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Originally posted by Darrin:

Well you or your source here claimed that Gehlen at the time of bagtration in the south thought the main attack was going to come on rummania and AGSU in the extreme south of russia.

If this statment were true then it would show he was not fooled by any demonstration across from AGNU. But the ger did conc more PDs in AGNU then any other including AGSU. So there appears to be something missing from your statment. What is your source? While AGNU might be the shoretest route to ger it is what you think ghelan may or may not have said that determines weather the ger intel screwed up so badly. And your stament of ghelen appears contradictory. Not to mention that driving to ger from AGNU would be too far and to thin a thrust. That rus mioght break through to ger from AGNU was the least of ger concers.

Now while the russian might have had good plans it had more to do with they having ger spys giving them exact deplaoyments across the eastern front then any great operational or intel ability. The rus info was correct where as the ger info was in 1944 had to be found out the old fashioned way which often was wrong. Which although the ger did a good job of this earlier in the war by 44 they were at huge disadvatages. The russians had a HUGE advatage in 44 over the ger.

[This message has been edited by Darrin (edited 01-26-2003).]

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Originally posted by Jyri Kettunen:
Thatīs just what Iīm saying, so we agree on that for sure. But please, donīt belittle the counterproductive decisions the German side made 1944-45. Itīs like denying that Soviet unpreparedness had nothing to do with German success in 1941...

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Jyri,
they certainly made counter-productive decisions, there is no denying that.

Regarding the placement of the defensive lines in AGC though, Niepold makes an argument that a planned retreat, like the 'Büffelbewegung' in 1943 would have been difficult to execute, without ensuring that the Red Army does not launch an opportunistic attack into the retreat move. Also, partisans were a big problem in that. while a study of the map will show that this is the logical thing to do, actual logistics on the ground may have prevented it from being carried out successfully. The German army of early 1944 was no longer the same and as capable as the one of early 1943.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

Iīd certainly be interested in any source that contridicts my view. But ger oil including imports, sythetic and own production was about 9 mil metric tons. Of which at least 4 mil tons were imported from rum in 43. Note imported rum kept a small amout of her own production for herself. This might be what you are thinking about. Ger oil prodcuction in 44 was almost 6.5 mil tonnes. Considering ger lost rum for a 1/3 of the year when they supplied almost 1/2 thier production in 43 6.5 mil tones is reasonable. The further losses outside rum imports being mainly due to strategic bombing. Another possibility of your rum oil shortage might be after the ger left polstei which I placed roughly in sep they destroyed it. So a shortage post aug would have happened.

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You may think I have some sort of blind belief in everything I've read about Soviet forces, but that is far from the truth. There is much I have conflict with regarding the Soviet Union especially where it concerns Stalin. There are many things about the study of Soviet forces in WWII that push and pull with great force upon ones intellect and often at the same time. Admiration can mix with sadness or horror at the same exact time. Stalin as a leader is one of the most confusing and conflicting issues when it comes to this, but in the end one does come away with a sense of accomplishment - not by Stalin per se, or any one facet of the Soviet military or society, but accomplishment as a nation pressed to the limits from within and without. It is an amazing study, because of the sheer multifaceted forces at work throughout that terrible conflict.

At this moment I'm trying to determine just how bent Stalin was on Jewish genocide during and after the war. Why? Because there are indications that might warrant such a believe. This sort of thing is uncomfortable to say the least, but it's something I need to know, because I need to know the truth. So, don't think for a minute I'm some sort of synchophantic follower of the Red Army, spouting the cause of Soviet operational art for its own sake. I actually happen to believe the Red Army had developed this level of competency at the operational level, because of what I have read, and there has been nothing that has contradicted that in my studies, from either side. It wasn't the 'silver bullet' that guaranteed victory, but it was a concept the Red Army understood well and used to the best of their capabilities, and in the end it contributed greatly to Soviet victory.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

Iīd certainly be interested in any source that contridicts my view. But ger oil including imports, sythetic and own production was about 9 mil metric tons. Of which at least 4 mil tons were imported from rum in 43. Note imported rum kept a small amout of her own production for herself. This might be what you are thinking about. Ger oil prodcuction in 44 was almost 6.5 mil tonnes. Considering ger lost rum for a 1/3 of the year when they supplied almost 1/2 thier production in 43 6.5 mil tones is reasonable. The further losses outside rum imports being mainly due to strategic bombing. Another possibility of your rum oil shortage might be after the ger left polstei which I placed roughly in sep they destroyed it. So a shortage post aug would have happened.

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Why do you still believe Rumania produced half in you dont have a source?

4 million tons were not imported by Germany from Rumania in 43, only 2.766 million tons came from the Ploest oil fields to Germany, owhich Rumania only made 1.9 million tons.

And in 1941, Rumania had a good year producing ~5.5 million tons. However, she kept half to herself, how is that small?

German fuel production in 44 is around 6 million, yes.

And how did Germany lose Rumania for a 1/3 of the year? It was basically alredy lost. The Danube had been mined, Allied bombers were attacking it and the Soviets were coming. Germany only got 11,000 in August. 70,000 in June.

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Regarding the placement of the defensive lines in AGC though, Niepold makes an argument that a planned retreat, like the 'Büffelbewegung' in 1943 would have been difficult to execute, without ensuring that the Red Army does not launch an opportunistic attack into the retreat move. Also, partisans were a big problem in that. while a study of the map will show that this is the logical thing to do, actual logistics on the ground may have prevented it from being carried out successfully. The German army of early 1944 was no longer the same and as capable as the one of early 1943.

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Orderly withdrawals under enemy pressure are one of the most difficult operations to execute, and that was one reason for German "stand fast" -doctrine. But I still do believe that if bridgehead evacuation would have been well planned and executed long before Bagration started, it would have been a success. As late as early June, there were 6 divisions (3 of them PzG divisions) behind the bridgeheads and the rivers, were those 17 divs (minimum) should have been in the first place, and partisans couldnīt operate effectively between these forces (but behind those 6 divisions yes), so I donīt believe partisans would have been a significant hindrance for the operation.

How the Red Army would have reacted to that, I donīt know, but if their Maskirovka practises had been started, FE reparation of their defensive lines, it may have slowed down any possible reaction considerably.

Re logistics. I think there were enough time between "rasputitsa" and early June to repair roads for the operation. About other logistical difficulties, I simply do not know.

EDIT: Some badd Enklish corrected

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
At this moment I'm trying to determine just how bent Stalin was on Jewish genocide during and after the war.

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:

Why do you still believe Rumania produced half in you dont have a source?

4 million tons were not imported by Germany from Rumania in 43, only 2.766 million tons came from the Ploest oil fields to Germany, owhich Rumania only made 1.9 million tons.

And in 1941, Rumania had a good year producing ~5.5 million tons. However, she kept half to herself, how is that small?

German fuel production in 44 is around 6 million, yes.

And how did Germany lose Rumania for a 1/3 of the year? It was basically alredy lost. The Danube had been mined, Allied bombers were attacking it and the Soviets were coming. Germany only got 11,000 in August. 70,000 in June.

And Rumania capitulated in August.

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As I said I am perfectly willing to believe that I or my source are wrong but I see no title or author from you. Let me know what your sources are so I can check your figure if you want. In 1944 ger did produce about 6.5 million tons of oil from imports, syn and domestic. I really donīt think germany ever produced as much oil itself as rummaia produced in 1943. There seems to be a hole in your data. Even your data in the first sentance is contrictory in 43 2.766 mil tons of oil came to ger from plostei but they only produced 1.9 mil tons of oil in rummia. So they exported around .9 mil tons of oil they didnīt have?

Exactly how much they kept to themselves in 1941 when they were neutral for almost half the year is not relevent to the the conditions of 43-44. But a decline from 5.5 mil in 41 to 1.9 mil in 43 seems a bit step to believe.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
You know, Darrin, your lack of knowledge is my weakness. When I see someone who appears to know as little as you do about Soviet operations (and German operations, it seems), I have an honest desire to attempt to explain it all for your benefit. However, your lack of knowledge in the Soviet-German War is not so much a result of not knowing, but more a conscious decision to only learn that which you want to learn. Only now do I realize this. My efforts, my arguments are useless and wasted upon you. Even Jyri and I have come upon agreements in other discussions elsewhere. But not you, Darrin. Never you.

You may think I have some sort of blind belief in everything I've read about Soviet forces, but that is far from the truth. There is much I have conflict with regarding the Soviet Union especially where it concerns Stalin. There are many things about the study of Soviet forces in WWII that push and pull with great force upon ones intellect and often at the same time. Admiration can mix with sadness or horror at the same exact time. Stalin as a leader is one of the most confusing and conflicting issues when it comes to this, but in the end one does come away with a sense of accomplishment - not by Stalin per se, or any one facet of the Soviet military or society, but accomplishment as a nation pressed to the limits from within and without. It is an amazing study, because of the sheer multifaceted forces at work throughout that terrible conflict.

At this moment I'm trying to determine just how bent Stalin was on Jewish genocide during and after the war. Why? Because there are indications that might warrant such a believe. This sort of thing is uncomfortable to say the least, but it's something I need to know, because I need to know the [b]truth. So, don't think for a minute I'm some sort of synchophantic follower of the Red Army, spouting the cause of Soviet operational art for its own sake. I actually happen to believe the Red Army had developed this level of competency at the operational level, because of what I have read, and there has been nothing that has contradicted that in my studies, from either side. It wasn't the 'silver bullet' that guaranteed victory, but it was a concept the Red Army understood well and used to the best of their capabilities, and in the end it contributed greatly to Soviet victory.

I know this matters not a whit to you, but I just had to say this, Darrin.[/B]

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Greg

I respect your knoweledge about the russia front more than other peole. Iīm impressed at the improved production and operational capabilities of rus. I would even rate operation cap in the late war as at least equal to germany. They certainly struggled on and surrvived largly due to themselves. Aided much more so by thier large area then thier large population or production. Not to take anything away from the improved rus but I believe there were many other factors that contributed more to victory in 1944 than some great russian only deception formula.

The ger army was not incompetent at anything. They were better at some things then others and the competence level did change. Until 43-44 they were generally competent.

The situation during the last 6 months of 43 showed the ger retained thier edge over the sov and it would be the sovs who would run out of men and tanks first. They managed to adv only 300km at most and that is proably a high average and again only in the south. A big part of this gain was territory the gers had actually pulled out of in late 43. Even so the rus adv about 1 mile a day on avg or about 1.5km. The rus also suffered total personnal losses of on avg over 20,000 people per day or mile advanced.

Switch from late 43 to early 44 and the rus are already gaining more ground. Even so thier losses remain high and the ger remain moderate. With mainly a larger conc of ger cas esp mia in the summer to show for it. Was this do to some new special operational and deception ability. Well if it was it would be exremly difficult to actually prove. So look at other causes first then come back and reconsider this.

By other causes I donīt mean just rus and ger causes on the east front but also other coutries on this front and then coutries elsewhere. It seems to me that there were many other casues more significant to rus victory in 44 then any super special operational and deception ability of the rus army.

Even the operational and deception abilities that were present were more profound due to knowing the ger deployment from spies. I certainly would not want to play rock, paper, siccors against a mind reader.

While Iīm not going to reiterate anything I ve already spoken of here or in the last thread. I will point out a few other reasons.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

Greg

I respect your knoweledge about the russia front more than other peole. Iīm impressed at the improved production and operational capabilities of rus. I would even rate operation cap in the late war as at least equal to germany. They certainly struggled on and surrvived largly due to themselves. Aided much more so by thier large area then thier large population or production. Not to take anything away from the improved rus but I believe there were many other factors that contributed more to victory in 1944 than some great russian only deception formula.

I asked above for your source of ghelen comments. You seem to have forgotten to provide it. A good chance to try to educate me correctly. Even if it is a glantz book I may still get it. I just started reading his kursk book my fourth glantz book. I do read things I donīt believe in it just doesn't convert me.

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Darrin,

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Darrin,

Gehlen's comment can be found in Kahn's "Hitler's Spies." I'm at work, but that is the book.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

I really donīt think germany ever produced as much oil itself as rummaia produced in 1943. There seems to be a hole in your data. Even your data in the first sentance is contrictory in 43 2.766 mil tons of oil came to ger from plostei but they only produced 1.9 mil tons of oil in rummia. So they exported around .9 mil tons of oil they didnīt have?

Exactly how much they kept to themselves in 1941 when they were neutral for almost half the year is not relevent to the the conditions of 43-44. But a decline from 5.5 mil in 41 to 1.9 mil in 43 seems a bit step to believe.

To tell the truth I donīt have absolute faith in in the numbers I have but your numbers seem less credible than the ones I have.

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Yes, Germany did produce more oil than Rumania in 1943 in a year of the war. As an even greater challenge though I will compare Rumania's production in 1941 (at there height during the war) to Germany's synthetic oil production in 1943(at there height during the war). Numbers go somewhat like this:

Rumania 1941 ~5.6 million tons of oil.
German SYNTHETIC (only) 1943 ~5.8 million tons

And that is synthetic only, not counting the 1.9 million tons of crude produced by Germany. As you can clearly see, German production topped the height of Rumanian production during the war, even challenging Rumania's all time high in 1937 at 8.8 million tons.

And sorry, there is no hole in my numbers, I just forgot to put the 2 different sources and stumbled over my geography. The " 2.766 million tons came from the Ploest oil fields to Germany" was from USSBS, which based there account on Speer's ministrys records.

But a report filed by Speer's planning department on June 30, 1944 gave the total at ~2.282 million tons from Rumania and Hungary, of which 1.9 million came from Rumania. the rest was Hungarian. Sorry for the confusion.

I believe that the percent kept by Rumania from it's oil production in 1941 for it's own economy and forces is important as 47% of Rumanian production was owned by various German companies. More relevant than you thought, huh?

And the steep decline you speak of was from wear and tear upon the oil fields. They were just not ready to handle the pressure that was forced on them.

8.7 million in 1937 to 5.5 million in 1941 is quite a drop, but then Barbarossa was just getting started then. Not to mention the fact that Allied bombing raids, Allied mining of the Danube, and the growing need of fuel by the German industry, german forces, Rumanian industry, Rumanian forces and so on was just to much....

My stats come from USSBSs, The Sruggle for Europe by Wilmot and a document titled "Annual German oil production".

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:
Yes, Germany did produce more oil than Rumania in 1943 in a year of the war. As an even greater challenge though I will compare Rumania's production in 1941 (at there height during the war) to Germany's synthetic oil production in 1943(at there height during the war). Numbers go somewhat like this:

Rumania 1941 ~5.6 million tons of oil.
German SYNTHETIC (only) 1943 ~5.8 million tons

And that is synthetic only, not counting the 1.9 million tons of crude produced by Germany. As you can clearly see, German production topped the height of Rumanian production during the war, even challenging Rumania's all time high in 1937 at 8.8 million tons.

And sorry, there is no hole in my numbers, I just forgot to put the 2 different sources and stumbled over my geography. The " 2.766 million tons came from the Ploest oil fields to Germany" was from USSBS, which based there account on Speer's ministrys records.

But a report filed by Speer's planning department on June 30, 1944 gave the total at ~2.282 million tons from Rumania and Hungary, of which 1.9 million came from Rumania. the rest was Hungarian. Sorry for the confusion.

I believe that the percent kept by Rumania from it's oil production in 1941 for it's own economy and forces is important as 47% of Rumanian production was owned by various German companies. More relevant than you thought, huh?

And the steep decline you speak of was from wear and tear upon the oil fields. They were just not ready to handle the pressure that was forced on them.

8.7 million in 1937 to 5.5 million in 1941 is quite a drop, but then Barbarossa was just getting started then. Not to mention the fact that Allied bombing raids, Allied mining of the Danube, and the growing need of fuel by the German industry, german forces, Rumanian industry, Rumanian forces and so on was just to much....

My stats come from USSBSs, The Sruggle for Europe by Wilmot and a document titled "Annual German oil production".

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Iīll look up your book reference. But it still seems fishy a drop of rummanian oil from 8.5 mil produced in rum in 37 to 5.5 mil in 41. Produced not shipped no mines to worry about and EXTRMLY few strategic bombers. Seems totally at odds to what would be expected. Also your figure for 37 even disagrees with the number I have from john ellis WWII a statistical survey which says rum produced only 2.4 mil tons of oil in 37. I still remain skeptical. Perhaps some of your numbers are in barrels or something.

That ger crude oil prroduction at home would increse from 37 to 41 to 43 but rum oil could not even hold steady from 37 to 41 to 43 seems inexplicable.

Even your overall ger numbers contradict numbers in brute source by ellis. 5.8 syn plus 1.9 crude plus 2.8 mil impoort from rum and hungary would equal 10.5 mil tons of oil in 43 when the number I have is 8.5 mil.

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Originally posted by Darrin:
PS. Please explain your following point your math TOTALLY escapes me. How does 9 PD in AGNU on the 1st of june mean 80% when there were 17 PD were on the eastern front? How does 50% sudddenly become 80%?

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** AGNU had 9 PDs, AGC 2, AGN 1 that's what I call disparity.
As an aside: that's perhaps where the author made a mistake, in this comparison AGNU has roughly 80% of the PDs]

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I did not make a point, I pointed something out. When you look at these three Army Groups then AGNU has 80% of the PzDivs, that's pretty skewed towards AGNU.

In fact the numbers you keep quoting are actually an overstatement, Ron has included 5th SS in them while this unit was at that time actually being transferred to germany for refit. So that means that the actual deployment was 9 PDs in AGNU against 1 understrength PD in AGC and AGN each, and if that isn't clear enough evidence that the germans concentrated their armour assets in AGNU then consider the fact that AGC's AFV strength consisted for almost 90% of StuGs.

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Originally posted by Jyri Kettunen:
No itīs not about nationality. Itīs about how Army High Commands respond to threatning situations.

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There was a smiley behind that remark, because it was intended to be a tongue-in-cheek reference to the fact that you consistently explain german failure by pointing out how the Finns did it differently.

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Please study the map before you make claims like these.

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Maybe you are the one who should study the map better, because there is more to it than just looking where units are ahead of a river

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If you would, youīd notice that there were ca. 50km deep and 60km wide bridgehead in front of Orsha,

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Ironically these units were actually positioned behind the Sozj river, but more importantly the main road to Orsha was the Moscow-Misk Highway north of the Dniepr. This is historically the line along which the soviets attacked. And on that axis there was no river or bridgehead behind which the germans could have positioned themselves.
Pulling the units east of the Dniepr behind that river would not have made the german defensive position around Orsha any better.

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and ca. 40km deep, 80km wide bh in front of Mogilev.

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Again Mogilev could be approached by the soviets without the need of river-crossings (initially on the north-south axis between the Dniepr and the Drut, and later from the northern direction of Orsha).

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Add to that 40km deep and 90km wide bh of Vitebsk (minimum, the bh is much more difficult to define there),

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Vitebsk was historically cut off by soviet attacks north and south of Vitebsk, pulling the units back over the Dvina would still leave the units in Vitebsk vulnerable to encirclement and would greatly facilitate soviet operations (by creating a longer, narrower bulge and by giving away the area that the soviets needed to travel through to get behind Vitebsk).

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and you have 17 divisions (at least) defending a piece of land with absolute no strategical use, with major rivers behind their back.

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The main strategic use of these areas was to create a buffer between the soviets and the main cities (and transport nodes) in the area, and in the case of Vitebsk to be able to defend the city at all.

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These would have served much better in fortified lines behind the rivers of Dvina and Dniepr, forcing Soviets to commit major river crossings under enemy fire. Couple this with well premade delay and defensive lines, and then Soviet advance would have slowed doen significantly, giving time to mobile reserves to appear from other fronts.

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There were no fortified lines (and the theatre is much to great to create them quickly, especially considering the expected calm summer.
There were also not enough troops to create a water-tight defensive line which the which the soviets could not cross and create bridgeheads beyond, not to mention the fact that the soviets could attack paralel to the rivers.

Your comment on "mobile reserves from other fronts" is interesting in that it implies that one of the main reasons the germans couldn't save the situation is a lack of reserves.. certainly pulling units from other fronts is not a realistic way of solving AGC's problems. It would take several days for the first reinforcements to arrive and by that time the soviets would have overrun the main defensive lines.

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So did the Finnish Army 1944, but there were premade defensive lines behind the front, and as soon as it was evident that Soviets launched a major offensive, there were no "stand fast" -orders to defend militarily meanless locations.

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While stand-fast orders were of course a very bad idea and greatly contributed to the succes of Bagration the geramns simply couldn't have saved the situation by being more flexible, they could possibly have saved AGC from destruction but it would still be routed.

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No, the rivers ran through Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk, and these cities would have been part of the main defensive line. Your reasoning resembles Hitlerīs somewhat.

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I would find the last part offensive if it hadn't been so off the mark Hitler was very much focussed on holding the cities and keeping them defended even if they were (about to be) encircled. Me, I find the idea of having a defenisve line ahead of city logical, but I'm not opposed to admitting defeat and pulling out of untenable situations.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:

Geographically Bjellorussia is pretty bad terrain, but it is still nowhere near as constrained as in Finland. This obviously has some rather major implications for the way you can defend it.

So, when the terrain is not so tough, itīs OK to set counterproductive defensive lines, and not to use riverlines as your advantage?

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Bad wording on my part I guess.. the terrain and geographical circumstances in Finland are much more constraining, while in Bjellorussia there is more room for maneuvre and there are many more possible axis of attack. Pulling back behind a river and creating an impenetrable defense isn't very helpful if the enemy can choose to cross the river elswhere where your defenses are weaker and your troops more spread out.. or if he can even eschew river-crossing completely and attack paralel to the river.
That is not to say that riverlines shouldn't be used to ones advantadge, but they are not the end-all of defensive strategy )or even an answer to the strategic deficits of the defense force, which include such things as a lack of reserves a great disparity to the amount and mobility of units available to the attacker).

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
I did not make a point, I pointed something out. When you look at these three Army Groups then AGNU has 80% of the PzDivs, that's pretty skewed towards AGNU.

In fact the numbers you keep quoting are actually an overstatement, Ron has included 5th SS in them while this unit was at that time actually being transferred to germany for refit. So that means that the actual deployment was 9 PDs in AGNU against 1 understrength PD in AGC and AGN each, and if that isn't clear enough evidence that the germans concentrated their armour assets in AGNU then consider the fact that AGC's AFV strength consisted for almost 90% of StuGs.

From all this it should be fairly obvious that the germans concentrated the bulk of their forces in AGNU, and almost none of it in AGC that was actually the main focus of the offensive.
Now AGNU was of course also attacked during the summer campaign, but only after several PDs had been pulled out in response to crises elsewhere. No matter how hung up you might be about the 80% figure being off, the corrected numbers still offer no evidence that the germans saw through the soviet deception operations.. quite the contrary in fact.

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Oh I see. For some unknown reason you want to ignore the 5 PDs in AGSU. Then the ger have 9 PDs out of 12 PD in the three northern ones. If you ignore the PD in AGNU but even this does not make 80% it is 75%. Acoording to rons numbers that he has at least gave us a refernce for but actualy 80% according to your new info that you donīt even bother to tell us where it came from.

I have never asserted the ger did not conc armour in AGNU. They did conc armour just not the 80% fantasy figure claimed by the article with no autuors or references. You still think ths number is correct somehow using new unsubtaniated math to prove it.

In fact the gers may have conc more of thier PDs AGNU then AGC but the exact opposite happened with regards to inf divs. You should consider carefully when you write 'bulk of thier forces' as to what it and you mean.

What the article actually says is this quote.

"Most German armor reserves were poured into the northern Ukraine. (CG AG North Ukraine) controlled 80 percent of German armor."

Well on the 1st of jun according to rons refencesed data it contained 9 out of 17 PDs which is just over 50%. Even if we donīt include the one div you give no reference for it is still 9 out of 16 which is less than 60%. Either way the fantasy figure of 80% does not hold up.

In truth the article claims 80% of ger armour not just PD. But according to rons referenced data for 1st of june there was only 1 out of 6 PGD present. Or a 16% conc.

But even then you have to rember stug type vehicles were more common at this point than earlier. But they were spread around inf divs. Meaning thier is no reason 1 ger army group should have anyway near the 80% figure suggested here. In truth its probably closer to 25%.

So about 50% of the PDs and 15-30% of the other armour makes no where near the fantasy figure of 80%. Unless you took a different type of math in school then I did.

If the ger had 17 PDs in the east and 4 AGs then each AG should be expected to have about 4 PD on avg. On the 1st of june AGNU had twice its share and AGC according to rons figures had half thier share. This certainly would have helped the rus when it came to attacking AGC but the rus did att AGNU in july as well.

We are talking about numbers that were accurate for the 1st of jun. When the rus attacked AGC on the 22nd of june at least 2 of the PDs were gone. The ger appeared to have figured out that the main att was not coming at this time and place even before the 22nd of jun. Reality changes with time.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
In conclusion I would say that while I don't agree with Greg's harsh assesment of your understanding of warfare I do agree that you seem to consistently attribute the outcome of operations to a single factor with apparently blatant disregard of any other major factors, such as disparity of forces, disparity of intelligence, disparity of preparedness, disparity of capabilities and the geographical constraints and idionsyncracies of the theatre.

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Foxbat, Iīll give you more detailed reply later, but this conclusion is really odd. Where have I claimed that disparity of forces, disparity of intelligence, disparity of preparedness, disparity of capabilities and the geographical constraints and idionsyncracies of the theatre donīt have effect on operations?

What I have been trying to say is that Germans would have been able to give Soviets more hard time, and perhaps save AGC, if their defensive positions would have set in rational way (I come to this later) prior to Bagration. Thereīs no "General Terrain" winning wars, and major river lines wonīt save anything without sufficient preparations, like pre-made fortified lines, and men enough to defend them. It's sheer ignorance to claim that whatever Germans would have done prior to Bagration, the end result would have been there anyway (because of brilliant Soviet operational art of war, that is ).

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
There was a smiley behind that remark, because it was intended to be a tongue-in-cheek reference to the fact that you consistently explain german failure by pointing out how the Finns did it differently.

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Comparing these two fronts is very interesting, because Soviet practises honed againts Germans didnīt work so perfectly against different kind of opponent. Having side that, Finns made same mistakes at Karelian Isthmus prior to "Fourth Stategic Attack", as AGC prior to Bagration. Soviet Maskirovka had managed to fool prominent military leaders, who believed that major offensive against Finland would be waste of Soviet resources. So all suggestions from field commanders to withdraw major bulk of the forces to better defensive positions just in case were ignored. Soviets had studied Finnish frontline positions extensively, and in two days Finnish frontline was trashed at Valkeasaari. But after that Finnish military leaders adjusted their way of thinking according to the new situation, and fe Eastern Karelia was abandoned as the main objective of defense.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
Ironically these units were actually positioned behind the Sozj river, but more importantly the main road to Orsha was the Moscow-Misk Highway north of the Dniepr. This is historically the line along which the soviets attacked. And on that axis there was no river or bridgehead behind which the germans could have positioned themselves.
Pulling the units east of the Dniepr behind that river would not have made the german defensive position around Orsha any better.

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Ironically the divisions would have served better behind a *major* river. Shorter defensive lines as a result would have given opportunity to strengthen problematic Minsk Highway area between Dniepr and Dvina.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
Again Mogilev could be approached by the soviets without the need of river-crossings (initially on the north-south axis between the Dniepr and the Drut, and later from the northern direction of Orsha).

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Yeah, and after Berlin had fallen Mogilev could be approached from any direction without major river-crossings...

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
Vitebsk was historically cut off by soviet attacks north and south of Vitebsk, pulling the units back over the Dvina would still leave the units in Vitebsk vulnerable to encirclement and would greatly facilitate soviet operations (by creating a longer, narrower bulge and by giving away the area that the soviets needed to travel through to get behind Vitebsk).

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I admit that Dvina line would have not been a perfect choise, but there were not any better available. One option would have been abandon Vitebsk altogether, but that was of course out of question ( )...

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
The main strategic use of these areas was to create a buffer between the soviets and the main cities (and transport nodes) in the area, and in the case of Vitebsk to be able to defend the city at all.

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Is that Hitler talking? ( ) The very idea of defending the bridgeheads and major cities at the same time at all cost was operational incompetence on a grand scale.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
There were no fortified lines (and the theatre is much to great to create them quickly, especially considering the expected calm summer.

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There should have been a premade fortified line already, and after that comprehensive set of delay and defensive lines. At least an effort to do that, instead seeing it as heresy.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
There were also not enough troops to create a water-tight defensive line which the which the soviets could not cross and create bridgeheads beyond, not to mention the fact that the soviets could attack paralel to the rivers.

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You seem to willfully misinterpret me. I have not claimed that water-tight defensive line was possible, but that rational defensive positions would have limited Soviet success remarkably (that is not to say decisively).

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
While stand-fast orders were of course a very bad idea and greatly contributed to the succes of Bagration the geramns simply couldn't have saved the situation by being more flexible, they could possibly have saved AGC from destruction but it would still be routed.

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I agree somewhat, but your philosophy of history seems to be that because Soviets were so succesful, they would have been succesful in any case.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
Your comment on "mobile reserves from other fronts" is interesting in that it implies that one of the main reasons the germans couldn't save the situation is a lack of reserves.. certainly pulling units from other fronts is not a realistic way of solving AGC's problems. It would take several days for the first reinforcements to arrive and by that time the soviets would have overrun the main defensive lines.

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Again, you are so sure that Soviets would have overrun the main defensive lines that it is almost eerie. Yes, AGC was without reasonable reserves, so their mission would have been to delay Soviets as much as possible, then local breakthroughs would have been counterattacked with arrived reserves, and then major fighting withdrawal to next delay/defensive lines.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
Bad wording on my part I guess.. the terrain and geographical circumstances in Finland are much more constraining, while in Bjellorussia there is more room for maneuvre and there are many more possible axis of attack. Pulling back behind a river and creating an impenetrable defense isn't very helpful if the enemy can choose to cross the river elswhere where your defenses are weaker and your troops more spread out.. or if he can even eschew river-crossing completely and attack paralel to the river.
That is not to say that riverlines shouldn't be used to ones advantadge, but they are not the end-all of defensive strategy )or even an answer to the strategic deficits of the defense force, which include such things as a lack of reserves a great disparity to the amount and mobility of units available to the attacker).

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Yes, it was General Constrained Terrain that repulsed Soviets in Finland so many times. Finnish troops just stood by and watched how constrained terrain conducted fine defensive operations.

And again, Iīm not talking about water-proof-impenetrable defense lines behind major rivers, but ideal defensive positions before a major offensive.

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Originally posted by Jyri Kettunen:
Foxbat, Iīll give you more detailed reply later, but this conclusion is really odd. Where have I claimed that disparity of forces, disparity of intelligence, disparity of preparedness, disparity of capabilities and the geographical constraints and idionsyncracies of the theatre donīt have effect on operations?

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You have been consistently making claims that the initial defensive positions are what decided tbe entire offensive, eg "Those divisions in AGC beyond the great rivers were doomed by virtue of their initial placement" with apparent disregard for other factors and barely veiled mockery for those whose belief in the soviet warmachine is such that they think that the soviets could have been succesfull even if AGC had pulled back 5km.

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What I have been trying to say is that Germans would have been able to give Soviets more hard time, and perhaps save AGC, if their defensive positions would have set in rational way (I come to this later) prior to Bagration.

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I see, so despite a disparity of forces, disparity of intelligence, disparity of preparedness, disparity of capabilities the germans could have perhaps saved the army group by altering their initial defensive positions. Or am I reading to much into that remark?

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Thereīs no "General Terrain" winning wars, and major river lines wonīt save anything without sufficient preparations, like pre-made fortified lines, and men enough to defend them.

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But there were no pre-made fortified lines, not enough men, no mobile forces, and no reserves. You might as well argue that the soviets would have had a harder time if AGC had had 5 on strength PzDivs

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It's sheer ignorance to claim that whatever Germans would have done prior to Bagration, the end result would have been there anyway (because of brilliant Soviet operational art of war, that is ).

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Originally posted by Darrin:
Oh I see. For some unknown reason you want to ignore the 5 PDs in AGSU.

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The reason is actually simple, if you want to compare the extent to which the germans concentrated their armoured force in AGNU as opposed to AGC it doesn't really add anything to compare AGNU to AGSU

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Then the ger have 9 PDs out of 12 PD in the three northern ones. If you ignore the PD in AGNU but even this does not make 80% it is 75%. Acoording to rons numbers that he has at least gave us a refernce for but actualy 80% according to your new info that you donīt even bother to tell us where it came from.

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Assume my new and magical numbers are wrong, what the heck was 5th SS up to? They didn't see any action until august! If they were indeed still in AGC and not in germany is I claim they were not being very helpful

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I have never asserted the ger did not conc armour in AGNU. They did conc armour just not the 80% fantasy figure claimed by the article with no autuors or references. You still think ths number is correct somehow using new unsubtaniated math to prove it.

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So if you agree with the basic assertion why are you still so hung up on the percentage? Oh I know why, because that is an easy way of getting at Andreas and his view of Bagration.

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In fact the gers may have conc more of thier PDs AGNU then AGC but the exact opposite happened with regards to inf divs. You should consider carefully when you write 'bulk of thier forces' as to what it and you mean.

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Oh really, so the idea that the infantry units in Bellorussia were stretched thin is also a figment of someone's imagination? I guess the germans that were overrun during Bagration must be retroactively happy that there infantry forces can now be declared strong.

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What the article actually says is this quote.

"Most German armor reserves were poured into the northern Ukraine. (CG AG North Ukraine) controlled 80 percent of German armor."

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So? I didn't write that article, nor did Andreas. Maybe it is off, but it is a fact that AGNU had a whole bunch panzer divisions and AGC and AGN didn't even have one whole PD.

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In truth the article claims 80% of ger armour not just PD. But according to rons referenced data for 1st of june there was only 1 out of 6 PGD present. Or a 16% conc.

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Just adding PD's and PGD's and claiming that that gives an accurate picture of the whole of german armour is nonsense. If you want to get a real picture of how much the german armour was concentrated in AGNU you should count all the armour, not just units.

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But even then you have to rember stug type vehicles were more common at this point than earlier. But they were spread around inf divs. Meaning thier is no reason 1 ger army group should have anyway near the 80% figure suggested here. In truth its probably closer to 25%.

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Now that is what I call unsubstantiated, how on earth did you arrive at that figure?

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If the ger had 17 PDs in the east and 4 AGs then each AG should be expected to have about 4 PD on avg. On the 1st of june AGNU had twice its share and AGC according to rons figures had half thier share.

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In reality AGC had less than a quarter of "their share" ie one understrength PD.

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This certainly would have helped the rus when it came to attacking AGC but the rus did att AGNU in july as well.

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By the time the soviets attacked aGNU it's panzer strength had gone down substantially.

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We are talking about numbers that were accurate for the 1st of jun. When the rus attacked AGC on the 22nd of june at least 2 of the PDs were gone. The ger appeared to have figured out that the main att was not coming at this time and place even before the 22nd of jun. Reality changes with time.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
You have been consistently making claims that the initial defensive positions are what decided tbe entire offensive, eg "Those divisions in AGC beyond the great rivers were doomed by virtue of their initial placement" with apparent disregard for other factors and barely veiled mockery for those whose belief in the soviet warmachine is such that they think that the soviets could have been succesfull even if AGC had pulled back 5km.

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5km? Decided the entire offensive? Forget it. You are misinterpreting and twisting my words so that this discussion is somewhat futile.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
I see, so despite a disparity of forces, disparity of intelligence, disparity of preparedness, disparity of capabilities the germans could have perhaps saved the army group by altering their initial defensive positions. Or am I reading to much into that remark?

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Yes, thatīs true. Not unharmed in any way, but much less divisions wiped out.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
But there were no pre-made fortified lines, not enough men, no mobile forces, and no reserves. You might as well argue that the soviets would have had a harder time if AGC had had 5 on strength PzDivs.

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Argh...there should have been pre-made fortified lines and delay lines beyond that. Is it so hard for you to understand? You just take as a matter of fact that Germans did all that they could, but their role in all operations was insignificant.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
I would think that the basic idea of warfare is to create the preconditions for victory, and in Bellorussia the soviets had created the preconditions that essentialy doomed the german defenders. Of course my belief that the soviets could have exploited these pre-conditions in the face of "bridgeheads behind the rivers" speaks volumes of my unflinching, zombie-like hero-worship of the red army..

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The reason is actually simple, if you want to compare the extent to which the germans concentrated their armoured force in AGNU as opposed to AGC it doesn't really add anything to compare AGNU to AGSU

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Then the ger have 9 PDs out of 12 PD in the three northern ones. If you ignore the PD in AGNU but even this does not make 80% it is 75%. Acoording to rons numbers that he has at least gave us a refernce for but actualy 80% according to your new info that you donīt even bother to tell us where it came from.
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Assume my new and magical numbers are wrong, what the heck was 5th SS up to? They didn't see any action until august! If they were indeed still in AGC and not in germany is I claim they were not being very helpful

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I have never asserted the ger did not conc armour in AGNU. They did conc armour just not the 80% fantasy figure claimed by the article with no autuors or references. You still think ths number is correct somehow using new unsubtaniated math to prove it.
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So if you agree with the basic assertion why are you still so hung up on the percentage? Oh I know why, because that is an easy way of getting at Andreas and his view of Bagration.

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In fact the gers may have conc more of thier PDs AGNU then AGC but the exact opposite happened with regards to inf divs. You should consider carefully when you write 'bulk of thier forces' as to what it and you mean.
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Oh really, so the idea that the infantry units in Bellorussia were stretched thin is also a figment of someone's imagination? I guess the germans that were overrun during Bagration must be retroactively happy that there infantry forces can now be declared strong.

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What the article actually says is this quote.
"Most German armor reserves were poured into the northern Ukraine. (CG AG North Ukraine) controlled 80 percent of German armor."

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So? I didn't write that article, nor did Andreas. Maybe it is off, but it is a fact that AGNU had a whole bunch panzer divisions and AGC and AGN didn't even have one whole PD.

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In truth the article claims 80% of ger armour not just PD. But according to rons referenced data for 1st of june there was only 1 out of 6 PGD present. Or a 16% conc.
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Just adding PD's and PGD's and claiming that that gives an accurate picture of the whole of german armour is nonsense. If you want to get a real picture of how much the german armour was concentrated in AGNU you should count all the armour, not just units.

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But even then you have to rember stug type vehicles were more common at this point than earlier. But they were spread around inf divs. Meaning thier is no reason 1 ger army group should have anyway near the 80% figure suggested here. In truth its probably closer to 25%.
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Now that is what I call unsubstantiated, how on earth did you arrive at that figure?

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If the ger had 17 PDs in the east and 4 AGs then each AG should be expected to have about 4 PD on avg. On the 1st of june AGNU had twice its share and AGC according to rons figures had half thier share.
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In reality AGC had less than a quarter of "their share" ie one understrength PD.

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This certainly would have helped the rus when it came to attacking AGC but the rus did att AGNU in july as well.
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By the time the soviets attacked aGNU it's panzer strength had gone down substantially.

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We are talking about numbers that were accurate for the 1st of jun. When the rus attacked AGC on the 22nd of june at least 2 of the PDs were gone. The ger appeared to have figured out that the main att was not coming at this time and place even before the 22nd of jun. Reality changes with time.
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So if the germans had "figured out that the main offensive would not come in AGNU" then why did they pull these units out of the eastern front entirely? To adress another crisis, that's why! Otherwise if they had the foresight to see where the attack would come they would have transferred those PDs to AGC.

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I made a mistake it was the numbers of sutgs and PGD were close to 25% the number of PD having the most tanks would be close to 50%. Anybody could see that the avg is certainly less than 50% Iīd guess 40% almost half of your fantasy figure.

The stament the author made was about most armour reserves being moved to AGNU. Then he says 80% of the ger armour was there. He either got his information wrong is as bad at math as you are or doesnīt have a clue how to say what he wants. Its a fantasy figure that has absolutly no basis in reality.

Now if he and you wanted to talk anout the relative numbers of PD in AGC and AGNU saying it had 4 times would be more appropriate. His stament without some huge conditions attached is just plain wrong.

Andreas to his benifit never tried to defend this obviously false stament. You still seem to think it correct and that shows just how off base you are.

The inf divs in AGC were stetched thin due to thier fwd deployment over long lines. Then anything to do with having less of everything compared to AGNU. You and your authors better chose your words more carfully in the future.

Ghelen comments as given to us came from hitlars spies by khan which I donīt have but might at least look up. At one point greg said ghelan thought AGC was the main target but switched it to AG South Ukr. He even said AGC was in for a calm summer. Well if these comments are true then why were all those PD in AGNU it was never mentioned as the target. So it seems the credibility of these statments atributed to gehlan is in question.

Although it could be they were inbettween the two main threats. Even then robing AGC of so many PD to place them in the middle but quite far south of AGC large bulging frontage seems odd. Although if ghelens comments were true then he was not fooled by the rus deceptions mesure opposite AGNU as this article also claimed. One use of these units could have been if the rus att rummia first then these div could try to cut off the fwd rus spearhead. That was what ghelan did predict.

These PDs already started disapaitting long before the 22nd when on the 12 of jun 2 PDs were transfered to normandy. At ths time the landing had been around for less than a week and no reasonable person could call it a crisis at this point. It proably only became a crisis in aug. But its nice to know you think the ger were capable of fortune telling.

It's fine if your too scared to give any sources for your info about 5th SS PD. But maybe you should reply to my eralier request for sources on the sov army being so mechanized. ie. All those trucks you think existed in the rifle divs. No source no more disussion at least on this thread from me.

I read the relevent pages in Hitlars spies by Khan today and looked at the references. His book although I only looked at it briefly is very well referenced.

Gehlen on the 30th of march is quoted as saying AGC is in for a large off as might AGN be. This is credibly referenced to a book and more importantly a ger archive report.

Then there are some comments attributed to gehlen latter that spring no date. AGC 'calm summer'. Large off somewhere in between AGN and AGC or in the south. He decided aparently on the southern one against rum as being the most likly. An attack on on rum/hun and the balkans.

Now these latter comments are sourced to three books and not to an actual report by gehlan. So thier credibility is a bit suspect compared to above. Iīll assume they are true for now.

Ghelan did predict or almost predict the actual offensives that happened around AGC. He just got the timeing wrong.

Although these crytic quotes might be suggesting an att was expected in AG south ukr it could also have been expected in AG north ukr as well. Without more detailed info it would be impossible to say that the 9 PD in AGNU were not there to defend that army group. Althogh 9 PD to purly defend 1 relitvly small ger army group seems like a bit of overkill.

While gehlen was the forgien armies east director. This placed him in the best position to make decisons about the overall rus front. Individual army group itell off might be in a better pos to access threats against thier respective AGs. Intel by its very nature is often wrong and is always delayed. They tend to see what hapened 3 weeks ago instead of whats going to happen today.

Thanks