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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
I think what is missing in the literature (or maybe I have simply missed it myself) is a discussion of comparative source methodology for the East Front in WW2.

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I suspect that military history and in particular, military historians, are too iconoclastic to be influenced much by such a discussion. I have never seen such a discussion, although analyzing, weighing and interpreting data has been a regular issue of discussion in our work place for a very long time.

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It must be demonstrated that the old saying "the truth lies somewhere in the middle" simply does not apply to the evaluation of conflicting information from two militaries which were wildly different from each other in how they handled the truth.

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Exactly. Generally agree with the rest of your discussion and find it to be useful synopsis of the entire problem.

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the Hitler government was an IMMATURE totalitarian regime,..

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Both the regime and the people who headed it.

I suspect given enough time, the Nazi Party would have seriously damaged the effectiveness of the German military.

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Many Soviet memoirs published, however all were published by party-owned publishing houses;.....

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And, many of these were partly or signficantly ghost written, usually by the same group of professionals. As such....there is an otherwise hard to explain consistency in the stories.

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Well, those are some quick thoughts, any comments?

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Pretty good synopsis. Part of the problem you get with Soviet reporting is that as a rule of thumb, the other side always looses more than you do. This makes it even more inappropriate to make use of Soviet claims of German losses.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
I don't have research budget for that. The reason we've looked at Kharkov is because of a study we have been doing on Urban Warfare. On the other hand, we may take a look at Stalingrad.

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Think you can match Beevors book? It is a fine piece of work.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Disagreements with Glantz's book "The Battle of Kursk"

Oh really, 900 divisions?

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No, Glantz never wrote that the Soviets had fielded 900 divisions by the end of 1941.

Glantz then provides a footnote that does the accounting for this figure. His math included counting two brigades as one division. Adding it up, one comes up with 518.5 division equivelents.

Alternatively, he may be adding into this figure the units that were lost (which he lists), which comes out to 737 division equivelents.

One does get close to 900 (881) if one adds up the total in his footnotes of divisions mobilized between 22 June - 31 December (385 divisions, 267 brigades) with the total lost during that same period (208 divisions, 21 brigades). One is still left to wonder how the Soviet Army managed to loose 208 out of 385 divisions, but only 21 out of 267 brigades, or why the number of division's lost should be added to the number mobilized to produce a count total Soviet divisions.

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Originally posted by Samuel:
No, Glantz never wrote that the Soviets had fielded 900 divisions by the end of 1941.

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The actual quote from his book (page 8) is:

"Whereas prewar German intelligence had estimated an enemy of approximately 300 divisions, by December the Soviets had fielded almost three times that many units."

As the first part of the sentence is talking "divisions" then the reference to "units" in the second part of the sentence I assume applies also to divisions. And fielding "three times" 300 divisions looks like 900 divisions according to my reading of the sentence.

Now....I will grant you, this is probably not what Glantz meant to say....but this is the only reasonable interpretation I could make of the sentence the way it was written.

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All those calcualtions do not make any sense. Why don't you simply add the number of divisions mobilized between 06.22.1941 and 12.31.1941 to the number of divisions already mobilized on 06.22.1941?

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I agree they do not make any sense. I don't see a set of numbers presented in the book that can be added together that gets me to 900, unless you are suggesting I add the German estimate of 300 divisions (which he does not state is either accurate or inaccurate) to the 385 new divisions and 267 brigades (267/2 = 133.5) for a total of 818.5 divisions.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Zetterling,

Your points are taken, and some are very good ones. I thank you for your frankness.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Yea, we were probably too frank.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
My disagreements here run deep, but are based more on differences in methodology than anything else. Suffice to say, this is not the place for such age old arguments concerning historiography.

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Greg, I disagree, the methodology used is key to debating the merits of Glantz's work.
As I attempted to point out in my comparison of German versus Soviet sources, there is a demonstrable difference in reliability between the two. That is, anyone using Soviet sources is COMPELLED to deal with the probability that those sources have been manipulated to serve a purpose beyond simple truth-telling.
What is your methodology for dealing with this? If you ignore this factor, can you even claim to have a methodology?

Further, some of us on this forum have listed many examples of errors or disagreements from Glantz's book on Kursk. Those flaws vary in degree but mostly all call into question the value of the sources Glantz used and the credibility of any events or conclusions drawn from them.
In his foreword, Glantz states, "Today, newly available Soviet and German sources permit a reevaluation of EVERY (my emphasis) aspect of the Battle of Kursk and, in fact, the war as a whole. Now the mythology can be stripped from the battle to reveal what actually occurred and why. That is the purpose of this volume."
Given this claim to be a definitive account of both sides of the battle, Glantz's book is certainly fair game for critique and it clearly was intended to be more than just the "Soviet view". As such, Glantz's statements about the German side as well as the Soviet side are indeed appropriate for examination.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Yea, we were probably too frank.

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Or as Jack Nicholson once said, "You want frank? You can't handle the frank!" ...or something like that.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:

As the first part of the sentence is talking "divisions" then the reference to "units" in the second part of the sentence I assume applies also to divisions. And fielding "three times" 300 divisions looks like 900 divisions according to my reading of the sentence.

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No, not 900! He wrote almost three times. This means not exactly 900 but somewhat less.

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I agree they do not make any sense. I don't see a set of numbers presented in the book that can be added together that gets me to 900, unless you are suggesting I add the German estimate of 300 divisions (which he does not state is either accurate or inaccurate) to the 385 new divisions and 267 brigades (267/2 = 133.5) for a total of 818.5 divisions.

I am obviously left somewhat confused by the statement. I am also wondering about the part of the sentence that says "...more than compensating for the loss of at least 229 division equivalents in battle." His footnote records 208 divisions and 21 brigades, which would be 218.5 division equivalents according to his own formulation.

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The numbers he presented are only related to events taking place after 06.22.41. You still have to add the divisions already fielded before the 06.22.41. He gives as a source in the note, his book "Stumbling Colosssus". You must add a total of 312 divisions equivalent fielded before the 06.22.41 to the 518 divisions equivalent fielded after the 22.06.41.

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:

As I attempted to point out in my comparison of German versus Soviet sources, there is a demonstrable difference in reliability between the two.

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Really? I'd like to see such a demonstration.

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Originally posted by Samuel:
No, not 900! He wrote almost three times. This means not exactly 900 but somewhat less....He gives as a source in the note, his book "Stumbling Colosssus". You must add a total of 312 divisions equivalent fielded before the 06.22.41 to the 518 divisions equivalent fielded after the 22.06.41

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Sorry, but I have not purchased "Stumbling Colossus".

Okay, so 312 + 518 = 830 or 2.77 times 300.

One could debate whether 2.77 is almost 3.00 but it really is a minor quibble. Still, it is a confusing statement, especially in the use of "division equivalents".

So, are there any other of my 26 "areas of disagreement" that you wish to take issue with?

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Originally posted by Samuel:
Really? I'd like to see such a demonstration.

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Would you like me to go through the official Soviet OB and determine what the totals were per year?

I have the complete set so it should'nt be a problem.

I use the same equivalents Glantz uses:
1 Tank/Mech Corps = 1 Div
1 Rifle Division = 1 Div
2 Rifle Brigades = 1 Div

Artillery would be more tricky since no two Arty Divisions were the same. What I will do is use 4 Brigades per Division equivalent.

No Regiments will be counted.

Regards,

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Originally posted by craig:
Would you like me to go through the official Soviet OB and determine what the totals were per year?

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Just in case would like to discuss the OB, I'm available

Regards,

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Originally posted by Samuel:
Really? I'd like to see such a demonstration.

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Some of this has been posted before in other news groups by people using my data (and not giving credit)....but I have done a comparison for German claims of Soviet losses at Kursk compared to actual Soviet losses and then the reverse check, which is Soviet claims of German losses at Kursk compared to actual German losses. I have done this for both aircraft and tanks.

The results are that while German claims can be off, and vary somewhat...there does appear to be some correlation with Soviet losses and the claims are in the ball park. On the other hand, Soviet claims are almost invariably well in excess of German losses, and appear to have no correlation with German casualties. They do appear to have some correlation with Soviet losses (meaning the Soviets tend to claim more kills than they lose).

These Soviet claims are then inserted into their post-war texts as is.

There are many other examples of distortions in Soviet history...and it is systematic and very much part of the system. I do discuss them to some depth in my upcoming book.

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Originally posted by craig:
Just in case would like to discuss the OB, I'm available

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
As I attempted to point out in my comparison of German versus Soviet sources, there is a demonstrable difference in reliability between the two.

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It seems like you're making a general assertion about German combat claims.
I've found them to be unreliable on a regular basis. Consider the following
that occurred during eight days of Jagdwaffe operations on the Channel
Front in June 1942...

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3rd JUNE 1942
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RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 22
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 6

German pilots who made these claims:
Hptm. Schnell, JG 2 (4 Spitfires)
Ofw. Mayer, JG 2 (3 Spitfires)
Oblt. Boettcher, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Oblt. Ruedorffer, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Ofw. Wurmheller, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Fw. Pfeiffer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Hartmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Augustin, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Nowak, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Toll, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Oblt. Leie, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Oblt. Pflanz, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Ubelbacher, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Knies, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters reported lost that day, all of them Spitfires:
BL626 - F/O Tonder, 312 Sqn Shot down by JG 2.
BL340 - F/Lt. Dvorak, 312 Sqn Shot down by JG 2.
BR191 - P/O Moore 616 Sqn Shot down off Le Touquet.
Serial? - Sgt. King, 154 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
BL341 - Sgt. LeBlond, 130 Sqn Mid-air collision w/Hinds.
W3937 - Sgt. Hinds, 234 Sqn Mid-air collision w/LeBlond.

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4th JUNE 1942
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RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 8
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 4

German pilots who made these claims:
Oblt. Schnell, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Uffz. Toll, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Reichherzer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Stratmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Augustin, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Passer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Hartmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters reported lost that day, all of them Spitfires:
AB831 - Sgt. Potelle, 501 Sqn Shot down by JG 2.
W3842 - Sgt. Strachen, 501 Sqn Shot down by JG 2.
AD245 - Sgt. Jackson, 234 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
EN835 - P/O Schrobiltgen, 350 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.

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5th JUNE 1942
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RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 21
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 5

German pilots who made these claims:
Fw. Wurmheller, JG 2 (4 Spitfires)
Oblt. Pflanz, JG 2 (3 Spitfires)
Hptm. Bethke, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Lt. Kruger, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Oblt. Leie, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Tueschner, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Edelmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Stritzel, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Oldermann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Kautzmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Oblt. Ruedorffer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Gerhard, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Bleymueller, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Pfeiffer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters reported lost that day, all of them Spitfires:
AR347 - Sgt. Hughes, 72 Sqn Damaged by Me109. Scrapped.
BM508 - P/O Edwards 129 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
BM639 - P/O Steen, 129 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
BL250 - P/O Rowell, 131 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
Serial? - P/O Hancock, 133 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.

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6th JUNE 1942
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RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 13
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 3

German pilots who made these claims:
Hptm. Hahn, JG 2 (3 Spitfires)
Hptm. Schnell, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Ofw. Mayer, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Oblt. Boettcher, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Augustin, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Toll, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Knies, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Stratmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Hartmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters lost that day (s/n BE502 was a Hurricane):
BL984 - S/Ldr Carver, 118 Sqn Shot down by Fw190s.
EN975 - Sgt. Jones, 118 Sqn Shot down by Fw190s.
BE502 - Sgt. Rosser, 175 Sqn Damaged by Fw190. Repaired.

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11th JUNE 1942
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RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 3
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 1

German pilots who made these claims:
Lt. Augustin, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Oblt. Pflanz, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters reported lost that day:
BM350 - Sgt. Harmer, 402 Sqn Damaged by Fw190. Repaired.

The unsubstantiated victory by Rudolf Pflanz is especially interesting
because it supposedly occurred at about 6:30am, but the RAF reported
no combat on this morning. During an afternoon flight, Jacob Augustin
appears to be the Luftwaffe pilot who claimed to have shot down
J.R. Harmer over the Channel, but his Spitfire returned to base.

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Originally posted by Jukka Juutinen:
But Chris was talking about ground operations, air combat claims are here totally irrelevant.

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Originally posted by Jukka Juutinen:
But Chris was talking about ground operations, air combat claims are here totally irrelevant.

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Oh no, I'm also talking air. In the case of the Germans, on any given day their claims were half to twice the Soviet losses but over the course of two weeks their loss claims were about equal to Soviet losses.

On the other hand, Soviet claims on every day noticably exceeded German losses and over the course of two weeks overclaimed German losses by a factor of 8 to 10 (sorry but I don't have the exact figures in front of me).

It was the outrageous overclaiming of German air kills that lead me down this line of reasoning to start with. When I laid a graph of Soviet claims by day over a graph of German claims by day...there was no correalation. When I laid the graph of Soviet claims over a graph of Soviet losses...well guess what.

Armed with this discovery, I went to Moscow to breif Col. Sverdlov (veteran and prof. Frunze military academy)...and before I could get to my last graph (the kicker)...he said "Well of course, the enemy always looses 30% more than you do."

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Still, it is a confusing statement, especially in the use of "division equivalents".

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I found his statenent very clear.

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So, are there any other of my 26 "areas of disagreement" that you wish to take issue with?

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Yes, but I have to check some documents.