The 12. SS-Pz.Div. had up to 11 June lost (complete write-offs) 15 Panzer IV and 6 Panthers plus 2 Panther (Befehlswagen). 42 Pz IV and 32 Panther were operational, while 43 Pz IV and 25 Panther were in need of repair. The majority of the tanks in need of repair were vehicles that had broken down (technische Schäden) while on march. The division had serious problems taking care of these vehicles. First, it had no heavy towing vehicles. It had not a single Sd.Kfz. 9/1, which was the 18 ton half-track designed for the purpose. The division asked higher command echelons to make at least 1 (one) such vehicle available. Also a lack of spare parts was a serious handicap. The division had virtually no spare parts for Pz IV and an incomplete inventory of spare parts for the Panther.

The 21. Pz.Div. had two 18 ton recovery vehicles, but this was insufficient. It was noted that the slow and large vehicle was easily detected from the air, which forced the crew to operate under cover of darkness. The division emphasized that it was urgent that at least a limited number of such vehicles were made available to the 1st SS-Panzer Corps.

Four recovery vehicles were made available by Oberquertiermeister West to the corps and it was intended to initially send them to 21. Pz.Div.

The Pz.Lehr division had suffered from air attacks on the repair and recovery platoons for the Panthers. The former was completely destroyed and the latter 60 % destroyed.

For this corps, it seems not that the prospects of quickly recovering damaged tanks were good. Also the effects of allied air power seems to have contributed to slower recovery (not a major surprise).
Things may have been different later, but this was the coprs in the west that probably was best equipped. At least it was in terms of weapons.

Interesting information as usual.

I have an unrelated question regarding the grid references for British ORS reports. I recently tracked down 1:25000 topo maps of all of Normandy on CD. The French Geographic Department offers these items for a reasonable amount of money. The ORS grids don't match up well relative to location descriptions provided in the ORS report for Mortain relative to grid references on modern topo maps of the vicinity. Presumably some changes have occurred in grid references between than and now? Any thoughts on conversion between British Army reference points and say Lambert I or Lambert II coordinates?

Regards

Where did you obtain the maps on CD?

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Niklas:

Interesting information as usual.

I have an unrelated question regarding the grid references for British ORS reports. I recently tracked down 1:25000 topo maps of all of Normandy on CD. The French Geographic Department offers these items for a reasonable amount of money. The ORS grids don't match up well relative to location descriptions provided in the ORS report for Mortain relative to grid references on modern topo maps of the vicinity. Presumably some changes have occurred in grid references between than and now? Any thoughts on conversion between British Army reference points and say Lambert I or Lambert II coordinates?

Regards

Jeff D.

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Presumably what you are refereeing to are more detailed contemporary Topo maps…perhaps 1:25,000? I did manage to come across an old 1:25000 black & white copy of the Mortain area from an AAR report on the 30th ID (some of the more compelling interviews were conducted within days of the ending of the battle). Xerox copies of overlays were also included. After side-by-side comparisons with circa-1995 French 1:25,000 maps it became pretty evident how little the terrain has seemingly changed since 1944. The hedgerows are all in the same locations. A couple of new buildings and a missing orchard here and there.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Thanks for the kind offer Rich. I am indeed interested. I was however reminded of a story from Robert Weiss, FO, 230th Field Artillery Battalion. Lt. Weiss was trapped on hill 314 during the battle around Mortain. He indicated that all he had as far as maps were concerned was a Michelin road map of the Mortain area. This was apparently what was being issued, as this was all that was available at the time. Probably 1:50,000. I imagine calls for fire using 1:50000 road maps was a bit of a challenge for an FO.

Presumably what you are refereeing to are more detailed contemporary Topo maps…perhaps 1:25,000? I did manage to come across an old 1:25000 black & white copy of the Mortain area from an AAR report on the 30th ID (some of the more compelling interviews were conducted within days of the ending of the battle). Xerox copies of overlays were also included. After side-by-side comparisons with circa-1995 French 1:25,000 maps it became pretty evident how little the terrain has seemingly changed since 1944. The hedgerows are all in the same locations. A couple of new buildings and a missing orchard here and there.

I would be very interested in obtaining the old Army maps of the Puffendorf vicinity. Areas encompassing 2nd AD's operations during November 15 to 20, 1944. I could forward along a check for copying fees.

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Weiss' problem was pretty general during the breakout and the use of the Michelin (1:100,000) map was common for road marches. BTW, a reproduction of that Michelin map is available from Michelin and is usually in better map and bookstores. But the reason the map was in use at Mortain was that the 30th Division, like most others had 'run off' the mapsheets. It took time to print and distribute the proper maps and in this case Mortain was merely an assembly area, they were not expecting to conduct operations there (sorry, but it was a surprise, at least to the 30th Division).

If you let me know exactly the area and scale you want covered for Puffendorf I will look up and order the relevent maps the next time I get to the Archives. Usually the 1:25,000 or 1:100,000 maps are what is available, although some of the 1:10,000 map sheets are still around.

On 4 May 1944, allied air power struck a major blow at the battalion, when Mailly was subjected to a night air attack by bomber command. 47 soldiers of the battlion were killed.
On 30 june soldier was killed and five days later another died at a hospital. On 22 July one soldier was killed in an accident and on 26 July one drowned in a canal at Marseille.
The first fatality in August was a soldier in the supply company who was killed in Paris. Another soldier in the supply company was killed on 8 July and three days later a member of the workshop company was killed in an accident.
On 13 August one soldier of 5th company plus one officer and one soldier of the staff company were killed in action. On 18 August one soldier from the staff company died from wounds.
On 19 and 20 August, the number of missing rose sharply. On 19 August 21 were reported as missing and on 20 August no less than 119. How many of these that were taken prisoner or killed is impossible to establish, but presumably there were many missing for each killed.

Obviously the battlion did not suffer many casualties to allied air power during 1-18 August (note that the losses given above are due to any cause, not just air power). From 19 August onwards it is impossible to tell.
During the period 1-18 August the battalion spent much time driving around in "jabo" areas, but if it lost any significant number of vehicles during the period, due to allied air power, the soldiers must have been relatively far from the vehicles.
On the other hand, the air attack on 4 May was a major blow to the battalion.