quote:

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Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:
As broken down pz were set back to the rear they where either repaired [ 14 day repair] or unrepairable and sent further back [long term repair]. FRom what i read....
<snip>
Looking at Jentz figures for 1943 [eastern front],it seems that -except for the lead up to Kursk- german 'monthly operational availability' ran at something around 40%..By comparison ,I recall the SHerman tank had an 'operational availability' of ~ 80% through out the western front? Maybe if they'd devoted more effort into repair services they'd have done better in the war...something was clearly 'rotten in the state of Denmark'.(

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Sorry, I'll try to clear this up a bit. First, you are incorrect in one major point. The vehicles in repair "over 14 days" were not neccessarily evacuated to Germany. They were in fact normally held either in a division repair park, or if one was set up, a theater repair park. But they were maintained as part of the division equipment issue (they remained part of the Iststaerke) in those cases. If they were evacuated to Germany for complete rebuild or overhaul then they were in fact deleted from the division inventory and so appeared in the Panzerlage remarks (where they are extant).

In any case, the organization of the German maintnence was very similar to that of the US and Britain (form follows function after all). Each Panzer Abteilung intially had a Workshop Section as 1st Echelon Maintenence (later consolidated IIRC into a Regimental Workshop Platoon) and a Divisional Workshop Company for 2nd and 3rd Echelon Maintenence.

Also, comparing the German and American operational status is deceptive, because in almost all cases those vehicles in American units that could not be repaired in a reasonable time were evacuated to army maintenence or a theater workshop (when they were set up). The key is that in the American practice vehicles evacuated beyond division maintence were dropped from inventory.

So the comparison, even only of German vehicles in repair "for less than 14 days" to American vehicles in unit maintenence is incorrect and illusory.

It is true of course that the Germans had major problems in parts supply and delivery, as well as in repair (they never were really any good at logistical planning in strategic terms, part of the reason they lose wars ). Part of the reason for retaining vehicles requiring long term repair appears to be because they were often used as "hanger queens" - supplying spares for other vehicles. But then, the US had major problems in getting spares forward as well. IIRC at one point an inventory of the Normandy base section in the fall of 1944 revealed that there were no Ford GAA engines available as replacements. Track shoes and grousers were also a perennially short item.

Hope these quick thoughts answered some of your questions.

quote:

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This was indeed the case. An example of this is that between 1 Oct 1943 and 31 Jan 1944 8,702 tanks and assault guns were repaired at the front and only 453 in the zone of interior. Thus almost 20 times as many AFV were repaired at the front as in the factories. I have seen nothing suggesting that the Germans completely changed their practises during the war. probably this statement originates from Jukes, who I believed wrote something similar. To me it seems that the German maintenance system was quite decentralized.

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lets crunch some numbers from Jentz & Spielberger .

9150 tk/Ass gun repairs undertaken in a three month period and ~ 2000 tanks 'writen off' in the same time period. Meanwhile 908 Stugs ; 1210 Pz-IVs ; 960 Panthers & ~ 260 Tigers were produced during the same period.So to a first approximation production offsets loses.

Through Oct-Jan , the number of tanks & assult guns listed as available was 2800-3200 of which a mere 35-50% were operational...

So that sounds like each tank/Assault gun available on the eastern front, had to undergo a 'repair event' once ever month.So the question becomes , what level of repair damage/repair are we speaking off.

If ever tank/assault gun in the eastern front on average under goes a 'minor repair' event every month [which takes ~ two weeks to complete].... then there should be 1/2 the tanks operational at any given time [assuming the break downs are a fairly random even]?

Since this is not far off the reported figures [ difference could be the small number of long term repairs], then the 20:1 figures represent just the frequency of minor to major repairs required.I bet that the bulk of the major repairs had to be undertaken at these factory type locations in germany...which is what Glantz reports

Clearly the german repair system was not up to the task at hand and maybe they should have spent less money building new tanks and more on the repair system.

Barbarossa proves this , since after the first three months of fighting 1/4 of the tanks were write offs and another 1/4 where under repair leaving about 1/2 operational....just three months later there were only about 1500 tanks of which 1/4 where write offs and the vast majority of the rest were under repair... sounds like a sorry state of afairs.

[This message has been edited by Paul Lakowski (edited 12-05-2002).]

OK just read Riches comments so that should take some wind out of my sail...thanks for that Rich!

So do the figures for american tanks mirror germans...IE about 1/3 to 1/2 operational over all?

Just incase this hasn't been brought up before, He notes that the red army 'created' 385 division and 297 seperate brigades over and above the original numbers...thus he's not that far off the truth, since ~300 original division plus 385 new divisions and 297 seperate brigades = ~900 units fielded ...not present in December 1941. Heres what he wrote "Whereas prewar German intelligence had estimated an enemy of approximately 300 divisions,by December the Soviets hadfielded almost three times as many units".

To me the term 'feilded' means the process to deploy, so thats 300 + 385 divisions - 229 loses [divisonal equivillents?] = 456 + 285 brigades...from what I read most of these 'newly created divisions' were shells with at most a brigade strength, so I don't know eactly how many 'divisional equivillents' they actually had .

quote:

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Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:
[QUOTE]

This was indeed the case. An example of this is that between 1 Oct 1943 and 31 Jan 1944 8,702 tanks and assault guns were repaired at the front and only 453 in the zone of interior. Thus almost 20 times as many AFV were repaired at the front as in the factories. I have seen nothing suggesting that the Germans completely changed their practises during the war. probably this statement originates from Jukes, who I believed wrote something similar. To me it seems that the German maintenance system was quite decentralized.

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Since this is not far off the reported figures [ difference could be the small number of long term repairs], then the 20:1 figures represent just the frequency of minor to major repairs required.I bet that the bulk of the major repairs had to be undertaken at these factory type locations in germany...which is what Glantz reports
[/QUOTE]

That of course depends on how you define major and minor repairs.

However, I just looked into a US Army CMH pamphlet (CMH Pub 104-7), "German Tank Maintenance in WWII". It was written under auspices of Müller-Hillebrand. Here it is claimed that the German army went to war in 1939 with a highly centralized system, but in 1941 this was changed to a decentralized system (thus partly contradicting a previous statement by me). This was of course not an immediate process and it was not until 1942 it was complete. It seem that during Barbarossa, a transition was in progress, thus it may be difficult to characterize it as centralized or decentralized.

quote:

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Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:
Clearly the german repair system was not up to the task at hand and maybe they should have spent less money building new tanks and more on the repair system.

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This may well be the case, but what Chris objected to was whether the German system was centralized or not.

quote:

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Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:
A follow up comment about 300 russian divisons becoming 900 divisions, I don't read Glantz comments the same way.

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Apparantly there is some confusion over this passage as on page 3 of this thread, Samual came up with a different set of math to explain the claim, and then claimed "I found his statenent very clear."

I am more than willing to conceed that I simply did not understand his statement. As we have produced three different interpretations of it, I will stand by my statement that it is a little confusing.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
This may well be the case, but what Chris objected to was whether the German system was centralized or not.

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Exactly. My comments on the first 21 pages were clipped and placed on another news group (the History Channel). In a number of cases, people objected to the comments without appreciating that they are in some cases pretty precise and limited as to what they are disagreeing with. For example, the my comment on "peace feelers" was related to identifying exactly which nations put out peace feelers...which was missed by one of the commentators on the other news group.

In general, the Soviet propoganda machine has a tendency to want to paint the Germans as rigid and overly centralized (which is kind of a comical criticism considering the faults of their own military and economic systems). So, when I see a statement like the German repair system was centralized, I wonder whether this statement came from German sources, or came from Soviet sources.

quote:

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Originally posted by Tero:
Finnish historians had access to the party archives in Petrozavodsk and they found lists of several thousand ethnic Finns who had been executed in the 30's. When they dug deeper and found men like Andropov had been involved in partisan activity with war criminal aspects in it (execution of POW's after interrogation were written down in the reports) the archives were sealed again.

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Tero

quote:

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Originally posted by Samuel:
Which statment are you refering to?

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I don't have my copy of Guderian here at home (its in the office), but he made a statement to the effect that Hitler seemed impressed by Model's arguments. The account on pages 1 through 3 appear to have been drawn from Guderian, and I know of no other detailed description of this conference that would lead me to believe that it was drawn from other sources. Guderian could only speak for himself, not "the audience". This appears to be a minor embellishment added by the author (Glantz or House).

quote:

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Guderian wrote that von Manstein was often not at is best. Why are you leaving out the word often?

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Well, to start with, I was paraphrasing...and the word "often" has no relevence to my criticism which was:

"I am not sure how this conclusion was reached....To reach the conclusion that these two sentences do, requires a lot more material about various Manstein/Hitler conferences that I have bothered to look into. I have never seen anything that would lead me to believe that Mansein was overawed by Hitler's personality and intuition."

The criticism was of the statement:

"Yes, as in so many conferences during the war, von Manstein hesitated to make his case. In private, he was often scathingly critical of Gemran strategy, but he was so overawed by Hitler's personality and intuition that he often stumbled when talking to the dictator."

I do not see how those statements were drawn from Guderain, so therefore there may have been other sources used. It is an interpretation of Manstein that I do not believe is well supported.

quote:

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Are you giving more credential to a 1958 memo than memoirs published in 1951? If it is the case I would like to understand why.

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The contradictory attendee list was provided in Earnst Klink's book, which was prepared in the 1960s. I think he was an employee of the German archives and the book was published under direction of the archives (I would need a translator to read the intro for me to confirm this, as the book was never published in English). It is certainly the most definative book on the German side on the Battle of Kursk. It is not listed in the Glantz/House bibliography. We have seen some other errors in Guderian's recall of the conference, and therefore, a Busse memeoir, which contradicts Guderian's known account appears to be an valid attempt to get the details correct. Furthermore, Speer does not mention the conference in his book.
Now it might be possible to nail down the participation of Model, Speer and Thomale by going through the records of their commands at that time and seeing where they were, but I know of no one who has done this, although I don't rule out that Klink clearly knew at the time the Model was in Russia.
Therefore in the face of a correcting memo in 1958 openly contradicting an account written in 1951 and whatever additional research Klink did, I therefore have more confidence in Busse's memo than Guderian's recall. As Glantz/House did not list Klink in their bibliography, I can only assume that they did not have the opportunity to evaluate the contradictory statements.

Many authors describe the number of op tanks as droping by 50% just after the start of major german operations early and mid war. This gives an inexact decription of the op reliability for two reasons.

First take an example where you have 4000 tanks of which just before comencing operations the ger tanks usually had high reliability. Babarrasso, Blue, Kursk all pre combat had close to 95% op or 3800 tanks op. Soon after combat is initiated the number of tanks op might decline to 2000 the 50% decline many talk about. The number in long repair moight be 1000 but the number of destroyed tanks at 1000 should not be included in calculating the true operational percentage. The actual op red is more like 66% in this example a 1/3 decrease.

In truth the ger kept 60-70% of thier tanks op outside of major operation perperations. This is when looking acrosss the entire front or higher not at individual unit level. After normandy the ger needed larger numbers of tanks and they had a harder time keeping the larger number of tanks working as well as earlier. Part of the problem may have been the dificulty of moveing parts to where they are needed quickly at such places as normandy. The op % dropped drastically in aug 44 in the west and east but rebouded until droping later. As the war went on the reporting system broke down and I would accept any numbers as bieng 100% exact by 1945 at least.

quote:

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Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:
[QUOTE]

OK just read Riches comments so that should take some wind out of my sail...thanks for that Rich!

So do the figures for american tanks mirror germans...IE about 1/3 to 1/2 operational over all?

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No they cannot "mirror" anything, because the two systems, although designed to the same end and superficially appearing the same, were actually very different. In US and UK practice vehicles evacuated to 4th echelon repair were usually written-off and even if not, they "disappeared" from the unit inventory. It appears quite likely that most of the German tanks in repair 'over 14 days' would have been write offs if they had been in Allied hands. It also appears that the Germans were often indecisive about write-offs, quite often in the Italian Panzerlage vehicles are reported "lost" (Totalausfaelle) and then a few days later (the reports at 10 AOK were usually done every 3 to 4 days) they note that it is now considered in 'long term repair.' This phenomena appears in the 12th Army Group armor reports as well, but infrequently (and usually was due to previously unrecovered tanks that had been written off being recovered).

The only complete account of US operational versus non-operational tanks is from 13 August 1944. First Army as of 2200 12 August had 823 Shermans on hand, with 76 non operational. Third Army as of 2200 11 August had 1,261 Shermans on hand, with 27 (?) non operational. Theater 'reserves' included: First Army 40 on hand with 6 non operational; Third Army 89 on hand, all operational; in addition 292 were "On Water" - that is afloat between CONUS and the Continent. Thus, about a 5 percent non operational rate.

However, there were also another 101 in a third category, "repairable in over 24 hours." Those were considered 4th echelon repair and were evacuated from the division to army maintenence (where they actually became part of the 'reserve'). At division level once reported they were not reported again - dropped, as I have said, from the division inventory. A portion of these were eventually written off, the rest were eventually repaired. Thus, of the 2,314 actually on hand, 210 were non operational, a 9 percent non operational rate, nearly twice that previously given.

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:

The only complete account of US operational versus non-operational tanks is from 13 August 1944. First Army as of 2200 12 August had 823 Shermans on hand, with 76 non operational. Third Army as of 2200 11 August had 1,261 Shermans on hand, with 27 (?) non operational. Theater 'reserves' included: First Army 40 on hand with 6 non operational; Third Army 89 on hand, all operational; in addition 292 were "On Water" - that is afloat between CONUS and the Continent. Thus, about a 5 percent non operational rate.

However, there were also another 101 in a third category, "repairable in over 24 hours." Those were considered 4th echelon repair and were evacuated from the division to army maintenence (where they actually became part of the 'reserve'). At division level once reported they were not reported again - dropped, as I have said, from the division inventory. A portion of these were eventually written off, the rest were eventually repaired. Thus, of the 2,314 actually on hand, 210 were non operational, a 9 percent non operational rate, nearly twice that previously given.

).]

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Still that leaves > 90% operational wow!
WHen I was looking through Lehmanns 'Liebstandart Vol-III', he notes several locations where the number of long term and short term [ 14 days] and operational tanks ...these [1st SS Pz Division] are
================ dec 4 43======dec 12 43
long term repair ---43------------ 55
short term repair --118----------- 139
operational -------78------------ 41

So if I take it that long term repair = write off the availablity figures become 40% on the 4th and 23% on the 12th . It also suggests that 16 tanks where lost to 'long term repair' in that week?

[pp 347 & 354]

quote:

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:

....while this may not be the best way to resolve these differences, it is a way, and for whatever my thinking was at the time, it is the way I decided to address the issue at 0530 in the morning. Note that my posts are labeled as areas of disagreement...as I have not ruled out that I could be mistaken.

In general though, there are a lot of poor military history books published. I am often frustrated to have spent the money and time reading them. The standards for the industry are not as high as they should be.

[This message has been edited by Chris Lawrence (edited 12-04-2002).]

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I think the best way to settle it is for a discussion to happen about it between Mr. Glantz and Mr. Lawrence. Though it will never end as the eastern front can never fully accurately be presentedin a book. It will always have mistakes.

quote:

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Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:
[B] [QUOTE]

This was indeed the case. An example of this is that between 1 Oct 1943 and 31 Jan 1944 8,702 tanks and assault guns were repaired at the front and only 453 in the zone of interior. Thus almost 20 times as many AFV were repaired at the front as in the factories. I have seen nothing suggesting that the Germans completely changed their practises during the war. probably this statement originates from Jukes, who I believed wrote something similar. To me it seems that the German maintenance system was quite decentralized.

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lets crunch some numbers from Jentz & Spielberger .

9150 tk/Ass gun repairs undertaken in a three month period and ~ 2000 tanks 'writen off' in the same time period. Meanwhile 908 Stugs ; 1210 Pz-IVs ; 960 Panthers & ~ 260 Tigers were produced during the same period.So to a first approximation production offsets loses.

Through Oct-Jan , the number of tanks & assult guns listed as available was 2800-3200 of which a mere 35-50% were operational...

So that sounds like each tank/Assault gun available on the eastern front, had to undergo a 'repair event' once ever month.So the question becomes , what level of repair damage/repair are we speaking off.

If ever tank/assault gun in the eastern front on average under goes a 'minor repair' event every month [which takes ~ two weeks to complete].... then there should be 1/2 the tanks operational at any given time [assuming the break downs are a fairly random even]?

Since this is not far off the reported figures [ difference could be the small number of long term repairs], then the 20:1 figures represent just the frequency of minor to major repairs required.I bet that the bulk of the major repairs had to be undertaken at these factory type locations in germany...which is what Glantz reports

Clearly the german repair system was not up to the task at hand and maybe they should have spent less money building new tanks and more on the repair system.

Barbarossa proves this , since after the first three months of fighting 1/4 of the tanks were write offs and another 1/4 where under repair leaving about 1/2 operational....just three months later there were only about 1500 tanks of which 1/4 where write offs and the vast majority of the rest were under repair... sounds like a sorry state of afairs.
B][/QUOTE]

I think that the data for German tanks being repaired, sent to repair facilities and etc from October 43-January 44...., listed by Mr. Zetterling can be in question as the Germans were on the retreat during that time.

There is a good possibility of German tanks needing to be sent back and be worked on in the factories but were captured by the Soviets instead during their advancements. This could be why German tanks sent to "Interior zone" numbers are so low compared to other numbers.

Then again, I'm no expert.

quote:

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:

There is a good possibility of German tanks needing to be sent back and be worked on in the factories but were captured by the Soviets instead during their advancements. This could be why German tanks sent to "Interior zone" numbers are so low compared to other numbers.

Then again, I'm no expert.

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I have some data for the Zitadelle period.
The 505 Tiger battalion had five complete losses during July 1943 and one sent to Germany for repairs. At the end of the month there were four operatioonal in the battalion, 20 in short term repair and 15 in long term repair. Thus at the end of the month, there were 35 Tigers in workshops at the front, while one had been sent back to germany. Admittedly this is a period invovling both offensive and defensive action. For the same period the 216. Stu.Pz.Abt. sent zero vehicles back to Germany, while 21 were in workshops at the end of the month.

I have figures for some 4th Panzer Army division during Zitadelle (given as In repair at the division/In repair at army or army group facilities/sent to Germany/Complete write-offs):

3. Pz.Div. 1-10 July 1943: 45/3/0/6
3. Pz.Div. 11-20 July 1943: 42/3/0/3
11. Pz.Div. 1-10 July 1943: 57/4/0/3
11. Pz.Div. 11-20 July 1943: 28/11/0/5
GD. Pz.Gren.Div. 1-10 July 1943: 57/1/0/11
1. SS-Pz.Gren.Div. 1-10 July 1943: 47/15/2/8
2. SS-Pz.Gren.Div. 1-10 July 1943: 69/0/0/3
3. SS-Pz.Gren.Div. 1-10 July 1943: 37/5/0/8

Superficially this may look like 382 with the units, 42 at army/army group facilities, 2 to Germany, 47 complete losses. However, the number of tanks given as in repair with the divisions area is actually the number at the end of the period. Thus it is conceivable that further tanks were actually in this category but repaired within the period. On the other hand it is conceivable that some tanks were later reclassified and sent to other reapir echelons. Nevertheless, it seems hard to escape the conclusion that few of the tanks damaged during Zitadelle were sent to Germany for repairs.
The unit I have seen with the highest number sent to Germany is the 10. Pz.Brig. (Panthers). Up to 12 August it sent 15 Panthers back to Germany. As we all know, this unit is perhaps not the most representative of the German tank forces at the time.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:

The unit I have seen with the highest number sent to Germany is the 10. Pz.Brig. (Panthers). Up to 12 August it sent 15 Panthers back to Germany. As we all know, this unit is perhaps not the most representative of the German tank forces at the time.

[This message has been edited by Niklas Zetterling (edited 12-07-2002).]

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Agreed. I think the most representative would probably be the numbers on the different formations with Pz. IV versions during this time period.

The Pz III would not be accurate as it was now outdated on the eastern front by 43.

quote:

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:

The Pz III would not be accurate as it was now outdated on the eastern front by 43.

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But would it not? Actually, in the 10 July 1943 Panzerlage for the Ostheer, the Panzer III variants operational were the following:

139 Pz-III kurz (5cm L42)
41 Flammpanzer-III
168 Pz-III 7.5cm
534 Pz-III lang (5cm L60)
882 Total

Over one-half the 1,565 panzers in total that were operational.

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
But would it not? Actually, in the 10 July 1943 Panzerlage for the Ostheer, the Panzer III variants operational were the following:

139 Pz-III kurz (5cm L42)
41 Flammpanzer-III
168 Pz-III 7.5cm
534 Pz-III lang (5cm L60)
882 Total

Over one-half the 1,565 panzers in total that were operational.

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I was reffering to the outdatedness of the Pz III on the eastern front in 1943 combat wise, not numerically. But you prove a point.

This is a very interesting story that very much goes to the heart of a lot of my work. Can you provide a source?

Not directly in english I'm afraid.

You could try to contact Timo Malmi has done research on the subject. I trust he will be able to place you in contact with people who actually know these things.

http://www.uta.fi/~titima/prisoners.html

quote:

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Originally posted by Tero:
Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:

You could try to contact Timo Malmi has done research on the subject. I trust he will be able to place you in contact with people who actually know these things.

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Thanks for the link.

Each PTRZ had one Separate Repair and Restoration Base (ORVB), two Mobile Tank Repair Bases (PTRB), and one evacuation company (approx. 15 recovery vehicles).

Just two of the PTARZ, the 7th and 8th, from the second half of 1943 to the end of the war repaired 4,730 engines and more than 12,000 other tank parts [agregats].

The first three PTRZs were formed in early 1943. Thoughout 1943 another PTRZ and nine PTARZs were formed. The creation of these units allowed capital repairs to be done in the field instead of at central depots or at the factory. This greatly reduced the repair time; a tank sent to a factory in the Urals for capital repairs could be gone for up to four months.

Below front level there were Mobile Reparair Bases (PRB), Army Repair and Restoration Bases (ARVB), and Repair and Restoration Battalions (RVB), Separate Tank Repair Battalions (OTRB), etc..

For the entire war, repairs were carried out at the following levels (Item, at unit and Army level, at front level, at central depots, at factories)

Tanks and SU, 66.5, 27.6, 4.2, 1.7%
Tank engines, 30.8, 52.4, 12.0, 4.8%
Tank parts, 25.2, 72.2, 2.3, 0.3%

Below shows at what level was repair done. Read: Item, immediate repair, medium repair (district or front level), capital repair (at a central depot or factory):

Tank and SU, 60.4, 36.1, 3.5%
Armored cars and halftracks, 67.5, 28.3, 4.2%
Motorcycles, 64.2, 23.7, 11.1%
Prime movers, 55.8, 33.8, 10.4%

Evacutation of damaged tanks was done by evacutation companies, which had a capacity of moving 46 medium tanks 30 kilometers per month. The SPAMs (whatever the heck that is) could evacuate 30 tanks and dismantle 6 tanks per month. In 1942 56 evacuation companies and 56 SPAMs were formed. In 1943 42 evacuation companies, 6 evacutation detachments and 26 SPAMs were formed.

Statistics on tank evacuation and disassembly. Read: Evacuated tanks and SUs, pulled out stuck or sunk tanks and SUs, tanks and SUs evacuated to PTRZ or PTARZ, disassembled (cannibalized) tanks and SUs:

1943, 32,539, 1,460, 9,344, ?
1944, 29,009, 1,847, 8,754, 16,129
1945, 22,372, 1,597, 2,543, 10,471

136th, 343, 101, 202, 40
67th, 328, 126, 154, 39

quote:

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Originally posted by Dan Stevlingson:
It seems like you're making a general

___________________

3rd JUNE 1942
___________________

RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 22
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 6

German pilots who made these claims:
Hptm. Schnell, JG 2 (4 Spitfires)
Ofw. Mayer, JG 2 (3 Spitfires)
Oblt. Boettcher, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Oblt. Ruedorffer, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Ofw. Wurmheller, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Fw. Pfeiffer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Hartmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Augustin, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Nowak, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Toll, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Oblt. Leie, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Oblt. Pflanz, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Ubelbacher, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Knies, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters reported lost that day, all of them Spitfires:
BL626 - F/O Tonder, 312 Sqn Shot down by JG 2.
BL340 - F/Lt. Dvorak, 312 Sqn Shot down by JG 2.
BR191 - P/O Moore 616 Sqn Shot down off Le Touquet.
Serial? - Sgt. King, 154 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
BL341 - Sgt. LeBlond, 130 Sqn Mid-air collision w/Hinds.
W3937 - Sgt. Hinds, 234 Sqn Mid-air collision w/LeBlond.

___________________

4th JUNE 1942
___________________

RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 8
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 4

German pilots who made these claims:
Oblt. Schnell, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Uffz. Toll, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Reichherzer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Stratmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Augustin, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Passer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Hartmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters reported lost that day, all of them Spitfires:
AB831 - Sgt. Potelle, 501 Sqn Shot down by JG 2.
W3842 - Sgt. Strachen, 501 Sqn Shot down by JG 2.
AD245 - Sgt. Jackson, 234 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
EN835 - P/O Schrobiltgen, 350 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.

___________________

5th JUNE 1942
___________________

RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 21
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 5

German pilots who made these claims:
Fw. Wurmheller, JG 2 (4 Spitfires)
Oblt. Pflanz, JG 2 (3 Spitfires)
Hptm. Bethke, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Lt. Kruger, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Oblt. Leie, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Tueschner, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Edelmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Stritzel, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Fw. Oldermann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Kautzmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Oblt. Ruedorffer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Gerhard, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Bleymueller, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Pfeiffer, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters reported lost that day, all of them Spitfires:
AR347 - Sgt. Hughes, 72 Sqn Damaged by Me109. Scrapped.
BM508 - P/O Edwards 129 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
BM639 - P/O Steen, 129 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
BL250 - P/O Rowell, 131 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.
Serial? - P/O Hancock, 133 Sqn Cause of loss unspecified.

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6th JUNE 1942
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RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 13
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 3

German pilots who made these claims:
Hptm. Hahn, JG 2 (3 Spitfires)
Hptm. Schnell, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Ofw. Mayer, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Oblt. Boettcher, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Lt. Augustin, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Uffz. Toll, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Knies, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Stratmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)
Ofw. Hartmann, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters lost that day (s/n BE502 was a Hurricane):
BL984 - S/Ldr Carver, 118 Sqn Shot down by Fw190s.
EN975 - Sgt. Jones, 118 Sqn Shot down by Fw190s.
BE502 - Sgt. Rosser, 175 Sqn Damaged by Fw190. Repaired.

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11th JUNE 1942
___________________

RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by JG units: 3
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by KG units: ?
RAF Spitfires claimed shot down by Flak units: ?
Actual RAF day fighter losses to all causes: 1

German pilots who made these claims:
Lt. Augustin, JG 2 (2 Spitfires)
Oblt. Pflanz, JG 2 (1 Spitfire)

RAF day fighters reported lost that day:
BM350 - Sgt. Harmer, 402 Sqn Damaged by Fw190. Repaired.

The unsubstantiated victory by Rudolf Pflanz is especially interesting
because it supposedly occurred at about 6:30am, but the RAF reported
no combat on this morning. During an afternoon flight, Jacob Augustin
appears to be the Luftwaffe pilot who claimed to have shot down
J.R. Harmer over the Channel, but his Spitfire returned to base.

[This message has been edited by Dan Stevlingson (edited 11-22-2002).]

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