quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
OH MY GOD! Who is Daniel Kane and why are you using him to torture me?

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Jeff, Alex:

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:

All in all curious, and I'm afraid somewhat descriptive of the limitations of the ORS investigative technique. Comments?

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THis was quite an interesting comment. When I first was informed that ORS teams had investigated the battlefield at Mortain, my instant reaction was hesitation, because I believed that too many of the German tanks had been fired upon by allied forces even after they had been knocked out or abandoned, and that this would make it difficult to establish actual causes of destruction. In the end this seems not to have been that kind of a problem. But what you bring up is a new one.
There is one thing that I have been worried about in the Mortain case. The ORS teams found 33 Panthers, 10 Pz IV and 3 assault guns. What seems strange (or at least not very representative) is the ratio between these types. Even though data is at little shaky on the number of German tanks that attacked, it does not appear that the Panthers were significantly more numerous than the Pz IV. Also, during the previous fighting in Normandy, Panthers show a greater survivability than Pz IV, but in the Mortain sample, Panthers are more than three times more common than Pz IV. Of course this can be nothing more than random variation (or a resualt of how the German commanders committed their forces in the particular situation). However, if, as your very plausible explanation suggests, German vehicles were towed away by American units, this can perhaps also have caused such a "bias" of the sample. It is conceivable that the particular roads you discussed were in the attack directions of units equipped with Pz IV mainly.
In one sense, the problem of American units hauling away German wrecks is more problematic. If German units removed vehicles, there are very good reasons to expect them to take away vehicles that were repariable, and not those vehicles actually destroyed. However, if the purpose is to clear a road, that argument is of course no longer true. Nevertheless, it seems more likely that the vehicles are not removed very far in those cases (in most cases it seems that vehicles are just pushed off the road), even though terrain considerations, as you mention in this case, can result in the vehicles being towed away longer distances.
In any case it points to the importance of conducting the ORS investigation as soon as possible after the engagement.

quote:

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
To switch gears somewhat; What concerns me (or more properly interests me) regarding ORS studies are the very small samples of air inflicted AFV casualties.

I agree in principal with your comments on this, not just for these studies but for all OR studies. I have actually heard senior US OR people state that what is needed for study is a few well-researched examples. This, I believe, is entirely incorrect. The study of warfare is not an engineering or technical study, but is a "quantitative social science" study. As such, one needs large robust data bases with plenty of examples from different environments, so as to be able to ferret out the truth among all the noise, variables and cross-correlations. You will note, from our data base section of the web site, we are the only ones developing such data bases.

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Whether the size of a sample is large enough or not depends largely on the questions that are to be answered with the sample and to what extent it is intended to generalise the conclusions outside the situations the sample was assembled from. Unfortunately one occasionally sees authors and researchers who use standard statistical tables to obtain a minimum sample size, without understanding that these tables are based upon assumptions that are not identical to the characteristics of the population the sample is taken from.
If we look at the ORS samples there are many questions that might be tried to be answered from them. Just to give a few:

1. Of the tanks lost in the particular situation, what percentage can be attributed to air power.
2. How many tanks were lost.
3. What was the ratio of air claims to actual kills
4. How many sorties were, on average, required to destroy one tank.

Just to illuminate, assume that we have a sample of 100 tanks, of which 10 are destroyed by air. If we want to answer question 1, we have a sample size of 100. If, on the other hand, we want to answer question 4 the sample size is 10 (or the number of sorties flown of the relevant mission type).

In any case, if you want to generalise the conclusions to other engagements, or even other operations or wars, the sample size considerations are of course even more pronounced.

If we take the sample at the Ardennes battle (perhaps some 100 tanks out of potentially 300) this is, in my opinion a sufficient size of sample to answer many questions, but not all. Similarly, using the Mortain sample to answer questions about that battle can be possible given the size of the sample, as holds true for the Falaise samples. But to use this data from Mortain, Falaise and the Ardennes and try to generalise the conclusions to air power on the western front 1944-45 seems hazardous (unless further arguments are added), given the overall sample size. To use the data to generalise conclusions for WWII air power seems more than dangerous. To make conclusions outside that war is just bizarre.

If the purpose is to make some kind of combat outcome model, a large number of engagements clearly must be used. But perhaps the most important argument put forward by Trevor is that not only is a large number of engagements needed to design a model, but also a large number of independent engagements must be used to validate the model.

Niklas Z

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Unfortunately one occasionally sees authors and researchers who use standard statistical tables to obtain a minimum sample size, without understanding that these tables are based upon assumptions that are not identical to the characteristics of the population the sample is taken from.

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This error seems quite common, but is only part of the problem.

quote:

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If we want to answer question 1, we have a sample size of 100. If, on the other hand, we want to answer question 4 the sample size is 10 (or the number of sorties flown of the relevant mission type).

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Exactly. With any modeling of any combat effect having to deal with multiple variables, once you start partitioning or categorizing your data base to deal with each of the variables (say 10 different types of terrain, three or four different types of force mix, three or four different levels of air support, human factors, etc.).....you quickly discover that you never have enough cases. A look at our EPW study (Phase II), where we were working with 202 examples, clearly shows how quickly you can run out of data. I am convinced that we need about a 1,000 relevent cases for analysis of the "big questions" of combat. This is far larger than anyone else is discussing (or funding).

As such, there is no single study that is rigorous or far reaching enough to clearly establish a fact. Furthermore, they all have some problems and limitations as to data selection, representativeness, etc. Therefore, it helps to look across multiple studies to see what the patterns are and why they differ. If multiple sources (and multiple methodologies)are all "pointing in the same direction", then one is probably safe to draw some conclusions from them.

Another problem that one encounters, is that because of the difficulty in the understanding, applicability and use of these studies, there is a tendancy among some people to conclude that nothing is really knowable, or that its all stochastic, or its just one specific instance and who knows what reality is.

quote:

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But perhaps the most important argument put forward by Trevor is that not only is a large number of engagements needed to design a model, but also a large number of independent engagements must be used to validate the model.

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The validation issue, which I consider to be one of the most important steps for the US modeling community to take, is simply not done for most (all but one or two) US combat models. I do believe that the US should not be using any combat model for analysis (or training!)that has not been rigorously and independently validated.

Niklas, did you ever do an independent validation of the TNDM?

quote:

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
The validation issue, which I consider to be one of the most important steps for the US modeling community to take, is simply not done for most (all but one or two) US combat models. I do believe that the US should [b]not be using any combat model for analysis (or training!)that has not been rigorously and independently validated.

Niklas, did you ever do an independent validation of the TNDM?
[/B]

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Not really, the work I did several years ago on arctic conditions involved some changes to the model (since that kind of climate and terrain was not covered by it). I do not remember the number of engagements used, but we found the results of the model to be well in line with the engagements. This was no rigorous validation, but it is at least something that lends further credibility to the TNDM.

There are a couple of important points that I missed in the ORS Report No. 4. The total number of German vehicles counted was determined by matching the counts of the 2 ORS team and the ORS team from 2 TAF. Thus, it is possible there was some duplication. Worse, there is some confusion in terminology. Although the total of tanks is given as 33 Panther, 10 Mark IV and 3 SP guns, the 2 ORS team actually counted 21 Panthers, 4 StG or possibly JgPz (they called them a 75mm SP on a Mark III chassis) and 2 SP 75mm guns (presumably Marders). So where did the 3 other SP guns go in the total count (4 StG and 2 Marders versus a count of 3 SP guns)? Were they counted as Mark IV tanks? I expect I’ll never be able to answer that question.

However, plotting the locations of the 2 ORS wrecks has proven beneficial and has answered (possibly) a number of questions. As I mentioned, the wrecks appear in a number of clusters, the largest of which is to the north and northwest of St. Barthelemy. From the layout of these wrecks we can assume a number of answers, which relate to the air effectiveness question.

One distinct group of vehicles was found along a 4 to 5 kilometer-long stretch of the road from Mortain to Barenton. When the Germans attacked, the US 2nd Armored Division (-) was in and around Barenton, so for those vehicles to get there would require traversing some backroads and trails through the Foret de Mortain and around Hill 314 (which was held by the 2nd/120th Infantry throughout the battle). US accounts indicate that only German infantry followed this route, so it is likely that these were actually destroyed prior to the battle, either to the 1st ID en route to Mayenne or earlier by Allied air. The group consists of 2 Panthers, 1 88, and 4 trucks. One Panther was on its side and was wrecked by an unknown shell, the other was wrecked by unknown causes. All the others were lost to HE, but there were no rocket or bomb craters along this stretch of road. It appears likely that all were lost to ground forces, probably before the German attack.

A second distinct group was found along the road from Barenton to Ger. This was the right-hand boundary of the 2nd AD counterattack beginning on 7 August. It appears likely from the evidence that they were lost to artillery fire supporting this advance, although there is some evidence that air attacks may have hit this stretch of road. Two Marders, 1 88, 1 50mm AT, 2 SPW, and 5 trucks or staff cars were counted in this group. One of the Marders was hit by an AP round as may have been the other. All of the other wrecks appear to have been due to HE fire although one truck may have been bombed.

The third group is found strung along an 8-kilometer stretch of the road between Ger and Mortain. Again, most of these appear victims to HE attacks, it may be significant that this stretch of roadway was fully exposed to observation from Hill 314. All of these were hit by HE or were abandoned, there was little or no evidence of air attack. The group includes 1 StG or JgPz (which may have been one of the two reported lost to air attack by SS-PzGRgt 4, see below), 1 Panther (undergoing track repair and abandoned), 7 trucks, 1 ambulance, 1 VW, and 1 car.

North of the Ger-Mortain road, about three kilometers northeast of l’Abbayye Blanche is the two small clusters totaling 3 Panthers, all of which appear to have been under repair (two were being towed). About two kilometers west of there is a Bergepanther, possibly hit by a bazooka, but it sounds more like a hit by a large-caliber HEAT round – possibly from a 105mm M4 or M7 (or less likely, from a 105mm M3 of the 117th Cannon Company, see below).

The last and most interesting groups are all around (mostly north or northwest) of St. Barthelemy. This is where the msot evidence of bomb and rocket attacks occur as well. However, there is a major problem here, most of the fighting in this area began at 0500 on 7 August and was ending by around 0900, when the village defense was collapsing. Coincidentally, that is also when most of the ground haze was burning off, and the air attacks began. Eyewitness accounts appear to place the bulk of the sorties in this area – indeed, some of the losses to 1st/A/823rd TD Battalion at l’Abbayye Blanche (about 3.5 kilometers south of this area) were inflicted by air attacks at this time. From comparing the accounts of B Company of the 823rd (which was deployed between Juvigny – 5 kilometers west of St. Barthelemy – and St. Barthelemy) it appears that many of the German tank losses accounted for in the ORS reports were as a result of the 823rd action – most were either destroyed or knocked out before the air attacks began. There are a total of 15 Panthers in this area, 2 of which appeared to only have been hit by rocket projectiles, 1 which was evidently hit by 105mm rounds by the 117th Cannon Company). The others include 2 probably destroyed by bazookas (by a team from the 117th Infantry led by a Sgt. Hardy, see “Against the Panzers”), 8 were almost assuredly victims of guns of the 823rd in St. Barthelemy, while 2 outside of le Mesnil Tove (north of Juvigny) were probably lost to guns of the 823rd there late in the morning. In and among these tanks were a collection of 10 SPW, 1 armored car and 7 trucks, VWs and cars.

German strength and losses are difficult to determine. The units actually participating in the attack consisted of elements of the 2nd Panzer, 1st SS-Panzer, 2nd SS-Panzer, and 17th SS-Panzer Grenadier divisions. Unfortunately, Niklas’ excellent research only turned up the before and after strength for the 1st SS. They had 57 PzIV, 46 Panther and 27 StG operational on 5 August and 14 PzIV, 7 Panther, and 8 StG operational on 13 August, a decrease of 43, PzIV, 39 Panther and 19 StG. The 2nd Panzer history claimed a strength of 60 tanks and 15 JgPz before the battle and the division reported 9 PzIV, 8 Panther and 5 JgPz operational on 11 August, a possible decrease of 43 tanks and 10 JgPz. The 2nd SS-Panzer reported 37 PzIV, 41 Panther and 22 StG on 23 July and 4 PzIV, 1 Panther, and 6 StG on 11 August. According to German accounts, two of four StG attached to Der Fuehrer Regiment were lost to Allied air attacks on 7 August. However, I expect that much of the decrease was as a result of the fighting following COBRA, when the 2nd SS was desperately attempting to hold the onrush of the 2nd and 3rd Armored.

German reports indicate that the total armor committed were 75 PzIV, 70 Panther, and 32 StG and JgPz. By 13 August there were only 28 PzIV, 18 PzV, and 21 StG and JgPz operational in these units. The ORS report gives a total of 46 tanks, StG, and JgPz lost (of which 2 may not have been lost in the battle), which leaves at least 64 unaccounted for, many of which were likely damaged or perhaps broken down en route (and I still haven’t found the mysterious Panther of 1st SS hit by the crashing Typhoon in the defile at Vente – it sounds rather Hollywoodish). Of these, it appears that as few as 2 were lost exclusively to air attack. Furthermore, the accounts of the battle indicate that the main German armor thrust between St. Barthelemy and Sourdeval was halted before the intervention of Allied airpower. Perhaps if we knew the cause of loss and locations of the 17-odd tanks counted by the ORS team of 2 TAF, we could more definitely say that the Mortain counterattack was halted by Allied air. However, the weight of the evidence is that it was halted by the action of the 117th and 120th Infantry, supported by A and B Company of the 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion (which lost 11 of 24 guns in the action) and the artillery of the 30th Division

I've read the book (excellent), its just that I wanted Rich to wake up.

Open question:

Have any of you run across any kind of regulation or policy for tank recovery for the German Army? In other words, was recovery biased in any way?

For example, did recovery units go first for what was nearer, easier to drag away, higher value afvs, tanks, sp guns? Did they go for lighter vehicles first?

Any comments?

An excellent bit of elbow grease. Thanks for sharing. Several comments and questions I wanted to throw at you…hopefully this weekend when things slow down a bit.

Believe it or not I had ordered 1:25000 relief maps of the Mortain area several days ago from some company in England in order to both track ORS ground investigations and insert casualties discussed in A2D2. (We arm-chair historians have to buy this shit on our own).

http://www.gripmaps.com/acatalog/GRIP_Maps__France_9.html

Most of the engagement locations detailed in A2D2 are referenced to grids. One point of interest that I wanted to clarify in my own mind with a map study of the ORS Mortain report and A2D2 coverage was two Stug’s mentioned by Lt. Livingston (823rd TD) as having been KO’d by rocket firing Typhoons. The loss of two StugIII’s by air attack in the vicinity of Livingston’s position was apparently confirmed by members of the 2nd SS Panzer. Clearly the ORS Mortain study doesn’t include mention of two Stugs being KO’d via aircraft, although a pair of StugIII (2 75mm SP) are indicated in the ORS Mortain report at grid 693095 (near Road Barenton to Ger.).

Since I don’t presently have the 1:25000 maps in my hot hands (back ordered…waiting for next printing cycle) I was curious as to whether the two Stugs mentioned by Livingston are the same Stugs indicated by ORS at grid 693095.

quote:

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Alex:

Try finding a copy of “Dept. Of The Army Pamphlet No. 20-202 “Historical Study, German Tank Mantenance in WWII”, Jun 1954. Fairly dry, but a pamphlet dedicated strictly to a subject that is perhaps difficult to find references on.

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quote:

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Originally posted by Alex H:
In other words, was recovery biased in any way?

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Well at Kursk, they tried to recover everything. Of course, they held the battlefields. The Germans are definately recovering seriously damaged tanks that are later written off as destroyed.

If you don't mind, I would prefer to wait about a month or two before I get around to answering your other two questions. Right now, I am trying to finish up the ground combat section of the book. I then intend to go back, and completely address the air. As these two questions are related to that work....I would prefer to wait until I get to that point.

Your two questions were:

quote:

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Secondly as you have brought up the Russian Front, I am curious how coordination of various “tank busting aircraft” (ala HS-129B-2, JU-87G-1 or Shturmoviks) was conducted between ground and air elements. Moreover were the Soviets and\or Germans employing Air liaison Officers operating from tanks\AC’s ala the Anglo-American Armies in NW Europe? Or were tank-busting sorties employed more along the lines of a roving sorties over the battlefield? Assuming the former, what sort of reaction times were typical between a request for CAS and aircraft appearing over\engaging the target?

And Lastly; I vaguely recall an incident during Kursk in which it is claimed that either Ju-87G’s (or perhaps they were HS-129’s) destroyed a large portion of a Soviet Tank Brigade which had been assembling for a counterattack. Based upon your research is there any truth to this story? (Sorry the finer details of this engagement somewhat allude me…I can provide more information on this event if it is unclear to you what I am asking).

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The confusion regarding the two StG destroyed by rocket attack (yes both Livingston and the Der Fuehrer account mention the incident) is caused by the terminology used by the ORS people. From the context it appears that a 75mm SP refers to a Marder-type vehicle. In the Mortain report they mention a 75 S.P. (Mark III chassis) which is obviously a StG., a few yards west of 653124 (on the Ger-Mortain road about 6 to 7 kilometers east of l'Abbaye Blanche), then two others (less well defined as StG), both near 586123 (opposite the position at l'Abbaye Blanche. Finally, there is a fourth Mark III (StG?) at 596145 (near the vehicle 'boneyards' about 2.5 kilometers northeast of l'Abbaye Blanche).

So the question(s) is/are:

1) Were the Mark III all StG.
2) If so, why were only 3 SP guns totaled up?
3) If not, are some of the Mark IV tanks totaled up actually Mark III (tanks or StG)?

Now of the four 'Mark III' the two opposite l'Abbaye Blanche were lost to (1) a 75mm AP strike and brew up (2) unknown causes and brew up. The one on the Ger-Mortain road was blown up by unknown cause, and the last was noted as 'hit on rear by unknown shell.'

Thanks for reply. The ORS nomenclature does present some challenges. Curious why ORS wouldn’t simply call the vehicles either StugIII’s or Marders. Both vehicles had been encountered by the British Army as early as 1942.

Chris:

Looking forward to your commentary on my additional questions regarding tactical air and Kursk.

Another mention is made in November (I haven't had a chance to copy the record yet) of a massive bombing attack that killed and wounded some hundreds of corps personnel. However, that was a case of a medium or heavy bomber attack on towns (most of the casualties occured in and around Juelich and Dueren some 20 or more kilometers behind the front), not a tactical air support mission.

A similar account exists for North Africa on 5 September 1942 (evidently this is the series of attacks that caused Rommel to make the statements Jeff quoted in an earlier post). Carpet bombing attacks were made every night from the night of 30-31 August to 3-4 September (5 nights). The estimated number of sorties was 700 and the total number of bombs dropped was estimated as 5,600. During the same period 41 daylight attacks were made, each by a total of about 18 aircraft (738) and the total number of bombs dropped was estimated as 3,600. It is remarked that the morale effect of the night carpet bombing was worse than the daylight attacks -- lack of sleep, fear of where the next bomb would fall, and the actual strikes on troop elements (Zersprengung zur Truppenteilen) were all given as primary causes for the morale effect. The actual losses for all of the bombing was given as 110 KIA, 305 WIA, 170 vehicles (including a single tank) destroyed and 270 vehicles damaged (including 2 tanks). Eight other weapons (larger than 2cm, including one fire-direction calculator) were detroyed and 12 were damaged. Total losses for the period 30 August to 6 September were 553 KIA, 1,788 WIA, 569 MIA, 49 tanks, 395 other vehicles, and 55 guns lost (the casualty listing was seperate from the bomb report and note that the high personnel and material losses were partly as a result of the continuous heavy air attacks and the strong expenditure of artillery ammunition by the enemy. So, 12.7 percent of the gun losses, 17.7 percent of the KIA and WIA, 42.8 percent of the vehicle losses, but only 2 percent of the tank losses were accounted for by the air attacks.

Hope this stirs the pot a bit.

quote:

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Interveiwer: You were in command of your own tank by the time of the Normandy battles how did that feel ?

Bobby: I was quite sad to leave Michael & the others as we had formed quite a team & friendship. But on the other hand it was a proud moment for me. I tried to take all I had learned into my new tank which was number 335. I always remember our first battle was aginst some churchill tanks around the town of Bayeux. I remember wishing I was behind the gun. My new gunner was Gert Von Wend he was only 19 years old but he was quite good , well he had a good teacher! We managed to hit three of them before allied planes came in dropping bombs we retreated back into a small wood & hit two halftracked vehicles. The allies had many planes in the sky so we retreated as far as we could & camouflaged the tank. My other two comrades lost their tanks to the bombs. It was quite different than the East when we could roam about looking for targets. We waited until dark before creeping away dragging half the wood with us. We had to be very careful as there were enemy tanks & infantry everywhere. By morning we were joined by a couple of Panzer IV's from Panzer Lehr which was in the area. We mounted an attack aginst a small column of light tanks & forced them back I think we destroyed 8 or 10 of them. It was then that my tank was hit by rockets from an Allied plane. I was very badly hurt & only the radio operator Hans Dremein got out alive. We were taken back to Germany to recover. It was then that I heard about Michael & his destruction of all those tanks at Villers-Bocage. I heard about it on the radio. I wished I had been with him. I was informed about Michaels death by a Major & Hildegard who came to visit me.

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From:

http://www.panzer-vi.fsnet.co.uk/tales_bwoll.html

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
Another small bit of evidence for the actual effectiveness of air support. In examining the very complete records of the German LXXXI Corps during the fall of 1944 on the Western Front I noticed two mentions of air attacks causing casualties. In one case, on 18 November, 3. Panzer Grenadier Division reported specifically that 7 of the 16 men KIA that day were lost due to a direct hit by a bomb (Bombenvolltreffer) on their bunker. Evidently this was unusual enough an occurence to warrant this specific mention, but [b]no other such mention is made anywhere in the record.
][/B]

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There was an interesting discussion on the WWII newsgroup a couple
years ago regards Panzer Brigade 112, which was hit by USAAF P-47s
near Dompaire on 13 September 1944. The air support was requested
by the 2nd French Armored Division. I don't know if there was a ground
investigation by the ORS, but these air attacks may have caused more
damage than usual because the German tanks were closely bunched
according to Heinz Altmann, who said that he personally witnessed a
number of vehicles set alight by the planes. I asked Heinz why German
tanks would be parked close together during daylight hours, but he was
uncertain. Then Louis Capdeboscq (who used to be a regular on the NG)
posted a translated French account of the battle which added background
details. I still have a copy if anyone wants to read it.

Apparently the planes were Thunderbolts of the 406th Fighter Group,
which would make sense because their 513th Fighter Squadron was the
only available unit equipped with HVAR (5-inch rockets) at the time.

I have not seen the after action reports for Panzer Brigade 112, but the
attack against them was a combined effort by French armored forces and
the USAAF. I would certainly be interested to know how many German
AFVs were damaged/lost/recovered, etc.

--

quote:

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Thirty-four Panthers were total write-offs. During this action, practically no mechanical breakdowns occured. The exclusive cause of the total write-offs was attacks by 16 to 20 Jabos with rocket bombs and phosphorous shells fired from mounted weapons. A considerable number of crew members were casualties. The Abteilung commander was severaly wounded and his adjutant was killed.

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From S. Zaloga’s “Lorraine 1944, Patton vs. Manteuffel” (pg 62)

quote:

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The following morning Group Massu occupied the eastern end of Dompaire, finding four abandoned Panther tanks in the streets of the town. A Kampfgruppe, made up mostly of the 192nd Pz. Gren. Rgt. under Col. von Luck from the 21st Panzer Division, was sent west from Epinal to reinforce the attack, but by the time it arrived, on 14 September, Langlade had been reinforced near Ville-sur-lllon by his third battlegroup, Group Putz. Von Luck's battlegroup, consisting of 17 tanks and 240 infantry, made an attack on Group Minjonnet from the east, near Hennecourt, attempting to prevent the complete annihilation of l/Pz. Rgt. 29 in Dompaire. It was brought under fire by divisional artillery and stopped after an hour of fighting. The German 47th Panzer Corps headquarters decided that any further attacks would be futile. Von Luck and the surviving elements of Pz. Brig. 112 were ordered to withdraw towards positions west of Epinal, hoping that these remnant might be used later in the planned counteroffensive. The hapless survivors of Pz. Brig. 112 were put under 21st Panzer Division command. In less than two days of fighting, the brigade had been reduced to only 21 operational tanks of its original 90. Casualties were estimated to be 350 dead and about 1,000 wounded. Of the 33 tanks found in Group Massu's sector, 13 had been knocked out by tank or tank-destroyer fire. 16 by aircraft attack, and four had been abandoned intact. French losses were five M4A2 medium tanks, two M5A1 light tanks, two half-tracks and two jeeps; 44 were killed, and a single P-47 was shot down.

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quote:

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Originally posted by Dan Stevlingson:
These air attacks may have caused more
damage than usual because the German tanks were closely bunched according to Heinz Altmann, who said that he personally witnessed a number of vehicles set alight by the planes. I asked Heinz why German
tanks would be parked close together during daylight hours, but he was
uncertain.

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The 112. Pz.Brig. was a unit that could almost be depicted as weird. It did not exist before september, except as a paper organization. Plans existed, which showed where soldiers, officers and equipment should be found to man the unit. At the beginning of September, it was alarmed and gathered at Grafenwöhr on 5 September. It was immediately sent to the front in eastern France, picking up its Pz IV and Panther tanks on the way and went into action on 12 September.
Even if the members of the brigade had received prior training as individuals, the brigade effectively had no chance to train as a unit, and this may have been an explanation for its strange bunching up.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
[
B] <Re: Allied pilot claims compared to wreckage found>
I think that the recovery question has little, if any, impact on the
issue. The cases we look at all included a large number of German
tanks abandoned without being hit by anything. It would have been
more worthwhile to recover those than any vehicles hit from the air.
[/B]

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But first someone had to be in position to reach a tank. Recovery
crews were valuable and I find it hard to believe that they would
risk driving around for hours in a free fire zone, looking for the
best tanks available for recovery. I do not believe that they had
the time or fuel for such luxuries in August 1944, even if some
official report said the protocol was otherwise. Unless they were
a safe distance from the front they would grab the nearest damaged
tank in repairable condition and get out of there. Especially when
it was clear that their side was losing the battle.

I know that the ORS implied that tanks hit by air weapons would
always be burnt out (unrepairable) but I doubt if that was true.

quote:

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look at the air claims, 153 were regarded said to be destroyed, 43 probably
destroyed and 56 damaged. Assuming that half the "probably destroyed" were
in fact destroyed and the remainder damaged, we find that the claims would
indicate around 175 destroyed. The ORS teams found 9 destroyed by air.
Would the Germans have towed away about 160 destroyed tanks in such
a situation? There is no way the claims can be defended.
[/B]

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You are right that losses to air could not be anywhere near 160 but
the Germans were observed to be towing AFVs away. And they did
not need special recovery teams to do this. Sometimes panzer crews
towed a disabled tank with a servicable one. That may have been
against regulations, but if so the rule was ignored out of desperation.
There are written accounts and photographic evidence of this.

I once read about a panzer crew that fixed a tow to another tank
while under fire, but that was not very smart. I would think that
the average recovery crew was more sensible because the Germans
could hardly afford to lose them.

quote:

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Originally posted by Dan Stevlingson:
Recovery crews were valuable and I find it hard to believe that they would risk driving around for hours in a free fire zone, looking for the best tanks available for recovery. I do not believe that they had the time or fuel for such luxuries in August 1944, even if some official report said the protocol was otherwise. Unless they were a safe distance from the front they would grab the nearest damaged tank in repairable condition and get out of there. Especially when it was clear that their side was losing the battle.

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Well it is true that the location of the vehicles also influence whether they are recovered or not. Nevertheless, this does not imply that a considerable number of tanks hit by aircraft were recovered. Also, I maintain that it is a major difference if a tank is destroyed, rather than damaged and subsequently recovered and repaired. The German monthly average loss of Panthers during 1944 was about 10 %. This suggests that the average life of a Panther was several months. I don’t know the average time a tank spent in workshops, but the majority of all German tanks that went into workshops were in short term, that is implying repaired within two to three weeks. Thus, the benefit of removing a tank from the rest of the war seems considerably greater than damaging it and sending it to workshops.
In any case, it is clear that the findings of the ORS teams represent the bottom line for the number of tanks destroyed or lost at Mortain. The issue is then how much can the actual outcome have differed from this. The ORS teams reported they had found 9 tanks hit by air weapons. What would you suggest is the likely actual outcome, 10, 15 , 20 , 30 , 50 or anything else?

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Originally posted by Dan Stevlingson:
I know that the ORS implied that tanks hit by air weapons would always be burnt out (unrepairable) but I doubt if that was true.

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I believe the ORS meant that tanks knocked out by rockets were not worth recovering, that does not necessarily imply that other weapons from aircraft caused similar effects, even though a direct hit from a heavier GP probably also caused a tank not to be worth recovering.