quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
The core of Model's offensive power was his panzer divisions. Of these, the 12th had hardly seen any action before 11 July. The remaining five had on average suffered 1,124 casualties until the end of 10 July. That can in no way be regarded as enormous losses.

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quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:
This is an interesting view - if the core of the offensive were the Panzerdivisionen, but they had suffered hardly any losses, then I think it is arguable that Model did not see them as the core of his offensive power at this point in time. 12th Panzer I believe did not in fact see any action on the northern flank. So while you see the armour as the core of the offensive power, the question is whether Model also thought so?

Also, I think that point makes the losses in the infantry divisions stand out even more starkly, since they would have been suffering very considerably.

So what is the argument then? That 9th Army could have continued the attack with the Panzerdivisionen, moving the infantry into second line? But that was not the plan, it seems. As I understand the plan, it was to use the infantry to crack the line, and the armour to exploit. If this was the plan, it had clearly failed, with very heavy losses.

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You are jumping into conclusions and performing circular logic. From what I wrote, it can not be concluded that the infantry divisions suffered enormous losses (unless the thesis you try to prove is accepted as true, hence the circular argument). As the post by Kjetil above shows, they were not enormous.
Secondly, it is clear that Model did employ his panzer divisions to break through, as is evident from the actual fighting.

You ask what the argument is. OK: Models offensive power was insufficient to break through the very strong Soviet defence. But it was insufficient already before the beginning of the offensive.

I believe Hernan formulated it succinctly:
"one can argue that the only reason that the germans were still be able concentrate those forces for Zitadell, was the soviet decision to remain on the defensive".

106.ID Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.07.43
tot verwund Vermißt krank sonst Summe
Abgänge 695 3155 146 112 98 4206

320.ID Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.07.43
tot verwund Vermißt krank sonst Summe
Abgänge 557 2532 378 219 223 3909
Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.07.43

198.ID Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.07.43
tot verwund Vermißt krank sonst Summe
Abgänge 362 1500 183 454 140 2639

167.ID Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.07.43
tot verwund Vermißt krank sonst Summe
Abgänge 724 2504 113 285 96 3722

The Loses in Mr.Zetterling`s book from 5.7. to 20.07.43 are to Low for 167.ID!
167.ID alternatete between 4.PzAOK and 8.AOK
Source RH26-167/ 29 + 30 , The data`s from
the Division KTB seems to be the most reliable!

168.ID Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.08.43
tot verwund Vermißt krank sonst Summe
Abgänge 1238 5172 1166 629 95 8300

T314 R472 Fernschreiben 168.ID to 11.Ak 30.07.43 4100 Loses for 168.ID (since5.7.43)

Source RH24-52 / 159 52.AK

"Meldung 25.07.43
332.ID Verluste Tot,Vermißte,Verwundete vom 01.07.43 bis 24.07.43
Summe : 3787 Mann "

RH26-332 / 21
332.ID Verluste 4.7 bis 2.8.43 =
4536 Mann

332.ID Verluste 2.8.43 bis 9.8.43=
1889 Mann (davon 1076 Vermißte)

RH21-4/331 PzAOK4 IIa
332.ID Verluste 4.7 bis 12.08.43 =
6411 Mann

3.PD Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.07.43
tot verwund Vermißt krank sonst
Abgänge 363 2129 119 262 80
Summe 2953

7.PD Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.07.43 tot verwund Vermißt krank sonst Summe
Abgänge 452 2422 59 258 40 3231

Totenk. Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.07.43
(RH10-314)
tot verwund Vermißt krank sonst Summe
Abgänge 684 3751 42 563 148 5188

Gr.D Abgänge 01.07.43 bis 31.07.43
(RH10-209)
tot verwund Vermißt krank sonst Summe
Abgänge 565 2644 94 0 226 3529

Loses for 6.PD , 11.PD , LAH , 19.PD , D.R
for July 43 have roughly the same amount!

b.) Losses AOK9 see
Kjetil Aasland Post and
Mr.Zetterlings Page 203 to 205
for Juli 43
c.)
The ongoing fighting even after the 17.7.43 until late July 43 (for many of the remaining units of AOK8 and PzAOk4 the fighting didn`t stop)
and the rapid regeneration ability of the Russian side , with their accumulated reserves, made the height of German losses in 1943 so problematic! As already described in the book DRZW Band 5 / 2, (for the Second half of 1943), the Germans were not even capable to replace half of their losses !

I think that`s the differnt to 1941 and 1942

Kursk in July 1943 didn`t end with the success of about 250,000 prisoners as Charkov in May 1942 or Kerch Mai 1942 !

This success gave the Germans 1942 always time for their own short breaks ( befor the next step) !

With the start of the Kursk offensive, there were no more breaks for the Germans

2.) Topic : losses to replacements:
Source T313 R376 PzAOK4
Eingetroffener Ersatz Monat Juli 1943 bei HGr.Süd= 30 / 1662 / 18075 = 19.767 Mann
( Off. /Unteroff. / Mannsch.)

Losses " 10 Tages-Meldung (Summe HGr.Süd)
nach RW6/558 for July 1943) = 81.080 Mann

19.767(Repl) / 81.080 (Losses) = only 24,4% of the losses has been replaced (HGr.Süd) !

Thanks for the excellent contribution. Some comments.

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The ongoing fighting even after the 17.7.43 until late July 43 (for many of the remaining units of AOK8 and PzAOk4 the fighting didn`t stop)
and the rapid regeneration ability of the Russian side , with their accumulated reserves, made the height of German losses in 1943 so problematic! As already described in the book DRZW Band 5 / 2, (for the Second half of 1943), the Germans were not even capable to replace half of their losses !
------------

You are completely right, the German strength dwindles rapidly during the summer and early fall, and this clearly is of key importance. In that way the losses are of fundamental importance - but not just or specifically the losses during Zitadelle. If I remember correctly, the replacement levels in July and August weren't particularly low compared to other years (also in 42 and 44, they were much lower than the losses), but often much of the difference was made up by reinforcements. These were however conspicuously absent in these months, which coincided with the major influx of German divisions in Italy.

-----------
I think that`s the differnt to 1941 and 1942

Kursk in July 1943 didn`t end with the success of about 250,000 prisoners as Charkov in May 1942 or Kerch Mai 1942 !

This success gave the Germans 1942 always time for their own short breaks ( befor the next step) !
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Yes, to an extent. But also in 1942 it does not seem that they managed to regenerate their formations to any very notable extent once the campaigning season had started. The divisions of AOK 2 for example still had on average a Fehl of 2500-3000 men on 1 August. Over the course of the summer, they received much too few replacements to keep pace with the losses. I unfortunately lack much specific data on Ersatz to 6. Armee in the summer months, but given the extremely worn-down condition it was in already in September, the same was clearly the case here. It's much the same in 1941 for that matter, when the combat power of the divisions across the whole front was eroded by a remarkably similar level of losses that could not be fully or nearly fully replaced. The main difference, as you mention, was that the Red Army was now in a position to dictate the pace and nature of the fighting, which exacerbated the difficulties arising from this state of affairs. That suggests to me an emphasis on the summer operations as a whole and on the greatly increased Red Army strength levels rather than on the German Zitadelle losses.

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2.) Topic : losses to replacements:
Source T313 R376 PzAOK4
Eingetroffener Ersatz Monat Juli 1943 bei HGr.Süd= 30 / 1662 / 18075 = 19.767 Mann
( Off. /Unteroff. / Mannsch.)

Losses " 10 Tages-Meldung (Summe HGr.Süd)
nach RW6/558 for July 1943) = 81.080 Mann

19.767(Repl) / 81.080 (Losses) = only 24,4% of the losses has been replaced (HGr.Süd) !
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A word of caution though is that the "eingetroffener Ersatz" is perhaps likely to be only Marschersatz (ie, M.Btl. and Gen.Kp.)? If so, it may not include men released from the armies' own medical installations, Einzelreisende and transfers from the FED, which could sometimes be equally large (see f.e. the different Ersatz data for AOK 18 in 1941).

A late November Org.Abt.overview presents these figures (zugänge) :

HG A 8,700
HG S 25,600
HG M 46,800
HG N 11,000
In all 92,100

We can compare this to figures for Eingetroffene for the same period :

HG A 8,126
HG S 25,156
HG M 45,553
HG N 10,665
In all, 89,500