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Niklas Said I agree that Pickerts verdict is particularly interesting if his corps was particularly targeted by allied air power. But he wrote in MS # B-597 that: “During the fighting around Caen, the troops sometimes suffered considerable losses, including equipment, from artillery fire. The losses due to Jabo-attacks … remained insignificant.

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It almost sounds like we are all talking about a different Pickert. See Rich’s post above.

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Rich Said: Pickert's III Flak Korps possibly suffered the highest losses from Allied air attack of any comparably sized German unit in Normandy.

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Wolfgang Pickert’s “The Impact of Allied Air Attacks on German Divisions and Other Army Forces in Zones of Combat” is liberally employed in the (presumably U.S. Air Force sponsored) TDI study entitled “German Evaluation of Allied Interdiction in WWII”. The large excerpts of Pickert I have access to paint a rather grime picture of the German Army in Normandy and its sufferings at the hands of the US IXth and XIXth TAC's(as well as the RAF).

See the following excerpt: http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff2/pickart.html

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Niklas Said I think that the recovery question has little, if any, impact on the issue.

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AFV’s damaged by Tactical Air attacks outside of the vicinity of the MLR would be easily recovered and repaired at night. As CAS was still in its infancy during this period much of the damage incurred on German vehicles would more than likely have been behind German lines, and resultant from deep roving Allied fighter bomber sweeps.

Captured vehicles assessed for ORS reports detailing June and July and even early August would most certainly represent tanks\AFV’s captured near the relatively static front lines. The probability that captured vehicles during this period of the campaign had been victims of Allied Tactical Air Interdiction Attacks are somewhat reduced. Such a sample of vehicles would doubtless portray a high percentage of KO’s from ground fire. Tactical Air Interdiction was typically being employed during this period as a tool for battlefield isolation, not direct support of friendly ground troops. Interdiction related vehicular casualties would be somewhat removed from the main ground combat area and would therefore be absent from the ORS samples during this time period.

If a damaged tank doesn’t burn it is typically recovered and repaired. By your own research it is evident that the Germans were not categorizing tanks in long-term or short-term repair relative to causation of damage.

One last thought on vehicle recovery. The RAF ground assessment report of Mortain apparently indicates that German recovery activities more than likely did skew the findings of British Army ORS teams.

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The German recovery service is remarkably efficient, and on this occasion there was very definite evidence that it had been as efficient as usual. Eyewitnesses confirmed this fact. It can therefore be safely assumed that the vehicles found were only a small proportion of those actually destroyed and damaged, and probably an even smaller proportion of those which, although only slightly damaged, had been abandoned by their crews. To attribute destruction or damage to a particular arm or weapon is particularly difficult; however, taking into account the number of vehicles found, surrounded by rocket craters, and others with almost certain rocket or 20mm strikes, it appears that the claims were reasonable. It is inevitable that when a large number of aircraft are operating in a comparatively small area, that certain claims will be duplicated. There is no reason to believe, however that on this occasion the duplication resulted in anything but a small over-statement of the damage inflicted.

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This RAF assessment was of course hotly contested by the original British Army ORS group No 2...after the fact. (Anyone interested in the Army response I will be glad to post it here).

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Niklas Said The cases we look at all included a large number of German tanks abandoned without being hit by anything.

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These same ORS studies concede that many of the abandonment’s were a result of air attacks...presumably a morale effect of seeing adjacent vehicles and tanks being KO’d from air attacks.

I also suspect in some cases the vehicles were not subjected to the thorough going over that is implied in these ORS studies. Example:

Air attacks were conducted on Peiper’s Battle Group during 18th December, 1944. The details of these attacks are laid out in “To Win the Winter Sky” by Danny Parker (see pgs 183 – 185). Extremely foggy conditions prevailed. Apparently pilots of the 365th & 368th Fighter Groups (IXth TAC) had to fly along the Ambleve River valley in order to get below the fog and try and locate Peiper’s Kampfgruppe.

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Meanwhile, the strafing went on. Shortly after Price was forced to ditch, Wells came on the corn announcing that he too was hit, but thought he could make it home. Lt. Thoman escorted Capt. Wells back to base while Brooking stayed on to use up his ammunition on the Germans. But Chievres was so socked in that both pilots headed elsewhere to put down. Ma). Brooking continued to orbit above the German column, hiding in the clouds, all the while asking "Sweepstakes" to send more fighter-bombers to the scene. Soon squadrons from the 368th Fighter Group showed up. Brooking introduced them to the location of the Germans and a new tactic: scoot out of the clouds at tree-top level to bomb and strafe the column and then dash back into the clouds before the flak gunners could draw a bead. The German column would be under attack for the rest of the afternoon. At 3:35 PM Brooking returned home to Chievres and put down in a blind landing, coasting in on fumes. At 2:20 PM, another flight from the 365th took off under 1st Lt. Howard R. Dentz, Jr., arriving over Stavelot just before 3 PM and bombing and strafing the tanks, troops and vehicles moving through the town. Other flights under Maj. Arlo C. Henry, Jr„ Capt. Neal E. Worley, Capt. Robert E. Robinson and Capt. Samuel E. Saunders kept up the strafing of Kampfgruppe Peiper until dusk. Col Stecker himself led the last flight of the day which was vectored to drop its bombs on the supply lines of the ISS Panzer Division near Blankenheim. The Hell Hawks claimed 56 vehicles, 15 tanks or half- tracks. The group lost one plane shot down, one bellied in at base and seven were severely damaged by flak. Maj. Brooking received the Silver Star.

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ORS joint Report No.1 “Air Attacks on Enemy Armor in the Ardennes Salient” details the ground team investigations conducted on the above described air attacks on Peiper’s Kampfgruppe (18th December, 1944).

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1. 18 Dec. 44-IX TAG
4 P-47s with 8 x 500 lb GP bombs fuzed 8-15 sees delay.
Air Claim: 4 tanks destroyed K 7603.
Ground Check: In and around Malmedy were found 4 Panthers, all disguised as Shermans by the addition of thin sheet metal superstructures. One of these had been destroyed by the crew and the others by American artillery.

2. 18 Dec. 44-IX TAG
3 P-47s with 6 x 500 lb GP bombs fused 8-15 sees delay
Air Claim: 3 tanks destroyed K 7603.
Ground Check: See serial I above.

3. 18 Dec. 44 - IX TAG
14 P-47s with 28 x 500 lb GP bombs fused inst., 1/40 sees.
Air Claim: 12-15 tanks destroyed K 710003 - K 717025.
Ground Check: At K 700000 was a Royal Tiger facing east; there were no visible signs of damage; no bomb craters found. The fighting compartment had been burnt out; It is possible that the fuel had run out. At P 685993 was another Royal Tiger facing east but its gun was pointing west. The rear half of the turret was smashed and the roof over the driver's and hull-gunner's compartment was stove in. A bomb crater, probably 500 lb GP with 1/40 sec delay, was found some 17 yards to the east of the tank. The complete absence of human remains suggests that the crew had baled out on the approach of the aircraft. The destruction of this tank was seen by an officer of 740 Tank Bn. which was being held up by the Royal Tiger; he said that it was hit by a bomb dropped from a P-38 on 25th December, 1944.

4. 18 Dec. 44 - IX TAG
4 P-47s with 8 x 500 lb GP bombs fused 8-11 sees delay.
Air Claim: 2 medium tanks destroyed K 6810.
Ground Check: Nothing found in the area.


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Now than Peiper himself indicates losing 3 tanks and several APC’s from air attacks on the 18th of December. From “German Evaluation of Allied Interdiction in WWII” (pg IV-55):

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Colonel Peiper, commander of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment, tells how he had a bad break the afternoon of 18 December as the weather cleared and American fighter-bombers attacked him. He said he lost 3 tanks and 5 armored personnel carriers which blocked the road and delayed his advance until 1800.

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Rrich Said Jeff, sorry, but you did notice that their was no confirmation of any kills from the 18 December air attacks in ORS No.1?

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Rich Said Jeff, according to Niklas' excellent work…

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Niklas does do excellent work. I went through a great deal of trouble trying to obtain his work on Kursk after reading through Normandy 1944. I look forward to obtaining his next historical study.

I hope you folks don't take my postings here as too argumentative. They are not intended to be. It's simply my attempt to understand the issue at hand. If I look at things from a different perspective I hope you will be patient and bear with me. I wasn't trained as a Historian…my background is in engineering.

I'm not historian...I just play one on TV

As ORS Joint Report No. 1 shows no KO’d tanks from air claims for Dec. 18th I am suggesting that the 3 kills Peiper indicates he incurred were:

1) Completely missed by ORS ground team investigations.

2) The vehicles were repaired and returned to service prior to the ground investigations being conducted.

Your point

1) is well taken. The ORS report investigated 5 KT, 47 Panther, 5 PzIV and 18 StG. German losses in the Ardennes totaled (as best we were able to determine):

16-20 Tiger
191-194 Panther
141-158 PzIV
179-182 StG

So the ORS had an excellent sample of KT, a good sample of Panthers, a minimal sample of StG, and a poor sample of PzIV. Howeve, the overll sample was pretty good, especially since it was limited to the northern half of the bulge.

2). Then they were not counted by ORS or the Germans as a loss. So I don't quite see your point.

3). More likely the tank losses were damaged and quickly repaired. The point is that the air claims were highly suspect in many ways.

The claims exceeded actual losses.
The claims were for losses in areas where no losses (or even bomb or rocket strikes could be confirmed) occured.
Losses could be confirmed where no claims existed (similar to the Korean War napalm effects).

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Niklas Said I agree that Pickerts verdict is particularly interesting if his corps was particularly targeted by allied air power. But he wrote in MS # B-597 that: “During the fighting around Caen, the troops sometimes suffered considerable losses, including equipment, from artillery fire. The losses due to Jabo-attacks … remained insignificant.

It almost sounds like we are all talking about a different Pickert. See Rich’s post above.

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I sure have seen Rich's post and I have no disagreement with it. It is fully conceivable that even for a unit that suffered higher losses from the air than most other units, artillery was still the most important cause of casualties.

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Wolfgang Pickert’s “The Impact of Allied Air Attacks on German Divisions and Other Army Forces in Zones of Combat” is liberally employed in the (presumably U.S. Air Force sponsored) TDI study entitled “German Evaluation of Allied Interdiction in WWII”. The large excerpts of Pickert I have access to paint a rather grime picture of the German Army in Normandy and its sufferings at the hands of the US IXth and XIXth TAC's(as well as the RAF).

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I have not used that report by Pickert. I don't know how many years after the war it was written. The MS-B 597 is dated 20 april 1947, that is fairly soon after the war. The Corps after action report is dated 20 september 1944. In my opinion, report made many years after the war are less reliable, unless they rely on contemporary material. It is worth noting that the 20 september 1944 report also emphasize the losses from artillery. It even goes so far as to conclude that the FLAK should be employed about 10 kilometer behind the front to reduce the vulnerability to artillery (aircraft were important to spot the Flak positions). The report goes on to complain that the army and Waffen-SS insisted on using the Flak units in the ground, particularly anti-tank role. On 15 august (at a time when the air threat seems to have been particularly great) the 5th Panzer Army demanded that all the corps heavy flak batteries should be used in ground combat. The corps objected that this would mean that there would be no heavy batteries firing at aircraft. This the army regarded with indifference. Such behaviour does not suggest that the army commanders, at least not at the time of events, found the threat from the air exceedingly problematic. Afterwards they may well have modified their views, but I prefer to rely on their contemporary views.

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AFV’s damaged by Tactical Air attacks outside of the vicinity of the MLR would be easily recovered and repaired at night. As CAS was still in its infancy during this period much of the damage incurred on German vehicles would more than likely have been behind German lines, and resultant from deep roving Allied fighter bomber sweeps.

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First of all, if a tank is recovered and repaired, it is not destroyed and should not be counted as a claim (at least not of the same significance as a vehicle damaged beyond economical repair). Second, tanks were mainly located in the front line, which would make such losses as you describe less likely. Also, there is nothing in the contemporary German records that indicate such losses, except possibly some isolated cases (I can only recall one). There is, on the other hand plenty of information on German tanks lost (irretreivably) in ground combat.

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Captured vehicles assessed for ORS reports detailing June and July and even early August would most certainly represent tanks\AFV’s captured near the relatively static front lines. The probability that captured vehicles during this period of the campaign had been victims of Allied Tactical Air Interdiction Attacks are somewhat reduced. Such a sample of vehicles would doubtless portray a high percentage of KO’s from ground fire. Tactical Air Interdiction was typically being employed during this period as a tool for battlefield isolation, not direct support of friendly ground troops. Interdiction related vehicular casualties would be somewhat removed from the main ground combat area and would therefore be absent from the ORS samples during this time period. If a damaged tank doesn’t burn it is typically recovered and repaired.

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See my comment above.

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By your own research it is evident that the Germans were not categorizing tanks in long-term or short-term repair relative to causation of damage.

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Not quite, They did tend to chategorize according to degree of damage, but that did not always correspond to actual repair times, because of the irregular flow of spare parts.

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One last thought on vehicle recovery. The RAF ground assessment report of Mortain apparently indicates that German recovery activities more than likely did skew the findings of British Army ORS teams.

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The German recovery service is remarkably efficient, and on this occasion there was very definite evidence that it had been as efficient as usual. Eyewitnesses confirmed this fact. It can therefore be safely assumed that the vehicles found were only a small proportion of those actually destroyed and damaged, and probably an even smaller proportion of those which, although only slightly damaged, had been abandoned by their crews. To attribute destruction or damage to a particular arm or weapon is particularly difficult; however, taking into account the number of vehicles found, surrounded by rocket craters, and others with almost certain rocket or 20mm strikes, it appears that the claims were reasonable. It is inevitable that when a large number of aircraft are operating in a comparatively small area, that certain claims will be duplicated. There is no reason to believe, however that on this occasion the duplication resulted in anything but a small over-statement of the damage inflicted.

This RAF assessment was of course hotly contested by the original British Army ORS group No 2...after the fact. (Anyone interested in the Army response I will be glad to post it here).

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I would most strongly disagree with this RAF statement. I think it is one of the more ludicrous statements I have ever seen. First of all, the claims were 252 tank and assault guns damaged or destroyed. German figures on the number of tanks that participated do not agree entirely, but the highest I have found indicates the intended participation of 177 tanks and assault guns. Even if we make the rather bizarre assumption that every German tank was hit from the air, we would still have a quite significant inflation of claims.
But if we look at the air claims, 153 were regarded said to be destroyed, 43 probably destroyed and 56 damaged. Assuming that half the "probably destroyed" were in fact destroyed and the remainder damaged, we find that the claims would indicate around 175 destroyed. The ORS teams found 9 destroyed by air. Would the Germans have towed away about 160 destroyed tanks in such a situation? There is no way the claims can be defended.
It is also worth noting that there is no quantifiable data presented on how many tanks that would have been dragged away, which makes the statement "It can safely be assumed that the vehicles found were only a small portion of those actually destroyed and damaged" by RAF unsupported. Furthermore, the results from the Mortain investigation are in line with the results from the period 15-25 August, when German recovery efforts were very modest, which suggest that recovery did not play a significant part in the conclusion that air weapons were not an effective tool for destroying tanks.

Niklas Zetterling

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Howeve, the overll sample was pretty good, especially since it was limited to the northern half of the bulge.

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Again the sample does not -- nor could it -- represent tanks damaged or KO’d and subsequently returned to service during the course of the campaign.

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Then they were not counted by ORS or the Germans as a loss.

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I’m talking about the Vehicles being KO’d than recovered and repaired as well as the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of tactical air attacks. You are suggesting that a units combat power is unaffected by tanks under short or long-term repair?

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The claims exceeded actual losses.

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Air claims always exceed actual losses (except apparently the oddity you pointed out regarding napalm). I think I said something to that effect several posts ago. Approx 8:1 claims to actual kills during the mobile period of the Korean War. Including napalm. This is based on a much more comprehensive sample relative to ORS studies conducted in Normandy or the Ardennes. Over 80% of NKPA total tank Strength at the start of the War was subsequently recovered and examined by UN ground crews. Operational studies conducted by 2nd TAC air in Ardennes suggest a 10:1 ratio. From what I am seeing perhaps a 15:1 or 20:1 overall is more appropriate. The KG Peiper Example above suggests a 5:1 ratio for that particular engagement.

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The claims were for losses in areas where no losses (or even bomb or rocket strikes could be confirmed) occurred.

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ORS Joint Report 1 for the Ardennes indicates 30 locations of possible air claims were investigated by ground teams. Air crews made claims at over 154 locations. 124 locations around the Ardennes were therefore not investigated by ground crews. Air attacks on KG Peiper on the 18th indicates one instance of kills not being included in the ORS assessment for Ardennes. Was this one of the 30 locations investigated…or one of the 124 not investigated?

ORS Joint Report No.1 claims only 1 tank KO’d by Air action in the Ardennes and 6 possible air related kills…out of 101 tanks examined. I suspect the KT KO’d on the 25th of Dec wouldn’t have been included had it not been for an unqualified Army TD officer actually seeing the KT killed by a 500 pound bomb. The ORS ground team did after all indicate the bomb crater was a good 17 yards from the KO’d tank.

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Losses could be confirmed where no claims existed (similar to the Korean War napalm effects.

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You have a Ardennes or Normandy example in mind…or just the under scored napalm claims in Korea?

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
You have a Ardennes or Normandy example in mind…or just the under scored napalm claims in Korea?

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Sorry Jeff, I wasn't clear, but I was referring to the KT destroyed by the P-38 on 25 December. There were no claims by any aircraft for AFVs near that grid square on 25 December (years ago when working on the Ardennes project I plotted many of the air attacks on the map, unfortunately the maps are now moldering away in some Army basement). So, as the ORS sample (30 of 174 is a fairly robust sample BTW) shows, it is almost impossible to correlate air attacks with kills.

Let's bring in another opinion, that of Meinrad von Lauchert, commander of 2nd Panzer Division from December 1944 to the end of the war. On 17 December 1944 he replied to a series of questions posed by US Army interogators as follows:

Q: What about NAPALM and rocket-firing TYPHOONS?
A: I never experienced NAPALMS at the front, and very few rocket firing Typhoons. The latter accounted for a few of our tank losses.

Q: How does the ground force react to Marauders and Invaders?
A: They were terribly feared further back. Their effectiveness started back at the repair shop level. For the front line troops, medium bombers were not usually used.

Q: Do ground forces find bombs or strafing more unpleasant?
A: In the MLR bombs were far more unpleasant, since, toward the end, we usually fought in or around towns. The individual soldier hardly noticed the machine guns of a plane....Of course strafing was far more effective in the destruction of tanks [n.b., it is obvious from the context that he means armored vehicles--Rich], and, as far as unarmored vehicles were concerned, your aiming was so precise that I almost never saw it happen that a plane needed a second try to destroy its objective.

Tanks in short and long-term repair, by definition, cannot affect a units combat power, since they do not have any combat power to contribute. An armored units combat power is defined by the number of operational tanks it has. Tanks in short-term repair (by US and UK definition they were short-term if the repair could be completed in less than 24 hours) may have represented a potential combat power, but nothing more.

In any case, in the Ardennes all evidence points to a distinct lack of repair and recovery capability within the German units. Many of the damaged and broken down vehicles were abandoned in place, it appears that relatively few were actually recovered and fewer still were repaired.

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So, as the ORS sample (30 of 174 is a fairly robust sample BTW) shows, it is almost impossible to correlate air attacks with kills.

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I disagree, and I have as yet seen no evidence presented here that supports this opinion.

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So, as the ORS sample (30 of 174 is a fairly robust sample BTW) shows, it is almost impossible to correlate air attacks with kills.

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Relative to the Korean War this sample size isn't quite so robust.

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Tanks in short and long-term repair, by definition, cannot affect a units combat power, since they do not have any combat power to contribute.

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The context was Implicit. But I will give some elaboration; Combat power of formation X prior to air attack. Combat power of formation X after air attack. Vehicles damaged or destroyed during said air attack either burned or now reside in a mechanics capable hands. These Tanks in short and long-term repair, by definition, cannot affect a units combat power until repaired, since they do not have any combat power to contribute for the duration of the time they are being repaired.

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On 17 December 1944 he replied to a series of questions posed by US Army interogators as follows:

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He was interrogated on the 17th?

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Q: What about NAPALM and rocket-firing TYPHOONS?
A: I never experienced NAPALMS at the front, and very few rocket firing Typhoons. The latter accounted for a few of our tank losses.

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This seems inconsistent with ORS findings regarding the accuracy of Rocket projectiles. Von Lauchert indicates his unit was attacked by "very very few" Typhoons…yet these "very very few" attacks resulted in some tank losses.

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Q: Do ground forces find bombs or strafing more unpleasant?
A: In the MLR bombs were far more unpleasant, since, toward the end, we usually fought in or around towns. The individual soldier hardly noticed the machine guns of a plane....Of course strafing was far more effective in the destruction of tanks [n.b., it is obvious from the context that he means armored vehicles--Rich], and, as far as unarmored vehicles were concerned, your aiming was so precise that I almost never saw it happen that a plane needed a second try to destroy its objective.

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I think you must have snipped too much from this portion of the interview, as I don't see how these few sentences imply he was talking specifically about APC's or AC's. He does use the word "tanks". Surely a Panzer officer can distinguish between the two categories of vehicles. Was he replying in English? Or were his answers interpreted from German?

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So unfortunately again I'm not quite sure what you are driving at?

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It goes back to page 2 of this thread and the implied reliability of various operational studies, reports, as well as memoirs or recollections of soldiers regarding the effectiveness\ineffectiveness of tactical air. There seems to be a "cat on a hot tin roof" approach to accepting or not accepting the reliability German Officers memories or memoirs. Von Lauchert is good to go…Rommel was looking to cover his ass. General Pickert was senile but Hauptmann Pickardt was an officer who had acute insights into the lack of effectiveness of Allied air attacks.

Thanks for your continued replies to my queries on this subject matter. Unfortunately I am headed out of town for a week or so for work. Headed to Seattle…I hate Seattle. I would like to study your answers a little closer before responding.

Regards

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
It goes back to page 2 of this thread and the implied reliability of various operational studies, reports, as well as memoirs or recollections of soldiers regarding the effectiveness\ineffectiveness of tactical air. There seems to be a "cat on a hot tin roof" approach to accepting or not accepting the reliability German Officers memories or memoirs. Von Lauchert is good to go…Rommel was looking to cover his ass. General Pickert was senile but Hauptmann Pickardt was an officer who had acute insights into the lack of effectiveness of Allied air attacks.

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I don't see a problem with our way of judging the sources. It is a well establish principle when doing historical research that a source is regarded as more reliable the closer it was to the actual event, in time and space. If Hauptmann Pickart reported in mid June 1944, that is simply closer to the actual event than a statement made in a memoir ten years or so after the event. Obviously this is not the only factor that decides the reliability of a source, but it is one of the more important. Also you seems to have misunderstood the Pickart report. He discussed the situation with several high ranking German officers at the front in Normandy and what he reported was not only his own judgement, but also their impressions, as they were at that time.
I think I have applied this principle of "closeness in time" rather consistently. I believe TDI does so too.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Niklas:

Thanks for your continued replies to my queries on this subject matter. Unfortunately I am headed out of town for a week or so for work. Headed to Seattle…I hate Seattle. I would like to study your answers a little closer before responding.

Regards

Jeff Duquette

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Please take your time. I suggest we change the focus of the entire discussion. Why don't you try to give us strong reasons why we should rely on air claims.
To give some background, in every case I have been able to check, claims have always been exaggerated, except occasionally when they were deliberately reduced by higher HQ:s.
Just to take an example. In the Gulf War, the CENTCOM in Riyad arrived at the conclusion that the Iraqi forces lost 4 280 tanks. In the cases where the air craft were equipped with video tapes, these were studied by the CENTCOM. If the air craft were not equipped with such devices (most were not), rules of thumb were applied to reduce claims, since the inflation of claims was a well known phenomenon. Despite this precautions, the CENTCOM arrived at an overall figure of destroyed Iraqi tanks which exceeded the number of tanks the Iraqi possessed by almost 1000. If that is not indicative of inflated claims, then what is?
Similarly, the claims made by air units at Mortain exceeded the number of German tanks employed. How is this to be explained. There are considerable data from the east front, were German claims can be compared to SOviet data on losses. Again claims made by the units were inflated, even though the OKH reduced them too much. And in this case the sample size is well over ten thousand tanks. I believe TDI can probably present similar data for the Ardennes campaign.
There are a number of logical reasons why claims are exaggerated.
1. Target identification is wrong. In the Gulf war it was evident that trucks quite often were identified as APC:s and APC:s as tanks, but almost never the other way around. I have discussed this matter with Israeli officers and analysts who have worked with precisely this problem. They arrived at the conclusion that victimes must be examined on the ground. They even found examples were air crews had in fact attacked the shadow created by sunshine on trees, which from altitude looked like a tank. They employed the method of bringing the pilot to the place were his claimed victim was located.

2. The target has been missed when fired upon. Many air weapons produce much smoke, flash and dust, which cover the target and make observation difficult. Nevertheless, it is more often than not reported, in such cases, that the target has been destroyed.

3. Duplication. The target has been attacked by more than one weapon. The target may even have been attacked even though it was already destroyed.

4. Degree of damage. The target was not destroyed, even though it was hit. As I see it, if a target was damaged but subsequently repaired, it is not destroyed. While it did temporarily diminish the fighting capability of a unit, it can not be compared to a permanent destruction. Furthermore, if damaged tanks are to be accepted as claims, it becomes much more difficult to check the accuracy of the claims. It is probably more difficult to find records on the number of tanks repaired due to enemy action (as opposed to mere mechanical breakdown) than on the number completely destroyed.
In any case, is there any reason to believe that the ratio damaged/destroyed would be greater for tanks subjected to air attack than to ground fire?

To sum up, if claims in general are exaggerated, what are the reasons to beleive that air claims are less exaggerated?

Niklas Zetterling

[This message has been edited by Niklas Zetterling (edited 09-08-2001).]

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
It goes back to page 2 of this thread and the implied reliability of various operational studies, reports, as well as memoirs or recollections of soldiers regarding the effectiveness\ineffectiveness of tactical air. There seems to be a "cat on a hot tin roof" approach to accepting or not accepting the reliability German Officers memories or memoirs. Von Lauchert is good to go…Rommel was looking to cover his ass. General Pickert was senile but Hauptmann Pickardt was an officer who had acute insights into the lack of effectiveness of Allied air attacks.

The Same effect on the other side of the hill. Depuy was unqualified to make a judgment on the effects of air attacks on German Convoys, but an officer from a TD outfit can make the call on weather a King Tiger was knocked out by an air attack or not.

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Sorry, my bad, the questionnaire was completed by von Lauchert on 17 December 1947, not 1944. Another case of my bad typing.

As to the context, the entire report is some 30 pages of legal-size paper, so I can't possibly type the whole thing in. In this case, it appears that von Lauchert said gepanzerte in the general meaning of armored vehicles, since the only other mention of vehicles is specifically given as unarmored vehicles. I expect with a bit of digging I might find the original German interview, but I was more interested in his inconsistancies than anything -- just as you say "few rocket-firing Typjoons" but they destroy a "few tanks?" Unfortunately it is part and parcel with the whole confusing subject.

BTW, the Ardennes ORS sample is fairly robust, the total of the ORS samples is even more robust. Of the seven-odd cases I have explored so far, only Korea appears inconsistent. It also appears to be inconsistent with the more modern Arab-Israeli War cases, Desert Storm and Kosovo.

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Niklas Said: To sum up, if claims in general are exaggerated, what are the reasons to beleive that air claims are less exaggerated?

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Of course air claims are exaggerated! I have already indicated as much in two previous postings on this thread. To what degree are these claims exaggerated…that is part of what I am interested in. As I have already indicated an operational study by 2nd TAC following The Battle of the Bulge indicates an exaggeration in the vicinity of 10:1 for AFV’s. The study was conducted immediately following the campaign so it should fit into your acceptance criteria for the “principle of closeness in time". Looking at information from Futrell’s work on the Air War in Korea as well as ORO ground counts the exaggeration of air claims to actual ground confirmed kills was approximately 9:1. If claims to actual kills is consistently hovering around 9:1 or 10:1 than there is a correlation between claims and kills…the correlation is just not a simple 1:1 relationship.

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Niklas Said: It is also worth noting that there is no quantifiable data presented on how many tanks that would have been dragged away, which makes the statement "It can safely be assumed that the vehicles found were only a small portion of those actually destroyed and damaged" by RAF unsupported.

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Niklas Said: On 15 august (at a time when the air threat seems to have been particularly great) the 5th Panzer Army demanded that all the corps heavy flak batteries should be used in ground combat..

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Rich Said: BTW, the Ardennes ORS sample is fairly robust, the total of the ORS samples is even more robust..

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It is apparent that you feel that the ORS Joint Report No.1 for the Ardennes was fairly robust, however even the ORS team itself felt less than pleased with their efforts on this particular investigation:

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Consequently a combined team of eight, including Wing" Commander Graham and Squadron Leader Abel of ORS 2nd TAP, was based at Aywaille in the Ardennes salient from where they carried out an extensive ground search for destroyed tanks claimed by the Air Forces. In contrast to their earlier work in Normandy, the ORS were hampered by adverse weather, extreme cold and occasional blizzards, and the fact that much of the ground was covered in snow which prevented tanks from being seen from more than a few yards away, The investigation was therefore slower, and was acknowledged to be less thorough. There was little opportunity to assess RAF attacks…(Originally From: Pro WO 291/1331 “Operational Research in Northwest Europe”)

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Of course air claims are exaggerated! I have already indicated as much in two previous postings on this thread. To what degree are these claims exaggerated…that is part of what I am interested in. As I have already indicated an operational study by 2nd TAC following The Battle of the Bulge indicates an exaggeration in the vicinity of 10:1 for AFV’s. The study was conducted immediately following the campaign so it should fit into your acceptance criteria for the “principle of closeness in time". Looking at information from Futrell’s work on the Air War in Korea as well as ORO ground counts the exaggeration of air claims to actual ground confirmed kills was approximately 9:1. If claims to actual kills is consistently hovering around 9:1 or 10:1 than there is a correlation between claims and kills…the correlation is just not a simple 1:1 relationship.

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I think there is little point in establishing a ratio between kills and claims. If it is somewhere in the region of 1:5 or 1:15 there is still so much room for variation that it is of little use to find an average ratio, at least if the purpose is to estimate actual losses.
What is clear is that the claims are exaggerated, and I also think that - usually - air claims are more exaggerated than claims by ground units, at least as far as tanks kills are considered. In any case, the degree to which claims are exaggerated can, I think, vary very much, from situation to situation.
Hence, the 1:9 ratio would, at best, apply to that particular situation.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Conversely over reliance on ORS Report no. 4 as establishing a rule of thumb for determination of air inflicted AFV casualties seems precarious if portions of the sample population had been dragged away by recovery crews.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
This conveniently corresponds well with the kick-off date of Operation TRACTABLE (August 14), so it seems reasonable to assume that 5th Panzer Army was interested in employing heavy flak guns in an anti-tank role. I’d call this more of a temporary case of robbing Peter to pay Paul rather than some sudden realization by 5th Panzer Army that Allied Tactical Air was ineffective and therefore all heavy flak could be released from its role as AAA.

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Obviously, had there been no pressure from enemy ground forces, the AA units would have been employed in their intended role. However, it is at least an indication of whihc threat was perceived as most dangerous, that from enemy ground forces or that from enemy air forces.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
If claims to actual kills is consistently hovering around 9:1 or 10:1 than there is a correlation between claims and kills…the correlation is just not a simple 1:1 relationship.

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In the case of the Kursk air campaign, where I had both German and Soviet claims and Soviet and German kills from unit records, I did do this test. When I compared claims to kills on a daily basis, they varied widely from day to day. Furthermore, I could see no correlation between German losses and Soviet claims. There was however, a pretty clear correlation between actual Soviet losses and the Soviet claims of German losses.
There problem is that one cannot assume a direct relationship, becuase 1) it varies widely and 2) what is causing the "overclaiming" may have nothing to do with actual enemy losses.

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Chris Lawrence Said: In the case of the Kursk air campaign, where I had both German and Soviet claims and Soviet and German kills from unit records, I did do this test. When I compared claims to kills on a daily basis, they varied widely from day to day. Furthermore, I could see no correlation between German losses and Soviet claims. There was however, a pretty clear correlation between actual Soviet losses and the Soviet claims of German losses.

There problem is that one cannot assume a direct relationship, becuase 1) it varies widely and 2) what is causing the "overclaiming" may have nothing to do with actual enemy losses.

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Interesting. Although it is not particularly surprising that claims to kills would very widely on a day-by-day or engagement-by-engagement basis. What was the over-all claims to kills for the entire operation (time line -- say – kick off of the German Attack up through cancellation of the southern pincer of the attack), and how was either side investigating\confirming ground kills relative to air claims? Surely there isn’t anything equivalent to ORS studies generated by the German Army or Red Army?

Secondly as you have brought up the Russian Front, I am curious how coordination of various “tank busting aircraft” (ala HS-129B-2, JU-87G-1 or Shturmoviks) was conducted between ground and air elements. Moreover were the Soviets and\or Germans employing Air liaison Officers operating from tanks\AC’s ala the Anglo-American Armies in NW Europe? Or were tank-busting sorties employed more along the lines of a roving sort battlefield isolation method? Assuming the former, what sort of reaction times were typical between a request for CAS and aircraft appearing over\engaging the target?

And Lastly; I vaguely recall an incident during Kursk in which it is claimed that either Ju-87G’s (or perhaps they were HS-129’s) destroyed a large portion of a Soviet Tank Brigade which had been assembling for a counterattack. Based upon your research is there any truth to this story? (Sorry the finer details of this engagement somewhat allude me…I can provide more information on this event if it is unclear to you what I am asking).