Zetterling's?

Glantz's?

There's a lot more authors too.

You may change your opinion after to see my first draft (any day now...as I keep saying).

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
However, I believe that, having seen Chris's materials, he is the one best positioned to provide a comprehensive analysis of the battle using both German and Russian primary sources.

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I wonder if any author working on a WWII battle has ever been in a better position in terms of sources than Chris.

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
And, as you can see from this forum as well, he isn't afraid to hash out his work publicly during the manuscript phase. Contrast this with the usual ordeal of an author having his errors pointed out AFTER publication. Everybody loses when that happens!

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It clearly is the better approach. unfortunately, there are far too few cases when errors being pointed out after publication, despite the abundance of errors.

and can you provide me with some examples of what you or others disagree with in Glantz's book?

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Right now, Niklas' book is the only one I would recommend although I hope to add to this collection with my own release next year.

The other books are either very incomplete or have a large number of errors, with some of the recent releases making about one a page.

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Wonderful Mr.Lawrence, I look forward reading it when it comes out.

Do you have a title for it yet??

German side (all silly mistakes showing simple lack of proof-reading)
- incorrect identification of a General and/or Oberst (I guess he had "mood" rank!) Lauchert as commander of PzBde 10. Actually, Lauchert was a Major subordinate to PB10.
- two different starting strength figures for the Ferdinand unit
- physical description of Kempf (which is actually the description of Halder!) in an asinine attempt to divine someone's personality from a single photo

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:
I respect that Mr. Zetterling.

and can you provide me with some examples of what you or others disagree with in Glantz's book?

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As I don't have the Glantz/House book on Kursk, this is written from memory.

In the book it is stated that the German 9th Army suffered 50,000 casualties on one page. On another page overall German losses (AG Center and South combined) are said to have been 49,000. Aside from the figures being incompatible, they are in neither case correct (the first is more than double the real losses, the second slightly low). For the latter figure one of my articles is given as the source, but the articles says 56,000, not 49,000.

Page 1, title; "Prologue: Munich, 3 May 1943".

Conference occurred 4 May. Guderian met with Hitler to discuss tank production on 3 May.

Page 1, 2nd paragraph: States that Zeitzler was the "nominal author" of the plan..."although in truth the idea was so obvious that anyone at the table might have proposed it."

It would appear that the plan was originally proposed by Manstein to Hitler was one of two (or more?) options presented in early March.

Page 1: 3rd paragraph: "The day before the conference in Munich, Model had bypassed his commander, von Kluge, to present his concerns to Hitler."

It is my understanding that this meeting occurred in late April. I am not aware of a meeting on 2 May.

Page 2: 1st paragraph: "His audience, who had learned to read the dictator's moods, recognized that he was impressed by Model's arguments."

Now, how do he know "his audience" recognized this. This was obviously drawn from a Guderian statement, so this may have been Guderian's impression but Guderian did not speak for the entire audience.

Page 2, paragraph 1: "Yet, as in so many conferences during the war, von Manstein hesitated to make his case. In private, he was often scathingly critical of German strategy, but he was so overawed by Hitler's personality and intuition that he often stumbled when talking to the dictator."

I am not sure how this conclusion was reached. The actual statement by Guderian about Manstein was that after Hitler rejected Manstein's request for two more infantry divsions he received no clear answer. He did state that Manstein was not his best in this situation.

To reach the conclusion that these two sentences do, requires a lot more material about various Manstein/Hitler conferences that I have bothered to look into. I have never seen anything that would lead me to believe that Mansein was overawed by Hitler's personality and intuition.

Page 2, paragraph 3: "Albert Speer, Minister for Armaments and War Production....."

Speer, Model and Thomale was not at the conference of 4 May according to Ernst Klink's book, who quotes a 1958 memo by Gen. Busse (COS AG South) in his footnotes.

Page 2, paragraph 5: "For two days, the participants considered the three options...."

Conference lasted one day.

In general, part of the problem with this whole passage is that it is completely based on Guderian's account, with no attempt to cross check to other sources. There appears to be some errors in Guderian's account (including who participated).

Page 7, paragraph 3: "In its previous campaigns in 1939-1940, the Wehrmacht had developed blitzkrieg (lightning war) from a propoganda theme into a practical set of tactics."

This is a very odd statement.

Page 7, paragraph 4: "The highly centralized German maintenance system, which relied upon returning vehicles to the factory for major repairs, could not keep pace with the demands of the Russian campaign."

I believe the Germans had forward repair capability.

Page 8, paragraph 2: "Whereas prewar German intelligence had estimated an enemy of approximately 300 divisions, by Decmeber the Soviets had fielded almost three times that many units."

Oh really, 900 divisions?

Glantz then provides a footnote that does the accounting for this figure. His math included counting two brigades as one division. Adding it up, one comes up with 518.5 division equivelents.

Alternatively, he may be adding into this figure the units that were lost (which he lists), which comes out to 737 division equivelents.

One does get close to 900 (881) if one adds up the total in his footnotes of divisions mobilized between 22 June - 31 December (385 divisions, 267 brigades) with the total lost during that same period (208 divisions, 21 brigades). One is still left to wonder how the Soviet Army managed to loose 208 out of 385 divisions, but only 21 out of 267 brigades, or why the number of division's lost should be added to the number mobilized to produce a count total Soviet divisions.

Overall, it does not appear that the Soviets fielded 900 divisions, although as the statement says "three times that many units" this could be true by defualt.

Page 9, first line: "The Germans quickly recovered their nerve and their mobility, fighting the first Soviet winter offensive to a standstill by February 1942."

I question whether the Germans lost their nerve in the first place or that they were able to halt the Soviet winter offensive by recovering their "nerve" and "mobility".

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Page 7, paragraph 4: "The highly centralized German maintenance system, which relied upon returning vehicles to the factory for major repairs, could not keep pace with the demands of the Russian campaign."

I believe the Germans had forward repair capability.

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This was indeed the case. An example of this is that between 1 Oct 1943 and 31 Jan 1944 8,702 tanks and assault guns were repaired at the front and only 453 in the zone of interior. Thus almost 20 times as many AFV were repaired at the front as in the factories. I have seen nothing suggesting that the Germans completely changed their practises during the war. probably this statement originates from Jukes, who I believed wrote something similar. To me it seems that the German maintenance system was quite decentralized.

Furthermore, there are very good records from 4th PzArmy during Zitadelle, showing the tank situation every tenth day. These papers gives the number of tanks destroyed, the number of tanks damaged but remaining with workshops belonging to the division, the number of damaged tanks sent to army facilities and the number of tanks sent to the rear area. This papers do certainly not support Glantz/House statement.

Page 11, paragraph 11: "Once Rokossovsky was able to attack on 25 February, his forces achieved consdierable success against the weak Hungarian and German units south of Orel."

This is a minor point of sematics, but I don't think the problem was caused by the "units" being weak, but by there not be enough units to hold the extended front.

Page 13, end of paragraph continued from previous page: "For perhaps the last time in russia, the Luftwaffe provided undisputed air superioirty for a major German mechanized operations." (refers to Kharkov in March).

This is kind of an issue of interpretation, since the Germans did effectively have air superiority over Kursk. The key word is "undisputed", which along with "perhaps" makes this statement true, but somewhat misleading.

Page 14, first paragraph: "When Hitler visited von Manstein's Zaporozh'e headquarters on 10 March, the field marshal pressed the dictator for commitment to resume the offensive as soon as the rasputitsa ended."

Manstein was discussing several options with Hitler, including the "backhand" blow for future operations. He currently was on the offensive. This is a very incomplete discussion and leaves the wrong impression.

Next sentence "Four days later, when the SS Panzer entered Khar'kov, von Manstein tried to persuade von Kluge, as commander of Army Group Center, to cooperate in an immediate attack against Rokossovsky's force in the newly formed Kursk Bulge."

The SS entered Kharkov 11 March, vice 14 March. As this is drawn from Manstein, page 436, one will note that Manstein does not give a precise date for this discussion, therefore the date of 14 March appears to be an assumption.

next sentence: "Von Kluge refused, insisting that his troops needed to rest and refit."

Again, drawn from Manstein, page 436. This is not really what Manstein says.

Page 14, paragraph 5: "In January 1943, however he [Hitler] reluctantly appointed a committee of three men to find 800,000 new recruits for the armed forces..."

Minor point of semantics, but I question the use of the adjective "reluctantly". Also, it was a committee headed by three men, I assume it had staff.

Page 16, 2nd sentence: "Nevertheless, by 30 May 1943, the enormous effort had brought the German armed forces to their highest strength (9.5 million) of the entire war."

The German army had 10.1 million in July 1943 and 10.6 million in January 1944. Perhaps he means "to date".

Page 16, 3rd paragraph: "In addition, an SS division usually had a battalion of self-propelled assualt guns and enough armored half-tracks to mount most or all of its infantry and reconnaissance troops."

As of Kursk, most of the SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions had one battalion mounted in half-tracks and the rest in trucks.

Page 16, 3rd paragraph: "By constrast, an ordinary panzer division often had only one company of assualt guns and one or two companies of half-tracks..."

In the south, 4 or the 5 Panzer Divisions did not have an organic assualt gun unit, while the 11th Panzer had a battalion. Most (maybe all, I haven't checked my notes) had three companies (a battalion) mounted in half-tracks.

Next sentence: "Such a division included two or three battalions of Panzer III and IV medium tanks, five battalions of infantry, and three battalions of towed medium artllery..."

The usually had one or two tank battalions (Pz II, IIIs and IVs), six battalions of infantry (two regiments). They effectivley had eight battalions of infantry if you include the recon and engineer battalion.

Next sentence: "Although nominally authorized at 13,000 to 17,000 men, the average 1943 panzer division, despite all Guderian's efforts, was probably closer to 10,000 or 11,000."

Going into Kursk, most of these panzer divisions were at 13,000 or 15,000 men or greater. For example, "ist" strength of 6th PzD on 20 June is 15,854 while the 7th PzD is 15,431.

Page 17, 2nd paragraph: "By spring of 1943, this reduced organization [six infantry battalions and three gun batteries] became almost universal on the Eastern Front, and an infantry division was fortunate to have 8,000 effectives, supplemented by up to 1,000 unarmed Russian "helpers".

Again, looking at this 20 June report (T312, R50, page xx3584) we see "ist" strengths for the infantry divisions as:

328th ID: 14,066
39th ID: 9,905
282nd ID: 14,543
161st ID: 15,363
106th ID: 14,756
168th ID: 15,882
320th ID: 14,164

Furthermore, three of the divisions still have about 48 feild peices. It would appear that there is only one two-regiment infantry division among these seven.

Actually, the "unarmed Russian helpers" were often armed and in many cases were not Russian, but other nationalities.

Next sentence: "Continuing reductions in available horses and motor vehicles made this infantry division far less mobile than its 1941 predecessor. Soviet attackers sometimes overran German artillery batteries because the guns could not be moved, and German infantry units had to use bicycles for reconnaissance and local counterattack forces."

Have not made a comparison to the 1941 division, but there appears to have been transport at Kursk for every German artillery
battery.

If all the artillery batteries have transport and the infantry have feet, it would appear that the infantry divisions are mobile.

The German use of bicycle mounted units date back to the start of the war and is not a change since 1941.

Overall, these statements are somewhat misleading.

Page 17, 2nd paragraph: "In 1942 most divisions had received a limited number of new, 75mm antitank guns but ammunition for these was often in short supply."

This again leaves the wrong impression. Most of the infantry divisions at Kursk (southern atttack) were armed with 19 - 39 "medium" AT (mostly 50mm) and 21 to 24 "heavy" ATguns (75mm). This is hardly a limited number and compares favorably to the Soviets.

Ammunition was certianly not an issue at Kursk with several basic loads being available to all units.

Next sentence: "Thus, the German infantry division was reduced to a passive role, holding long stretches fo the front line with only limited offensive or defensive capability."

This concluding statement is misleading. In the south the 332nd, 167th, 168th, 106th and 320th IDs were definately involved in the attack and in several cases did quite well. There were healthy, fully manned 14,000 to 15,000 man divisions with a full complement of weapons and reasonably well trained.

And Mr. Lawrence, if your postings are any way close to the way your book is, I am really looking forward your book. Can't wait until it comes out.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Disagreements with Glantz's book "The Battle of Kursk"

[b]Page 16, 2nd sentence: "Nevertheless, by 30 May 1943, the enormous effort had brought the German armed forces to their highest strength (9.5 million) of the entire war."

The German army had 10.1 million in July 1943 and 10.6 million in January 1944. Perhaps he means "to date".[/B]

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I can add that these figures are not necessarily what they can be taken for, as they include all services, including hospitalized soldiers and officers and men in training facilities.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Disagreements with Glantz's book "The Battle of Kursk"
[b]Page 16, 3rd paragraph: "In addition, an SS division usually had a battalion of self-propelled assualt guns and enough armored half-tracks to mount most or all of its infantry and reconnaissance troops."

As of Kursk, most of the SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions had one battalion mounted in half-tracks and the rest in trucks.
[/B]

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:
Thanks all who answered my question and thanks for saving me the $25 from buying Glantz's book, for it will now be used on Mr. Zetterling's Kursk 1943 book.

And Mr. Lawrence, if your postings are any way close to the way your book is, I am really looking forward your book. Can't wait until it comes out.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
This was indeed the case. An example of this is that between 1 Oct 1943 and 31 Jan 1944 8,702 tanks and assault guns were repaired at the front and only 453 in the zone of interior. Thus almost 20 times as many AFV were repaired at the front as in the factories.

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I can also confirm this. I have recently begun collating the Panzerlage of AOK 10 in Italy on an Excel spreadsheet and have completed the period from 5 November 1943 to 31 January 1944. These include reports on Iststaerke, Instandsatzung and Totalausfalle for the six panzer and panzergrenadier divisions (as well as the other formations of the army) on about a three-day interval (the reports previous to 5 November 1943 only gave Einsatzbereit). These recorded a total of three Sturmgeschuetz evacuated to Germany for repairs during the period. And yet, during the same period the number of panzer and sturmgeschuetz in short-term and long-term repair at a guess probably averaged about 100 at any one time (I have not worked all the numbers yet).

Rather, it appears that the German system utilized long-term repair vehicles in the field as both a method of parts warehousing (similar to the "hanger queens" common in air forces) and to reduce the strain on the transportation system. And, before anyone starts making erroneous assumptions about German AFV "unreliability" it should be mentioned that the "long-term" repair in German practice was more similar to the American 4th Echelon repair. That is, in American practice those vehicles that were not repairable by division maintenance, which were evacuated to army or Communications Zone repair. In essence that meant that in US practice all of the vehicles held for repair in a unit were usually repairable in under 48-hours, while in German practice "short-term" repair meant that it was repairable in under two weeks. As a result, American operational readiness for tanks was typically often over 90 percent, and sometimes as high as 95 percent, while German operational readiness typically appears to hover at around 60 percent.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:

I wonder if any author working on a WWII battle has ever been in a better position in terms of sources than Chris.

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It helps to have had a budget. At one point there was around a dozen people working full-time or part-time on this project.

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It clearly is the better approach. unfortunately, there are far too few cases when errors being pointed out after publication, despite the abundance of errors.

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The problem here is:

1) Who has the expertise to point them out?
2) Who is going to take the time to point them out?
3) What forum is this going to be presented in?
4) Who is willing to make enemies by the process of pointing the errors out?

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:
Wonderful Mr.Lawrence, I look forward reading it when it comes out.

Do you have a title for it yet??

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"Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka"

It is to be published by Westview Press and will probably coming out Fall 2003 (it would help if I could get the manuscript off my desk).

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:
And Mr. Lawrence, if your postings are any way close to the way your book is, I am really looking forward your book. Can't wait until it comes out.

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My postings were off the top of my head, as my manuscript was in the office and I was at home. So there may be an error or two in them (my memory really isn't very good).

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
I am not sure whether the Glantz/House statement referred to Kursk only, or if it was a description of the German forces in a more general sense.

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