quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Darrin,
you crack me up.

Before I apologise to anyone, why don't we go back to what you said:

What 'reports' are you referring to? Sources please. The 6th Army report that Rich quoted, which unfortunately suffers from the fact that 6th Army HQ was destroyed in the encirclement, and with it its reports?

BTW - what do you know about the Iassy-Kishinyew Operation and its outcome?

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Regarding the matter of mechanisation. I'll try to explain it to you in simple terms.

Which part of the armies did the 'defeating' in 1941 and 1944?

Was it:

a) the horse-drawn infantry divisions or
b) the mechanised/armoured groups?

Which part of the armies was destroyed in the battles?

Was it:
a) the horse drawn infantry divisions or
b) the highly mobile mechanised formations?

Does that make it a bit clearer? I would have explained it earlier, but you took so much umbrage immediately that there was no point.

[shrug]As I guess there is now, I just do it to show you your lack of comprehension of the issues. [/shrug]

Here's another hint regarding Iassy-Kishinjew: just because you never read about it, does not mean it never happened. Sometimes you maybe should just sit back and try to get a bit more information out of people to help you understand a bit better, instead of trying to force your inappropriate and false conclusions on them. Or playing to the gallery trying to show how much you know.

BTW - are you still of the opinion that AGSU escaped 'mainly unhurt'? Or have you at least learned that much from our conversation?

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You have explained or proven nothing. 90% of all cas in army are inf cas. You said largly mechanized soviet forces deafeated the largly unmech ger forces. Even foxbat belives the rus rifle divs had tons of trucks. If your trying to state that the rus mech corp only went after inf and left the 90% of thier army sitting around twiddling thier thumnbs then you have to do better. Also while it might be theorectically good for panzer div to att inf quite often panzer div became involved. Look at kursk the ger PD thrust in the south was opposed by sov tank armies. The ger usually tried to do the same thing. It seems the arm divs accounted for at least half of all tanks des.

Wrong yet again. Lets just say if I donīt agree with something Iīll continue to disagre. Otherwise my head would get bloody from hitting the wall. Its not the size of ther bookself that matters in this debate which I am sure yours is bigger than mine.

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Your statement about AGC having the highest number of German troops. Well that is hardly surprising, if you look at where the fronts passed in summer 44. AGSU - Romania. AGNU and AGC south shielded Hungary. AGN Estonia. So where would one expect the Estonian, Hungarian and Romanian divisions to be? This had nothing to do with their combat worthyness, but all with Axis politics. Even if they had wanted to, OKH could not order the Romanian army to deploy in Bjelorussia.

Finally your repeated assertion that AGC was not destroyed. Well, the sum total of 28 destroyed divisions speaks a different language to me. I wonder how many of the Grosseinheiten that could be deployed on the Vistula once the carnage was over came from elsewhere, and were sent to the sector after June 22nd?

[This message has been edited by Andreas (edited 01-23-2003).]

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As Ive said before AGC had the most ger troops but also the second highest % of ger troops second only to AGN. On the 1st of jun AGC had 849,00 ger troops in its area plus minors. Now asuming no reinforments were sent before or during bagtration and no replacments either for an entire 3 month period. We know they suffered a bit less than 400,000 tot per cas so they had to have at least 450,000 left assuming total lack of reinforments or replacments for 3 months. Even in this worst case fatasy it wasnīt destroyed.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

Go Look up and read the original thread. I said the overall losses of the ger in the east AFTER aug were low. I posted the numbers for sep and oct and Iīm 99% sure even rich will say they were accurate. I have never posted anything about the 6th army or AGSU losses alone.

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Oh but you did, and I quoted you on it (which you have chosen to omit from your quote). You said that German forces in the south escaped 'mainly unhurt'.

To prove it, you used loss figures from September 44, which are only slightly more relevant than those from September 1939 for the matter at hand.

Darrin, it is quickly becoming clear that I can as well argue with a wall, as argue with you. Your rambling monologue about the Finns and the West, and your continued attempt to walk away from false statements you made, instead of acknowledging that you made an error proves as much, and shows that to discuss anything with someone like you is a waste of time.

As I said earlier, best for me to admit you are right. The Soviets never fought better than the Germans their loss figures prove it. The soldier on the Reichstag is a figment of my imagination. The Soviets were actually just a backdrop to a huge german operation, in which first the Germans won by themselves, and then they lost by themselves. Soviet interference had little to do with it, it was all the Germans, all the time, all along.

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Originally posted by Andreas:
As I said earlier, best for me to admit you are right. The Soviets never fought better than the Germans their loss figures prove it. The soldier on the Reichstag is a figment of my imagination. The Soviets were actually just a backdrop to a huge german operation, in which first the Germans won by themselves, and then they lost by themselves. Soviet interference had little to do with it, it was all the Germans, all the time, all along.

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I donīt exactly know what we are discussing about anymore, but this "who was on the Reichstag at the end" -attitude gives me the creeps. Itīs like the ultimate argument proving that all that the Red Army did 1944-45 was superb, showing operational art of war in all its glory, the lesson for all about the skills that only Soviets possessed. As I have learned, western historiography had long ignored Soviet achievements and their importance for the end result of WWII (which btw Finnish historiography has always recognized), but now it seems to me that certain people have started to practice that kind of "revisionism", where only Soviet deeds matter, ignoring that Germany fought multi-front war, signifigance of lend-lease material for Soviet success etc. etc.

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Originally posted by Jyri Kettunen:
I donīt exactly know what we are discussing about anymore,

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As far as I can tell the subject still essentialy revolves around Darrin's denial of a soviet victory in the summer of 44.

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[..]but this "who was on the Reichstag at the end" -attitude gives me the creeps. Itīs like the ultimate argument proving that all that the Red Army did 1944-45 was superb, showing operational art of war in all its glory, the lesson for all about the skills that only Soviets possessed. As I have learned, western historiography had long ignored Soviet achievements and their importance for the end result of WWII (which btw Finnish historiography has always recognized), but now it seems to me that certain people have started to practice that kind of "revisionism", where only Soviet deeds matter, ignoring that Germany fought multi-front war, signifigance of lend-lease material for Soviet success etc. etc.

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I have never deniend the rus did not achieve victory in 44. More that what victory they achieved had much less to with some special type of soviet maskerivka then just the overall military situation germany was in. Also bagtration or the victory in 44 was not in anyway equivalant the barbasso victories. The ger losses during 44 were not that much higher than in 43. Although the ger did have a bigger portion of mias in the summer of 44 which ment more perment losses. And less wounded who would normally make up the majority of losses and who will eventually recover and return. But this situation did not continue beyond aug 44 at the lasest. From sep-dec ger losses were normally low with no exagerated mia numbers.

PS. Please explain your following point your math TOTALLY escapes me. How does 9 PD in AGNU on the 1st of june mean 80% when there were 17 PD were on the eastern front? How does 50% sudddenly become 80%?

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** AGNU had 9 PDs, AGC 2, AGN 1 that's what I call disparity.
As an aside: that's perhaps where the author made a mistake, in this comparison AGNU has roughly 80% of the PDs]

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
Well maybe you should read what Andreas is responding to (Maskirova was unimportant/ineffective, Bagration was only a local success, AGC was not destroyed, AGSU escaped unhurt, the soviets showed themselves to be an utterly incompetent army against the finns, against the germans in 44 they didn't really win either, the soviet were crap at air and seaborne ops -the gers and allies were experts of course, the soviet army was not mechanised in any meaningfull way) before bringing out the soviet-revisionist-glorifiers argument.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Regarding AGC's situation in summer 1944, it's irrelevant whether their defensive positions were counterproductive. What does matter is that the equivalent of four army groups descended upon AGC on 22 June 1944. Why? Well, I think if you look at Foreign Armies East records you'll find the answer. Gehlen, head of Foreign Armies East (for those who did not know this), missed Bagration entirely, first stating on 30 March 1944 that AGC was to be hit, then changing his mind latter that spring, saying it was in for a "calm summer," and that the main attack was due south by Romania (a possible Soviet attack in the Baltics was deemed unlikely since the Soviets lacked the tactical proficiency to be successful up north - Gehlen's thinking, not mine).

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Counterproductive defensive positions are irrelevant? Come on! Or is it because there was a Soviet soldier on Reichstag in the end, it was irrelevant?...

FE if Finnish forces would have defended bridgeheads over the river Svir, by the time the Soviet Petroskoi operation started 21.6., they would have been simply crushed. Instead they withdrawed before the offensive, and saved themselves for later defensive measures. Now, if Soviets would have started Petroskoi-operation simultaneously with Viipuri-operation (9.6.)...it would have been a different story...

quote:

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Regarding AGC's situation in summer 1944, it's irrelevant whether their defensive positions were counterproductive. What does matter is that the equivalent of four army groups descended upon AGC on 22 June 1944. Why? Well, I think if you look at Foreign Armies East records you'll find the answer. Gehlen, head of Foreign Armies East (for those who did not know this), missed Bagration entirely, first stating on 30 March 1944 that AGC was to be hit, then changing his mind latter that spring, saying it was in for a "calm summer," and that the main attack was due south by Romania (a possible Soviet attack in the Baltics was deemed unlikely since the Soviets lacked the tactical proficiency to be successful up north - Gehlen's thinking, not mine).

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While it might say calm summer it seemed to predict secondary attacks against AGC. So a relative calm.

So we have one partially failed ger intel report. Certainly not the first time in war that the intel turned out to be wrong. One bad report is certainly no reason to say the ger were incompetent in 44. At just intel let alone everything else. Especially considering the overall poor situation they were in summer 44.

The ger were very keen to any threat to rummia not just becasue of its poor performing army and possible surrneder. Even more importantly due to its oil. Half of ger oil came from rummaia. Without rummania ger would also be MUCH more reliant on its own artifical oil factories. Which were much more resource intensive and more vulnerable to bombing. Losing rummania in sep 44 was the final staw which led to an even more rapid ger clapose then would have happened.

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PS. If what you have said was accurate there would be no reason for the ger to assemble half their PD in AGNU on the 1st of june. Also ghalen was not fooled by sov decpeption measures opposite AGNU in may-jun.

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Well, of course not! It would be quite obvious to any competent commander at that time that a major push would have to come in the direction of Lvov. It was the truest path toward Germany, naturally! Which is exactly why the Soviet made it one of the last operations (before Yassy-Kishinev, but that was actually planned after the main offensives for summer). By doing so, they were able to sucker the Germans into holding their reserves in AGNU until it was too late to help in the Baltics and in Belorussia. Quite simple, really. And once those reserves were sent belatedly to aid in the Baltics and Belorussia, then the Lvov-Sandomir operation commenced. Does that help make it easier to understand now?

quote:

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Originally posted by Darrin:

The ger were very keen to any threat to rummia not just becasue of its poor performing army and possible surrneder. Even more importantly due to its oil. Half of ger oil came from rummaia. Without rummania ger would also be MUCH more reliant on its own artifical oil factories. Which were much more resource intensive and more vulnerable to bombing. Losing rummania in sep 44 was the final staw which led to an even more rapid ger clapose then would have happened.

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I dont think Germany really cared about the Rumanian army, just so long as the Ploesti oil fields keep feeding some fuel to the German war machine.

And I'd like to see some figures on the "Half of ger oil came from rummaia" part. By 1944, Rumanian oil was not of very much importance to the German war effort. It was barely producing enough oil for the Rumanian and Hungarian economys respectfully.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
If the Germans chose to set up defensive positions as such, so be it. Not that anything else would've helped. Being oblivious to a major offensive with its subsequent overwhelming odds made it so. I'm sorry, but if you can't understand this point, then you don't fully grasp the basics of warfare.

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Greg, with all respect, if you think defensive positions are irrelevant prior to a major offensive, you donīt fully grasp the basics of warfare. War history is full of examples where offensives with overwhelming odds have been repulsed, take the first month of Winter War as one.

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Originally posted by Jyri Kettunen:
Counterproductive defensive positions are irrelevant? Come on! Or is it because there was a Soviet soldier on Reichstag in the end, it was irrelevant?...

FE if Finnish forces would have defended [b]bridgeheads over the river Svir, by the time the Soviet Petroskoi operation started 21.6., they would have been simply crushed. Instead they withdrawed before the offensive, and saved themselves for later defensive measures. Now, if Soviets would have started Petroskoi-operation simultaneously with Viipuri-operation (9.6.)...it would have been a different story...[/B]

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Everyone knows that if the germans had been Finns they would have won )or at least forced the soviets to sue for peace)
But seriously I think you're overplaying the initial defensive position issue, imho this was only really an issue near vitebsk.
For the rest the issue of having to defend in place rather than being able to pull back to defensive position further to the rear did play a role in allowing the soviets to encircle larger groups, but the speed of the soviet advance meant that a secondary defense line would simply have been overrun.

I think that before you start comparing what worked in Finland with what happened in Bjellorussia and starting to draw conclusions from that it is important that you fully appreciate the difference in circumstances.
AGC expected local attacks that it could fend off at it's own, not a good time to be desert your main defense line and pull back to a weaker one.
Even if AGC had been willing to pull out preemptively it wasn't just a question of giving up 'a defensive line', it would have meant giving up a large amount of terrain and several cities (not a very logical move considering the intelligence assesments at the time).
Geographically Bjellorussia is pretty bad terrain, but it is still nowhere near as constrained as in Finland. This obviously has some rather major implications for the way you can defend it.

quote:

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Originally posted by Jyri Kettunen:
Greg, with all respect, if you think defensive positions are irrelevant prior to a major offensive, you donīt fully grasp the basics of warfare. War history is full of examples where offensives with overwhelming odds have been repulsed, take the first month of Winter War as one.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Well, of course not! It would be quite obvious to any competent commander at that time that a major push would have to come in the direction of Lvov. It was the truest path toward Germany, naturally! Which is exactly why the Soviet made it one of the last operations (before Yassy-Kishinev, but that was actually planned after the main offensives for summer). By doing so, they were able to sucker the Germans into holding their reserves in AGNU until it was too late to help in the Baltics and in Belorussia. Quite simple, really. And once those reserves [b]were sent belatedly to aid in the Baltics and Belorussia, then the Lvov-Sandomir operation commenced. Does that help make it easier to understand now?

And, Darrin, I can deal with the abbrev., but if you're going to spell someone's name out, at least take the time to get it right (it's Gehlen, not ghalen). I do as a courtesy to the reader.[/B]

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Well you or your source here claimed that Gehlen at the time of bagtration in the south thought the main attack was going to come on rummania and AGSU in the extreme south of russia.

If this statment were true then it would show he was not fooled by any demonstration across from AGNU. But the ger did conc more PDs in AGNU then any other including AGSU. So there appears to be something missing from your statment. What is your source? While AGNU might be the shoretest route to ger it is what you think ghelan may or may not have said that determines weather the ger intel screwed up so badly. And your stament of ghelen appears contradictory. Not to mention that driving to ger from AGNU would be too far and to thin a thrust. That rus mioght break through to ger from AGNU was the least of ger concers.

Now while the russian might have had good plans it had more to do with they having ger spys giving them exact deplaoyments across the eastern front then any great operational or intel ability. The rus info was correct where as the ger info was in 1944 had to be found out the old fashioned way which often was wrong. Which although the ger did a good job of this earlier in the war by 44 they were at huge disadvatages. The russians had a HUGE advatage in 44 over the ger.

a) has no clue about what happened in the east in 1944

b) can't spell even when other people show him how to spell the word correctly

c) seems to be incapable to learn (after repeatedly being told that AGSU was destroyed in August 1944 he still goes on about September and Romania; reading comprehension obviously not being his strong point)

d) makes up figures as is his wont (E.g. half the German oil coming from Romania)

e) Can only mechanically repeat things others tell him. Note that he has not brought any relevant sources himself, but lets others do the work for him (BTW the Tessin figures are not that relevant for the discussion, UNLESS they are coming with fixed dates)

f) likes to reinvent history, and re-interpret the actual course of events by making up words. Example: a German general staff officer in 1st Panzer Army in summer 1944 says 28 divisions are destroyed. Now clearly Darrin is not up to challenge the fundamentals of the statement, instead he gives us some crap about how 'destroyed' today means something else than 'destroyed' meant to the Germans in 1944. Well, if in doubt, I go with the German officer's opinion, and let Darrin continue to live in Lalaland.

He is really not someone to be taken seriously, I guess I can have a more serious and productive discussion about Sesame Street with my five year old niece.

Jyri - the fact that there was a Soviet soldier on the Reichstag proves that the Soviets won the war in the east. No more, no less. Now, if we can accept that as an historic fact (something which Darrin seems to have trouble with), then we may want to look for the explanation why they did win? Can we agree on that? Now, Darrin's argument (as usually well supported, I guess he read it in Reader's Digest) is that really the Finns and the West mattered. Well, the figures don't actually bear that out. The Soviets destroyed a huge number of German divisions.

So, actual losses. By the time of the Vistula-Oder operation, total losses were 1:1, with a crucial difference. The Soviets lost 200k men, as did the Germans, but the Soviets only lost 44k killed, which means that about 150k could be returned at some point. That ratio was a lot less favourable for the Germans. (Figures quoted in a Glantz article, taken from Krivosheev (sp?)) That is very different from earlier operations, and indicates that they actually did get a lot better at what they did. operationally (500 or so km in 19 days, only stopped by the weather) and tactically (inflicting the same amount of losses they suffered).

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
Everyone knows that if the germans had been Finns they would have won )or at least forced the soviets to sue for peace)

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No itīs not about nationality. Itīs about how Army High Commands respond to threatning situations.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
But seriously I think you're overplaying the initial defensive position issue, imho this was only really an issue near vitebsk.
For the rest the issue of having to defend in place rather than being able to pull back to defensive position further to the rear did play a role in allowing the soviets to encircle larger groups, but the speed of the soviet advance meant that a secondary defense line would simply have been overrun.

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Please study the map before you make claims like these. If you would, youīd notice that there were ca. 50km deep and 60km wide bridgehead in front of Orsha, and ca. 40km deep, 80km wide bh in front of Mogilev. Add to that 40km deep and 90km wide bh of Vitebsk (minimum, the bh is much more difficult to define there), and you have 17 divisions (at least) defending a piece of land with absolute no strategical use, with major rivers behind their back. These would have served much better in fortified lines behind the rivers of Dvina and Dniepr, forcing Soviets to commit major river crossings under enemy fire. Couple this with well premade delay and defensive lines, and then Soviet advance would have slowed doen significantly, giving time to mobile reserves to appear from other fronts. [/B][/QUOTE]

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
I think that before you start comparing what worked in Finland with what happened in Bjellorussia and starting to draw conclusions from that it is important that you fully appreciate the difference in circumstances.
AGC expected local attacks that it could fend off at it's own, not a good time to be desert your main defense line and pull back to a weaker one.

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So did the Finnish Army 1944, but there were premade defensive lines behind the front, and as soon as it was evident that Soviets launched a major offensive, there were no "stand fast" -orders to defend militarily meanless locations.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
Even if AGC had been willing to pull out preemptively it wasn't just a question of giving up 'a defensive line', it would have meant giving up a large amount of terrain and several cities (not a very logical move considering the intelligence assesments at the time).

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No, the rivers ran through Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk, and these cities would have been part of the main defensive line. Your reasoning resembles Hitlerīs somewhat.

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
Geographically Bjellorussia is pretty bad terrain, but it is still nowhere near as constrained as in Finland. This obviously has some rather major implications for the way you can defend it.

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So, when the terrain is not so tough, itīs OK to set counterproductive defensive lines, and not to use riverlines as your advantage?

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Originally posted by Foxbat:
As an aside, AGNU pretty much did as you suggest. Fat lot of good that did them, as this allowed the soviets to simply take over their first defensive line without a fight

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What are you talking about? AGNUīs positions were just as ridicilous, in front of the Bug-river. If High Command wonīt trade any terrain for blood, that kind of defensive lines its army ends up with.

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Jyri - the fact that there was a Soviet soldier on the Reichstag proves that the Soviets won the war in the east. No more, no less. Now, if we can accept that as an historic fact (something which Darrin seems to have trouble with), then we may want to look for the explanation why they did win? Can we agree on that?

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Thatīs just what Iīm saying, so we agree on that for sure. But please, donīt belittle the counterproductive decisions the German side made 1944-45. Itīs like denying that Soviet unpreparedness had nothing to do with German success in 1941...

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:

I dont think Germany really cared about the Rumanian army, just so long as the Ploesti oil fields keep feeding some fuel to the German war machine.

And I'd like to see some figures on the "Half of ger oil came from rummaia" part. By 1944, Rumanian oil was not of very much importance to the German war effort. It was barely producing enough oil for the Rumanian and Hungarian economys respectfully.

BTW, Rumania fell in August, not September.

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Well, Darrin just continues to prove that he:

a) has no clue about what happened in the east in 1944

b) can't spell even when other people show him how to spell the word correctly

c) seems to be incapable to learn (after repeatedly being told that AGSU was destroyed in August 1944 he still goes on about September and Romania; reading comprehension obviously not being his strong point)

d) makes up figures as is his wont (E.g. half the German oil coming from Romania)

e) Can only mechanically repeat things others tell him. Note that he has not brought any relevant sources himself, but lets others do the work for him (BTW the Tessin figures are not that relevant for the discussion, UNLESS they are coming with fixed dates)

f) likes to reinvent history, and re-interpret the actual course of events by making up words. Example: a German general staff officer in 1st Panzer Army in summer 1944 says 28 divisions are destroyed. Now clearly Darrin is not up to challenge the fundamentals of the statement, instead he gives us some crap about how 'destroyed' today means something else than 'destroyed' meant to the Germans in 1944. Well, if in doubt, I go with the German officer's opinion, and let Darrin continue to live in Lalaland.

He is really not someone to be taken seriously, I guess I can have a more serious and productive discussion about Sesame Street with my five year old niece.

Jyri - the fact that there was a Soviet soldier on the Reichstag proves that the Soviets won the war in the east. No more, no less. Now, if we can accept that as an historic fact (something which Darrin seems to have trouble with), then we may want to look for the explanation why they did win? Can we agree on that? Now, Darrin's argument (as usually well supported, I guess he read it in Reader's Digest) is that really the Finns and the West mattered. Well, the figures don't actually bear that out. The Soviets destroyed a huge number of German divisions.

So, actual losses. By the time of the Vistula-Oder operation, total losses were 1:1, with a crucial difference. The Soviets lost 200k men, as did the Germans, but the Soviets only lost 44k killed, which means that about 150k could be returned at some point. That ratio was a lot less favourable for the Germans. (Figures quoted in a Glantz article, taken from Krivosheev (sp?)) That is very different from earlier operations, and indicates that they actually did get a lot better at what they did. operationally (500 or so km in 19 days, only stopped by the weather) and tactically (inflicting the same amount of losses they suffered).

Now Darrin, I will not respond to any more of your posts. You are not worthy of my time. Whether you respond to this one or not is no concern of mine. You will just again make up things in your head, and throw out unsupported statements that have no basis in reality. Grow up.

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