quote:

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Originally posted by Darrin:

In brief my current stand.

The ger army was not incompetent at anything. They were better at some things then others and the competence level did change. Until 43-44 they were generally competent.

The situation during the last 6 months of 43 showed the ger retained thier edge over the sov and it would be the sovs who would run out of men and tanks first. They managed to adv only 300km at most and that is proably a high average and again only in the south. A big part of this gain was territory the gers had actually pulled out of in late 43. Even so the rus adv about 1 mile a day on avg or about 1.5km. The rus also suffered total personnal losses of on avg over 20,000 people per day or mile advanced.

Switch from late 43 to early 44 and the rus are already gaining more ground. Even so thier losses remain high and the ger remain moderate. With mainly a larger conc of ger cas esp mia in the summer to show for it. Was this do to some new special operational and deception ability. Well if it was it would be exremly difficult to actually prove. So look at other causes first then come back and reconsider this.

By other causes I don´t mean just rus and ger causes on the east front but also other coutries on this front and then coutries elsewhere. It seems to me that there were many other casues more significant to rus victory in 44 then any super special operational and deception ability of the rus army.

Even the operational and deception abilities that were present were more profound due to knowing the ger deployment from spies. I certainly would not want to play rock, paper, siccors against a mind reader.

While I´m not going to reiterate anything I ve already spoken of here or in the last thread. I will point out a few other reasons.

- ger lost init
- hitlar ass attempt
- demoraloized state of the ger army
- the belief by the ger that the US had twice as many divs as they actually did
- final solution resorce drain
- etc...

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One of the reasons the rus finaly got an extra push is what I´ll call the lend lease bump. An example is av gas the west supplied 50% of the avgas that rus had to use or doubled thier own production levels. Significant on its own this becomes even more significant when you consider that most LL arived during the last two years of the war. So rus production might have stayed at a yearly avg of 100,000 units example numbers only. But instead of having all LL avgas divided by all four years of the war its effect was really conc to the last two years for example. So native rus production of 100,000 units/yr during the war increases by 200,000 extra uníts of avgas available late in the war. So its more like a tripling effect from early to late war.

On 15.6.1944 (according to Schematische Kriegsgliederung/ GenStdH, OpAbt III) the German PzD's in the East were distributed as follows:

- HGr "Sukr"
- - 3.PzD and 13.PzD - as reserve of AOK 6
- - 23.PzD - under the command of IV.PzK/AOK 8
- - 14.PzD - under the command of LVII.PzK/AOK 8
- - 24.PzD, 3.SS-PzD, GD (since 27 Feb 44 GD was organized as PzD. Moreover since then it used the tactical symbol of a PzD)- as reserve of AOK 4 (rum)

- HGr "Nukr"

- - 1.PzD, 7.PzD, 8.PzD, 17.PzD - as reserve of PzAOK 1

- - 4.PzD, 5.PzD, - as reserve of PzAOK 4

- - 16.PzD, 9.SS-PzD, 10.SS-PzD - as reserve of HGr "Nukr"

- 20.PzD was under the direct disposal of OKH in the rear of HGr "Nukr"

- HGr "Nord"

- 12.PzD - as reserve of HGr "Nord"

Therefore on 15 June the Germans had a total of eigthteen (18) PzD and nine (the half) were under the direct command of HGr "Nukr". 20.PzD was also stationed there therefore the Germans had ten Pz. divisions in NW Ukraine during that time.

1. WHY THESE DIVISIONS WERE DISPOSED THERE?
The statement that the Germans disposed ten PzD's in NW Ukraine because they expected a major soviet offensive there is probably overestimated. Five of the divisions (1.PzD, 7.PzD, 8.PzD, 16.PzD, 17.PzD) were there because of Manstein's order to Hube to retreat to the west, not to the southwest. Two more divisions (9.SS-PzD, 10.SS-PzD) arrived there to save Hube's army. Two other (4.PzD, 5.PzD) arrived there to relieve Kovel. Only 20.PzD was sent there from Byelorussia to rest end refit. From April till June elements of almost every of these divisions were involved in heavy local combat therefore it was impossible to pull them completely out of the front.
Because of the same reasons the Germans had six PzD's in Rumania (they retreated there from South Ukraine and immediatelly were involved in heavy combat)

2. WHAT WAS THE CONDITION OF THESE DIVISIONS?
By mid June the Germans had only two 100% replenished PzD in the East - 4.PzD and 5.PzD. On paper 20.PzD was also at full strength, but it was authorized to have only one PzAbt. Moreover, its PzAAbt and PzJgAbt were in the Reich for rebuilding and thus missed the initial battles in Byelorussia.
9.SS-PzD and 10.SS-PzD were in perfect condition, but both divisions missed their Panther-Abt'n, as well PzJgAbt'n. Moreover, they were intended to fight in the West.
1.PzD, 8.PzD, 16.PzD and 17.PzD were not in good shape. 1.PzD had less than 60 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 2000 men. 8.PzD had only 12 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 2000 men. It was reinforced with I./PzR 11 with 80 PzV. 16.PzD had less than 60 Pz and StuG and a shortfall of aprox. 2000 men. 17.PzD had less than 30 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 1200 men. Moreover, these divisions were short of some other types of heavy weapons, as well of motor vehicles and had a limited mobility. All four divisions were still recovering from Hube's disaster and were capable only for limited offensive actions.
7.PzD was in similar shape - it had less than 45 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 2700 men. Moreover it was split into several battle groups that were spread over a large area.

3.HOW ABOUT THE OTHERS?
6.PzD and 19.PzD were respectively in Germany and Holland for rebuilding. They were nothing more than bunch of men. 25.PzD was even in worst condition - the remnants of its personnel were in Denmark were they were merged with PzD "Norwegen". 5.SS-PzD was in the Reich for rebuilding after the disaster near Korsun. According to a condition report dated 1.6.44 it was not capable for any type of combat and only the Panther-Abt was operational.
12.PzD had no personnel shortfall, but had only 55 Pz.
Both 13.PzD and 14.PzD had less than 5 tanks. 24.PzD had less than 60 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 2500 men. 3.SS-PzD had no personnel problems, but had about 45 Pz and StuG and was short of many other types of heavy weapons. Only GD was in good condition - it had more than 100 Pz and StuG and had no personnel shortfall. 23.PzD had less than 30 Pz and StuG a shortfall of aprox. 1600 men.

4.IN THE EVE OF BAGRATION
On 15 June 20.PzD was ordered to transfer to Bobruisk area. 5.PzD was to follow four days later, but because of the partisan actions that damaged the railroads between Brest and Minsk, its transfer was postponed. Thus the fortune saved this division from certain annihilation.

So the fact remains - THE GERMANS DECIDED TO TRANSFER TWO FULLY REPLENISHED PANZER DIVISIONS TO BYELORUSSIA JUST BEFORE THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE THERE.

Kamen

quote:

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Originally posted by Kamen Nevenkin:
My $0.02

On 15.6.1944 (according to Schematische Kriegsgliederung/ GenStdH, OpAbt III) the German PzD's in the East were distributed as follows:

- HGr "Sukr"
- - 3.PzD and 13.PzD - as reserve of AOK 6
- - 23.PzD - under the command of IV.PzK/AOK 8
- - 14.PzD - under the command of LVII.PzK/AOK 8
- - 24.PzD, 3.SS-PzD, GD (since 27 Feb 44 GD was organized as PzD. Moreover since then it used the tactical symbol of a PzD)- as reserve of AOK 4 (rum)

- HGr "Nukr"

- - 1.PzD, 7.PzD, 8.PzD, 17.PzD - as reserve of PzAOK 1

- - 4.PzD, 5.PzD, - as reserve of PzAOK 4

- - 16.PzD, 9.SS-PzD, 10.SS-PzD - as reserve of HGr "Nukr"

- 20.PzD was under the direct disposal of OKH in the rear of HGr "Nukr"

- HGr "Nord"

- 12.PzD - as reserve of HGr "Nord"

Therefore on 15 June the Germans had a total of eigthteen (18) PzD and nine (the half) were under the direct command of HGr "Nukr". 20.PzD was also stationed there therefore the Germans had ten Pz. divisions in NW Ukraine during that time.

1. WHY THESE DIVISIONS WERE DISPOSED THERE?
The statement that the Germans disposed ten PzD's in NW Ukraine because they expected a major soviet offensive there is probably overestimated. Five of the divisions (1.PzD, 7.PzD, 8.PzD, 16.PzD, 17.PzD) were there because of Manstein's order to Hube to retreat to the west, not to the southwest. Two more divisions (9.SS-PzD, 10.SS-PzD) arrived there to save Hube's army. Two other (4.PzD, 5.PzD) arrived there to relieve Kovel. Only 20.PzD was sent there from Byelorussia to rest end refit. From April till June elements of almost every of these divisions were involved in heavy local combat therefore it was impossible to pull them completely out of the front.
Because of the same reasons the Germans had six PzD's in Rumania (they retreated there from South Ukraine and immediatelly were involved in heavy combat)

2. WHAT WAS THE CONDITION OF THESE DIVISIONS?
By mid June the Germans had only two 100% replenished PzD in the East - 4.PzD and 5.PzD. On paper 20.PzD was also at full strength, but it was authorized to have only one PzAbt. Moreover, its PzAAbt and PzJgAbt were in the Reich for rebuilding and thus missed the initial battles in Byelorussia.
9.SS-PzD and 10.SS-PzD were in perfect condition, but both divisions missed their Panther-Abt'n, as well PzJgAbt'n. Moreover, they were intended to fight in the West.
1.PzD, 8.PzD, 16.PzD and 17.PzD were not in good shape. 1.PzD had less than 60 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 2000 men. 8.PzD had only 12 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 2000 men. It was reinforced with I./PzR 11 with 80 PzV. 16.PzD had less than 60 Pz and StuG and a shortfall of aprox. 2000 men. 17.PzD had less than 30 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 1200 men. Moreover, these divisions were short of some other types of heavy weapons, as well of motor vehicles and had a limited mobility. All four divisions were still recovering from Hube's disaster and were capable only for limited offensive actions.
7.PzD was in similar shape - it had less than 45 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 2700 men. Moreover it was split into several battle groups that were spread over a large area.

3.HOW ABOUT THE OTHERS?
6.PzD and 19.PzD were respectively in Germany and Holland for rebuilding. They were nothing more than bunch of men. 25.PzD was even in worst condition - the remnants of its personnel were in Denmark were they were merged with PzD "Norwegen". 5.SS-PzD was in the Reich for rebuilding after the disaster near Korsun. According to a condition report dated 1.6.44 it was not capable for any type of combat and only the Panther-Abt was operational.
12.PzD had no personnel shortfall, but had only 55 Pz.
Both 13.PzD and 14.PzD had less than 5 tanks. 24.PzD had less than 60 Pz and a shortfall of aprox. 2500 men. 3.SS-PzD had no personnel problems, but had about 45 Pz and StuG and was short of many other types of heavy weapons. Only GD was in good condition - it had more than 100 Pz and StuG and had no personnel shortfall. 23.PzD had less than 30 Pz and StuG a shortfall of aprox. 1600 men.

4.IN THE EVE OF BAGRATION
On 15 June 20.PzD was ordered to transfer to Bobruisk area. 5.PzD was to follow four days later, but because of the partisan actions that damaged the railroads between Brest and Minsk, its transfer was postponed. Thus the fortune saved this division from certain annihilation.

So the fact remains - THE GERMANS DECIDED TO TRANSFER TWO FULLY REPLENISHED PANZER DIVISIONS TO BYELORUSSIA JUST BEFORE THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE THERE.

Kamen

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quote:

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Originally posted by Kamen Nevenkin:
2. WHAT WAS THE CONDITION OF THESE DIVISIONS?
By mid June the Germans had only two 100% replenished PzD in the East - 4.PzD and 5.PzD. On paper 20.PzD was also at full strength, but it was authorized to have only one PzAbt. Moreover, its PzAAbt and PzJgAbt were in the Reich for rebuilding and thus missed the initial battles in Byelorussia.

[snip]
So the fact remains - THE GERMANS DECIDED TO TRANSFER TWO FULLY REPLENISHED PANZER DIVISIONS TO BYELORUSSIA JUST BEFORE THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE THERE.

Kamen

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Sorry Kamen, but these two statements are a bit contradictory - a PD without its AT, Recce Abteilungen and only half of the MBT complement is hardly fully replenished as far as PDs go.

Furthermore, Niepold states that the application to receive two divisions in AGC, one of these a PD was made on 24th June following a conference in Minsk at which the Chiefs of Staff of OKH, AGNU and AGN were present, and positively answered by Hitler on that day, and communicated by Zeitzler on the same day. The PD in question was 5.PD. This is in direct contradiction to what you wrote.

Essentially - to me it appears from your post that the only serious Panzer strength during May and up to mid-June was in AGNU, for various reasons.

1. I don't believe that my statements cited by you "are a bit contradictory". 20.PzD was not authorized to have Stab/PzR and Panther-Abt so its authorized strength was less than 1OO Pz. By mid June it had 83 PzIV and 9 PzIII - therefore its armor element was de facto fully replenished.
Yes, the division missed PzJgAbt 92 that was in Germany for rebuilding, but its anti-tank capabilities remained intact - during that time 20.PzD reported 28 sPak (Sfl) and 5 sPak (mot Z). These guns were distributed among the heavy companies of both PzGrReg'n. The division was authorized to have 21 JgPzIV and 12 sPak (mot Z) so these figures show that, despite the absence of PzJgAbt, it was in condition to offer proper anti-tank defense. Please, note that during that time four (14., 16., 24., 26.) German PzD were not AUTHORIZED to have PzJgAbt'n thus they have no such units at all.
20.PzD was fully outfitted with other types of Heavy weapons - SPW, artillery, etc. - too. Therefore it was fully capable for any type of action. This was confirmed by the commander of the division who wrote in the condition report dated 1.6.1944 that its formation is "zu jeder Angriffsaufgabe geeignet".
By the beginning of Bagration both PzAAbt 20 and PzJgAbt 92 were ready for combat, but because of the Soviet advance they were unable to join its parent division. Please note, that in my post I wrote " On paper 20.PzD was also at full strength " . I believe that my statement is clear.
In general, my statement was that 20.PzD was one of the three fully combat capable PzD's that the Germans had in the East.

2. 20.PzD was transferred to Lublin area not because it was intended to strength HGr "Nukr", but because this area was far better for training and was far closer to factories. Therefore it was much easier to Germans to rebuild the division there in comparison with the forests of SE Byelorussia that were full of partisans. Please note that the division was NOT SUBORDINATED TO HGr "Nukr", but was under the direct command of OKH.

3. My statement about 5.PzD is based on the divisional history written by von Plato, but I admit that I never had seen any written orders about this (I saw the order dated 24 June with my eyes). However, its statement sounds reasonable, because the situation had changed daily, as well because of the fact that von Plato him self was Ia of the division. Moreover, his book is one of the finest and most accurate divisional histories that I ever have seen. This possible transfer is still a very interesting topic for me and I'm ready to accept any additional infos and views about it.

4. I wrote my post with the idea to give some more information about the topic, not to take side or make clear conclusions. My goal was to provide the other forum members with some additional facts that will help the discussion to move forward.

quote:

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Originally posted by Kamen Nevenkin:
4. I wrote my post with the idea to give some more information about the topic, not to take side or make clear conclusions. My goal was to provide the other forum members with some additional facts that will help the discussion to move forward.

Kamen

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Morning Kamen, I think your post was very helpful in achieving that, and thanks a lot for the additional info on 20.PD. Sorry if I sounded a bit stroppy, my post was written a bit hastily.

Niepold's statement about the transfer of 5.PD appears to be based on the war diaries of the OKH, and AGC. I have a look tonight to see what I can find. I think it is reasonable to assume that 24th is the correct date, if indeed the order is dated that day as well. This puts the transfer after the start of the offensive, at a time when it was becoming clear that AGC may have serious trouble coping on its own.

AG SU Pz 186/87/138, StuG 194/62/278
AG NU Pz 830/133/229, StuG 480/70/185
AG M Pz 85/14/37, StuG 404/76/68
AG N Pz 91/53/30, StuG 241/53/69
Total Pz 1,192/287/434, StuG 1,319/261/680

Status 15 September 1944:

AG S Pz 51/22/43, StuG 62/23/95
AG A Pz 179/133/132, StuG 198/181/148
AG M Pz 398/239/76, StuG 544/160/92
AG N Pz 595/153/27, StuG 410/133/49
Total Pz 1,223/547/278, StuG 1,214/497/384

Note that the strength (operational + repair) of the tank forces in the east actually increased between 31 May and 15 Sept, from 3,059 to 3,481, despite the transfer of 9 and 10 SS-PzD to the west. Also, the total tank strength of AG-NU on 31 May was 49.1 percent of the total. AG-Mitte was second with 18.9 percent of the total, although there was practically little difference between then and AG-SU (17.3%) or AG-N (14.3%). The situation in September was radically different though, with AG-N (37.3%) and AG-Mitte (38.5%) accounting for over two-thirds of the tank strength in the east (AG-A was 19.9% and AG-S was 4.5%).

Overall there is little to indicate that the strength assigned to AG-NU on 31 May was unreasonable. The possible alternative was to make AG-Mitte stronger, but one must ask if the situation warranted such a move, especially considering the events AG-NU and AG-SU had just been through.

1.9.SS and 10.SS were sent to the west, but 6., 19., KGr/25., 5.SS and Hermann Goring had arrived. Moreover by 15 Sep seven (101, 102, 103, 104, 109, 110, FGB) PzBr had been created.
2.By mid Sep the German PzD's received a large number of the new JgPzIV. In some reports they were designated as StuG, while in others - as sPak (Sfl)
3.The higher numbers of StuG increased the total number of AFV's, but didn't increased the offensive capabilities of the particular army groups. Why? Because StuBr'n were capable mainly for defensive actions and local counterattacks, while the PzD's had enough capabilities to launch full scale offensive actions. Thus the number of PzD's was more important than the number of AFV's.
4.During the second half of September 3.PzA was detached from HGr "Miite" and subordinated to HGr "Nord". During that time it had five PzD and unknown number of smaller armored units. Please note, that this change didn't bring any troop movements. Thus HGr "Nord" obtained several hundred AFV's only by move of a single pencil.

My $0.02

quote:

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Originally posted by Kamen Nevenkin:

5.SS-PzD was in the Reich for rebuilding after the disaster near Korsun. According to a condition report dated 1.6.44 it was not capable for any type of combat and only the Panther-Abt was operational.

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I guess you use the same non-existent sources as I do, I'm mildly surprised you didn't get shouted at for bringing this up

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So the fact remains - THE GERMANS DECIDED TO TRANSFER TWO FULLY REPLENISHED PANZER DIVISIONS TO BYELORUSSIA JUST BEFORE THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE THERE.

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No need to shout I don't think anyone doubts that by mid-june the germans were aware that AGC would be the target of an offensive.
The real questions are whether they correctly apraissed the scope of the offensive, and whether soviet deception efforts had been effective in diluting german defensive efforts in Bellorussia.

ps. Good to see that sanity and reason have returned to this topic

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
Tank status of the Ostheer 31 May 1944 (#operational/in repair/assigned or en route):

AG SU Pz 186/87/138, StuG 194/62/278
AG NU Pz 830/133/229, StuG 480/70/185
AG M Pz 85/14/37, StuG 404/76/68
AG N Pz 91/53/30, StuG 241/53/69
Total Pz 1,192/287/434, StuG 1,319/261/680

Status 15 September 1944:

AG S Pz 51/22/43, StuG 62/23/95
AG A Pz 179/133/132, StuG 198/181/148
AG M Pz 398/239/76, StuG 544/160/92
AG N Pz 595/153/27, StuG 410/133/49
Total Pz 1,223/547/278, StuG 1,214/497/384

Note that the strength (operational + repair) of the tank forces in the east actually increased between 31 May and 15 Sept, from 3,059 to 3,481, despite the transfer of 9 and 10 SS-PzD to the west. Also, the total tank strength of AG-NU on 31 May was 49.1 percent of the total. AG-Mitte was second with 18.9 percent of the total, although there was practically little difference between then and AG-SU (17.3%) or AG-N (14.3%). The situation in September was radically different though, with AG-N (37.3%) and AG-Mitte (38.5%) accounting for over two-thirds of the tank strength in the east (AG-A was 19.9% and AG-S was 4.5%).

Overall there is little to indicate that the strength assigned to AG-NU on 31 May was unreasonable. The possible alternative was to make AG-Mitte stronger, but one must ask if the situation warranted such a move, especially considering the events AG-NU and AG-SU had just been through.

Unfortunately I have been unable to find the summary Panzerlage for the intervening period (and they may no longer exist) but eventually I intend to develope a database of strengths using the monthly divisional Meldungen that may answer some more questions.

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Hi Rich do you have stength data on individual StuG brigaes on May 31 1944 ?