The losses were less than half of those suffered by 2nd Army (9,266 on average during the period), suffered over 10-day instead of a 7-day period, bringing the average daily loss rate down even further by comparison. I am assuming the two numbers are comparable - you are the expert on that.

But never mind that. What were the comparative army sizes, i.e. how many divisions during the relevant period in 6th Army, and how many in 2nd Army?

Also, as far as I can tell the 1942 summer campaign had relatively little of the "let's assault a serious dug-in position" character that 2nd Army's task was, so the ability of 6th Army to continue a relatively fluid campaign (which is not the same as 'easy') may not tell us much.

All the best

Sorry, you've lost me there. Where does 2nd Army come into this? You mean 9th Army?

6th Army size in this period fluctuated of course, but was for the most part 18-19 divisions - in other words, it was slightly smaller than 9th Army (which had 22 divisions I believe) in July 1943.

Certainly the 6th Army loss intensity was lower, for any given ten-day period, as mentioned. The point involved here is that 6th Army was subjected to a very high and constant loss intensity for two months before entering the battle for the city itself, which surely can be described as assaulting "a serious dug-in position" if anything can. Also, if we were to check the sort of losses 11th Army suffered during the first week of the Sevastopol operation in May, I doubt we'd see much lower figures.

If losing on average 1,000 men during Zitadelle had the effect of offensively incapacitating 9th Army until they had had a chance of resting and integrating replacements, then losing 4-5,000 men per Division in little more than two months should certainly have had the same effect on 6th Army, since they had neither received the requisite replacements nor had any rest and refit time at all. In terms of the impact on the Divisions' capabilities and as long as rest, refit and replacement has not taken place to any notable degree, it really does not matter very much if the losses have been taken in a week or in a month.

Any anyway, I also provided a fairly large number of cases where divisions at other times and from other armies suffered losses on the same level as AOK 9. I don't believe you will find many cases among these where the division in question can be described as incapacitated as a result.

I also mentioned the fact that some of the Zitadelel divisions were employed in renewed heavy offensive fighting within days of the operation being cancelled. These were by no means divisions who suffered average losses in Zitadelle - on the contrary, they were among those who had suffered most heavily. Reich lost 2,300 men and TK 2,800. And yet before the end of the month, TK was assaulting the Soviet positions on the right shoulder of the Mius breakthrough, positions who were very seriously dug-in, as well as in very rough terrain and very densely defended. It was an extremely tough offensive mission by any standard.

So, all in all, I think the question you raise can be accounted for. I don't see that previous experience would suggest that the level of losses we are talking about here (for, it must be recalled, Divisions who started the operation at unusually high strength levels) should incapacitate Divisions from continuing to function offensively, and still less a whole armies. Obviously it would vary a great deal from division to division - those who lost 1500 to 2000 men in the first Dekade alone must clearly have been badly affected also in the short term, but that concerns only a limited number of the army's divisions.

Regards, K.A.

A note on this. The figures as such are directly comparable. To the logic of the argument; here we are dealing with the effect of operations on the forces, not with the loss intensity as such. From this perspective, it is fairly irrelevant if the losses took place in six or ten days.

Secondarily I would say that if you do want to take into account exact timeframes, then Dekaden is the logical way to do so, and not just because it provides comparability. Certainly that will make the 9th Army losses look smaller compared to if you use 4-11 July, but the same thing will be the case for a lot of other data points. If 58.ID has 750 casualties in II-January and 800 in III January, that might easily include 1400 in the period 17-23 January.

Regards, K.A.

This is a notable drop to be sure, but how bad is it? It is, for instance, no worse than the average GefSt figures recorded in the previous autumn and winter, when they were opposing the Mars operation (2,240 on 3 October, 2,208 on 13 December although these are probably somewhat understated due incomplete reports from several divisions) - figures that can be called fairly normal. In winter 44, they were a good deal lower, at 1500 or less.

All of these figures by the way are "infanteristischer Gefechtsstärke", which is in actuality more akin to Kampfstärke, as it encompasses only infantry-type units.

Hence, the effect of Zitadelle was essentially to squander the beneficial effects of the pre-Zitadelle buildup, and to return strength to more normal levels. But those levels were not debilitating - this was for example the level of strength with which this army had been involved in protracted and major combat operations during 1942.

Regards, K.A.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Hence, the effect of Zitadelle was essentially to squander the beneficial effects of the pre-Zitadelle buildup, and to return strength to more normal levels. But those levels were not debilitating - this was for example the level of strength with which this army had been involved in protracted and major combat operations during 1942.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
"The losses were less than half of those suffered by 2nd Army (9,266 on average during the period), suffered over 10-day instead of a 7-day period, bringing the average daily loss rate down even further by comparison. I am assuming the two numbers are comparable - you are the expert on that."

A note on this. The figures as such are directly comparable. To the logic of the argument; here we are dealing with the effect of operations on the forces, not with the loss intensity as such. From this perspective, it is fairly irrelevant if the losses took place in six or ten days.

---

Kjetil

9th Army, my apologies.

The figures are only directly comparable if the armies had a directly comparable strength from which the losses were taken. I don't have the numbers, I would appreciate if you or someone who has them could post them.

Assuming the two armies had similar strengths to start with, the point remains that 9th Army losses are more than twice those averaged in 6th Army.

It is the effects on operations question which is really what I am interested in. I understand Dr. Zetterling's argument to be that the losses were not impossibly high in that they would not have prevented the offensive from continuing.

quote:

---

In fact, had it been impossible to conduct offensive operations after 26 % losses in combat units, it would have been impossible to conduct most of the offensives on the eastern front, whether by Soviet or German units (including much of operation Barbarossa)."

---

I think that is an open question, and one where I would be inclined to disagree. I am not sure the comparison is valid. For example, many divisions as far as I know went into Barbarossa overstrength, leaving them leeway to replace losses. Also, I would think that high losses suffered over a short time have an impact on organisation and unit morale, since losses tend to disproportionately fall on junior leaders, AFAIK (an extreme example of this in another army is 6th DWR in the Normandy campaign). Also, the quality of German replacements or indeed soldiers by 1943 was not the same as it was in 1941, or even 1942. See e.g. the complaints about Volksliste III drafts entering in Spring 43 in the history of 12.PD.

The argument that the losses of 9th Army were not sufficient to preclude continuation of the offensive does not appear convincing to me based on the comparisons advanced thus far.

That is IMO fundamentally different from the question of leaving the units in the field.

All the best

The impact on morale you suggest is not supported by the actions that the units fought after Zitadelle.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:
The figures are only directly comparable if the armies had a directly comparable strength from which the losses were taken. I don't have the numbers, I would appreciate if you or someone who has them could post them.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:
Also, I would think that high losses suffered over a short time have an impact on organisation and unit morale, since losses tend to disproportionately fall on junior leaders, AFAIK (an extreme example of this in another army is 6th DWR in the Normandy campaign).

---

The claim that the quality of the soldiers were lower in 1943 is very doubtful. Furthermore, quality is a relative matter, since it is rather the quality difference between the opponents that matter. It is very evident from the Zitadelle battles that the German units enjoyed a substantial quality advantage.

----------------
The figures are only directly comparable if the armies had a directly comparable strength from which the losses were taken. I don't have the numbers, I would appreciate if you or someone who has them could post them.
-------------

Sorry, I thought you meant the nature of the figures as such. As far as I can see we have all the data we need to assess this already, but if you insist: AOk 9 had an Ist of 331,000 men on 1 July. The average Iststärke of AOK 6 in July, August and September 1942 respectively were 317896, 256500 and 265491.

------------
Assuming the two armies had similar strengths
to start with, the point remains that 9th Army losses are more than twice those averaged in 6th Army.
-----------

I don't think anybody would dispute that 9th Army would have been wiped from the field if it had sustained that level of losses as an average over a period of three months, but it's a fairly important point here that they didn't. Again, it is not loss intensity as such that is the issue under discussion, but the effect of losses on condition. From this perspective it has a rather vast importance that the AOK 9 losses you are referring to is a figure for a week's fighting, whereas the AOK 6 average you refer to went on for three months.

The main thing remains that what we are actually talking about is condition. There is in my opinion no doubt that the average 6th Army division assaulting in rubble in Stalingrad in October 1942 was in a considerably worse condition than the average AOK 9 division was at any point in July, judging from reports on Fehl and strength from both armies.

Again, if 6th Army divisions who had been considerably worse affected by losses were able to carry out sustained attacks against heavily defended urban positions in September and October 1942, why would 9th Army's significantly better condition prevent it from carrying out offensive operations in July 1943?

------------
It is the effects on operations question which is really what I am interested in. I understand Dr. Zetterling's argument to be that the losses were not impossibly high in that they would not have prevented the offensive from continuing.

quote:In fact, had it been impossible to conduct offensive operations after 26 % losses in combat units, it would have been impossible to conduct most of the offensives on the eastern front, whether by Soviet or German units (including much of operation Barbarossa)."

I think that is an open question, and one where I would be inclined to disagree.
-----------

Sorry old friend, but that is simply a fact. Losses of this magnitude were quite common in both summer campaigns, and they demonstrably did not prevent German divisions from continuing to pursue offensive operations.

----------
I am not sure the comparison is valid. For example, many divisions as far as I know went into Barbarossa overstrength, leaving them leeway to replace losses. Also, I would think that high losses suffered over a short time have an impact on organisation and unit morale, since losses tend to disproportionately fall on junior leaders, AFAIK (an extreme example of this in another army is 6th DWR in the Normandy campaign). Also, the quality of German replacements or indeed soldiers by 1943 was not the same as it was in 1941, or even 1942. See e.g. the complaints about Volksliste III drafts entering in Spring 43 in the history of 12.PD.
---------

None of this has any significant impact on the issues at hand. Volksliste III recruits was never more than a marginal phenomenon, and they were in any case all withdrawn from the Eastern Front in the autumn of 1943 if I remember correctly - sent to Italy for the most part, exchanged with men transferred from there. 3.Pz.Gren.D. got a horde of them. Also, I do not think you are correct that many divisions were Übersoll at the start of Barabrossa. Indeed, quite a few were actually understrength, which DRZW 5/2 makes a big point out of. It is of course in principle correct that the impact of the losses are connected to the starting strength of the formation, but this can hardly account for the wealth of cases quoted where divisions suffered losses of this magnitude an yet remained capable of carrying on with active operations, including offensive.

---------
The argument that the losses of 9th Army were not sufficient to preclude continuation of the offensive does not appear convincing to me based on the comparisons advanced thus far.
------

Well, what can I say? If you put the losses and condition of AOK 9 into a general context of a fairly comprehensive material detailing losses and condition across the whole campaign in time and space, it isn't too difficult to find parallells to the case of AOK 9 in July 1943. I thought I quoted a good few examples, I can quote more if you want. The fact that conditions were not exactly similar in June 1941 and July 1943 hardly invalidates them, and frankly I have not seen anyone offer the shadow of a credible explanation for why these losses would have unique effects despite the fact that neither the losses themselves or the resulting condition of AOK 9 are any such thing.

Anyway, it's not as if one can conclude that AOK 9 was unable to continue offensive operations unless it can be conclusively proven that they weren't. Where exactly are the arguments that shows the losses had this effect?

Also, as far as I can see, the argument is rather if the losses precluded AOK9's ability to function offensively in a general sense, but that of course comes down to a rather similar thing.

------------
That is IMO fundamentally different from the question of leaving the units in the field.
--------------

Yes, but as noted, you will find in most of the examples given that the divisions in question did indeed engage in offensive operations subsequent to suffering these losses.

Best regards, K.A.

[This message has been edited by Kjetil Aasland (edited 10-09-2008).]

- Nine divisions, or almost half the divisions of the army, actually suffered low or very low losses in I-July. 45., 72., 102., 137., 251.and 383.ID, Gruppe Manteuffel and 10-Pz.Gren.D. between them lost 976 men. Hence, a very substantial part of the army was not affected by the heavy losses at all, and represented an unusually ample reservoir of fresh and strong formations who could have been drawn on for offensive action. You won't find many armies after October 1941 who had nine divisions fit for offensive action except ahead oft he main campaigning season. This was of course not possible due to the Orel offensive, but that has nothing to do with the effects of the losses.

- In terms of the effect of losses on condition, you have to take into consideration the fact that the army had suffered no serious losses since the preceding winter, a period during which it had been highly prioritised for replacements.

- Also, its losses in II and III Dekade July were really pretty moderate - a combined 15,000. Over July as a whole, they lost about 36,000 men spread on 22 divisions, equals 1636 men divisional slice. This is very high, but again, far from unheard of. For instance, both Panzergruppe 2 and Panzergruppe 3 had on average as high or even higher divisional losses than this in August 1941, and 4th Army in October 1941. As for 6th Army, they lost more than 28,000 men in August 1942, which gives a divisional average of 1830.

Sure, the I-July losses were very, very heavy and clearly had a great impact on the combat power of the army, and an even greater effect on the worst-affected divisions, but on the other hand they had a strating point far, far better than the normal state of German armies to offset against that. Already if you look at the July losses as a whole, they are no worse than armies who were subsequently attacking had handled before them (and I hope we can agree that PzGr 2 and 3 did not enter August 41 at full strength, or still less that AOK 4 started Typhoon or AOK 6 entered August 42 in such a condition). Almost half the divisions of the army suffered trivial losses during the Zitadelle period. So, please help me out here - because I am having serious difficulty discovering a relevant way of looking at this that explains to me why 9th Army was a burnt-out force incapable of further offensive action as a direct result of Zitadelle.

Regards, K.A.

[This message has been edited by Kjetil Aasland (edited 10-09-2008).]

Thanks for the info on the strength of 6th Army.

I would like to point out that I am agnostic on the issue. I am just trying to understand better the underlying reasons for the statements that have been made, and I am already learning a lot. So many thanks to both of your inputs. If at any time you feel you are wasting your time indulging me, feel free to tell me to take a hike.

With that said:

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
[B]I don’t know what you mean by ”disproportionate”, but I have not seen any data suggesting that the losses were falling notably less on junior leaders in 1941 and 1942 compared to 1943.

---

That's not the point I am getting at. The point is that suffering this rate of losses in such a short space of time is likely to be more disruptive to internal unit organisation than suffering the losses over a longer period of time.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
[B]The impact on morale you suggest is not supported by the actions that the units fought after Zitadelle.

---

I am talking about a short-term impact. Also, the kind of actions fought afterwards were of a different nature.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
[B]The claim that the quality of the soldiers were lower in 1943 is very doubtful.

---

I have stated my source - maybe 12.PD was a one-off, or it was overall rare? Niepold in its history states that officers had to use force of arms to keep the men defending. That the Volksliste III guys were withdrawn in autumn rather reinforces the point, although I understand that there may never have been many of them.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
[B]Furthermore, quality is a relative matter, since it is rather the quality difference between the opponents that matter. It is very evident from the Zitadelle battles that the German units enjoyed a substantial quality advantage.

---

Compared to the quality differential they enjoyed over the Red Army they faced in 1941? I have serious doubts about that, based on my study of the conflict.

All the best

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Again, it is not loss intensity as such that is the issue under discussion, but the effect of losses on condition.

---

Before delving into responding to detail, I just want to discuss this, since it seems fundamental to me.

AIUI the loss intensity and the impact of losses on condition are not independent of each other in this case. The point here is whether these "very very high" losses were too high to continue the offensive, i.e. whether the intensity affected the condition to a degree that had an operational impact.

My thinking is as follows: maybe they were not, by themselves, and maybe they would not have been at all had the Germans bought success with them, but I have a hard time believing that given the particular situation 9th Army found itself in, having suffered enormous losses in its teeth units with very little to show for it contributed to shutting down the offensive. This does not mean I think the units had been shattered beyond repair, or for a long time incapable of going offensive again, it simply means that for the moment the high level of losses and the disorganisation they caused, combined with the failure to crack the Soviet lines, made it impossible to continue.

As for 6th Army in Stalingrad - the point Dr. Zetterling makes about relative quality does in fact apply here. The defenders of Stalingrad were nowhere near as well prepared or competent as those of Kursk, as far as I can tell. Until they entered the city proper, I doubt that German divisions had to face defensive systems such as they encountered at Kursk, allowing them to continue operating at relatively even higher losses than those experienced by their comrades at Kursk.

Thanks for the correction on the overstrength of German units in Barbarossa and the other info.

All the best

I would like to point out that I am agnostic on the issue. I am just trying to understand better the underlying reasons for the statements that have been made, and I am already learning a lot. So many thanks to both of your inputs. If at any time you feel you are wasting your time indulging me, feel free to tell me to take a hike.
------------

Nonsense. Your refusal to be easily pleased is one of your best qualities.

If I may I'll take the liberty of commenting on a couple of the points, even though you address things that Niklas Zetteling has written.

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That's not the point I am getting at. The point is that suffering this rate of losses in such a short space of time is likely to be more disruptive to internal unit organisation than suffering the losses over a longer period of time.
-------------

I think that is probably true, to some extent. You can find that logic reflected directly in assessments of divisions, where sometimes a lower grading is explicitly motivated by the need to recover from high losses in a short time. But I doubt that the impact of that was more than relatively marginal, as well as transitory.

-----------
I have stated my source - maybe 12.PD was a one-off, or it was overall rare? Niepold in its history states that officers had to use force of arms to keep the men defending. That the Volksliste III guys were withdrawn in autumn rather reinforces the point, although I understand that there may never have been many of them.
-------------

Yes, there was of course a reason why DVLIII-men were considered unsuitable for the eastern front and active steps were taken to remove them although actually, according to OrgAbt in summer 43, the experience with them had up until that time mostly been positive - most problems evidently arising from their being badly treated by their fellow soldiers and language problems (DVL3-men were native polish speakers). I'll need to look this up, it's ages since I did work on it and my memory is demonstrably fallible. But in any case, this is a special category of replacements, and hardly representative for general standards in 1943. Generally, I find that it is perilous to draw many conclusions about the standard of replacements from individual reports like this. Already in 1941 and 1942, you read experiences ranging from horror stories like whole Marschbataillone where almost no soldiers could speak German or had received relevant training in firearms, to ones that vax lyrical about the excellent standards of the replacements.

AIUI the loss intensity and the impact of losses on condition are not independent of each other in this case.
-----------

On a theoretical level; Certainly not, since they are both to a large extent the product of the same thing. But they are nevertheless two distinct issues governed by different logics. With Casualty intensity, you HAVE to relate losses to strength levels and it is also crucial to use similar timeframes, or at least adequately take into account any differences. Otherwise you have figures that tell you nothing, the whole point with the concept of loss intensity is that it allows you compare the extent of losses taken at different places and times by forces of different size. You are looking at it in order to assess the losses, not the units affected by them, so to speak.

Condition on the other hand concerns itself with exactly that. The measuring rod here is not the size of the losses and still less losses per given time unit, but the strength, and most usefully the combat strength, of the unit. That is the product in part of the losses, but equally of the initial strength and of the replacements received. You can perfectly well compare periods of different duration, no problem.

---------
The point here is whether these "very very high" losses were too high to continue the offensive, i.e. whether the intensity affected the condition to a degree that had an operational impact.

My thinking is as follows: maybe they were not, by themselves, and maybe they would not have been at all had the Germans bought success with them, but I have a hard time believing that given the particular situation 9th Army found itself in, having suffered enormous losses in its teeth units with very little to show for it contributed to shutting down the offensive. This does not mean I think the units had been shattered beyond repair, or for a long time incapable of going offensive again, it simply means that for the moment the high level of losses and the disorganisation they caused, combined with the failure to crack the Soviet lines, made it impossible to continue.
----------

Well, for that specific issue I think we need to consider the effect of the Orel operation, which was after all the direct cause of Model's attack being broken off. If 9th Army's left flank had been quiet, they would also have had the option of committing some or all of the 9-10 divisions which did not see much action and suffered very few losses during the first week of the offensive, withdrawing the most battered Divisions into a defensive role and giving them some opportunity to reorganise. As previously pointed out, almost half the army was virtually untouched.

And again, if that was the case, how was TK and Reich able, in late July, to successfully carry out another offensive mission which actually cost them roughly as many losses again as Zitadelle did, and then move directly on to doing it all again south of Kharkov in early August? They had more to go on than a normal Panzer Division of course, but still.

--------
As for 6th Army in Stalingrad - the point Dr. Zetterling makes about relative quality does in fact apply here. The defenders of Stalingrad were nowhere near as well prepared or competent as those of Kursk, as far as I can tell. Until they entered the city proper, I doubt that German divisions had to face defensive systems such as they encountered at Kursk, allowing them to continue operating at relatively even higher losses than those experienced by their comrades at Kursk.
--------

On the other hand, AOK 6 was in a much worse condition in Sep/Oct 42 than 9th Army was in mid-July, and even more important, it was in a bad condition practically across the board. 9th Army on the other hand had almost half its divisions almost fully intact.

You can always find differences in nuance between different situations. But in the end, as long as it cannot be shown that German units in a similar or worse condition became incapacitated in this way, why should one think that those of 9th Army must be? It seems to me more natural to stress a combination of several factors - the need to shift forces to oppose the Orel offensive and the threat that this ultimately posed to even a successful northern penetration at Kursk, the unpromising results during the first week , the strength of the opposition - and certainly, the depleted state of many of the army's divisions.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Well, for that specific issue I think we need to consider the effect of the Orel operation, which was after all the direct cause of Model's attack being broken off.

---

I need some time (which I do not have today) to go through the other items. But this one warrants a quick response.

As far as I know the Orel offensive started on 12 July. The 9th Army attack was to all intents and purposes over by 10 July. The formal decision to stop seems to have come through to frontline units on 12 July, which probably means it was taken on the 11th.

Is that timeline not correct?

All the best

Andreas

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:
Compared to the quality differential they enjoyed over the Red Army they faced in 1941? I have serious doubts about that, based on my study of the conflict.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:
That's not the point I am getting at. The point is that suffering this rate of losses in such a short space of time is likely to be more disruptive to internal unit organisation than suffering the losses over a longer period of time.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:
My thinking is as follows: maybe they were not, by themselves, and maybe they would not have been at all had the Germans bought success with them, but I have a hard time believing that given the particular situation 9th Army found itself in, having suffered enormous losses in its teeth units with very little to show for it contributed to shutting down the offensive.

---

There is another kind of reports that can be considered. The German commanders assessed the combat value of their divisions according to a scale from I to IV, where I is the highest rating, which meant that the unit could be assigned any offensive mission. Several years have elapsed since I checked such repots for Kursk, but if I recall correctly, all panzer divisions in the south were given the rating I, except one division which was given the rating II.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Andreas:
Compared to the quality differential they enjoyed over the Red Army they faced in 1941? I have serious doubts about that, based on my study of the conflict.

---

[/QUOTE]

Overall performance of the Red Army. They still suffered considerable losses at the tactical level, but they seemed to have held their own reasonably well at the operational level. You get none of the utter desasters that befell the Red Army in 1941 (even Manstein's backhand blow does not come close in my opinion). You get offensive operational successes that simply were not there in 1941.

What is your reason to think that the Red Army was still as much below the level of the Germans as it had been in 1941? Since you refute the idea that the Germans were any worse than they were in 1941, and question the idea the Red Army was better than it was, I presume you think the quality differential was unchanged?

All the best

Andreas

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
The core of Model's offensive power was his panzer divisions. Of these, the 12th had hardly seen any action before 11 July. The remaining five had on average suffered 1,124 casualties until the end of 10 July. That can in no way be regarded as enormous losses.

---

This is an interesting view - if the core of the offensive were the Panzerdivisionen, but they had suffered hardly any losses, then I think it is arguable that Model did not see them as the core of his offensive power at this point in time. 12th Panzer I believe did not in fact see any action on the northern flank. So while you see the armour as the core of the offensive power, the question is whether Model also thought so?

Also, I think that point makes the losses in the infantry divisions stand out even more starkly, since they would have been suffering very considerably.

So what is the argument then? That 9th Army could have continued the attack with the Panzerdivisionen, moving the infantry into second line? But that was not the plan, it seems. As I understand the plan, it was to use the infantry to crack the line, and the armour to exploit. If this was the plan, it had clearly failed, with very heavy losses.

All the best

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Andreas:
[b]That's not the point I am getting at. The point is that suffering this rate of losses in such a short space of time is likely to be more disruptive to internal unit organisation than suffering the losses over a longer period of time.

---

If I knew the answer to this, we would not have this discussion.

Your view is that 26% at Army level suffered over six days is not sufficient. I am doubtful that your view is correct.

The historical fact is that the offensive was abandoned after these losses, and before the Orel offensive started. Why?

I am happy to think that reorganisation of the army and a different plan was necessary (bring the armour up where the infantry failed), and this was the intent of Model, which was in turn prevented by Operation Kutuzov. But that is also a variation on the 'impossibly high' theme.

All the best

Andreas

Also, I think that point makes the losses in the infantry divisions stand out even more starkly, since they would have been suffering very considerably.
---------

Well, if my reading is correct it has not been said that the Panzer Divisions had suffered hardly any losses, except for 12.PzD. What was said was that the remainder suffered on average somewhat more than 1,000, and that this was not enormous. As I have previously pointed out, the average losses in 9th Army in that Dekade was also roughly 1,000, so there is no reason why this should imply that the losses in the infantry divisions were higher.

According to "A statistical analysis" Appendix 10, the divisional losses were;

Heerestruppen 1495
6. 1422
7. 1545
31. 1392
45. 166
72. 66
78. 1959
86. 1523
102. 35
137. 65
216. 958
251. 23
258. 1576
292. 1969
383. 470
Gr. Manteuffel 101
10.PzGren 31
2 pz 1399
4 pz 947
9 pz 921
12 pz 19
18 pz 964
20 pz 1390

This is 5-10 July, but there were only 339 casualties all in all 1-5 July, so for all practical purposes that's pretty much the I Dekade.

As you see, the divisions fal broadly into threee categories. Firstly, nine divisions which had suffered significantly more than 1,000 casualties, a further four who had suffered around 1,000 and finally nine who had suffered moderate or low to very low casualties - below 500, and in all cases except 1 much below. I take it there is no disagreement that the latter had not been incapacitated by their trifling losses, which alone means that not much less than half the army was still in excellent shape.

It can in fact be precisely documented how these losses affected AOK 9 combat strengths during the first days. In this table (BAMA RH20-9/139)we see the infanteristischer Gefechtsstärke of each division (ie, the rifle strengths of the Grenadier, Pi. and Schnelle Btl.) on 4 and 9 July respectively. The third column gives their reported losses. The fourth the reduction in combat strength, and finally the reduction in combat strength as a percentage of the 4 July strength.

Div Gef 4.7 Gef. 9.7. Loss Red. Red in pct
251 2736 2858 24 -122 -4,5%
137 2826 2789 45 37 1,3%
45 3747 3721 174 26 0,7%
72 3309 3319 66 -10 -0,3%
102 2930 2441 14 489 16,7%
258 3392 1866 1558 1526 45,0%
7 3532 1578 1377 1954 55,3%
31 3068 1939 1498 1129 36,8%
Gr v 2025 1901 16 124 6,1%
Manteuffel
20 pz 2831 1751 1393 1080 38,1%
4 pz 3549 3142 391 407 11,5%
2 pz 4062 3295 767 767 18,9%
6 3121 1684 1162 1437 46,0%
9 pz 3571 2884 687 687 19,2%
18 pz 3479 3014 925 465 13,4%
10 pzgr 4322 4195 9 127 2,9%
86 3650 2481 1167 1169 32,0%
292 3714 1710 1696 2004 54,0%
78 st 4545 2322 2165 2223 48,9%
Jg 8 722 653 161 69 9,6%
Jg 13 685 230 202 455 66,4%
216 2802 2076 994 726 25,9%
383 2633 3036 488 -403 -15,3%
12 pz 4456 4242 98 214 4,8%
TOTAL 75707 59127 17077 16580 21,9%

2. and 9.PzD's reported combat strengths who make no sense relative to their losses so I think it must be assumed that their 9 July reports were incomplete. In these two cases I have given the 9 July strength as the 4 July minus the losses in the intervening period. You will notice that the there is often a notable contrast between combat losses and reduction in strength, which is no surprise at all. In addition to combat losses, men were lost to sickness and other non-combat causes. They may also have been lightly wounded and remained with the troops, not being reported as losses but not included in the GefSt either, or they may have been detached to other formations and counted there. On the other side of the coin, replacements arrive and additionally men were released from the army's own medical installations back to the troops. There were a fair number of men - more than 3,000 on 1 July - in the FEB's that some of the divisions were lucky enough to possess. Also of course, not all losses fell on the infantry.

But tedious technicality aside, overall this amounted t9o a reduction of some 20% in the army's combat infantry, which amounts to a smaller drop in overall combat power since other types of combat units had suffered less. If we divvy up the GefSt among the 171 batallions in the army of the relevant types, the average is about 440 men on 4 July
and about 345 on 9 July.

Beyond that, the figures tell the same story as the losses, namely that the effect was very uneven. On the whole however, the remaining strengths on 9 July were not really very bad, even in some of the hard-hit units. Other things besides nominal strength matter of course, but I thought it might be useful to quote this.

The northern attack was not abandoned before Kutuzov started. Model paused to regroup on the 11th, with the intention of renewing the attack on the 12th. That was pre-empted by Kutuzov, whose preliminary attacks started on the 11th and which began in earnest on the 12th. See DRZW 8, p.111.

Also, even if one should accept that 9th Army was not capable of continuing the attack, what I have considerable difficulty in understanding is why in that case the German losses in isolation would be the cause? If the point is not the general state and condition of 9th Army but that 9th Army simply lacked the power to successfully attack these specific Soviet positions and these specific Soviet forces at this specific time, then you could just as well say that the cause is that they had too few divisions, or that the defending Soviet forces were too strong, or that the assault divisions had been insufficiently rebuilt prior to the battle or had not been given a reasonable buffer against losses in the form of refilled FEBs. Or better, that it was the total constellation of these factors which produced such a result, rather than some internal dynamic in German divisions resulting in a hitherto unobserved collapse in functionality once combat losses passed some magic limit.

Regards, K.A.

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Originally posted by Andreas:
If I knew the answer to this, we would not have this discussion.

Your view is that 26% at Army level suffered over six days is not sufficient. I am doubtful that your view is correct.

The historical fact is that the offensive was abandoned after these losses, and before the Orel offensive started. Why?

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Compared to the quality differential they enjoyed over the Red Army they faced in 1941? I have serious doubts about that, based on my study of the conflict.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Can you give me some clues on why you have reached that conclusion?

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Overall performance of the Red Army. They still suffered considerable losses at the tactical level, but they seemed to have held their own reasonably well at the operational level. You get none of the utter desasters that befell the Red Army in 1941 (even Manstein's backhand blow does not come close in my opinion). You get offensive operational successes that simply were not there in 1941.

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Originally posted by Andreas:

What is your reason to think that the Red Army was still as much below the level of the Germans as it had been in 1941? Since you refute the idea that the Germans were any worse than they were in 1941, and question the idea the Red Army was better than it was, I presume you think the quality differential was unchanged?

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