On the axis history forum a critique of the book ?Kursk 1943. A statistical analysis? by Zetterling/Frankson has been published. The critique has been written by Steven H. Newton.
It can be found via the link: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=42396 .

As there is a lively debate on Kursk on the Dupuy Institute forum and I have seen Mr. Zetterling posting frequently and Mr. Frankson also posting occasionally here I have allowed myself to copy the critique and publish it here.

I think it could be very instructive for many people interested in the topic to see these gentlemen and other experts (in particular Mr. Lawrence) discuss the conclusions drawn in the book compared to those that are or may be drawn from the critique.

The critique reads as follows:

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Unprecedented access to Soviet archival material has allowed David Glantz and Jonathan House to challenge many of the firmly established myths surrounding Operation Citadel, but they do not in the end disagree with the longstanding consensus that Kursk marked a turning point in the war strategically, operationally, and tactically. An important dissent to this conclusion, however, has recently been raised by Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson in their landmark study Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. Zetterling and Frankson have published the first comprehensive examination of the strength and losses of the contending armies based completely on archival sources, both German and Russian. Eschewing drama for meticulous detail, the authors have created an important (one is tempted to say definitive) reference work that deserves to have a serious impact on all subsequent writing about Kursk. In their final chapter, "Consequences of the Battle," Zetterling and Frankson examine the strategic, operational, and tactical significance of the battle and-in light of the information they have unearthed-declare that it is not "possible to claim that [Citadel] produced an outcome which was decisive to the war in the east."'
Zetterling and Frankson base their contention on analysis of five major factors: German personnel losses, German tank losses, Soviet tank losses, changing force ratios, and long-term patterns of German attrition. In order to assess the validity of their argument, each category must be reviewed in turn. Before undertaking that task, it should also be noted that Zetterling and Frankson, when speaking of the battle of Kursk, refer only to operations between 5 and 17 July, which covers the period of the German offensive. Soviet writers, however, have long contended that both the Orel and Kharkov counteroffensives should be considered, along with the earlier defensive phase, as one long battle, running from 5 July to 23 August (the date of the Russian capture of Kharkov). Glantz and House, along with most modern military historians, have come to accept the broader view. As will become apparent below, the distinction involves more than the name of a battle.
German casualties at Kursk, according to the authors, "were quite small" and "cannot be seen as decisive, at least not in the context of the struggle on the eastern front." Total German losses sustained by Army Groups Center and South in the attack were 56,827 men, which amounted to roughly 3 percent of the total 1,601,454 men the Germans lost in Russia during 1943. Moreover, Zetterling and Frankson point out that the 89,480 replacements sent into the Soviet Union during July 1943 "were more than sufficient to cover the losses suffered during [Citadel]."This argument is somewhat misleading, for it assumes that all troops lost in combat and all replacements sent forward are equal, and such was not the case. To make matters worse, the authors often engage in somewhat circular logic in their analysis of the numbers.
Consider the case of Model's Ninth Army. Zetterling and Frankson have this to say:

The German 9th Army suffered 22,273 casualties from 5 July to 11 July.... 9th Army's losses were most severe on the first day of the offensive and subsequently loss rates declined. Compared to the ration strength of the army at the beginning of the offensive, losses up to 9 July (inclusive) constituted about 5 per cent, while losses for the entire month constituted about 10 per cent of the ration strength at the beginning of the
month.

What is wrong with this analysis is that although Ninth Army's ration strength on 5 July was approximately 335,000, its combat strength (including troops held in army group reserve) was only 75,713. By 9 July the army's combat strength had declined to 55,931, a reduction of 19,782. Thus all but 2,491 of the 22,273 total casualties had occurred in the army's infantry, engineer, reconnaissance, and Feldersatz units. Thus even though the overall casualty rate of the army was just 6.6 percent, the casualty rate among the combat troops was a staggering 26.1 percent! Even the most cursory glance at division-by-division combat strengths on 4 and 9 July reveals the extent to which some units had been gutted. ote that these figures are skewed by the fact that XX Corps, on Ninth Army's far left flank, had seen no fighting and that several divisions (notably 4th and 12th Panzer Divisions and 10th Panzergrenadier ivision) had been engaged after 5 July. For example, the 11 percent losses reported by the 4th Panzer Division represented only a single day of combat. Among the eleven divisions that had seen continuous fighting between 5 and 9 July, the average loss rate was a debilitating 45 percent in combat troops. Thus for Zetterling and Frankson to downplay Ninth Army's losses during 5-9 July by categorizing them as merely a fraction of the army's ration strength is to present a distorted picture of the conflagration Model's troops endured during their shortlived offensive.
The authors are equally, if unintentionally, misleading with regard to Ninth Army's losses for the remainder of July during the defensive battle for the Orel salient. They assert that Model's army, in losing another 13,362 troops between 12 and 31 July, suffered only another 5 percent loss against "the ration strength at the beginning of the month." As has already been demonstrated, measuring combat losses against ration strengths rather than combat strengths is a chancy proposition. Worse, however, is that the authors ignore the fact that at least half of the divisions assigned to Ninth Army on 1 July had, by the middle of the month, been transferred to Second Panzer Army. Thus to measure percentage losses for the end of the month against the ration strength at the outset is guaranteed to return a deflated figure.
A more accurate method of examining German losses on the northern face of the Kursk salient is to combine the casualties of Ninth and Second Panzer Armies for the entire month of July. When that is done, German losses come into better focus. For the month of July, Ninth Army lost 37,355 soldiers while Second Panzer Army took 45,928 casualties, for a grand total of 83,283. The chronological spread of these losses between the two armies, as illustrated in the table below, makes the point about the transfer of the main responsibility for the fighting between the two armies that occurred in mid-month:
The two armies on 1 July had an estimated combined ration strength of 495,000 men, which would return a figure of 16.8 percent losses. Yet,as demonstrated above, losses against combat strength were several orders of magnitude above losses against ration strength. Although precise figures for Second Panzer Army are not available, a best-guess estimate for that army's 1 July combat strength would land in the neighborhood of 36,000.7 If losses among combat troops accounted for 75 percent of the total losses suffered (during Model's attack such losses equaled nearly 90 percent, but in defensive combat greater casualties befell support and service troops), then these would have amounted to about 62,400. That figure, compared to the estimate of 111,713 combat troops in both armies on 1 July, suggests that Ninth and Second Panzer Armies lost nearly 56 percent of their combat strength in a single month. Such loss ratios, whether the period under consideration is early July (Ninth Army alone) or the entire month (both armies), can hardly be characterized as "quite small." Similar calculations could be performed regarding the losses sustained by Fourth Panzer Army and Armeeabteilung Kempf.
The argument with respect to tank losses presented by Zetterling and Frankson is equally unsound. The authors suggest that German AFV losses during Operation Citadel, which they calculate at roughly 300, "were not extraordinarily high ... nor were they impossible to replace." Citing statistics on tank production, shipments of armor to the armies, and the total number of AFVs on the Eastern Front at the end of December 1943, they conclude:

It could of course be inferred ... that a trend was reversed by [Citadel] and certainly there is some truth to this. However, what is remarkable in the figure is the long period of build-up before [Citadel]. Also it must not be forgotten that the quality of the tanks on the eastern front steadily rose, which is indicated by the growth in the number of Tigers, Panthers, and later-model Panzer IV.... Thus it can be argued that the Ostheer was better equipped with tanks at the end of the year than it had been before [Citadel].

Specifically, the authors base their final statement on a comparison of the 30 June and 31 December AFV holdings on the Eastern Front. Recapitulated in the table below, "Specialty" tanks refers to all command and flamethrowing tanks; "Obsolete" tanks includes all Pzkw IIs, Ills, and IVs that were equipped with the L24 gun; "Modern" tanks consist of all late-model Pzkw IVs, Panthers, and Tigers; and "Assault Guns" incorporates all StG Ills, StuHs, and StuPz IVs.the outset of Operation Citadel. It strains credulity to the breaking point to assert that a 41 percent drop in operational armor strength left Hitler's army "better equipped with tanks at the end of the year than it had been before [Citadel]."
Zetterling and Frankson appear to have a much stronger argument with regard to Soviet armored losses. The authors note that:

On 1 July, the Red Army had a tank strength of 9,888 in the front armies and 2,688 in STAVKA reserves. Six months later the Red Army had less than half that number in [its] field units and STAVKA reserves. During those six months 11,890 tanks and assault guns had been produced. It must be emphasized that when a force suffers such extensive losses as the Red Army armoured forces did during the second half of 1943, production of tanks will not suffice to replace losses. There will also be delays before the new tanks are issued to combat units owing to the need for training new crews.

As has become evident when discussing German armor, operational readiness is critical to examining relative battlefield strength; unfortunately, the best authorities on Soviet tanks are vague concerning percentages of available versus operational AFVs. A poor best-guess estimate of Soviet operational readiness prior to the Battle of Kursk is that it approached 80 percent; German documents from the end of the year portray the Red Army in western Ukraine and Galicia as struggling to maintain a readiness rate of 40 percent. If, for the sake of argument, these figures are provisionally extended to encompass Russian armored strength across the front on both dates, then the following picture emerges:
Soviet tank losses during the period easily exceeded 15,000, and possibly approached 19,000, against German losses of only 3,841, a kill ratio in favor of the defenders of four- or five-to-one. From this purely numerical standpoint Zetterling and Frankson would appear to have made an unassailable case that the Soviets were losing the battle of armored attrition.
Zetterling and Frankson's figures for field forces and STAVKA reserves, however, do not take into account total Soviet AFV holdings. At the beginning of 1943, according to G. F. Krivosheev, the Red Army possessed 12,500 vehicles not in the hands of organizing units; by year's end his total had risen to 18,600 despite prodigious losses.',, The fact that the size of the Red Army's tank park could have increased by one-third during the same period that the number of AFVs available to the field forces declined by 55 percent suggests that-as Zetterling and Frankson argue-the true bottleneck lay in training new tank crews, not the supply of machines. This problem was obviously ironed out during the winter of 1943-1944, as Soviet tank availability, despite continued heavy losses, resumed a steady march upward early the next year.
What Zetterling and Frankson have actually documented is the extreme low point hit by the tank strength of the Soviet field forces at the end of successive offensives between July and December 1943, just prior to large waves of replacements arriving at the front. Moreover, Soviet armored losses must be weighed against what the Red Army had gained, especially in the south. German troops had been pushed almost completely out of Ukraine, the Wehrmacht had sustained irreplaceable casualties in trained manpower, and the Third Reich had been forced to concentrate heavily on producing AFVs (Tigers and assault guns) suited to the tactical defensive rather than the sweeping mobile operations of 1941-1942. This continuous if costly sweep to the west had begun at Kursk.
The final argument made by the two authors is that "using documents on monthly casualties on the eastern front it is possible to draw up a graph on the accumulated personnel losses ... [that] shows a steady increase in accumulated German casualties without any distinctive or sudden rises in losses. In fact, this graph displays a rather even attrition which may gradually have worn the German forces down." In other words, Zetterling and Frankson contend that, for Kursk to be considered decisive, some sort of spike should appear in the data during the six months following the battle, indicating a dramatic diminution of German strength; otherwise, Operation Citadel becomes merely one more nudge in the downward spiral of German strength.
Again the authors have focused exclusively on numbers at the expense of other considerations, in this case the length of the front. Prior to Operation Citadel the Russo-German front (excluding Finland and the Crimea) had temporarily solidified into one of the shorter lines held by the Wehrmacht during the course of the war: roughly 2,350 kilometers. By year's end that front had stretched to more than 2,640 kilometers, with minor shortenings of the northern and central sectors more than offset by the expansion of Army Group South's front line from 700 to 1,450 kilometers. Simultaneously, German Army strength declined from 3,138,000 to 2,528,000, a diminution of 610,000 men. When Operation Citadel opened, the Germans could deploy roughly 1,335 troops per kilometer of front; a week after Christmas that average had dropped by 28percent to only 957 soldiers per kilometer. In terms of combat strength this situation was far worse. Citadel had represented Hitler's final chance to stabilize-more or less permanently-the most economical front line he could achieve; the attack's failure led inevitably to progressively longer fronts that had to be defended with weaker and weaker forces. Yet to associate the beginning of the long, seemingly inexorable Soviet tide to Berlin with the battle of Kursk is not the same as proving that the battle itself was decisive. This appears, on balance, to be one of the points Zetterling and Frankson are attempting to make, and they are completely correct.
Any serious attempt to label Kursk-either in the limited 5-14 July sense that Zetterling and Frankson use or the larger 5 July-23 August context-as a decisive operation has to examine several key criteria:

1. The physical and moral effects of a failed German summer offensive;
2. The extent to which the short-term losses in Operation Citadel (whether or not they could be replaced in the long run) critically weakened the German capacity for resisting the Soviet counteroffensives directed at Orel and Kharkov;
3. The impact of losses in manpower, equipment, and territory to those Soviet counteroffensives and the retreat west of the Dnepr River;
4. The extent to which their losses reduced the qualitative edge of the German forces and decreased their capacity for operational concentrations; and
5. The consequences of maintaining an increased operational tempo across a lengthening front for six months.

When each of these considerations have been weighed and evaluated in their turn, then and only then will historians be able to supply a final answer to the question of whether or not Kursk represented a decisive battle. In the meantime there are literally tens of thousands of pages of German records from the period that deserve examination and analysis before a definitive portrait of the Wehrmacht's perspective on the battle can be presented. This book represents only a few tentative steps along that road.
(End of quote)

Added are three graphics that show tables taken out of the discussed book. These tables show comparisons between the status of German forces or equipment on different dates on

- Tank and assault gun operational readiness March ? December 1943.
- Available versus operational German AFVs on 30 June and 31 December 1943 (split into tanks and assault guns).
- Available German AFVs on 30 June and 31 December 1943 (split into obsolete, specialty, modern and assault guns).
- Comparative combat strengths and loss rates for (German) 9th Army units on 4 and 9 July 1943.

I can not see that Newton in any way invalidates our conclusions. We argue that German losses, as share of overall strength, was small during Zitadelle. It is easy to compare this level of losses with other operations and conclude that it was not remarkable. German units was not defeated by that level of losses during 1941 and 1942 summer offensives. The fact that the losses were almost exclusively confined to the combat strength during Zitadelle is not strange at all. It was the same for virtually all operations, except when units were encircled, whether British, German, American or Soviet.
Indeed, I would argue that it is easier to replace losses in the combat units (primarily the infantry) than in the rear services. The replacement system was well aware of this fact and designed accordingly.
To compare losses with combat strength rather than ration strength simply does not lead to different conclusions.
Essentially the same applies to tank losses.

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I can not see that Newton in any way invalidates our conclusions. We argue that German losses, as share of overall strength, was small during Zitadelle. It is easy to compare this level of losses with other operations and conclude that it was not remarkable.

Well, here is the points Newton is trying to make:

"This argument is somewhat misleading, for it assumes that all troops lost in combat and all replacements sent forward are equal, and such was not the case. To make matters worse, the authors often engage in somewhat circular logic in their analysis of the numbers.

Ninth Army's ration strength on 5 July was approximately 335,000, its combat strength (including troops held in army group reserve) was only 75,713. By 9 July the army's combat strength had declined to 55,931, a reduction of 19,782. Thus all but 2,491 of the 22,273 total casualties had occurred in the army's infantry, engineer, reconnaissance, and Feldersatz units. Thus even though the overall casualty rate of the army was just 6.6 percent, the casualty rate among the combat troops was a staggering 26.1 percent."

"Total German losses sustained by Army Groups Center and South in the attack were 56,827 men, which amounted to roughly 3 percent of the total 1,601,454 men the Germans lost in Russia during 1943. Moreover, Zetterling and Frankson point out that the 89,480 replacements sent into the Soviet Union during July 1943 "were more than sufficient to cover the losses suffered during [Citadel]."

Mr. Zetterling, how do you find 26.1% combat losses not sufficient enough? When in fact it was sufficient enough for Germany never to be on the offensive in the eastern front after summer of 1943. Based on your numbers Germany had more then sufficient numbers to start Barbarossa 2.
I truelly enjoyed your book Mr. Zetterling, I just think you know better why numbers didn't add up. With 6.6% total combat loss, and 5 Tigers counted as total losses how come Germany couldn't produce a single offensive on the east after Citadel? Why would Wermacht suddenly loose all the initiative with all those new plains, tanks, guns and more then sufficient replacement?

Mr. Dickson are you still planing to release your book? Working with Zamulin and having access to all german numbers you can eat, youre in the position to make a true masterpiece for Kursk, and to be frank I'm a bit surprise you can't find enough time and maybe interest to finish this project.

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Originally posted by outline:
[B]Dear Mr. Zetterling, thank you for your response. What book should we look for your response on Steven H. Newton comments? New book on Korsun pocket?

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Well, here is the points Newton is trying to make:

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Well, I did read it.

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Mr. Zetterling, how do you find 26.1% combat losses not sufficient enough?

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When in fact it was sufficient enough for Germany never to be on the offensive in the eastern front after summer of 1943.

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Based on your numbers Germany had more then sufficient numbers to start Barbarossa 2.

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I truelly enjoyed your book Mr. Zetterling, I just think you know better why numbers didn't add up.

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With 6.6% total combat loss, and 5 Tigers counted as total losses how come Germany couldn't produce a single offensive on the east after Citadel?

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Why would Wermacht suddenly loose all the initiative with all those new plains, tanks, guns and more then sufficient replacement?

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I have studied casualty data from a large number of operations, including data from British, German, Soviet and US formations. It has been clear that 6 % losses does not mean that the combat power is broken. Otherwise perhaps most of the successful operations would have failed. I have always calculated the loss rates in same way, and in those other operations the combat units suffer the vast majority of casualties too. In fact, it is just normal to have about 90 % of all casualties confined to the combat units.
In fact, had it been impossible to conduct offensive operations after 26 % losses in combat units, it would have been impossible to conduct most of the offensives on the eastern front, whether by Soviet or German units (including much of operation Barbarossa).
Newton uses the word "staggering" to describe 26 % reduction in combat units. If he had compared to other units in other situations, he would have realized that it is nothing remarkable with 26 %.

BTW, "outline", can you please inform me in what way the book is about politics.

How is the book about politics? It's obvious to me that you had your goals and conclusions set even before you got into the numbers. One can't have a balanced view of any conflict if youre only using one of the sides involved numbers.

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How is the book about politics? It's obvious to me that you had your goals and conclusions set even before you got into the numbers.

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One can't have a balanced view of any conflict if youre only using one of the sides involved numbers.

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Question to you Mr. Zetterling it's obvious to you that Kursk was not decisive, how do you explain that after late July of 1943 Germany lost everything they worked so hard for on the eastern front. If numbers do add up, as youre trying to prove, then why even such a military genius as Manstein wasnt able to take any initiative at all on the east since August of 1943. Who and what stopped Manstein if he had a stronger army from succeding like he did in Sevastopol and Kharkov?

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Anyway, could you please inform me how the Tsamo issue can lead to Newton's objections and furthermore, to the claim that I have some sort of political agenda?

"Reliable Soviet losses has been lucking"...and you gave von Manstein estimation on prisoners and losses inflicted by Army Group South up to July 18th.

and you gave 2 Krivosheev tables one is Citadel on 3 russian fronts and table on all major russian operations including Smolensk, Donbass, Kharkov, Belgorod + Chernigov and Poltava.

Now as far as Newton's book goes it clearly sayes German view on the cover as far as I can remember. So one can clearly understand what to expect and what not to expect.

Politics is the process observed in all human (and many non-human) group interactions by which groups make decisions, including activism on behalf of specific issues or causes (c)

I believe you did had your pre-set notions before and while writing this book.

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Originally posted by outline:
[B]Soviet casualties - page 116.

"Reliable Soviet losses has been lucking"...and you gave von Manstein estimation on prisoners and losses inflicted by Army Group South up to July 18th.

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and you gave 2 Krivosheev tables one is Citadel on 3 russian fronts and table on all major russian operations including Smolensk, Donbass, Kharkov, Belgorod + Chernigov and Poltava.

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Now as far as Newton's book goes it clearly sayes German view on the cover as far as I can remember. So one can clearly understand what to expect and what not to expect.

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Politics is the process observed in all human (and many non-human) group interactions by which groups make decisions, including activism on behalf of specific issues or causes (c)

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OK, using that defintion, my book is political, as are all other books. Quite a meaningful observation …

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I believe you did had your pre-set notions before and while writing this book.

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Any serious attempt to label Kursk-either in the limited 5-14 July sense that Zetterling and Frankson use or the larger 5 July-23 August context-as a decisive operation has to examine several key criteria:

1. The physical and moral effects of a failed German summer offensive;
2. The extent to which the short-term losses in Operation Citadel (whether or not they could be replaced in the long run) critically weakened the German capacity for resisting the Soviet counteroffensives directed at Orel and Kharkov;
3. The impact of losses in manpower, equipment, and territory to those Soviet counteroffensives and the retreat west of the Dnepr River;
4. The extent to which their losses reduced the qualitative edge of the German forces and decreased their capacity for operational concentrations; and
5. The consequences of maintaining an increased operational tempo across a lengthening front for six months.

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1. I don't think that the failed attack produced a big change in the moral of the german soldier, about the "physical" part, well, the attack only lasted 10 days, and not all the german units in the east were involved, so I can't see how that would lead to big physical effects for the Heer in the east front

2. Possibly, if one takes those losses in a vaccum. But considering that those losses were paid with (bigger) soviet losses, and that that ratio was pretty "standard", for the war in the east to that point, I don't think that they were the reason for the subsequent german defeats

3. I don't think this is a valid point

4. Again, the "qualitative edge", has two sides. But, since the losses in Zitadelle (for both sides), were not a major part of the total losses, and the ratio of losses was not different that before, I can't see how they would lead to a change in that "edge". The same applies to the german capacity for operational concentrations. (one can argue that the only reason that the germans were still be able concentrate those forces for Zitadell, was the soviet decision to remain on the defensive)

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Originally posted by outline:
Mr. Dickson are you still planing to release your book? Working with Zamulin and having access to all german numbers you can eat, youre in the position to make a true masterpiece for Kursk, and to be frank I'm a bit surprise you can't find enough time and maybe interest to finish this project.

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Taking into account the books by Zetterling, Zamulin, Glantz, and soon (I hope) Lawrence, I don't think there's much left to say about the German offensive in the south. You're quite mistaken if you think I'm awash in anything regarding Kursk.

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Originally posted by outline:
There is over 20! different charts in new Zamulin book sourced from TSAMO of course. Valeriy Zamulin uses Zetterling/Frankson tables and charts in his 2nd consecutive book (each book is well over 700 pages). I understand that it might be a problem translating those books but obtaining TSAMO charts should be no problem. I guess no one is really interested enough to present first source RKKA numbers for western reader. Maybe Mr. Zetterling will do another book on Kursk since Gary is so busy with his work and personal life.

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Nothing to say about Kursk? Zamulin released 3 books 700+ pages each about Kursk, and still he admits it himself he is half way in. I wonder if his books would be succesful if they would ever be translated. Neizvesnoe srazhenie velikoy vojni is quite amazing.

[This message has been edited by outline (edited 08-20-2008).]

67 GRD - 8772, 3277
71 GRD - 8796, 7062
90 GRD - 8417, 6113
51 GRD - 8728, 3980
52 GRD - 8900, 2444
375 RD - 8649, 7735
89 GRD - 8189, 8211

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I'll start off then. According to Zamulin, on 5 July and 9 July 6th Guards Army divisions reported the following strengths:

67 GRD - 8772, 3277
71 GRD - 8796, 7062
90 GRD - 8417, 6113
51 GRD - 8728, 3980
52 GRD - 8900, 2444
375 RD - 8649, 7735
89 GRD - 8189, 8211

Overall strength reduction is 36 percent, total casualties were 21,549.
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To step back from the issue a little; 21,500 casualties in just seven divisions in four days - these are really extreme casualties. That level of loss would be a pretty bad month for a whole German Army.

Mr.Zetterling, right now any westerner or easterner who has connections and some financial back up will get access to tsamo.

21,500 in 4 days in just 7 divisions. is staggering. plain and simple.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
German units was not defeated by that level of losses during 1941 and 1942 summer offensives.

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The question this raises for me is which units in the 1941/42 summer offensives suffered this level of losses in the same short amount of time and remained capable to pursue the offensive against an undefeated Soviet position?

While the losses were clearly not impossibly high in principle, (some German divisions suffered far higher casualties during 1941, and some US infantry divisions suffered 200+% casualties in the 11 months from June 44 to May 45), nor impossible to replace, as shown by the figures of replacements, the fact that they were suffered over the course of less than a week could well mean that they were in fact impossibly high and impossible to replace, unless the divisions affected were given time to recover. Which they did not get. In other words the assessment of the impact of the losses to me appears to be highly context dependent.

All the best

"The question this raises for me is which units in the 1941/42 summer offensives suffered this level of losses in the same short amount of time and remained capable to pursue the offensive against an undefeated Soviet position?"

The losses suffered by 6th Army during the summer and early fall battles in 1942 stand comparison - while not quite at the same intensity level over such a brief period, they came fairly close and that intensity had a duration of several months. July through September (and predominantly in the last two of these months) some divisions (for example 60.mot.ID and 71.ID) lost more than 5,000 men, few lost fewer than 3 to 4,000. Its Dekade-losses from III-July and through September were 7099, 9298, 6893, 12081, 8692, 10402, 10426.

Most Divisions tended to take losses in spurts, and since operations were continuous there was no opportunity for rest, refit and integration of replacements. Not that anything remotely close to sufficient replacements arrived anyway, and by October most of these divisions were in as bad a state as the average German divisions in front of Moscow the previous December. By mid-september, batallions typically had Kampfstärken of around 300 men, and that's after a large number of divisional units had been disbanded or amalgamated. In early September, 389.ID had a monstrous Fehl of almost 9,000 men, and an Iststärke of barely 7,500.

None of this prevented 6th Army from keeping up more than three months of almost continuous offensive operations, although no doubt it played its role in the inability of the army to capture Stalingrad.

If we look at the Divisional losses in Zitadelle, these cover two Dekaden - the I and II in July. Over these two Dekaden, AD Kempf's divisions lost, on average,about 1955 men, not including XXXXII AK which was hardly engaged. 4.PzA's Divisions lost on average about 1860, while the divisions of AOK 9, in the first Dekade lost on average just below 1,000 men. So I suppose we may, with reasonable accuracy, think of roughly 1,000 casualties per Division per Dekade as the typically Zitadelle level of loss.

I don't have divisional losses by Dekade for every army and every period, but to pick cases of Divisions losing close to or more than 1,000 men in a Dekade, more or less at random:

4th Army
I-October 41: 15., 78., 137.,292. and 183.ID.
II-October: 197.ID
III-October: 98. and 258.ID
II- November: 137., 260.ID
II-February 42: 17.ID
I-April: 268.ID

6th Army:
II-May 42: 62. (more than 2,900 casualties), 71., 79., 294. and 113.ID
II-June: 44.ID
III-June: 376.ID (and possibly more, incomplete report)
III-July: 113., 297.ID
I-August: 100.Jg
III-August: 76., 79., 3.mot., 384.ID
I-September: 3.mot, 71., 295.ID
II-September: 71., 94., 295.ID
III-September: 60.mot., 76., 100.Jg, 295.ID

11th Army:
8-21 May 1942: 22.Pz, 28.le, 50., 32. 170.ID

17th Army (with some sick included though):
III-September: 198.ID, 97.Jg, 101.Jg
I-October: 1.Geb, 97.Jg, 101.Jg
II-October: 1.Geb
III-October: 1.Geb
II-November: 1.Geb

18th Army:
16.-25.8-41: 58., 93.ID
26.8.-5.9.: 58., 291.ID
6.-15.9.: 291.ID
16.-25.9.: 291.ID
Monthly (at least 1800)
January 43: 28 jg, 61., 96., 170., 227.ID, SS-Polizei.
February: 11., 21., 132., 170., 250.Sp., SS-Polizei

1st Panzer Army:
II-February 42: 100.le.D.
II-May: 1.Geb.D.
I-September: 111., 370.ID
I-November: 13.PzD

2nd Panzer Army:

Up to 4 July: 17 pz, 18 pz, 29.mot
(shorter periods,so here those with 7-800 casualties):
5.-13.July: 10.mot, 17.pz
14.-19.7: 29.mot
20--25.7.: SS-Reich
26.7.-3.8.: SS-Reich

And so on and so on.

In conclusion: The Kursk losses were of course very, very high, by any relevant standard. But they were by no means uniquely high, and it is quite justified to say that there are many previous examples of divisions retaining their offensive capabilities despite losses on a similar level. That point is also proven by the Kursk divisions themselves, as some of the hardest hit (such as Totenkopf and Reich) went directly on to renewed (and successful) major offensive action, on the Mius.

Regards, K.A.

[This message has been edited by Kjetil Aasland (edited 10-07-2008).]