If 16 PD were in the army group NU area at 15,000 personal per div it would represent 240,000 pepole. The actual ger ground unit str of the AGNU on the 1st of jun for div and brigades would be approx 475,000. The panzer div would then represnt half the str in divs and brigades at this point. The actual % of troops drops as you include GHQ combat str 533,000 tot. And even futher if you include non combat GHQ units and units directly under OKH command 597,000 tot.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
It seems unlikly 80% of ALL ger Panzer divs in the east where in AGNUkr. Does any one have some good info on this? Sometime after the 1st but before the 22 of jun the 9th and 10th SS PD were transfered from lov to normandy.

---

There were only one Panzer division behind AGN an AGC just before Bagration. It was the 12th, located SW of Pskov. Other mobile divisions in reserve behind AGC were 25th PzGrenadier div near Orsha, Feldherrnhalle and 18th PzG divs near Mogilev. At Narva frontline (AGN) were SS-Nederlander and SS-Nordland, both Panzergrenadier divisions.

About the time, AGNU had 9 Pz and 1 PzG divs, AGSU had 5 Pz and 3 PzG divs.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Jyri Kettunen:
There were only one Panzer division behind AGN an AGC just before Bagration. It was the 12th, located SW of Pskov. Other mobile divisions in reserve behind AGC were 25th PzGrenadier div near Orsha, Feldherrnhalle and 18th PzG divs near Mogilev. At Narva frontline (AGN) were SS-Nederlander and SS-Nordland, both Panzergrenadier divisions.

About the time, AGNU had 9 Pz and 1 PzG divs, AGSU had 5 Pz and 3 PzG divs.

---

On the Eastern Front:
1PD,4PD,5PD,7PD,8PD,16PD,17PD plus 9SSPD and 10SSPD all with AG NordUk

12PD with AG Nord

13PD,14PD,23PD,24PD and 3SSPD with AG SüdUk

20PD and 5SSPD with AG Mitte

So 9 of 17 were with AGNU or 52.9%

***********************

For the complete story the remaining Panzer Divisions were located as follows:

In the West
2PD,9PD,11PD,19PD,21PD and 1SSPD, 2SSPD and 12SSPD
In Italy
26PD, HGPD
In Germany
6PD
In Denmark
25PD
**************************

The Panzer-Grenadier units were located as follows:

In the East:
20PGD with AGNU
11SSPGD with AG Nord
GD PGD and 10PGD with AGSU
25PGD with AGMitte
16PGD with AGSüd

In the West:
17SSPGD
In Italy:
3PGD,15PGD,29PGD,90PGD and 16SSPGD
In Greece:
4SSPGD
In Yugoslavia:
18SSPGD

*****************************

This data would certainly indicate that the 80% figure was in error.
Hope this information helps.

best regards

Ron Klages

quote:

---

Originally posted by Ron Klages:
From the works of Tessin I find the following locations for Panzer Divisions in June 1944.

On the Eastern Front:
1PD,4PD,5PD,7PD,8PD,16PD,17PD plus 9SSPD and 10SSPD all with AG NordUk

12PD with AG Nord

13PD,14PD,23PD,24PD and 3SSPD with AG SüdUk

20PD and 5SSPD with AG Mitte

So 9 of 17 were with AGNU or 52.9%

***********************

For the complete story the remaining Panzer Divisions were located as follows:

In the West
2PD,9PD,11PD,19PD,21PD and 1SSPD, 2SSPD and 12SSPD
In Italy
26PD, HGPD
In Germany
6PD
In Denmark
25PD
**************************

The Panzer-Grenadier units were located as follows:

In the East:
20PGD with AGNU
11SSPGD with AG Nord
GD PGD and 10PGD with AGSU
25PGD with AGMitte
16PGD with AGSüd

In the West:
17SSPGD
In Italy:
3PGD,15PGD,29PGD,90PGD and 16SSPGD
In Greece:
4SSPGD
In Yugoslavia:
18SSPGD

*****************************

This data would certainly indicate that the 80% figure was in error.
Hope this information helps.

best regards

Ron Klages

---

It gets even more confusing then that though. The 9th SSPD and the 10th SS PD were on the east front on the 1st of jun but after normandy they were ordered transfered west on the 12th of june. So by 22 jun the start date of bagtration the divs were gone. They left not just AG NordUkr but the entire eastern front. Assuming no other divs were moved we would then have 7 out of 15 ger PD or a bit less than 50%. Plus only 1 out of 7 (including correction) PGD on the east front in AG NordUkr.

Thanks a lot Ron!

It might just be the ger saw a threat real or imagined and conc there forces there but no way near 80%. After the threat diminished they started moving thier forces elsewhere such as normandy were the threat was more significant.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Ron Klages:
This data would certainly indicate that the 80% figure was in error.
Hope this information helps.

best regards

Ron Klages

---

Any info on tank strengths? Yes, I know that is not the same as numbers of divisions. I have the info for 12. and 13. PD, and neither were at a full strength level (little surprise there).

12. PD 1st June (placement in AGN for 1st June is correct BTW):

46 IVL
3 IVK
6 III 50L60
1 III N
3 Command Tanks

Total (gun tanks) 56

13.PD 1.8.44

5 III
36 IV

Total 41

Sources are:

12. PD (2.ID) Pommern 1921-45 (divisional history by Niepold) and Hoffmann 'Die Magdeburger Division - zur Geschichte der 13. ID/PD 1935-45).

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:

BTW - for anyone doubting the German assessment that the summer offensive was aimed at AGNU in the first place, I strongly recommend to read Niepold 'Mittlere Ostfront 1944', in which he quotes from OKH, and AGC assessments that state quite clearly that the main thrust was expected in AGNU, with 2nd Army being expected to have to parry a secondary thrust.

---

Your own reference article said the sovs moved in many tanks opositte AGNUkr which the ger saw then pulled out. Again according to your reference some gers in AGNU recognized the absence of the tanks. It seems the ger knew the sov tanks weren´t there anymore. They just did not know where they were sent to perhaps. Its all in the dates the conc on the 1st of june of 9 panzer divs is significant but by the 22nd 3 weeks later when bagtration was launched AT LEAST 2 of these divs were not even on the eastern front.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:

BTW - for anyone doubting the German assessment that the summer offensive was aimed at AGNU in the first place, I strongly recommend to read Niepold 'Mittlere Ostfront 1944', in which he quotes from OKH, and AGC assessments that state quite clearly that the main thrust was expected in AGNU, with 2nd Army being expected to have to parry a secondary thrust.

---

Zaloga puts it this way: "By mid june 1944 Fremde Heere Ost had concluded that the soviet summer offensive would start with simultaneous attacks against Army Group Centre and Army Group South Ukraine, but it continued to insist that the main offensive thrust would come against Army Group North Ukraine. The Army Group Centre intelligence assesment of 19 june agreed." (Bagration 1944: pp 40)

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
It might just be the ger saw a threat real or imagined and conc there forces there but no way near 80%. After the threat diminished they started moving thier forces elsewhere such as normandy were the threat was more significant.

---

By your own count over 50% of the PD's were in AGNU when it was not under attack, then attacks elsewhere led to units being siphoned off and AGNU ended up with signifacantly less forces when it was eventually attacked.
Sounds more like they were caught wrongfooted then that they were "shifting their forces when the threat diminished".

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
[..]In fact the rus victories were mainly in the south.

---

I don't quite follow that, do you mean in the 44 summer campaign or in general?

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:

Your own reference article said the sovs moved in many tanks opositte AGNUkr which the ger saw then pulled out. Again according to your reference some gers in AGNU recognized the absence of the tanks. It seems the ger knew the sov tanks weren´t there anymore. They just did not know where they were sent to perhaps. Its all in the dates the conc on the 1st of june of 9 panzer divs is significant but by the 22nd 3 weeks later when bagtration was launched AT LEAST 2 of these divs were not even on the eastern front.

---

Another one had then gone back to AGC (20.PD sent back up on 16th June). Still the intel assessment of AGC until mid June does make it clear that the Germans did not expect major attacks, but only secondary attacks in AGC sector (Fesselungsangriffe). They just did not know what was going to hit them until a day or two before it happened. By wich time it was too late.

Regarding 'perhaps they did not know where they were sent'. Actually, again according to Niepold, and based on the actual AG and OKH documents, the Germans suspected all Soviet tank armies in the south in the period May/June. They had some information placing 5th GTA opposite AGC in mid-June, but it was so vague that it was dismissed.

Regarding the two Panzer divisions that were sent west - does anyone know if they actually took their tanks with them?

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
Plus it is not like AGNordUkr was not attacked at all in the summer. According to rus plans it was attacked strongly starting in july and losses to non AGC forces were the largest source of ger cas in the east during jun-aug 44.

---

Indeed - the point being that the Germans expected this attack to come in AGNU AO first, to cut off AGC and then destroy it. If you look at frontages in AGNU, you will notice that they are far smaller than in AGC.
There is a dynamic not just of space, but of time working here. The Germans being right about the eventual attack on AGNU did not help them, because they were right about the event, but at the wrong time.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Ron Klages:
Forgot to add FHHPGD to the Eastern Front with AGMitte

Ron Klages

---

This was about half a division's worth BTW.

Andreas if your source saying the ger conc 80% of the ger panzer divs in AGNU was correct I might actually believe the sov deceptiion worked wonders. But that was NOT the case on the 1st of jun at the most they had 9 out of 17 PDs and only 1 out of 7 PGDs. And they certainly lost 2 of these 9 pds which were moved to normandy before the sov att launched bag on AGC 3 weeks later. Maybe even more...

Yes the ger did not know the sovs were going to att AGC first and so strongly. But the att on AGNU strated just 3 weeks after the attack on AGC in mid july. The delay was not huge but the ger were caught wrong footed at least in part. And as someone else said AGC was never destroyed. It suffered total personal cas of 400,000 from june to aug wia,kia and mia. In fact the ger suffered more cas during this period in the other three army groups combioned then it did in AGC.

Now considering the ger did not know the sov att was conc on AGC to begin with thier deployment of so many PDs in the 2 southern AGs was very normal. Both AG north and south ukr or whatever thier current names were usually containted most of the ger PDs on the eastern front.

The reasons why this is true are numourous but I will try to bring togeather things I said elsewhere to you. It is better tank coutry and the sovs conc most of thier tanks thier. Most sov victories prior to 44 came in the south. Many times when the sov conc high numbers of tanks elsewher it was not susscessful eg op mars. The ger AG in the south had a high % of rummanian and other troops meaning thier had to be better more mobile ger divs and reserves. To overcome the rum weakness and to encourage rum army cooperation. Also to ward off any danger or rum withdrawal AKA italy from the war. The ger in the south had to prepare for the possibility of the rum army dissapearing or changing sides which actual happend a few days after the att began in the south.

Now if your stament that 80% of the ger PDs had been conc in AGNU was correct then I would see this of evidence of something. But to say that most of the ger PDs were in the south was proably the norm. Compared to AGN and AGC they normally needed them more and in summer 44 the rum situation proably exaborated that even more.

While AGC could have used more PDs without enough knowledge of the att it kept its normally low numbers. Also remeber in summer 44 the number of ger panzer divs avialable in the east was extremly low due to the allies att italy landing in normandy and southern france. There just weren´t that many to go around in fact on the 1st of jun there were 17 2 of which were transfered to normandy... more? The two front war meant each of the 4 army groups in the east would have to survive on avg with around 4 PDs. That the ger weighted this avg to the southen army groups should be understood and not seen as some sort of grand deception plan at work.

The sovs were good at preventing AGC from discovering it was going to be the first reciepient of the main att. They were not so succesful at changing the balance of ger PDs on the eastern front. The ger placed PDs in AGNU becase it was expected to be att and it was. Even if it was not expected to be att it would normally have more PDs then AGC unless the ger knew and did something unusal. Even the unusally high number of 9 on the 1st of june seems to have been the peak for AGNU. The ger seem to have realized it wasn´t the main effort since they transfered out at least two of these div before any sort of att anywhere in the east.

And this is suppoosed to be the great achivment of sov mask. It just doesn´t seem like that much to me. This is just one operation that many claim to be exceptional appears to be more avg. I´d hate to see what the avg deception in 1944 was. On the other had the deception in front of AGC appears to have worked extermly well. Even so AGC knew it was going to be attacked.

AGC had the highest number of ger troops and much less minor troops. No rum and a few hun if memory serves me correct. It had a huge border to cover and was very vulnerable to attacks from the exposed southern flank. AGC was in some ways weak but in other ways it was strong as well. Its fwd location of its front was going to be an achilles heal.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
And as someone else said AGC was never destroyed.

---

Actually it was you who said it

quote:

---

It suffered total personal cas of 400,000 from june to aug wia,kia and mia. In fact the ger suffered more cas during this period in the other three army groups combioned then it did in AGC.

---

What exactly is your definition of destroyed? 100% casualties (out of Iststarke) perhaps? Because it seems to me that a unit can be destroyed even if it loses 'only' 50% of it's total strength.

quote:

---

If the rus were so concerned about deception maybe they could have started thier summer off on a different day then the 22nd of june. The 3 year aniversiry of barbarasso seems a bit to predictable to me.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
AGC had the highest number of ger troops and much less minor troops. No rum and a few hun if memory serves me correct. It had a huge border to cover and was very vulnerable to attacks from the exposed southern flank. AGC was in some ways weak but in other ways it was strong as well. Its fwd location of its front was going to be an achilles heal.

---

As is said before, the initial positioning of AGC was ridicilous. It was a result of operational incompetence on a grand scale; defending bridgeheads in front of major rivers for later offensives.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:
Okay Darrin,
whatever. Yes, AGC was fully prepared and up to strength, and that is why it escaped destruction during Bagration. The reason for this was that the German high command accurately saw through any attempts to deceive them. Soviet Maskirovka is a weird idea born out by people who do not understand the superior capabilities of the German army at everything, from producing fire-wood to accurate forecasting of their enemy's intention. Maskirovka is a construct that never insisted. The fact that the German high command did not detect the move of 5th GTA to AGC area was because they chose not to. The fact that they did not reinforce AGC, but instead even stripped it off its tanks in May was part of a wonderful plan, that post June 22nd ensured that AGC was not destroyed. The move of the two SS PD to Normandy was also not connected in any way to the invasion, but to a correct assessment that they would not be needed in the east.

There I said it. Thanks for making all that clear to me, and pointing out the error of my ways.

---

Andreas you can stop being sarcastic and say that you disagree with me and I will take what you say more seriously.

It wasn´t that here was no maskiroka but that it was far less powerful and all encompassing then most belive in my opionion. In fact one of the biggest failings the ger intel suffered from in summer 44 was total air inferority. Look at Ddays paton ruse for an example of a 1944 ruse that worked when 2 years ago it may not have. More planes more fuel more trined pilots certainly help.

Also the ger were capable of succesfully conducting deception operations of thier own. If you don´t believe the few east front examples we´ve discussed maybe the ardennes off in dec 44 might ring a bell. They caught the allies napping despit having lost total air sup and despite the allies being able to read all the ger codes.

E.g. your statement that the Red Army did not come up to the standards of the Wehrmacht or the Finns. I can however agree with statements like 'deception being more a case of shades of gray'.

Now, your comment about 'the south being better tank country' or something along those lines. That was true while they still fought in Ukraine. It no longer was the case when the fighting reached the Dnjestr in spring 44. Beyond the Dnjestr into Romania was not good tank country.

Your statement about AGC having the highest number of German troops. Well that is hardly surprising, if you look at where the fronts passed in summer 44. AGSU - Romania. AGNU and AGC south shielded Hungary. AGN Estonia. So where would one expect the Estonian, Hungarian and Romanian divisions to be? This had nothing to do with their combat worthyness, but all with Axis politics. Even if they had wanted to, OKH could not order the Romanian army to deploy in Bjelorussia.

You have not even begun to look at frontages, comparing AGNU and AGC. That would be quite revealing. AGC defended just over 1,000km in June. AGNU with a similar infantry force, and the above-mentioned vastly higher amount of mech forces defended 550km. Infantry division frontages in AGC extended to 30+km, to be covered by 7 battalions.

Finally your repeated assertion that AGC was not destroyed. Well, the sum total of 28 destroyed divisions speaks a different language to me. I wonder how many of the Grosseinheiten that could be deployed on the Vistula once the carnage was over came from elsewhere, and were sent to the sector after June 22nd?

Finally, a note on sources. The statements I made here I could confirm with sources. I will however not do you the honour, since you never do the same. Your one mention of 'reports' other than Zetterling (that one was on the losses of AGSU) has brought up a blank when I asked you to provide something more detailed. Somebody else (Rich?) then had to step in and actually show that the 'reports' you relied on were worthless, because of the absence of losses of the critical days.

Bottomline is - the Germans did not know until mid-June what was about to happen to AGC. Whether that is Maskirovka at work, or simple ignorance on the part of the Germans is neither here nor there. Most likely a combination of both.

The losses in AGC, AGSU and to a lesser extent AGNU were catastrophic.

The Red Army simply outfought the Germans at the operational level in their attacks on AGC, AGNU, AGSU. The scale of the Wehrmacht's defeat in 1944 was comparable to the scale of the defeat the Red Army suffered at the hands of the Germans in 1941, when one takes into account the ratio of losses to ratio of forces.

The Red Army summer campaigns of 1944 held lessons for modern armies that were seen as relevant right up to the end of the cold war, because they showed what the combination of air, land and sea assets in a determined attack can do to a defender fixed in place (as NATO would have been in Germany).

There's a couple of assertions you can get your teeth into. Have fun.

Edited because I am an idiot.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:

Finally, a note on sources. The statements I made here I could confirm with sources. I will however not do you the honour, since you never do the same. Your one mention of 'reports' other than Zetterling (that one was on the losses of AGSU) has brought up a blank when I asked you to provide something more detailed. Somebody else (Rich?) then had to step in and actually show that the 'reports' you relied on were worthless, because of the absence of losses of the critical days.

[This message has been edited by Andreas (edited 01-23-2003).]

---

Richs entire post on the subject.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Lawrence Sims:
Andreas, Sorry I don't have figures specific to AG South Ukraine.
I believe the information you want can be found in "Personelle blutige Verluste des Feldheeres, Berichtigte Meldung für die Zeit vom 1 Juni 1944 bis 10 Jan. 1945, Der Heeresarzt im Oberkommando des Heeres, Gen.St.d.H/Gen.Qu Az 1335 c/d (IId)"

A copy of which can be found in the National Archives, Washington DC on Microfilm Publication T78, Roll 414, Frame 6383234.

Maybe Niklas Zetterling has a copy of this frame and maybe able to help?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lawrence, that report summarizes the dekade reports through 10 January 1945 and evidently includes some corrections. Unfortunately, it only gives casualties by theater (i.e., Osten, Geb.AOK 20, AOK Norwegen, OB Sued-West, OB-Sued-Ost, and OB-West) rather than by army group or army.

But, for what its worth, here are the original dekade reports for AOK 6:

1-10 August 1944 165 KIA, 559 WIA, 0 MIA
11-20 August 295 KIA, 862 KIA, 87 MIA

The 21-31 August report is missing.

21 August-10 September 242 KIA, 208 WIA, 0 MIA

So it is rather obvious that in this case the original reports were somewhat inaccurate.

Ubfortunately I do not have access to the Nachmeldung correcting the dekade reports (they were evidently not filmed in the NARA miecrofilm series). I rather suspect Niklas has found them though and perhaps he will comment more on this.

---

Now as far as I could determine this is what you are refering to it wasn´t on this thread but our last one. I NEVER WRTOTE ANY NUMBERS FOR AGSU LOSSES AT ANY PERIOD. Find a post by me and quote it....

What this thread means is the overall total of losses for the east front is accurate as far as Rich is concerned. This is the number I have been using a little over 825,000 dead wounded and missing. Now what it does say is smaller units are not known if they were properly corrected. Such as the 6th army initial decade reports and probably even the individual div losses you were throwing around earlier. Not found files stating they were corrected is different from knowing they never were corrected. Zetterling published an article listing the AGC losses for this period so he seeems to have found something that was correct or corrected the just less than 400,000 number wia,kia and mia number I quote. So while the inital losses for 6th army were probably inacuatre no corrections have been found by rich.

Seems you totally misconcerwed rich post and or my point. Maybe you should apologize to rich before being posting again.

NOW AS TO SOURCES I´M STILL WAITING FOR ONE FROM YOU FOR YOUR COMMENT ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ARMY BEING LARGLY MECHANIZED AND THE GERMAN ONE HORSE DRAWN. SPECIFICALLY ABOUT ALL THOSE GHOST TRUCKS THOSE RUS RIFLE DIVS HAD?

Your One source for the ger having 80% of thier PD in AGNU was also wrong. Its too bad we can´t find out if it was glantz who actally wrote that article. No author listed or sources given on an army webpage not very credible.

quote:

---

[..] So while the inital losses for 6th army were probably inacuatre no corrections have been found by rich.

Seems you totally misconcerwed rich post and or my point. Maybe you should apologize to rich before being posting again.

---

I think you misconstrued Rich's post, his rather understated claim that "So it is rather obvious that in this case the original reports were somewhat inaccurate." shouldn't probably not be taken so literally .

Btw: what do you think happened to 6th Army? It was encircled, made a break-out, was stopped and again encircled and decimated.. and suffered 400 casualties? Well, I guess that is The Truth unless any Nachmeldungen show up

quote:

---

NOW AS TO SOURCES I´M STILL WAITING FOR ONE FROM YOU FOR YOUR COMMENT ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ARMY BEING LARGLY MECHANIZED AND THE GERMAN ONE HORSE DRAWN. SPECIFICALLY ABOUT ALL THOSE GHOST TRUCKS THOSE RUS RIFLE DIVS HAD?

---

ANDREAS CAN NEVER BE "RIGHT" ABOUT THAT BECAUSE YOU ARE UNWILLING TO LISTEN TO OTHERS! FIRST OF ALL YOU COMPLETELY TOOK HIS COMMENT OUT OF CONTEXT AND SECONDLY YOU ONLY ACCEPT YOUR OWN IDEA OF MECHANISATION AS THE TRUTH.[/shouting]

quote:

---

Your One source for the ger having 80% of thier PD in AGNU was also wrong. Its too bad we can´t find out if it was glantz who actally wrote that article. No author listed or sources given on an army webpage not very credible.

---

By your own count over 50% of the panzer divs was in AGNU*. I agree that it's too bad we can't slam Glantz for this error though but regardless of who wrote it, it is a general overview of Maskirova and Bagration so I wouldn't get all hung up on percentages (especially since the claim that Panzer forces were disproportionally available to AGNU is borne out by the numbers found in this very thread**).

[* "The 9th SSPD and the 10th SS PD were on the east front on the 1st of jun but after normandy they were ordered transfered west on the 12th of june. [..] Assuming no other divs were moved we would then have 7 out of 15 ger PD or a bit less than 50%".
In other words mid-june the number of PDs was more than 50% in AGNU. And it isn't as if they pulled those units out because they saw through the soviet deception.

** AGNU had 9 PDs, AGC 2, AGN 1 that's what I call disparity.
As an aside: that's perhaps where the author made a mistake, in this comparison AGNU has roughly 80% of the PDs]

quote:

---

While I will try to adreess individual points you raised its obvious I am preching to the choir. Althoughs its refresing to get you to admit that deception was not a one way street.

---

That you are preaching to the choir has been obvious all along

[Edited for spelling]

Before I apologise to anyone, why don't we go back to what you said:

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:
3. I stand by what I said about the ger army escaping mainly unhurt not largly unhurt as you misquote me. Thier own reports confirm the overall situation regardless of one div. One div escaping hurt does not equal all ger div in the south suffering grevious losses.

---

What 'reports' are you referring to? Sources please. The 6th Army report that Rich quoted, which unfortunately suffers from the fact that 6th Army HQ was destroyed in the encirclement, and with it its reports?

Which part of the armies did the 'defeating' in 1941 and 1944?

Was it:

a) the horse-drawn infantry divisions or
b) the mechanised/armoured groups?

Which part of the armies was destroyed in the battles?

Was it:
a) the horse drawn infantry divisions or
b) the highly mobile mechanised formations?

Does that make it a bit clearer? I would have explained it earlier, but you took so much umbrage immediately that there was no point.

[shrug]As I guess there is now, I just do it to show you your lack of comprehension of the issues. [/shrug]

Here's another hint regarding Iassy-Kishinjew: just because you never read about it, does not mean it never happened. Sometimes you maybe should just sit back and try to get a bit more information out of people to help you understand a bit better, instead of trying to force your inappropriate and false conclusions on them. Or playing to the gallery trying to show how much you know.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:
Sorry Darrin, but I thought it was by now pretty clear that I disagree with the general direction you are going in.

E.g. your statement that the Red Army did not come up to the standards of the Wehrmacht or the Finns. I can however agree with statements like 'deception being more a case of shades of gray'.

You have not even begun to look at frontages, comparing AGNU and AGC. That would be quite revealing. AGC defended just over 1,000km in June. AGNU with a similar infantry force, and the above-mentioned vastly higher amount of mech forces defended 550km. Infantry division frontages in AGC extended to 30+km, to be covered by 7 battalions.
Bottomline is - the Germans did not know until mid-June what was about to happen to AGC. Whether that is Maskirovka at work, or simple ignorance on the part of the Germans is neither here nor there. Most likely a combination of both.

The losses in AGC, AGSU and to a lesser extent AGNU were catastrophic.

The Red Army simply outfought the Germans at the operational level in their attacks on AGC, AGNU, AGSU. The scale of the Wehrmacht's defeat in 1944 was comparable to the scale of the defeat the Red Army suffered at the hands of the Germans in 1941, when one takes into account the ratio of losses to ratio of forces.

The Red Army summer campaigns of 1944 held lessons for modern armies that were seen as relevant right up to the end of the cold war, because they showed what the combination of air, land and sea assets in a determined attack can do to a defender fixed in place (as NATO would have been in Germany).

There's a couple of assertions you can get your teeth into. Have fun.

Edited because I am an idiot.

[This message has been edited by Andreas (edited 01-23-2003).]

---

Now finland didn´t get counquered by russia at any time. Not in the civil war not in 40 or even 44. The main summer soviet off gained a total of 10km in 1 week. Almost WWI amounts of territory gained for high losses. There is little evidence to support your russsian super army hypothosis.

During the last six months of 43 rus lost over 4 times as many tanks and men as germany. 3000 tanks a month on avg from jul-dec when they produced on avg only 2000 tanks per mponth. The TDI studys show ger formations being confortable more combat effective in 43 everywhere on the east. Around 1.5-2 times more effective by memory. And the soviet losses gained little territory for an entire 6 month off.

The ger lost 1.6 mil wia, kia and mia on the east front during all of 43. The number increased by about 20% to 2 mil in 44. Not a huge increase in total losses for the germans. In 43 the number of sov cas was almost 8 mil it dropped by 15% to almost 7 mil in 44. Still it was 3.5 times HIGIER than the ger losses. Again not a huge difference. But the small difference is capped off by large gains of teritory for all of 44. Much of the later gains in the south were assisted by the defection of rummania and her army. Forcing the ger to withdraw from this area.

While you might not like admitting it the rus were less tactially capabile than the ger in 44. Even there supposed operational and deception greatness which was not aparant in 43. Is dificult to see with all those cas in 44. Especially when you consider all those other military facts besides mask into the pot. Such as AGC having a longer border to defend casuing the front to have more km per div then in the south. Nice to see you using more correct number of bats per div then the 10 I had to correct you on. Also nice to see you admit that more than just deception caused the german army losses.

But thier problems esp in jun 44 extended far beyond the eastern front and any claim of soviet deception apparatus. On the 1st of june there were 8 PD on the west and 2 in italy. 17 on the eastern front in total plus 1 den and 1 ger. At first a 10-17 ratio but after Day and before bagtration 2 at least of the div on the east were transfered west. So in reality it was 12 PD fighting the allies and 15 fighting rus at this time. Almost equal numbers of the ger PD on active fronts were fighting the allies as the rus. It certainly had an impact on the fighting from the summer of 44 onwards in the east. In fact although ger tank proiduction was increased substantially it could not keep up with losses from both fronts after DDay. Although it could have easilly copped with one front.

While the allied strategic bombing did not decease ger prodution much until the very end of the war. It had immense impacts on ger increses in production and what was produced. For example on Dday thier were 10,000 88s alone plus other guns defending the riech. The total size of the arty of all sorts motors at etc was close to 25,000 in russia. Plus the ger used large ammounts of flak ammo 1 study showed 16,000 88 mm rounds to des 1 bomber. A weight of shell plus casing equal to almost 20 Panzer IVs. The ger produced almost as much AAA as the typical ARTY shells. If not by weight at least by quanity but these effects were only getting significant in 43. Plus millions of people manning flak guns repairing all the damage to the factories and rails. It was a huge drain of potential manpower.

Plus at least at normandy the supply trains from ger which should take less than a week were now taking around 2 weeks. The actual destruction of rail cars pales in comparison to the ieffeciancy that appeared due to the allied airforce. Not the bumbling ineff of the ger you should note.

And the replacments were trinckling in at two low a rate. In part do to the allied airforce above but also do to the ger to properly prepare for a really bloody two front war. More bloody in normandy per div then in russia over the whole summer offensive. Hitlar had issued an order in nov 43 saying no more reonformcent of the east at the expanse of the west was to be tolerated much effort went into the west for some time. Its not suprising that in jan 44 the rus started gaining significant ground for the terrmendous cas they sufered.

Add to this senior german gen provinding real deployments of ger troops in the east. Something far more useful than any ultra intercept. Its not surprising that the rus managed to gain ground and actually might have pulled of a few deception operations in the east.

But still in 1945 the rus lost roughly 3500 tanks and spATGs per month. A figure that was in exess of any other losses since the opening months of 41. Even though the ger were on the last legs and they were fighting on both fronts and getting bombed from above.

For tanks I am also including other sp tank like vehicles TDs etc... Total losses only for tanks all personnal casualties not just kia and mia/pow but also wia.