3
Factory Buildings: 44/21/59
Road cuts: 11/1/7
Railway cuts: 184/6/28
Vessels & Barges: 21/1/35
Enemy Aircraft: 58/9/37

Claims are clearly inflated but it looks like the 406th FG fired
the majority of rockets during Operation Luttich. Source is
William R. Dunn, "Fighter Pilot:The First American Ace of WWII".
Dunn served with the RAF before he transferred to the USAAF.

BTW thanks again for sending that document to me
regarding German troop level definitions.

quote:

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The issue is then how much can the actual outcome have differed from this. The ORS teams reported they had found 9 tanks hit by air weapons. What would you suggest is the likely actual outcome, 10, 15, 20, 30,50 or anything else?

---

I will hazard a guess just for the sake of throwing out numbers to chew over (or yak on). Based upon review of ORS studies as well as information I have on the Korean War, when considering extended operations averages of air inflicted AFV casualties will fall into the realm of 5% to 25%. Rare Individual actions may run as high as 50%…ala the 112th Panzer Brigade Story. I’m still hoping Chris will give us the poop on that Soviet Tank Brigade that was supposedly waxed by Stuka’s or HS-129’s during Kursk.

In my opinion ORS reports somewhat underscore what were probably actual kill totals; just as Pilot claims overstate losses inflicted. The number of kills examined in each of the ORS studies I have access to suggest that even minor fluctuations in the kill numbers from air attacks will result in significant changes in kill percentages. If the Germans recovered only 10 tanks from Mortain and five of these recoveries represent tanks knocked out from air attacks the overall air inflicted kills shift from 9 air inflicted tank kills of 46 tanks examined by ORS ground teams in the original Report No. 4…to 14 air inflicted tank kills out of 56 tanks KO’d. This equates to the difference of hanging our hats on 19% or guessing that it is possible that up to 25% of all tanks KO’d during Mortain were KO’d from air attacks. The same statistics are also easily swayed by either vehicles missed by ORS ground teams, or misidentification of air-inflicted kills ala the discrepancy between Livingston’s report as well as the 2nd SS report relative to the ORS report. Two misidentifications of causation move our statistics from 19% to 24%.

So I would agree with Ian Gooderson’s judgment on ORS reports.

Regarding the contention that recoverable Tanks should not necessarily be included in any such assessment, I agree as well as disagree with this argument. On the one hand a unit’s immediate combat power is reduced when tanks are damaged and not operational. On the other hand a units combat power will increase each time a damaged vehicle is repaired and returned to service.

quote:

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
In my opinion ORS reports somewhat underscore what were probably actual kill totals; just as Pilot claims overstate losses inflicted. The number of kills examined in each of the ORS studies I have access to suggest that even minor fluctuations in the kill numbers from air attacks will result in significant changes in kill percentages. If the Germans recovered only 10 tanks from Mortain and five of these recoveries represent tanks knocked out from air attacks the overall air inflicted kills shift from 9 air inflicted tank kills of 46 tanks examined by ORS ground teams in the original Report No. 4…to 14 air inflicted tank kills out of 56 tanks KO’d. This equates to the difference of hanging our hats on 19% or guessing that it is possible that up to 25% of all tanks KO’d during Mortain were KO’d from air attacks. The same statistics are also easily swayed by either vehicles missed by ORS ground teams, or misidentification of air-inflicted kills ala the discrepancy between Livingston’s report as well as the 2nd SS report relative to the ORS report. Two misidentifications of causation move our statistics from 19% to 24%.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Dan Stevlingson:
If you meant burned out tanks, there would be no difference in outcome unless some were missed during the search process. I would rather not try to guess at the possible numbers of AFVs hauled away by the Germans. Or overlooked by the ORS.

---

The reason I asked this was to see what the argument really is about. If, as Jeff seems to imply, the number of tanks knocked out by air at Mortain was not nine, as the ORS reports say, but rather around 10-15, that’s fine with me. At most we are then arguing about the breadth of a hair, at least from my point of view, because I am not particularly interested in the percentage of German tank losses at Mortain that were caused by air power. I quite frankly don't see how I could make use of such a percentage.
I would not argue that the ORs reports have come up with an immutable and everlasting accurate truth. Clearly mistakes can always be made, and some vehicles may have been dragged away.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Dan Stevlingson:
Ian Gooderson approached the topic correctly as he reminded his readers that the record might be incomplete, and for that reason one should be careful not to make too many assumptions.

---

I have no disagreement with Gooderson concerning the fact that the ORS reports should be used with caution, but that holds true for virtually any source on WWII.
As to assumptions, I can not escape the impression that the argument that the Germans towed away damaged tanks rests largely on assumptions. The fact that they could have done it is more than just an assumption, but if we try to assess the (approximate) number of tanks dragged away, then it is almost 100 % assumptions.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Dan Stevlingson:
And, I think it's reasonable to say that if a panzer crew permanently abandoned their vehicle because they were afraid of air attack then the Jabos should have gotten credit for knocking out that tank, even if the pilots did not press the trigger.

---

Without ground troops advancing the Germans would almost surely have got back to the abandoned tank and put it into use again. Probably such “kills” would have to be regarded as a “shared” kill (or perhaps a joint kill, if the word joint is still popular in US military vocabulary).

I agree, but in general the Germans seemed to go about recovering
damaged tanks with zeal. It is possible that they could have been
forced to discontinue that policy for some reason during Operation
Luttich, but I doubt it.

I think the ORS may have made some blanket statements about
aircraft rockets, such as that any tank being hit by them would be
burnt out and that the crew would probably not survive. That would
depend on where the rocket hit the tank. The ORS also implied that
rockets could not penetrate the frontal armor of a Mk V tank. I have
seen a photograph of a Panther tank with a massive, jagged edged
hole right through the front plate, believed to have been caused by
an aircraft rocket. This tank was found by US 2nd Armored Division
during operations in Normandy.

I suppose there is a possibility that this huge hole could have
been caused by a US ground weapon, but only if the armor plate
was of poor quality. The 17-lb. and 90mm APCBC rounds used by
British and US tanks had sufficient velocity and weight to do the
job, but the shot itself was not hard enough. Allied APCBCs tended
to crack or shatter on impact with sloped armor and usually failed
against the front plate of a Panther tank, although the results
seemed to vary slightly depending on the quality of armor. At that
time US tanks and tank destroyers did not have special shells like
HVAP, or the 90mm T33 and T43 reheated solid shot which was
by far the most effective weapon against high obliquity targets
like a Panther. This is mainly because the reheated monobloc shot
was not shatter-prone like the Allied APCBC projectiles.

quote:

---

I’m still hoping Chris will give us the poop on that Soviet Tank Brigade that was supposedly waxed by Stuka’s or HS-129’s during Kursk.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Regarding whether crew abandonment of tanks being subjected to air attacks should be included in overall air to ground kill totals…that’s a tough one. Ultimately if a tank crew permanently abandons a tank as a result of morale effects associated with air attacks the impact is still one of diminishing a units combat power.

---

Sorry for taking so long to get back to this. But, quite frankly, after re-reviewing the documentation, including interviews with captured panzer crews, and after looking at the patterns for where the abandoned tanks were, I simply cannot accept the idea that tanks were abandoned 'as a result of morale afects associated with air attacks.'

First, it appears quite clear that the tank crews were well aware that being in the tank was the safest place to be while under artillery and air attack, and that the usual reaction was quite simply to drive under cover or out from under observation, or both. Abandoning an operating vehicle under those circumstances was suicidal and goes against every natural, as well as trained, tendency of a soldier to seek cover and concealment.

Second, the vast number of abandonments are found in a small number of cases. The first is Mortain, where the German spearhead was not only operationally outflanked, it was also tactically outflanked, early in the battle, with the 2nd AD drive north from Barenton threatening the communications and rear areas of 1.SS-PzD, 2.SS-PzD, 17.SS-PzGD, and -- to a lesser extent -- 2.PzD. Quite simply, there was little time to deal with minor mechanical breakdowns, the forward zone was under observation and fire directed from Hill 314, making it difficult -- if not impossible during the day -- to get fuel and ammo forward.

Later, during the Falaise battles, large numbers of tanks were abandoned, probably for similar reasons, plus the simple problem associated with getting tanks across river barriers. BTW, that is not simply a German problem, it is an armor problem. Water barriers caused the majority of losses of M3 Lights during the first Philippines Campaign in 41 and 42, they were abandoned when bridge and ford sites couldn't be found, by an army in precipitous retreat. The same thing also happened in the opening of the Korean War, it appears that about half of the M-24s first committed were lost when they were abandoned at the Kum River.

The other major case was in the Ardennes, where the Germans were beset by terrain, weather, and logistical difficulties (not to mention a stubborn amd occasionally fanatical resistance). It appears that about 80% or more of Pieper's loss was to abandonment, lack of fuel compounded by having an impassable water barrier to both front and rear.

Also, while there certainly is a significant number of vehicles found in the area west of the Orne river, the concentrations are much more dense in the area near the Orne crossings and in particular just west of the line Trun Chambois. The latter position was under observation by allied ground troops as the Germans retreated.

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
First, it appears quite clear that the tank crews were well aware that being in the tank was the safest place to be while under artillery and air attack, and that the usual reaction was quite simply to drive under cover or out from under observation, or both. Abandoning an operating vehicle under those circumstances was suicidal and goes against every natural, as well as trained, tendency of a soldier to seek cover and concealment.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
The maps produced by the ORS giving the locations of vehicles found at the Falaise pocket area, the Shambles are and the Chase area tend to support your post Rich.
There was a vast pile up of vehicles at the west bank of the Seine, which of course was caused by the difficulties to cross the river. Obviously allied air attacks, which had destroyed all bridges over the Seine between Paris and the Channel was a major factor behind these difficulties.

Also, while there certainly is a significant number of vehicles found in the area west of the Orne river, the concentrations are much more dense in the area near the Orne crossings and in particular just west of the line Trun Chambois. The latter position was under observation by allied ground troops as the Germans retreated.

---

Pne of the most curious sets of photos I have ever seen are those depicting the crossings of the Seine. In all of them there does not appear to have been any effort to camoflage of conceal vehicles, and most of the personnel are lounging around the riverbank, sunbathing! Considering that weather conditions were adequate for catching a tan -- and I assume for flying, it makes one wonder just what the morale effect of Allied air really was on those characters.

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
Sorry for taking so long to get back to this. But, quite frankly, after re-reviewing the documentation, including interviews with captured panzer crews, and after looking at the patterns for where the abandoned tanks were, I simply cannot accept the idea that tanks were abandoned 'as a result of morale afects associated with air attacks.'

---

One would think so, but my impression is that the ORS interrogations
indicated that inexperienced panzer crewmen were behaving irrationally.

ORS joint report no. 3 according to Ian Gooderson:

"The experienced crews stated that when attacked from the air they
remained in the tanks which had no more than superficial damage
(cannon strikes or near misses from bombs). They had great difficulty
in preventing the inexperienced men from baling out when our
aircraft attacked".

HQ RAF, Tactical Bulletin No. 45, Tactical Employment of R.P.
aircraft, according to Ian Gooderson:

"Interrogation of prisoners has shown without question that German
tank crews are extremely frightened of attacks by RP...Crews are
very aware that if an RP does hit a tank, their chance of survival is
small. It is admitted that the chances of a direct hit are slight;
neverthleless, this would hardly be appreciated by a crew whose
first thought would be of the disastrous results if a hit were obtained."

--

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling: Just to give an example, Alfred Rubbel, in his unit history of 503. s.Pz.Abt., found that most tank crew members killed were actually killed outside their tanks.

---

You must be reading my mind. The other day, I was going to ask if you
had read this very book. Could you tell me if the author mentioned
the details of a train shipment of King Tigers that was attacked by
fighter-bombers in mid-August 1944?

Was there a Lt. von Rosen on board this train?

--

quote:

---

But, quite frankly, after re-reviewing the documentation, including interviews with captured panzer crews, and after looking at the patterns for where the abandoned tanks were, I simply cannot accept the idea that tanks were abandoned 'as a result of morale affects associated with air attacks.'

---

This is inconsistent with conclusions in several ORS reports. I suggest looking at something other than Joint Report No. 1. Report No. 3 "Investigation of An Air Attack on a German Column near La Baleine" is quite clear about morale effects of air attacks, and abandonment of operational Panzers by their crews.

quote:

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There can be no doubt of the success of the {air} attack, the detailed results as stated above being compatible with a high degree of demoralization resulting in an abandonment of vehicles. It should also be noted, as further confirmation of demoralization, that in spite of material destruction no German graves were found in the vicinity.

---

Regarding abandonment in general as a function of air attack, from ORS Report No. 15 “Enemy Casualties in Vehicles and Equipment During the Retreat From Normandy to the Seine”

quote:

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(b) The table at Appendix B includes only those casualties which occurred or might have occurred since the encirclement of the enemy. It is impossible to assess exactly what proportion of abandoned vehicles and equipments can be attributed to air action. Abandonment must often have come as a result of the extreme congestion and disorganization which prevailed during the retreat; traffic was often totally blocked and petrol became scarce. Inasmuch as the congestion and disorganization can be attributed very largely to the air, abandonment must in the majority of cases be attributed to air action. All abandoned vehicles and guns are therefore included in Appendix B.

---

Also from ORS Report No. 15 “Enemy Casualties in Vehicles and Equipment During the Retreat From Normandy to the Seine”

quote:

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4. Indirect Effects of Air Attack

The three principal effects appear to have been:

(i) Movement was restricted to the night until congestion and haste positively compelled day movement.
(ii) Crews had to stop and take cover when aircraft appeared.
(iii) Vehicles were driven off main roads on to the side roads.

It is hardly possible to assess these effects numerically in terms of casualties, but the delay resulting from them must have been largely responsible for the inability of the enemy to get away, and consequently for a large number of vehicles abandoned or destroyed by their crews.

---

Regarding POW interrogations from Joint Report No.1…ORS indicates the following conclusions can be drawn from POW interrogations:

quote:

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Experience shows that only limited information can be obtained as to enemy reactions and morale. The physical appearance of prisoners as long as they have only just left the battlefield may be a guide to the effect of our attacks, but PW stories of reactions were never very satisfactory.

---

I think POW interrogations should be put in the same realm as German General’s Memoirs and their obvious attempts at justifying why they lost the war...i.e. any conclusion from POW interrogation is suspect. It is quite likely that Panzer crews were ashamed to admit they had abandoned operational Panzers in front of their comrades in the interrogation cage .

quote:

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Second, the vast number of abandonments are found in a small number of cases. The first is Mortain, where the German spearhead was not only operationally outflanked...

---

You basically cover just about all major TAC air impact studies conducted by ORS in NW Europe; Mortain, Falaise and Ardennes. Contrary to your assessment Mortain does not reflect a large number of abandonment’s relative to some of the other ORS reports on the subject. The only case in which abandonment is lower than Mortain is the initial phase of Normandy. Obviously in the Normandy case (Jun 6 to Aug 7) the low abandonment levels are a direct function of the relatively static nature of the front. Moreover, most KO’d or damaged German AFV’s were probably being recovered and repaired as time and space made this activity convenient\realistic for German recovery crews. The low abandonment levels at Mortain relative to other ORS studies simply reinforces the assessment that German Recovery teams were fairly active during this operation.

More precisely Panzer abandonment levels described in ORS studies are as follows:

ORS Report No. 3 “German Column near La Baleine” shows an approximant 23.5% abandonment level

ORS Report No. 4 “Mortain” shows only an 11.5% abandonment level

ORS Report No. 15 Part I “The Pocket” shows a 37% abandonment level

ORS Report No. 15 Part II “The Shambles” shows a 40% abandonment level

ORS Report No. 15 Part III “The Chase” shows a 26.5% abandonment level

Joint Report No. 1 “Armor in the Ardennes” shows a 22% abandonment level

ORS Report No. 17 “Analysis of German Tank Casualties in Normandy Part I (Jun 6 to Aug 7)” shows a 4% abandonment level

ORS Report No. 17 “Analysis of German Tank Casualties in Normandy Part II (Aug 8 to Aug 31)” shows a 28% abandonment level

quote:

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Later, during the Falaise battles, large numbers of tanks were abandoned, probably for similar reasons, plus the simple problem associated with getting tanks across river barriers. BTW, that is not simply a German problem, it is an armor problem. Water barriers caused the majority of losses of M3 Lights during the first Philippines Campaign in 41 and 42, they were abandoned when bridge and ford sites couldn't be found, by an army in precipitous retreat. The same thing also happened in the opening of the Korean War, it appears that about half of the M-24s first committed were lost when they were abandoned at the Kum River.

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Agreed, with the stipulation that the circumstances surrounding German problems with river crossings in NW Europe was being exacerbated by Allied Air Interdiction and destruction of bridges capable of supporting tank traffic. The huge losses suffered by the German Army along the left bank of The Seine River are a case in point (see ORS No. 15 “The Chase”).

From Niklas Zetterling’s “Normandy 1944”.

quote:

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Allied air power caused great destruction to the French rail net. The destruction of the bridges over the Loire and the Seine was also a great hindrance to road movements.

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And finally a note on Tactical Airpower in the Ardennes…

quote:

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Airpower played both a negative and a positive role in the campaign. In a negative sense, the absence of Allied airpower in the early days of the campaign was a very great contribution to the initial German successes, Airpower had become a major element in the overall Allied military superiority in the west, beginning with preinvasion operations before the landings on the beaches of Normandy. It may be questioned whether the Allies could have landed successfully in Normandy without air superiority—almost to the point of air supremacy. Superior airpower had been an important ingredient in the
Allied successes in breaking out of the Normandy Beachhead and in driving the Germans back to their frontiers in August and September.

Thus the ability to operate in an environment free of Allied airpower greatly facilitated the initial German offensive. And there can be no question that the American defensive efforts and the subsequent American counteroffensive were aided greatly by the occasional presence of large numbers of aircraft providing close support and interdicting the German lines of communications.

---

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
the tank was the safest place to be while under artillery and
air attack, Abandoning an operating vehicle under those circum
stances was suicidal and goes against every natural, as well
as trained, tendency of a soldier to seek cover and concealment.

---

I agree, but consider the well known story about a Panther tank
commander called Ernst Barkmann of Das Reich, whose driver
tried to bale out of the tank while under fire in late July 1944.

They were exchanging shots with US Shermans when attacked by
Jabos. A bomb exploded nearby which nearly overturned the tank.
The Panther had lost a track, suffered some cracks in the hull, and
the driver was wounded. It was not clear what damage was caused
by Jabos and what damage was caused by ground weapons, but
the point is, this crewman whether experienced or not tried to bale
out of the tank against the wishes of his commander and right in
the middle of a firefight. The only thing that stopped him from leaving
was a jammed hatch cover.

quote:

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Dan: I believe that the German tank crewmen were referring
to having a hard time keeping inexperienced, replacement crew
men (it would be unusual to have an entire crew of inexperienced
tankers) from baling while under fire. That is not an unheard of
or irrational act -- most people don't like having rude strangers
try to kill them, and a natural reaction is to leave the area.

---

I thought the tank was the safest place to be when under fire and
abandoning it was suicidal in this situation.

--

quote:

---

Originally posted by Dan Stevlingson:
You must be reading my mind. The other day, I was going to ask if you
had read this very book. Could you tell me if the author mentioned
the details of a train shipment of King Tigers that was attacked by
fighter-bombers in mid-August 1944?

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Also there was one Tiger whihc caught fire. It seems not htat this was a particularly extensive fire, since the Tiger was unloaded, but fell off and tipped over.

---

I see. You mean the Tiger tank overturned
because the lifting device broke?

--

quote:

---

Originally posted by Dan Stevlingson:
I see. You mean the Tiger tank overturned
because the lifting device broke?

--

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quote:

---

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
I think POW interrogations should be put in the same realm as German General’s Memoirs and their obvious attempts at justifying why they lost the war…i.e. any conclusion from POW interrogation is suspect. It is quite likely that Panzer crews were ashamed to admit they had abandoned operational Panzers in front of their comrades at the interrogation cage.

---

I disagree on this, mainly because a source can seldom be regarded as generally reliable or generally unreliable. Most sources are useful in some aspects and not useful in other, this goes for memoirs as well as PoW interrogations.

quote:

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
You basically cover just about all major TAC air impact studies conducted by ORS in NW Europe; Mortain, Falaise and Ardennes. Contrary to your assessment Mortain does not reflect a large number of abandonment’s relative to some of the other ORS reports on the subject. The only case in which abandonment is lower than Mortain is the initial phase of Normandy. Obviously in the Normandy case (Jun 6 to Aug 7) the low abandonment levels are a direct function of the relatively static nature of the front. Moreover, most KO’d or damaged German AFV’s were probably being recovered and repaired as time and space made this activity convenient\realistic for German recovery crews.

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Why do you not include destroyed by crew in this matter. If you do, you will find much higher percentages in many cases.
Also, it has been some talk about assumptions. I reiterate that the German recovery efforts are almost exclusively assumptions so far in this debate. The fact that the Germans seem to have been quite successful on the eastern front at this, does not mean that they were as efficient in western Europe. It is not just a matter of doctrine, it is a matter of resources too. For example, I doubt that any German army in the east was expected to have only 248 trucks to cope with its supply transportation, as the 7th Army was supposed to do on the eve of D-Day. Rather, the impression is that the forces in the west were more combat unit heavy and less well backed up by rear services than their colleagues fighting in the east. This is of course no proof that the German recovery services were ineffective in Normandy, but it at least suggests that it can not be taken for granted that they performed as efficiently as in the east.
Also, it seems that another tacit assumption is that the German tanks recovered were mainly knocked out, and not mechanical breakdowns. I may have misunderstood on the latter, but at least greater clarity could be appropriate.

quote:

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
The low abandonment levels at Mortain relative to other ORS studies simply reinforces the assessment that German Recovery teams were fairly active during this operation.

---

This does begin to look like a circular argument.

quote:

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Niklas Said: Why do you not include destroyed by crew in this matter.

---

Frankly I hadn’t considered it as I had thought we were talking about abandoned tanks, not tanks destroyed by their crew. See above regarding the discussion on crew morale and crews abandoning their vehicles while under air attack. Destroyed by crew implies –at least to me -- a crew that has the balls to at least stick around long enough to destroy their machine so it doesn’t fall into enemy hands...than continue their retreat. However the trend is still the same. Normandy Phase I and Mortain being are lowest overal. Here are the numbers for abandoned + destroyed by crew.

ORS Report No. 3 “German Column near La Baleine” shows an approximant 41.2% abandonment + destroyed by crew

ORS Report No. 4 “Mortain” shows only an 23.9% abandonment + destroyed by crew

ORS Report No. 15 Part I “The Pocket” shows a 66.9% abandonment + destroyed by crew

ORS Report No. 15 Part II “The Shambles” shows a 86.6% abandonment + destroyed by crew

ORS Report No. 15 Part III “The Chase” shows a 82.6% abandonment + destroyed by crew

Joint Report No. 1 “Armor in the Ardennes” shows a 38.6% abandonment + destroyed by crew

ORS Report No. 17 “Analysis of German Tank Casualties in Normandy Part I (Jun 6 to Aug 7)” shows a 10% abandonment + destroyed by crew

ORS Report No. 17 “Analysis of German Tank Casualties in Normandy Part II (Aug 8 to Aug 31)” shows a 76% abandonment + destroyed by crew

quote:

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Niklas Said: This does begin to look like a circular argument.

---

The conclusion is not really the premise here Niklas. But I will elaborate a bit for you. All but two of the referenced ORS studies show a relatively large number of abandoned vehicles. The other ORS studies reflect a high abandonment level. Why? Because the period of time over which these other ORS studies focus reflect a German Army that is falling all over itself trying to retreat. When you’re in a hurry to bug out you don’t stop to recover tanks. Now than, two of the ORS reports detail relatively low abandonment percentages. These would be the Mortain Report and the Initial Phase Normandy Report (Jun 6 - Aug 7).

The premise is: Contrary to Rich's post there is actually a relatively low level of abandonment reflected in Mortain and Normandy Phase I reports. Now the Germans were eventually in a retrograde mode at the conclusion of Luttich. But they were apparently not so panicked by the presence of 2nd AD on their flank to leave the level of abandoned tanks (or destroyed by crew tanks) that are found within these other ORS reports. The conclusion is that the low levels of abandonment relative to these other ORS reports is a function of German Recovery activities.

quote:

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Niklas Said: For example, I doubt that any German army in the east was expected to have only 248 trucks to cope with its supply transportation, as the 7th Army was supposed to do on the eve of D-Day.

---

It is also probable that this shortage of motor transportation being experienced by the 7th Army was even further taxed by losses incurred from air interdiction.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Frankly I hadn’t considered it as I had thought we were talking about abandoned tanks, not tanks destroyed by their crew. See above regarding the discussion on crew morale and crews abandoning their vehicles while under air attack. Destroyed by crew implies –at least to me -- a crew that has the balls to at least stick around long enough to destroy their machine so it doesn’t fall into enemy hands...than continue their retreat. However the trend is still the same. Normandy Phase I and Mortain being are lowest overal. Here are the numbers for abandoned + destroyed by crew.
ORS Report No. 3 “German Column near La Baleine” shows an approximant 41.2% abandonment + destroyed by crew
ORS Report No. 4 “Mortain” shows only an 23.9% abandonment + destroyed by crew
ORS Report No. 15 Part I “The Pocket” shows a 66.9% abandonment + destroyed by crew
ORS Report No. 15 Part II “The Shambles” shows a 86.6% abandonment + destroyed by crew
ORS Report No. 15 Part III “The Chase” shows a 82.6% abandonment + destroyed by crew
Joint Report No. 1 “Armor in the Ardennes” shows a 38.6% abandonment + destroyed by crew
ORS Report No. 17 “Analysis of German Tank Casualties in Normandy Part I (Jun 6 to Aug 7)” shows a 10% abandonment + destroyed by crew
ORS Report No. 17 “Analysis of German Tank Casualties in Normandy Part II (Aug 8 to Aug 31)” shows a 76% abandonment + destroyed by crew
quote:

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If I understood Rich correctly, his conclusion was that tactical and operational circumstances on the Ground caused crews to abandon their vehicles, as did the problems with crossing certain terrain features, like rivers. In that case, the effort of blowing your own tank up, or setting it on fire, to prevent capture is a much less risky and time-consuming procedure than recovering it. Consequently, tanks set ablaze or otherwise destroyed by the crews are precisely what one could expect if those conditions described by Rich caused tanks to be lost (Rich, I hope you don’t mind that I step into your argument). The fact that abandonment + destroyed by crew are larger at Falaise/Shambles/Chase does not disprove Rich’s argument. Rather, the circumstances he argued caused crews to leave their tanks behind, was at least as prevalent as at Mortain. The base line here is rather to be expected to be the ORS report No 17, showing 10 % over the period 6 June – 7 August.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
The conclusion is not really the premise here Niklas. But I will elaborate a bit for you. All but two of the referenced ORS studies show a relatively large number of abandoned vehicles. The other ORS studies reflect a high abandonment level. Why? Because the period of time over which these other ORS studies focus reflect a German Army that is falling all over itself trying to retreat. When you’re in a hurry to bug out you don’t stop to recover tanks. Now than, two of the ORS reports detail relatively low abandonment percentages. These would be the Mortain Report and the Initial Phase Normandy Report (Jun 6 - Aug 7).
The premise is: Contrary to Rich's post there is actually a relatively low level of abandonment reflected in Mortain and Normandy Phase I reports. Now the Germans were eventually in a retrograde mode at the conclusion of Luttich. But they were apparently not so panicked by the presence of 2nd AD on their flank to leave the level of abandoned tanks (or destroyed by crew tanks) that are found within these other ORS reports. The conclusion is that the low levels of abandonment relative to these other ORS reports is a function of German Recovery activities.

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I am sorry, but I can’t escape the impression that there is a lot of conjecture in this.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
It is also probable that this shortage of motor transportation being experienced by the 7th Army was even further taxed by losses incurred from air interdiction.

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I wouldn’t have objected if you had used the word surely rather than probable.

However, the main point was that in vital areas, the forces in the west could look quite different compared to those in the east. Hence, we can not take for granted that the Germans recovered a similar percentage of stricken vehicles in Normandy as in the east.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:

If I understood Rich correctly, his conclusion was that
tactical and operational circumstances on the Ground
caused crews to abandon their vehicles, as did the problems
with crossing certain terrain features, like rivers. In that
case, the effort of blowing your own tank up, or setting
it on fire, to prevent capture is a much less risky and
time-consuming procedure than recovering it.

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I do not believe this happened at La Baleine in July 1944.
The ORS ground investigation found a 2nd SS battlegroup
that appeared to be abandoned either during or just prior
to the RAF pilots arriving, who followed up on the bombings
by USAAF Thunderbolts. The Typhoon pilots reported little
activity on the ground and no bodies were found nearby,
except for one German soldier who was killed by a sniper.

While there was some speculation that a bridge damaged
by P-47s may have prevented Panther tanks from using
it, there were other places to cross the river. But it seems
that the Das Reich troops did not bother to try.

I would have to question the perception that the Germans
gave up so easily merely because they were outflanked or
surrounded. The Waffen SS had (a reputation at least) for
fighting their way out of these situations. To abandon their
vehicles without a fight does not live up to the legend of
Das Reich, or larger than life stories about Ernst Barkmann
desperately battling his way out of encirclement while towing
a disabled Panther tank.

The ORS found no indications that the Das Reich column
had run out of fuel and most of the evidence suggests that
air attack, or the threat of air attack, is what influenced SS
panzer troops to abandon armored vehicles at La Baleine.

quote:

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
[B][The conclusion is not really the premise here Niklas. But I will elaborate a bit for you. All but two of the referenced ORS studies show a relatively large number of abandoned vehicles. The other ORS studies reflect a high abandonment level. Why? Because the period of time over which these other ORS studies focus reflect a German Army that is falling all over itself trying to retreat. When you’re in a hurry to bug out you don’t stop to recover tanks. Now than, two of the ORS reports detail relatively low abandonment percentages. These would be the Mortain Report and the Initial Phase Normandy Report (Jun 6 - Aug 7).

The premise is: Contrary to Rich's post there is actually a relatively low level of abandonment reflected in Mortain and Normandy Phase I reports. Now the Germans were eventually in a retrograde mode at the conclusion of Luttich. But they were apparently not so panicked by the presence of 2nd AD on their flank to leave the level of abandoned tanks (or destroyed by crew tanks) that are found within these other ORS reports. The conclusion is that the low levels of abandonment relative to these other ORS reports is a function of German Recovery activities.

/B]

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Sorry, I was being imprecise. I did not mean to say that the highest levels of abandonment included the Mortain and Normandy I cases. I simply meant that they also included many cases of abandonment.

However, I must agree with Niklas that much of this arguement is becoming circular. The speculation has increased from assumptions as to the effects of air power, to assumptions about the effectiveness of German tank recovery in the west, to assumptions about German tank crew (and all tank crews in general I suppose) morale while under air attack.

2nd British Army 6 June - 12 Aug: 854 knocked out, 365 Destroyed
1st Canadian Army 23 July - 12 August: 39 knocked out, 9 destroyed
1st US Army 6 June - 6 August: ?? knocked out, 195 destroyed.

On 18 July 1944 HQ European Theater of OPerations, US Army (ETOUSA) G-2 section sent a memo to the Armored Fighting Vehicle and Weapons (AFV&W) Section of HQ ETOUSA stating the current estimated strengths of both sides and the claims for German losses as follows:

German Tanks Destroyed by Allies
US
15 June 23
12 July 24
13 July 35
17 July 16
Total 98

British
19 June 157 total to date
29 June 25
2 July 39
3 July 13
9 July 11
10 July 10
Total 255

Source was given as 'cables' presumably from the respective army G-2 sections.

A second listing gave totals as:
US
56, no type specified
British
Mark III 1
Mark IV 91
Mark V 72
Mark VI 32
Unspecified 50
Total 246

Source is given as SHAEF.

The following explanation was then given:

"Its is believed that the figure for destroyed German tanks by British is 246 as this is within one of the figure of tanks known to have been positively destroyed, reported by cable [although how 246 is within one of 255 mystifies me!]. Over and above this 565 tanks have been claimed as knocked out by the 2nd Army. Many of these have probably been repaired. It is believed that the figure of tanks destroyed by US is probably close to the SHAEF figure of 56 and that 98 reported by cable probably includes some since reclaimed."