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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
I hope you will like the book. I too eagerly wait for Chris's book (or rather, have waited for years).

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Any day now. I actually have a couple of chapters in Rich's had for review and rework. The "pre-Kursk" chapters are still about my roughest stuff, with the rest of the book in much better shape. You'll start seeing drafts "any day now" (actually maybe in another week or two or three).

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BTW Chris, I liked your error listing, there are many pages remaining.

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Should I continue?

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
"Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka"

It is to be published by Westview Press and will probably coming out Fall 2003 (it would help if I could get the manuscript off my desk).

It covers only the German attack in the south in July, not the whole battle. As it is, we are staring at a very thick book.

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An idea, maybe you could do the battle of Kursk in parts. Start off with German attack in the south in July and then in the next book, do Model's attack in the north only in July and slowly work your way through the whole battle. It will probably take you five-six books, including the middle sector, but it will be a great account of the whole battle.

Too bad readers have to wait a year though.

But if you don't do a full account of all sectors in the battle, what do you think will be your next work? Staying with the east or moving to the west?

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Should I continue?

[This message has been edited by Chris Lawrence (edited 11-15-2002).]

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In your posts about how Mr. Glantz is wrong, you give very informative answers, but could you provide me with some sources of your answers as I have not gotten into the details of formr Soviet documents for the battle of Kursk.

And if it's possible, I'd enjoy it if you sent some documents my way.

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
Hmm, do a critique..name your sources...send me copies of everything...you wouldn't be writing your own book would you? hee, hee!

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No, just interested in the eastern front is all. And I do not have the ability to go over to Russia or Germany to see any type of files whatsoever.

Maybe it would be easier if Chris just finished his book and we can all compare it with Glantz, et al, ourselves. [/QUOTE]

Whatever gets his book out quicker, I am for.

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:
An idea, maybe you could do the battle of Kursk in parts.

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I have considered that.

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Too bad readers have to wait a year though.

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That is my fault, not the publishers. I was supposed to have the book done two years ago.

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But if you don't do a full account of all sectors in the battle, what do you think will be your next work?

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If I don't do more Kursk books, then I will probably do the various Kharkov battles in 1943 (of which one was part of Kursk).

Keep in mind, I make my living doing contracts for DOD. Few historians make a living as an author. As such, all this is done in my spare time in and around my regular(paying)work.

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Originally posted by Brad Sallows:
I suppose, Chris, one of the challenges you face is whether to highlight the greater and lesser myths/misconceptions and expound why they are so, and how to do it.

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I do address the myths in the text of the book. I do not bother to systematically refute other peoples works becuase there are so many to refute. As shown, a little earlier, just dealing with Glantz' work, I ended up disputing 26 points in the first 17 pages. This issue a page rate shows up in a large number of works I've seen on the battle (Zetterling being the notable exception). It would take an entire book to refute the other books, so, as such I do not bother. I do have an appendix that is a "History of the Histories" that shows how the myth of Prokhorovka was established over the years from Soviet writings to Werth, Clark, Jukes, Seaton, Erickson to Glantz (although he was mostly broken with it now).

I use footnotes, but my publisher may have other ideas. As it is, I try to use them sparingly, and don't use them at all for material I've pulled from the unit records (which is most of the book). I mostly use footnotes to identify sources. I do not conduct a lot of discussion in the footnotes.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
If I don't do more Kursk books, then I will probably do the various Kharkov battles in 1943 (of which one was part of Kursk).

Are you going to d a book for each time it was battled over??

Keep in mind, I make my living doing contracts for DOD. Few historians make a living as an author. As such, all this is done in my spare time in and around my regular(paying)work.

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So you go about giving lectures and speeches to different classes and other public things right??

Are you going to tour for your book??

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
I do address the myths in the text of the book. I do not bother to systematically refute other peoples works becuase there are so many to refute. As shown, a little earlier, just dealing with Glantz' work, I ended up disputing 26 points in the first 17 pages. This issue a page rate shows up in a large number of works I've seen on the battle (Zetterling being the notable exception). It would take an entire book to refute the other books, so, as such I do not bother. I do have an appendix that is a "History of the Histories" that shows how the myth of Prokhorovka was established over the years from Soviet writings to Werth, Clark, Jukes, Seaton, Erickson to Glantz (although he was mostly broken with it now).

I use footnotes, but my publisher may have other ideas. As it is, I try to use them sparingly, and don't use them at all for material I've pulled from the unit records (which is most of the book). I mostly use footnotes to identify sources. I do not conduct a lot of discussion in the footnotes.

[This message has been edited by Chris Lawrence (edited 11-16-2002).]

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Cant wait to see for myself. Your making more interested in the book than I already am.......

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:

Are you going to d a book for each time it was battled over??

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There is probably room to do a book on each that covers the operations around the city and the fight for the city itself (which was usually anti-climatic)....or to do a single book covering the three fights for the city in 1943.

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So you go about giving lectures and speeches to different classes and other public things right??

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I don't do much of that anymore. It never made much sense economically. Mostly we prepare reports (see our publications section).

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Are you going to tour for your book??

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Probably not.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
There is probably room to do a book on each that covers the operations around the city and the fight for the city itself (which was usually anti-climatic)....or to do a single book covering the three fights for the city in 1943.

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Sounds interesting, though I hope your price is not as high as some of the other books on Kharkov are. And wow, what a coincidence, you still might have a chance to show Glantz wrong again as he has a book about Kharkov 1942, so you might possibly get some information on 42 while working on 43.

I don't do much of that anymore. It never made much sense economically. Mostly we prepare reports (see our publications section).[/QUOTE]

Whatever works for you is what matters.

Probably not.

[/QUOTE]

The problem some would see with his work is that it revolves around 'secondary Soviet sources.' This may be true, but until there is a total opening of the Soviet military-political archives, there will only be 'secondary Soviet sources.' Either one makes due with what one has, or one writes about something else. Or, one writes about the Germans, and how they felt about the Soviets in WWII.

As it is, there is not one work out there on the Russian Front that is flawless. The work that Glantz does is of great value in opening a door that has long been closed. No story is ever reliable until each side has told his tale, and Glantz' work along with just a handful of others are trying to ensure that this story does become reliable.

I would suggest you pick books based on their focus, whether Soviet or German. Most, if not all, publications on the Russian Front have this preference. Just make sure you pick one of each.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
If I don't do more Kursk books, then I will probably do the various Kharkov battles in 1943 (of which one was part of Kursk).

Keep in mind, I make my living doing contracts for DOD. Few historians make a living as an author. As such, all this is done in my spare time in and around my regular(paying)work.

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Sir,

I would truly love to see a book done on the northern salient of the Kursk bulge.
I have waited (impatiently) for the publication of your current book ever since we discussed it some months ago.
I notice it is listed on the Warfield newsletter as a pre-publication offering for c.$50, but you indicate that publication is expected late in 2003. Has Mr.Warfield a pre-publication printing or is he "jumping the gun" on pre-orders?

Do you have an opinion on the new series of Kursk books by Jean Restayn?

I have also seen advertised a book on Kursk by someone named Lannoy,a new name to me. Have you any information about this book?

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
I've no doubt that Glantz has made mistakes in his books, and in fact, I've detected a few of them myself. However, there is no other historian out there who is working as hard as he is at trying to restore a balance to the western perception of the Russian Front.

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While I agree that sources in the German language have been more widely used than sources in Russian, it is not evident that an uncritical use of Russian sources (secondary or primary) will create a more accurate balance.
As I see it, the way Soviet sources is used to ”redress the imbalance in the western perception of the Russian front” is often similar to someone trying to cure headache by chopping off the head.
There are exceptions of course. Earl F. Ziemke’s and Magna E. Bauers book ”Moscow to Stalingrad” makes use of Soviet secondary sources (as it was written some 15 years ago, nothing else was available). However, unlike Glantz et al, Ziemke & Bauer checks many of the statements in the Soviet sources, compares them to German archival documents. While I have found errors in Ziemke’s writings too, they are less common and less severe.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Glantz' focus is on the Red Army primarily, which is where the gap exists to this day, so if his remarks on details from German forces are off at points, even many points, all one has to do is look up the myriad of publications that exist on German forces in the Russian Front.

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I don’t agree, since there is no myriad of reliable sources on the German side either. Furthermore, if the Soviet statements on the Germans are accepted uncritically, any analyses on why events unfolded as they did, why certain actions succeeded or failed, how efficient various methods were, etc, will be fundamentally flawed.
One of the most horrendous reports I have ever seen is a NATO report called ”The Sustainability of the Soviet Army”, by Chris Donnelly. It does completely uncritically accept Soviet secondary sources and makes many completely untenable conclusions.
As I see it, the use of Soviet sources has filled gaps; unfortunately many more errors have been introduced in the process. Had the Erickson/Glantz way been the only one pursued during the last 15 years, I think we would have had a more distorted perception today than we had 15 years ago.
Furthermore, while there is value in making the Soviet sources available to a western audience, there is no excuse for making more use of them than they deserve. Why stating that the Soviet general staff studies are noted for their accuracy and candor, when this is patently untrue. While I have only been able to check the statements on the Germans – and found these to be very inaccurate, and most likely not candid either – we do not know that the statements on the Soviet side are correct. I have not seen anything suggesting that Glantz/Orenstein have checked these studies against Soviet primary sources.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
The problem some would see with his work is that it revolves around 'secondary Soviet sources.' This may be true, but until there is a total opening of the Soviet military-political archives, there will only be 'secondary Soviet sources.' Either one makes due with what one has, or one writes about something else. Or, one writes about the Germans, and how they felt about the Soviets in WWII.

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Agree. However, to use the Soviet sources, one has to be very cautious and rather be too restrictive on their usefulness than placing too much value in them.
Back in 1990, Harris and Toase edited a book called ”Armoured Warfare” in which C. J. Dick wrote a chapter called ”The Operational Employment of Soviet Armour in the Great Patriotic War”. Here Dick argued on western perception of the war in the east:
”The Wehrmacht is generally portrayed as immensely superior in every aspect of military endeavour, save at times in strategic leadership. Its failures are ascribed to adverse climatic conditions, the sheer size of the USSR, overwhelming Soviet numbers, Hitler’s mistakes – to everything, in fact, except superior Red leadership and combat performance.”
Dick goes on to suggest as a corrective the use of Soviet publication, especially those who ”are written for didactic purposes, to educate the Soviet officer in his profession. For such material to serve its purpose, it must be truthful, even if it does not tell the whole truth.”
The latter statement is merits some comment. The fact that it ought to be truthful does not assure that it actually is. The available evidence strongly suggest that the lies and distortions were well entrenched in Soviet didactic material too.
Furthermore, the causes behind the eventual Soviet victory in WWII belittled by Dick seem far more plausible than his own statements. Also, as far as I can see, what has come out of Soviet archives since 1990 supports the notion that the Red Army overwhelmed the Germans by numbers and not by skill, and that the Soviet victory was bought at a cost that is not commensurate with a highly developed military skill.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
As it is, there is not one work out there on the Russian Front that is flawless. The work that Glantz does is of great value in opening a door that has long been closed. No story is ever reliable until each side has told his tale, and Glantz' work along with just a handful of others are trying to ensure that this story does become reliable.

I would suggest you pick books based on their focus, whether Soviet or German. Most, if not all, publications on the Russian Front have this preference. Just make sure you pick one of each.

[This message has been edited by Greg LG (edited 11-17-2002).]

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I would suggest picking books that contain as few errors as possible (the fault free is probably just a dream). It is better to know little than believing in lies, distortions, errors or mistakes.

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:
Sounds interesting, though I hope your price is not as high as some of the other books on Kharkov are.

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I have no control over price (unless I want to get into self-publishing -- and then I will guarentee it will be high).

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...book about Kharkov 1942, so you might possibly get some information on 42 while working on 43.

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I don't have research budget for that. The reason we've looked at Kharkov is because of a study we have been doing on Urban Warfare. On the other hand, we may take a look at Stalingrad.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
I've no doubt that Glantz has made mistakes in his books

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I am bothered by the large number of them. One notes that I pointed out 26 "disagreements" in 17 pages. That rate pretty much continues through all the book I have read to date (I've gone through 6 July), and it is not just the German material. I have encountered similar problems with other books of his (specifically "When Titan's Clash" and "From the Don to the Dnepr").

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However, there is no other historian out there who is working as hard as he is at trying to restore a balance to the western perception of the Russian Front.

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As proven by the existance of the legend of Prokhorovka in Werth, Clark, Seaton, Ericson, and Glantz......(but not Zeimke)....it would appear that the un-balance has not necessarily been in favor of the Germans.

To be honest, I do not know what you mean by "restore a balance". None of the 26 areas of disagreement I pointed out seem to have anything to do with balance...in fact his book seemed to under-estimate the size of the German units (seeing how these unit size estimates probably came from Soviet sources), which if anything, would make the German's appear all the more impressive.

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Glantz' focus is on the Red Army primarily, which is where the gap exists to this day, so if his remarks on details from German forces are off at points, even many points, all one has to do is look up the myriad of publications that exist on German forces in the Russian Front.

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Understand Glantz' focus and there is no question that over the years he has surfaced a lot of useful material. But, battle is an engagement between two sides. As such, if one does not carefully and accurately examine both sides....then one is not describing the battle.

I do not believe in "German" or "Soviet" (which is different than Russian) perspectives of history. I simply beleive in recording and explaining what happened.

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The problem some would see with his work is that it revolves around 'secondary Soviet sources.'

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This is only part of the problem. The other part of this problem is that he uses Soviet secondary sources without properly cross-checking them to German primary sources. In the extreme, we have seen a number of cases where he has quoted Soviet secondary sources for German strength and loss figures! This is a fundamentally flawed methodology and results in major errors in the data...and as a direct consequence...major errors in his interpretations.

If the basic data used to build the arguement in the book is not correct...then the arguement is not established. This is not an issue of "balance" or "perspective" but one of methodology.

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This may be true, but until there is a total opening of the Soviet military-political archives, there will only be 'secondary Soviet sources.'

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I am using mostly Soviet primary sources.

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As it is, there is not one work out there on the Russian Front that is flawless.

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I agree entirely, although I think I would use much stronger words. In retrospect, I find Zeimke to be the least error filled.

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The work that Glantz does is of great value in opening a door that has long been closed.

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The work Glantz has done over the years in identifying Soviet sources has been very useful. Even then, I found some of the interpretations coming out of Leavenworth and the "Sovietology" community to be somewhat hard to accept. They basically made these guys look 10 feet tall during the cold war.

Considering the extent of Glantz' research, I find his books to be a real disappointment. I find that they contain fundamental flaws in methodology and interpretation. As such, they further muddy the picture, as opposed to providing "balance". There really is a disconnect between Glantz' research and his published work. And while I greatly respect the research and sources he has uncovered over the years, I find myself very frustrated every time I look in depth at his books. Glantz did do some work for us under contract for the Kursk data base project and we were pleased with his results.

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No story is ever reliable until each side has told his tale,

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Sorry, but I am not interested in the "tales" told by each side, but what actually happened. That may or may not have some correlation with each sides tales.

The concept of writing history with a "German" or "Soviet" focus I believe is fundamentally flawed. It is a duel between two sides.

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Originally posted by Steve+:
Sir,I would truly love to see a book done on the northern salient of the Kursk bulge.

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I have not collected material on the northern salient. That would be a seperate research effort.

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I have waited (impatiently) for the publication of your current book ever since we discussed it some months ago.

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Sorry, but I am only working on the book part-time and must work a full-time job to pay for my extravagant life-style.

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I notice it is listed on the Warfield newsletter as a pre-publication offering for c.$50, but you indicate that publication is expected late in 2003. Has Mr.Warfield a pre-publication printing or is he "jumping the gun" on pre-orders?

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This is news to me. I have never heard a price for my book and it would be hard for anyone to set one until they get a page count.

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Do you have an opinion on the new series of Kursk books by Jean Restayn?

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I have not seen them. Is this one of these photographic series?

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I have also seen advertised a book on Kursk by someone named Lannoy,a new name to me. Have you any information about this book?

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No, haven't heard anything.

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By the way,I had to re-register to make a posting. I realize I haven't posted anything for some time...do you purge those who do not post on a regular basis? Just curious...

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:

I do not believe in "German" or "Soviet" (which is different than Russian) perspectives of history. I simply beleive in recording and explaining what happened.

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Bulls Eye.

As an author on a battle, it is about collecting basic information like what resources were available, how were they employed, under what conditions did they operate, what decisions were taken, what events took place, in what condition were the units after the battle, etc. From this, the author should contribute with his own perspective, not iterating someone elses perspective. However, if these basic onservations are wrong, interpretations, analyses, evaluations, conclusions, etc, will suffer irrepairably.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Considering the extent of Glantz' research, I find his books to be a real disappointment. I find that they contain fundamental flaws in methodology and interpretation. As such, they further muddy the picture, as opposed to providing "balance". There really is a disconnect between Glantz' research and his published work. And while I greatly respect the research and sources he has uncovered over the years, I find myself very frustrated every time I look in depth at his books.

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Agree. I can add that my critisism of the Soviet generalstaff study on Korsun on my site is not about translating it and making it available. To the contrary, I will make some use of it myself. Probably I would not have done it had he not made it available. What I do object to is the foreword where he claims that it is accurate and candid and thereby greatly exaggerates its usefulness. To me it is useful because I have bought some 20-25 rolls of microfilm (at $39 each) with documents to check it against. How many readers can do that? Admittedly the publication is not a mainstream one, but in principle there is no difference between such a publication and a better selling book.

One minor point:

"Next sentence: "Continuing reductions in available horses and motor vehicles made this infantry division far less mobile than its 1941 predecessor. Soviet attackers sometimes overran German artillery batteries because the guns could not be moved, and German infantry units had to use bicycles for reconnaissance and local counterattack forces."

"Have not made a comparison to the 1941 division, but there appears to have been transport at Kursk for every German artillery
battery."

Admittedly I have made only some relatively sketchy comparisons, but the general impression I got when comparing the '41 and reduced infantry divisional structures was that the transport assets of the latter had decreased roughly proportionately with the reduction in overall strength.

Also, I entirely agree with what has been written by both you and Niklas Zetterling about the proper basic approach to research. I so not think I have seen this expressed better.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Admittedly I have made only some relatively sketchy comparisons, but the general impression I got when comparing the '41 and reduced infantry divisional structures was that the transport assets of the latter had decreased roughly proportionately with the reduction in overall strength.

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Regimes:

- the Hitler government was an IMMATURE totalitarian regime, existing since 1933 and ending in 1945 with very few supporters continuing to operate afterwards

- the Stalin government was a MATURE totalitarian regime, existing since 1917 and lasting until 1989 with many supporters continuing to function within the government

State Party Influence within Armed Forces:

- German officers as a rule did not belong to the party; there was no party recruiting within the military; a weak commissar system was introduced late in the war

- Soviet officers as a rule were party members; the party actively recruited new members from the military (many mentions of this in Soviet accounts); the commissar had a very powerful role in command decisions from the start of the war

Propaganda within Armed Forces:

- Goebbels created Propaganda Companies at start of war; the company commander reported to the Ic (Intel officer) on the command staff; the Wehrmacht Propaganda office (in cooperation with Propaganda Ministry) censored publication of military-related writing and photography; military members, and some commands, continued to privately record their activities including use of countless still and motion-picture cameras; all propaganda activities ceased after war

- Soviet military propaganda conducted thru the unit commissar (practically the deputy commander); State Party censored all publications; I have seen no evidence of private photography...suggesting it was very rare; propaganda effort continued postwar

Official Records of Armed Forces

- War diaries maintained by Operations Officer and his staff with no evidence of political censorship; all records freely available to public post-war...subject to bureaucratic procedures and some security restrictions on counter-intel documents, governments in control of these records encourage researchers

- Unit reporting censored by commissar, unit records unavailable to public until 1989...researcher access remains relatively restricted; Russian government divided over issue of national security risk in allowing researchers access

Memoirs

- German officers wrote and published freely about their experiences...US Army program encouraged and subsidized initial officer studies; strong anti-regime content with heavy criticism of Hitler; no open rivalries

- Many Soviet memoirs published, however all were published by party-owned publishing houses; strong pro-regime content with some subtle criticism of deceased Stalin; famous Konev-Zhukov rivalry (public discussion subtle by Western standards)

Well, those are some quick thoughts, any comments?