Gentlemen,

I've read the interesting thread on Eastern Front WW II attrition relationships, which occurred over a year ago here. While eventually personalities intruded, many of the important factors were presented in the discussion. I think the conventional understanding of what happened there is incorrect, and a significant piece of the puzzle was missing, or alluded to in passing by a few participants without its true importance being realized and made the center of the discussion.

First to dispense with a few misconceptions. There is a school of thought that was present on the German side at the time and continued well after the war, that the Germans "could not hope" to win a war of attrition against the Russians. There is no doubt about the fact that many of them believed this at the time. But I think it is inaccurate as a statement of fact.

There is also the indisputable fact that the Germans did lose a war of attrition against the Russians. They did not lose for other reasons or on other fronts. This fact does not contradict the previous. You can be able to win a war a certain way, and fail to actually do so. Ability is not execution.

The German failure to win a war of attrition against Russia started from the error of not thinking they would need to, amplified by a fear that they could not, ending in an eventual attempt to do so that was too late. Not because they lacked the ability, but because they conceived the war in other terms, failed to exert themselves, adapted too slowly to the reality of a war of attrition. And because the Russians in the meantime learned enough to patch vulnerabilities and deficiencies they had suffered from earlier.

The basic story has to be told because it depends on specific periods and the relevant variables change over time. In the German 1941 offensive, they inflict losses 7 to 10 times those taken.

However, the Russians mobilize almost as fast as their higher loss rate - their replacement stream is very large. Not enough, however, to expand the fielded force, through the start of operation Typhoon. The Germans actually have better odds then than they did at the border, and they have an absolute odds advantage in the central front, in front of Moscow. Tanks are about even, planes guns and men are all in the German favor, in the central front.

In November, Russian replacements outpace losses and the size of the fielded force grows. They no longer have numerical inferiority in the Moscow region, for the December portion of the fighting. The Germans are forced to retreat by counterattacks - which the Russians had been trying regularly without success, well before then. The new factor is a reduction in the Russian monthly loss rate as the Germans reach logistical limits, and a failure of German formations to defend successfully against the latest round of counterattacks.

The key factor throughout this campaign, underemphasized by all sides, is the German replacement rate. It is essentially zero. The Germans are inflicting 7 to 10 to 1 losses, the Russians are replacing 5 of them at some times and 10 of them at others, overall maintaining their force but with dips (through October) and rebounds (through December). But the Germans aren't replacing their losses at all, really. They are only marginally weaker at the start of October, but the front line forces are dramatically weaker by the start of December. Trench strength of the infantry has fallen and operational figures for tanks are much lower.

Please notice, however, that the original attack succeeded despite Russian odds, and that Russian losses were so high they were able to reduce the fielded forces ratio for most of the summer and fall campaign.

Now, if the Germans had had a replacement ratio anywhere near their capacity, relative to the Russians, the campaign would have looked completely different. Running a huge loss inflicted ratio can snowball to a big edge in fielded forces, even against an enemy replacement rate as high as his (higher) loss rate. But to do so, one needs to profit from low own-side losses, by *increasing* one's own fielded forces. Cheap victory yields better odds because the enemy replacements only replace losses, while friendly ones appear as reinforcements and increase own-side strength. But this advantage can be *thrown away completely*, voluntarily, by simply not bothering to expand one's own fielded forces.

The Germans did more than that, through December. They failed to make good their own losses, let alone to expand their fielded force. This was not due to any lack of capacity. Germany later mobilizes gobs of men to defend a bleeding front through 4 years of war. The men who do so are around in 1941. But they aren't up with the leading infantry divisions, filling out the thinning ranks. They are back in Germany making consumer goods.

Germany attacked the Soviet Union without mobilizing its economy for war.

German industrial capacity was not lower than Russian capacity, pre-war. The Russians lost a huge portion of their territory and output decline in absolute terms in 1942 and 1943. Armaments output did not decline, because full mobilization of the Russian economy focused output narrowly on arms and munitions. But Germany was capable of an equal output in key armaments like tanks. In fact, German tank output in 1944 is comparable to Russian output. There is no capacity difference to speak of, on this score.

But the Russians hit their peak tank output by 1942, and the Germans only get to the same level in 1944. The Russians get "mostust" because of "furstest". A mobilized economy is one in an "on" position in tank output terms. The Russians go to the "on" position almost instantly. The Germans get there on a line. Tanks actually produced is an integral of these curves, and the line-triangle gives half the area of the step function. It also "backloads" the output achieved.

The Russians outproduce the Germans in tanks 2 to 1 simply because they got the drop on them and started earlier. And their edge is higher than 2 to 1, earlier in the war - the Germans are closing through 1944 on the output side.

It is a paradox that the Germans knew about the war six months earlier than the Russians did, and took out a third of their economy by occupation, but the Russian economy mobilized sooner. It is another paradox that German output was vastly exceeded by Russian in 1942, when the Germans weren't being bombed, but caught them in 1944, when their industry was under the heaviest sustained bombing in history.

What causes the paradox? The Germans *aren't even trying*.

They do not order full mobilization of the economy for war until after losing the battle of Stalingrad. Specifically, the first "full mobilization" speeches are delivered in February of 1943.

German industrial plant was switching *away* from land armaments in the early fall of 1941, because they thought they had already won.

They thought they had won at Smolensk, at Kiev, after Bryansk. The failure of Typhoon to win the whole war immediately is a command shock, leading to whole sale leadership changes. They modestly increase output in response, but fail to order full mobilization. When the Russian spring offensive is defeated, they believe they can avoid attrition being decisive and think they will win that summer. The success of the fall campaign sustains this misconception.

At the time of the attack on Stalingrad, portions of the German high command believe the Russians are too low on remaining fielded forces to hold a continuous front. They think all their reserves are being committed in the fight for the city, and when they do take it anyway they assume again that they have won the war as a result.

The success of the Stalingrad counterattack delivers another large command shock, because up until then they thought the Russians must be running out of men and material. They could not believe the Russians had been hording a reserve of thousands of tanks throughout 1942.

The actual course of the Russian tank force is, it starts huge but ineffective, the early fleet being destroyed in the first few months. They have no edge by the time of the fall fighting in 1941 or around Moscow. The Russian fleet bottoms then. Losses decline through early 1942 while output is soaring. The Russian tank fleet rebuilds throughout 1942, reaching pre-war levels, with a large improvement in type mix. It is then launched at the Germans at the end of 1942.

The Russians achieve a large edge in fielded forces by the end of 1942. In 1941, their huge replacement rate covered the enourmous losses of 1941, but could not expand the force. In 1942, the replacement rate is as high in men and higher in tanks and guns, and losses are falling compared to 1941. German losses also fall, and the exchange rate is still heavily in their favor - but the lower absolute loss rate on the Russian side allows their huge replacement stream to build their fielded force, despite taking 5 to 1 losses.

And the German do not match that increase. They make good previous losses and they modestly increase their tank fleet. But by the end of 1942, they are outnumbered in fielded tanks by 3 to 1, with half the Russian models now T-34s not T-26s. Despite equal industrial potential, six months advanced notice, possession of the initiative, and huge achieved loss rates inflicted.

Because they didn't try to ramp production themselves. They are putting a stock against a flow. The only flow they are achieving is Russian losses. As soon as the Russians reduce that below "catastrophic", their replacement stream outstrips it. And the Germans have no large replacement stream of their own to set against it. Not because of lack of capacity or overall population or industrial base odds. But because they haven't asked for the output, because they do not yet know they will need it.

Pride and overconfidence in the scale of multipliers quality would give them, caused this German "own goal". It was furthered by a general abstract belief that a war of attrition was a bad idea, not Germany's long suit. This was quite incorrect - given the loss ratios they were able to inflict and maintain well into 1943, German prospects in a war of attrition against Russia were excellent - if they had mobilized on day one.

Since they didn't, from late 1942 on they faced a war against much larger fielded forces on the Russian side. Roughly 3 to 1 in tanks and 2 to 1 in manpower. That odds ratio in fielded forces was achieved in the period of *highest* loss ratio, while they were on the defensive. The key variable was German reinforcements equal zero, which was purely a matter of choice and of overconfidence.

Next to the issue of Russian losses later on in the offensive period. It is true the Russians lost more in the second half of 1943 than they could replace, despite their massive replacement stream. The fielded forces ratio moved against them in that period - but from 3 to 1 down to 2 to 1, that kind of move. And the Russians simply *paused* to rebuild after such offensives.

When two sides are in an attrition slugging match, the ratio of fielded forces is a function of exchange ratio, replacement ratio, absolute loss level, and absolute replacement level. A large offensive like the Russians launched in late 1943 drives up the absolute loss level. When the exchange ratio is strongly against you, that reduces your fielded forces edge. But a pause that lowers the absolute loss level, even with no change in ratio, checks this effect. If the absolute loss level is tiny, then the ratio of fielded forces tends to the ratio of the replacement streams.

In 1943 and 1944, the Germans were finally getting their output up to Russian levels. If they could have fought the whole period from 1942 on at 1944 levels of output, they could have matched the Russians in the lulls, and beaten them through their higher loss ratio in the flurries.

But they were slow to get there, and their material loss rate rose along with their production. The German tank fleet never gets the one-off "bump" created by a year of peak output without high losses, that the Russians got in 1942. The Russian fleet stabilizes in the 20 thousands, the German fleet stabilizes around 7 thousand. Russian losses and replacements are high. German replacements are rising but so are losses.

It is also important to question German side material accounting, particularly things like tanks. Their write off practices differ significantly from those of other powers. You have to track operational numbers to get a sense of what is happening in the flurries and lulls, to the German tank fleet. What happens is, in the flurries they inflict very high losses on the Russians, and their own fleet drops to 50% running. In the lulls, the Russians replace their losses, and the Germans get vehicles out of repair.

In the late stages of the 43 fighting, the Germans have a few dozens spots on the whole eastern front where there are 30-50 tanks operational, each. That is why they are losing ground.

Also, remember that tanks do not simply fight other tanks. Russian tank losses are higher than German in part simply because there are more of them to lose, and they are fighting in places where there is no German armor. The Germans fielded as many large PAK as they did AFVs, and three quarters of the German army relied on them (supplimented, to be sure, by some StuGs and Marders) for their basic AT defense. The Germans also fielded over 20 million AT mines, and late in the war the only really effective infantry AT weapons of the war.

As for the manpower side of the equation, others have already pointed out Russian mobilization from liberated areas. It accounted for something like half the new recruit demand in 43 and 44. The Russians could only replace losses as fast as they were taking them if they (1) continued to take ground and (2) moderated the pace of offensives to what the recruitment stream could sustain.

Understand, the Germans are tactical tigers and pushing them harder is like leaning on a buzz saw. The Russians choose the absolute loss rate they can stand, and back off if accumulated losses have drive fielded forces lower (at the end of an operational flurry). A pause rebuilds forces for the next push. But they can't stay paused forever - if they don't free captured areas they don't get new manpower.

Next it is necessary to point out where the German superiority lay, because this too changed over the course of the war.

In 1941, Russian readiness was very low and their mech arm in particular was completely broken. This was largely a matter of complete lack of combat service and support. Entire mech corps with a thousand tanks evaporate in a week, without inflicting serious losses on the Germans, sometimes without even being noticed by their combat narratives. From excuse laden Russian side accounts, it is clear many of these were fuel delivery problems, minor mechanical difficulties that led to abandonment because no regular maintenance was done, inexcusable command stuff ups etc. They were simply not ready for prime time.

This must be distinguished from not having a mech arm, not knowing they needed one, not having technical equipment, or giving them the wrong orders at the operational level. None of those were involved. Clear operational conceptions with sensible orders, to formations of adequate scale, were given. BTs were comparable to the Pz IIs and 38s half the Germans were in, and T-34s and KVs superior to anything the Germans had. It is pointed out regularly that there weren't many of these compared to T-26s. But only compared to T-26s - compared to Pz IVs or IIIs, they were more numerous.

If the T-26s had all been paper weights the Russian fleet would have dwarfed the German one and exceeded it in quality. This leads to the paradox, how can having 10 T-26s in addition to a T-34 be worse than just having the T-34? It can be and it was. Poor, overstressed CSS and command resources are why it can be worse.

The T-26s can take all the fuel and the road space and the command attention and the mechanics' time. While producing nothing in tactical effect, and thus wasting those scarce resources. The Russians were right to abolish the mech corps in response, because they could not command them. A brigade of T-34s actually where it is needed, is more far more than 1000 tank mech corps sprawled helplessly over 50 square miles of swampy forest.

This is an important part of the puzzle because just on paper, the odds of late 1942 and mid 1943 don't look all that different from the odds right after the invasion. But they are - the Russian mech stuff in 1941 is completely combat ineffective and the Russian mech force of mid 1943 is combat effective.

This plays more of a role in the German 1941 successes than is generally recognized. The Russians react to breakthroughs by sending 1-2 mech corps to back stop them or pinch in their flanks. This is not all that different than how they stop Kursk (though more on the differences below). But in 1941, the forces sent to seal off penetrations this way evaporate in days. *Unexpectedly*. Meaning, other units have not been told to withdraw, etc.

Russian operational decision in 1941 suffer from the units they are relying on breaking apart in their hands. They take to giving orders to infantry armies rather than mech corps, because an infantry army is still on the map a week after an attack order.

The basic issue cannot be grasped unless you see the Russian incredulity over this standing discrepancy - German tank corps hits Russian rifle division, rifle division evaporates and German tank corps is in the house - Russian mech corps hits German infantry division, Russian mech corps evaporates. In 1941, mind.

Russian operational moves aren't good in 1941, though the placement of reserve armies is sensible. Beside mech falling apart of them, they are too slow to order withdrawals and too aggressive. The higher ups have a diagnosis of morale failure. They think everyone is just running away, and order hold at all costs, blocking detachments, etc. They should be backpeddling, instead they are shoving units west and nailing them in place. Numerous commanders saw the necessary withdrawals and recommended them in time, but were shot down by the high command and frequently removed.

In 1942 this improves not because the Russian high command is smart but because the field commanders are less obediant - they run when they ought to run, and largely avoid large scale encirclement as a result. That is one of the key factors driving the Russian loss rate lower, and it is a pure case of military mid levels seeing what needed to be done and doing it, against theory and orders shove on them by all sides.

Once they can attack, Russian operational "play" improves. But they still have occasional disasters caused by incomprehension about remaining tactical skill descrepancies. The attacks orders at Kharkov in the spring of 1942 make sense on a map, and if the sides were reversed would succeed at the local odds achieved. Instead they fail completely. The Mars attacks are smashed catastrophically, when with sides reversed tactically they look fine. Russian commanders too often expected a Russian division to perform as well as its German counterpart, in other words, and they regularly failed to do so.

German operational play deteriorates drastically after the 1941 campaign. 1942 works at first but is exploited badly. The early 1943 backhand blow restores the front, but it is the last "brilliancy" in the German hand. It is a mistake to speak of superior German command, better operational skill, or maneuver superiority from that point on. There isn't any. Anyone looking at the campaigns on the map from Kursk on (inclusive) can see the Russian high level play is superior.

They get outsized tactical odds ratios at critical points as a result. The German tales of 10 to 1 everything aren't wrong about many of these fights, but they happen with modest global odds ratios. The Russians simply succeed in ganging up locally, where they intend to fight.

The Germans nevertheless continue to score high ratios of losses inflicted. They are tactical tigers throughout the war, division level and below.

Technical specs cannot really explain it. The Germans conquer most of Russia in Pz IIIs, and lose it again in Tigers and Panthers. The "sign" of tank superiority is simply wrong, consistently, as an explanation of anything. It can explain part of German tactical achievements in the defensive period, but German tactical skill is higher whether it is present or not.

Some defender's edge cannot explain it either. The Russian loss ratio is higher in 1941 and 1942 when they are on the strategic defensive.

The likely explanation is clear enough for those who have read deeply enough in the histories and do not get distracted by the various large doctrinal debates and strategic factors already covered. German officers simply had a better grasp of effective tactics, and regularly employed the right weapon or technique in the right place for it. While the Russians frequently failed to do so, and made excessive use of mass in place of the proper choice of weapon or technique for the problem in front of them. They use all arms forces as a "total dose" - throw everything and hope something sticks - instead of a toolkit (use only the one assymmetric thing that wins cleanly, on its own).

Concretely, that means the Germans formed gun fronts against armor, used even limited armor as a "linebacker" and to deliver instant counterattacks, properly employed reaction reserves, met massed infantry attacks with counter-massed corps level artillery fires, used thinned fronts and MG outposts to avoid heavy artillery fire with the bulk of the men in deep shelters, etc. Lots of small bits of military cleverness done well - *not* grand maneuvering by massed armadas of armor, in which they had no further outsized successes. Nor superior fighting in sequence at the operational scale, etc.

Similar discrepancies are seen on other fronts, later in the war. Western allies try to do with massive logistical superiority and firepower arms (air and arty) what the Russians do with numbers and a "total dose". Germans hold them with small tactics, while misplaying the strategic stuff constantly.

In sum, the Germans could have won a war of attrition in the east if they had planned for it and fought it was one from the begining. They didn't, and gave the Russians a large fielded forces edge through more rapid mobilization, simply by keeping their own replacement nearly as zero for the first year and a half. The German edge was operational and included superior skill at maneuver warfare, only in that period, reflecting organization incapacity on the Russian side. By the time the Germans mobilized, the Russians had corrected those deficiencies. And they were no worse in operational direction of the war - indeed, German "play" deteriorated steadily, and by 1944 was abysmal. Tactical skills independent armor theory covered a multitude of failings, but in the long run could not counteract the strategic error of failing to mobilize for war at the outset. The German fielded force failed to expand in the era of its cheap victories, which threw away any long run odds-ratio effect those victories might have supported.

Thanks for revitalising that discussion along more constructive lines.

Far too long a post to make a comprehensive reply to at this time of night, so I will confine myself to just a few more or less factual points to begin with, which may hopefully be helpful.

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The key factor throughout this campaign, underemphasized by all sides, is the German replacement rate. It is essentially zero. The Germans are inflicting 7 to 10 to 1 losses, the Russians are replacing 5 of them at some times and 10 of them at others, overall maintaining their force but with dips (through October) and rebounds (through December). But the Germans aren't replacing their losses at all, really. They are only marginally weaker at the start of October, but the front line forces are dramatically weaker by the start of December. Trench strength of the infantry has fallen and operational figures for tanks are much lower.
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This however is not correct. The German replacement capacity was far from practically zero - it was 277,000 over the first three months of the campaign, and not much lower in the last quarter of 1941 (232,000). Figures from Germany and the Second world war 5/1 (MgFa). These include Genesene (returning convalescents), but perhaps most likely not the 80,000 men in the Field Replacement batallions on 22 June. These replacements appear to have come from four main sources:

1) roughly 400,000 trained men maintained as a replacement reserve from at the start of the campaign
2) roughly 250,000 suitable men combed out from units elsewhere by late October, with a further 25,000 found after that time
3) The class of 1922, which had been called up to the Replacement Army in May 1941 and apparently to a large extent shipped as replacements during the winter of 1941/42
4) Returning convalescents.

The total of these 4 groups much exceed the roughly 500,000 replacements that reached the East. An important reason for this was of course the perpetual transport crisis, which hardly sufficed to maintain the bare minimum neccessities and severely restricted the potential for troop reinforcement.

To be sure though, this was insufficient to compensate for the more than 1.1 million combat and non-combat casualties incurred during the same period. Addition of divisions compensated somewhat for the increasing personnel shortfall, but only to alimited degree during the last three months of 1941. As a consequence, strength clearly dropped markedly towards the end of the year. By the end of November, the shortfall relative to Sollstärke was already 340,000 men.

Overall, I would also say that the Red Army did rather better than just maintain their force levels through 1941, though it was only in early December that it is known to have notably exceeded that of their opponents. Early November is the outlier in this respect, coming as it did right on the heels of the monumental losses in the Brjansk and Vyazma pocket battles, and before the very large new formations forming in the central sector came into play. Apart from that, it would I think be difficult to find other points where the Red Army strength was not higher than it had been in the Western MDs on 22 June. But this is really mainly a nitpick, in broad terms you are correct.

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The actual course of the Russian tank force is, it starts huge but ineffective, the early fleet being destroyed in the first few months.
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Just omn a point of detail, it appears to have been destroyed to a large extent in just the first 2-3 weeks. Adding up the tank losses (as given by Krivosheev) for the border battles up to 10 July already puts Soviet tank losses past 12,000 - wholly incomparable to anything witnessed later.

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Losses decline through early 1942 while output is soaring. The Russian tank fleet rebuilds throughout 1942, reaching pre-war levels, with a large improvement in type mix. It is then launched at the Germans at the end of 1942.
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Another point of detail, the Soviet tank losses in the summer of 1942 were however very heavy, and their losses over the whole year not dramatically lower than in '41 (some 15,000 according to Zaloga/Ness).

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In 1942, the replacement rate is as high in men and higher in tanks and guns, and losses are falling compared to 1941.
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Actually, they are not, unless you see them on a monthly average basis (and they're not even much lower than 41 if you do). 7,369,258 according to Krivosheev (dead, wounded, sick, missing).

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German losses also fall, and the exchange rate is still heavily in their favor - but the lower absolute loss rate on the Russian side allows their huge replacement stream to build their fielded force, despite taking 5 to 1 losses.
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To the extent that one can trust the Soviet '41 data, the Germans exchanged losses on a somewhat more favorable ratio in 1942 than in 1941. Any specific basis for 5:1? What data I have seen suggests a clearer German advantage than this, at least for combat losses. German losses do not fall, at least not in absolute figures for the whole year.

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The key variable was German reinforcements equal zero, which was purely a matter of choice and of overconfidence.
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Again, this is a very large exaggeration. If you look at the overall personell strength in the East, this was fairly stable through the first two years of the war.

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Next to the issue of Russian losses later on in the offensive period. It is true the Russians lost more in the second half of 1943 than they could replace, despite their massive replacement stream. The fielded forces ratio moved against them in that period - but from 3 to 1 down to 2 to 1, that kind of move. And the Russians simply *paused* to rebuild after such offensives.
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What data do you have to indicate this? True, the Soviet Fronts strength dipped somewhat towards the end of 1943 compared to the earlier high during the 3rd quarter, but this was only a temporary phenomenon. The German strength however dropped more markedly and swiftly than during any previous period, and the general result of the summer/ autumn campaign was a less favorable force relation for the Germans. The Red Army didn't have to pause either - the flow of major operations was fairly constant through the winter 43/44.

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When the exchange ratio is strongly against you, that reduces your fielded forces edge.
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Not neccessarily, as the war in the East demonstrated all too clearly. What decides this is the relation between losses and replacements/reinforcements on both sides.

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Russian losses and replacements are high. German replacements are rising but so are losses.
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On another point of detail, there is no discernible rising trend in the number of German replacements (personnell) to the East - in fact the figures are amazingly similar through all the war years. Reinforcement through new formations however varied considerably (but are declining through the war). Materiel output (and deliveries) seem to be the only area where the later years show higher numbers than the earlier.

Finally - just one point to the general drift of the argument. In one sense, a part of the explanation for the vastly superior Soviet force generation was exactlt that the USSR was NOT mobilised (in a military sense) while Germany was. We are comparing here an army that had been at war for almost two years and spent one of them gearing up to this campaign with an army that was actually still on a peacetime footing. General mobilisation in itself meant an almost immediate and very large expansion of the Red Army. The Wehrmacht had by contrast already drawn far, far more extensively upon its potentially available resources. Obviously, Germany was not well prepared for total war and obviously Soviet achievements in this area went much beyond this. But it is neverthelss useful to remember that we are comparing armies who were not in similar positions in this regard on 22 June 1941. And as such, the relative parity with the Red Army (numerically speaking) that the Ostheer enjoyed through most of 1941 was something of an anomaly that is essentially attributable to the fact of their far more advanced state of mobilisation and could not be expected to be kept up over time.

quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
This however is not correct. The German replacement capacity was far from practically zero - it was 277,000 over the first three months of the campaign, and not much lower in the last quarter of 1941 (232,000). Figures from Germany and the Second world war 5/1 (MgFa). These include Genesene (returning convalescents), but perhaps most likely not the 80,000 men in the Field Replacement batallions on 22 June. These replacements appear to have come from four main sources:

1) roughly 400,000 trained men maintained as a replacement reserve from at the start of the campaign
2) roughly 250,000 suitable men combed out from units elsewhere by late October, with a further 25,000 found after that time
3) The class of 1922, which had been called up to the Replacement Army in May 1941 and apparently to a large extent shipped as replacements during the winter of 1941/42
4) Returning convalescents.

The total of these 4 groups much exceed the roughly 500,000 replacements that reached the East. An important reason for this was of course the perpetual transport crisis, which hardly sufficed to maintain the bare minimum neccessities and severely restricted the potential for troop reinforcement.

To be sure though, this was insufficient to compensate for the more than 1.1 million combat and non-combat casualties incurred during the same period. Addition of divisions compensated somewhat for the increasing personnel shortfall, but only to alimited degree during the last three months of 1941. As a consequence, strength clearly dropped markedly towards the end of the year. By the end of November, the shortfall relative to Sollstärke was already 340,000 men.

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Two points on this Kjetil

1) I would bet money that the figure does not include the 80,000 men in the FEBs. If it did, it should not, since the FEB was very quickly used as a line formation by those divisions where I have seen detailed divisional histories. I.e. it ended up serving as a tenth infantry battalion at the direct beck and call of the GOC.

2) (working from memory, I'll try to look it up and confirm) AIUI quite a few German divisions went into Barbarossa significantly over-strength. ISTR that e.g. 12.PD had 120% Sollstärke. Therefore these divisions already had a buffer built in, allowing them to lose a significant amount of personnel strength without becoming combat incapable, even though it would be arguable that a division that has gone through losing 1/6th of its force to arrive at Sollstärke is maybe not as good a force as a fresh division arriving with Sollstärke.

All the best

Germany was not remotely mobilized for war in 1941 in an economic sense. Armaments output peaks in the summer of 1944 at a level 4 times that of 1941. Which was a result of full economic mobilization and focus on armaments. Any standard economic history of the war will show this. (Milward, war economy and society for example).

If German AFV production were shifted a year and a half to the left, no change in the peak and starting upward sharply at the time of the invasion, they would not have faced the armor odds they did late in 1942, the fleet mix would have been superior. They would have been winning the war of attrition against Russia.

Russian manpower mobilization was running half a million to a million a month. The German rate is not lower in the ratio of populations, it is missing a zero. They did not even bother to replace 1941 losses. They were not mobilizing a significant manpower stream. They were trying to fight the war with a stock, not a flow.

It was not for any lack of personnel depth or because they had already mobilized. Germany passed 18 million men through its armed services in the course of the whole war, 13 million of them the army alone. They had rear area padding sufficient to recover from simultaneously losses of France and White Russia and man a line again - after covering 3 years of losses. There was no lack of manpower reserves preventing expansion of the force during the years of victory. They didn't because they didn't think they'd need to. They were trying to defeat Russia "on the cheap", without exerting their full capacity.

On Russian tank losses, yes they were very high in the first few weeks. The figure remaining after that still dwarfs the German fleet. By the time of Typhoon they have no tank edge in the central sector of the front. At the turn of the year, they have ~ 7k AFVs. The expansion in the Russian tank fleet happens in 1942 despite losses - it is back to the 20k level at the end of that year.

On flurries and lulls in Russian offensives, they are not one continued attack by any means. The winter 42 wave pauses after the Kharkov counterattack until Kursk. The 43 wave runs from Kursk to November.

Zetterling's famous statistics showing a net draw-down in their tank fleet is focused on that period. It is a misleading outlier centered on "flurry". It does serve to reveal the pattern of flurry and lull and the response of Russian tank fleet strength.

There is no reduction in the Russian tank fleet between the start of Kursk and the start of Bagration - on the contrary. The lull happens before Bagration, in early 1944. Local offensives continue certainly but the scale is distinctly less than the fall 1943 offensives, until Bagration kicks off.

I intensely dislike the apparent tendency to nitpick details without engaging the overall thesis. I acknowledge you say the reason was simply the length of the post - I am aware I am longwinded. To the extent any of your comments were directed at the actual thesis, your statement that Germany was already mobilized or was drawing more fully on its resources before the war, is the only item on point. And it is false.

German capacity for war output was no lower than Russia's, yet its actual output was vastly lower than Russia's. Germany's ability to replace its far lower losses was greater than Russia's, since the ratio of losses exceeded the ratio of population bases.

Yet German fielded forces decline in 1941, in the period of their largest victories, and expand much less in 1942 than the Russian's do. This is not the result of any incapacity, as great 1944 achievements, under worse conditions in every respect, prove.

"The German rate is not lower in the ratio of populations, it is missing a zero. They did not even bother to replace 1941 losses. They were not mobilizing a significant manpower stream"

which is quite simply not true, as already pointed out. So you might want to look over that again?

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To the extent any of your comments were directed at the actual thesis, your statement that Germany was already mobilized or was drawing more fully on its resources before the war, is the only item on point. And it is false.
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No it is not, in the sense that it was put forward. You are talking about armaments production, I am talking about the readiness status of armed forces. It is a fact that the Red Army was not yet mobilised on 22 June (though it was in the process of doing so, and was in a peacetime posture. As such , it had a very, very large pool of trained manpower that could be drawn upon, and with which it was planned to quickly expand it in case of mobilisation or war. Whereas the Wehrmacht was - of course, given that Germany had been at war for two years - in a highly developed wartime state, with no immediate potential for large expansion. Surely this is fairly self-evident?

regards, K.A.

Well, good thesis proceeds from a factually valid basis, and most people realise that there are few more valuable contributions to it than having your details picked at, facts corrected or supplemented or assumptions questioned. That is also the spirit in which points are raised. If your attitude is to intensely dislike this, well.....

regards, K.A.

quote:

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Originally posted by JasonC:
If German AFV production were shifted a year and a half to the left, no change in the peak and starting upward sharply at the time of the invasion, they would not have faced the armor odds they did late in 1942, the fleet mix would have been superior. They would have been winning the war of attrition against Russia.

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I am having serious problems with this idea. While it is probably irrelevant that these would have been fairly impotent Panzers compared to the tougher models produced 18 months later, I can not really think of a lack of tanks or guns being a major problem for the Germans in their autumn/winter campaign. A lack of mobility, and of re-supply due to an inability of supply to keep up with the far advanced forces was far more serious, judging from what I have read.

Producing more tanks/guns would not have helped that. Producing more (any) fully tracked supply vehicles, pouring more resources into rail-road rebuilding or the production of locomotives and rolling stock with Soviet track width may have changed the picture.

quote:

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Originally posted by JasonC:
They lost the war of attrition because they did not try to win a war of attrition, but to avoid one, chasing the delusion of cheap and rapid victory held out to them by prior successes and a faith in unbounded skill or maneuver multipliers. They had "victory disease". A fatal case.

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I fully agree on this. The idea that the Soviet Union could be defeated in one campaigning season was a massive problem. This was created in the heads of the German general staff following their experience in France, if we are to believe Frieser in 'Blitzkrieg Legende'. Without this idea, the massive losses incurred at Tikhvin, Moscow, and Rostov may have been avoided, leaving the Ostheer pretty much intact to take up campaigning again in spring 1942, after defeating the Soviet counter-offensive on favourable lines.

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On flurries and lulls in Russian offensives, they are not one continued attack by any means. The winter 42 wave pauses after the Kharkov counterattack until Kursk. The 43 wave runs from Kursk to November.
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Well, if I may offer the following overview of soviet operations from October 1943 through Match 1944, where would you find that pause after November?

During the 4th quarter 1943 the Red Army launched a sustained series of attacks against the German forces in the Ukraine, which had by this time pulled back to the Dniepr river line. Many of these are subsumed under the general heading of “The Lower Dniepr strategic offensive operation” by Krivosheev. As defined, this operation covers a very large portion of the Soviet forces (1,596,400 men in the Steppe, Southwest and Southern Fronts at the start of the operation) and also, temporally practically the whole quarter ( 26 September to 20 December). The Soviet losses were 754,392, making this operation the most costly thus far in the war among those reported by Krivosheev (which naturally also needs to be seen in light of the fact that it was also one of the largest and one of the longest). The quarter does however also include several major operations on the southern part of the front in addition to this major one. The Kiev offensive was carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Front 3-13 November, and cost the Red Army 30,565 casualties. It was followed by the Kiev defensive operation, which was conducted with even stronger forces by the same formation from 13 November to 22 December, and brought an additional 87,473 casualties. The Melitopol offensive, carried out by Southern Front, went on from 26 September to 5 November, and resulted in 198,749 casualties. A smaller operation was the attack to secure the vital crossings over the Dnepr at Zaporoshye during four days in October, which resulted in 17,708 casualties. Having secured the Kuban bridgehead earlier during the summer, the North Caucasus Front Front followed this up with the Kerch-Eltingen amphibious operation 31 October-11 December, during which 27,397 losses were suffered. In all, the offensives detailed above resulted in 899,817 Soviet casualties (which was not the total of the losses suffered on this part of the front through the quarter).

The remaining parts of the front were not characterised by a similar Soviet effort. On the central sector, Brjansk Front carried out an offensive in the area Gomel-Rechitsa 10 - 30 November, reporting 88,206 casualties. Even this was however mainly related to the operations further South, as it essentially secured the Northern Flank of the forces around Kiev. It is however clear that despite the fewer major operations, combat on this part of the front was nevertheless fairly intensive. The major Soviet operation in the Central sector was the Nevel-Gorodok offensive, carried out on the Army Group’s northern flank by Kalinin Front 6 October – 31 December, at the cost of 168,902 casualties.

The main focus of the Soviet effort during 1st quarter 1944 continued to be the southern part of the front, where the Red Army had spent the preceding six months pushing the Germans back at a high cost. The next stage of the Soviet effort here was the Dniepr-Carpathian offensive operation, whose scope, timeframe and cost exceeds even the Lower Dniepr operation. It lasted from 24 December 1943 to 17 April 1944, encompassed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts (and the 2nd Byelorussian Front from 15 March to 5 April) and cost the Red army 1,109,528 casualties – not only the highest total thus far for a single operation, but also higher than any subsequent operation. It is also notable for including a far greater force level than any other operation so far conducted, at 2,406,100 men at the start of the operation. In this, it foreshadows the great annihilation battles from the summer of 1944 onwards, though unlike some of these, it did not result in any major encirclements. Rather, the general attritional character of the operations during this 12 month period was preserved – the Germans were pushed back and weakened, but at a very high cost and without losing the cohesion of their frontline. A partial exception from this was the Korsun (Cherkassy) operation (24 January – 17 February), where significant German forces were encircled. Most of these however managed to break out, albeit without all of their heavy equipment. Soviet losses during this operation amounted to 80,188. In late December, the 1st Ukrainian Front launched the Zhitomir-Berdichev offensive westwards from Kiev, an operation that ended on 14 January. 100,018 casualties were recorded for this.

In the central sector, two major Soviet operations were the Kalinkovichi-Mozyr offensive, carried out by Byelorussian Front 8-30 January, and resulting in 56,157 casualties, and later the brief Rogachev-Zhlobin operation (21-26 February), carried out by the same formation at a cost of 31,277 casualties.

In the North, the relative calm of late 1943 were followed by a major Soviet effort in this quarter. The Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation 14 January – 1 March finally pushed HG Nord out of the areas it had defended since 1941, at the cost of 313,953 casualties.

It does not seem to me that there is anything that can reasonably be called a pause in Soviet operations here?

regards, K.A.

quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
In this, it foreshadows the great annihilation battles from the summer of 1944 onwards, though unlike some of these, it did not result in any major encirclements. Rather, the general attritional character of the operations during this 12 month period was preserved – the Germans were pushed back and weakened, but at a very high cost and without losing the cohesion of their frontline. A partial exception from this was the Korsun (Cherkassy) operation (24 January – 17 February), where significant German forces were encircled. Most of these however managed to break out, albeit without all of their heavy equipment.

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Hi Kjetil

That assessment is not quite correct. First you have forgotten about the encirclement of 1st Panzer Army (Hube's wandering pocket) in March/April, and the much smaller encirclements of the Feste Plätze Kowel (relieved), Brody (not fully encircled), and Tarnopol (not relieved), which were of course not as relevant as the Korsun and Hube pockets.

Also, German front cohesion was very seriously compromised at the junction of AGC and AGNU, where the Red Army created the so-called Wehrmachtsloch in the Pripjet area, and south of Tarnopol, during the encirclement of 1st Panzer Army. The major blow here was the loss of the last lateral transport link between Poland and southern Ukraine east of the Carpathians, which occurred when Tarnopol was lost.

Strategically this operation was instrumental in setting the stage for the summer offensives, by creating the Wehrmachtsbalkon in Bjelorussia and the theoretical possibility of a Red Army single envelopment towards the Baltics (a Soviet "Sichelschnitt"). The latter was exploited by Soviet Maskirovka in masking preparations against AGC in June.

Overall you are however correct that there was no operational pause in the winter 43/44. In fact, major operations went on with the clearing of the Crimea in April/May, and the fighting along the Romanian border in April/May (Targol-Frumos). I think the only real break along the front occured from late May to the end of June.

All the best

Point taken and accepted on both counts. What was in my mind regarding continued coherence of the front and absence of major encirclements was the contrast with the summer offensives in 1944. But since I mention Korsun as an exception, Brody and the others are equally relevant of course. The main reason for the current state of that text is however extremely mundane - it's work in progress, and for the most part limited to Krivosheev's data (which unfortunately include none of the above operations). There is a great deal of work remaining to be done on it, I know.

But thanks for simplifying that job by nitpicking on my individual points! (OK Jason, I promise that's the last time I'll allude to that ).

regards, K.A.

quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Hi Andreas

Point taken and accepted on both counts. What was in my mind regarding continued coherence of the front and absence of major encirclements was the contrast with the summer offensives in 1944.

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Hi Kjetil

Yes, I think compared to summer in Bjelorussia and Romania it was a bit more coherent. Summer in the same sector I am not so sure.

I'll have a re-read of Ziemke and "Korpsabteilung C" over the weekend (unless the weather is too good to stay inside), and fill in a bit more detail.

All the best

What I mainly wanted to convey was that unlike in the 1944 summer offensives, the Soviet offensives in late 43 and early 44 did not lead to any major annihilation battles, and that on the whole the front was moving west rather than collapsing. But your objection is valid, and I will clearly have to describe this in less sweeping terms.

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Rate means per unit time by definition. The rate of German losses in 1942 was marginally lower than in 1941. The rate of Russian losses are considerably lower. Of course 1941 is a shorter period of time, and in any statement about rates one needs to take that into account.
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Worry, my misunderstanding - I thought you were alluding to the ratio of Soviet/German losses. In the sense used, yes, the rate of Soviet losses were declining in 1942 relative to 1941, and the German even more so.

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If German AFV production were shifted a year and a half to the left, no change in the peak and starting upward sharply at the time of the invasion, they would not have faced the armor odds they did late in 1942, the fleet mix would have been superior. They would have been winning the war of attrition against Russia.
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Well yes, more tanks are by definition better than fewer tanks, all other things being equal. But winning or losing the war of attrition in the East is about rather more than tank production alone, yes?

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Russian manpower mobilization was running half a million to a million a month. The German rate is not lower in the ratio of populations, it is missing a zero. They did not even bother to replace 1941 losses. They were not mobilizing a significant manpower stream. They were trying to fight the war with a stock, not a flow.
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1. Interesting point concerning Soviet manpower mobilisation flow - is this an approximation or do you have specific figures for this? If so, I'd be very interested to hear more about it.

2. What exactly do you mean "not lower in the ratio of populations, it is missing a zero"? AFAICS, the Germans had slightly more men (perhaps 1-200,000, though it is hard to say due to the paucity of strength figures for late 41)in the East at the end of 1942 than they did at the beginning of it, which is also consistent with the picture on losses (incl. non-combat, which in 1942 were not much lower than the combat losses) and replacements/reinforcements, and which would indicate an average monthly personnel influx of ca. 150,000 men, as replacements and in reinforcing divisions, or a total over the whole year of roughly 2 million men. this can be compared to a Red Army that suffered roughly 7.4 million casualties and still grew by more than 2 milllion from the beginning of the year to the end, indicating that Soviet force generation (personnel) were roughly five times the German. So, not quite missing a zero.

3. Thus, they did "bother" to replace 1941 losses, in terms of their overall strength. But perhaps you are alluding to the fact that many divisins were left understrength after the 41 campaign (while overall numbers were kept up by increasing the number of divisions)?

But so far, I do not have any fundamental disagreement. However, I do not agree that they were still at this point failing to mobilise a significant (if also insdufficient) flow, and still less that they were still proceeding on a "stock" basis. And as it turned out, 1942 was (in terms of personnell) far from a weak effort, compared to later. '43 is roughly similar in this regard, and '44 certainly weaker.

To engage your overall thesis, I would say that you have several good points, but you focus too narrowly on the production of materiel, and particularly of tanks. This is certainly a very important aspect of force generation, but it is not the only one. For the Germans specifically, it must be borne in mind that the late-war surge in production (which, I agree, does reflect a relative lateness in full mobilisation for total war) is not reciprocated in the personnell sector, where by contrast the main period of growth is the early years of the war. Also, the total manpower potential of a warring state is a more finite entity than its armaments potential, and a crucial and obvious factor in the vastly superior ability of the Red Army to mobilise soldiers after Barbarossa began is the fact that the Wehrmacht had already utilised a far larger share of its potential manpower than the Red Army had. There was much less scope, equipment aside, for the Wehrmacht to grow while absorbing large losses than was the case for a Red Army that entered the war on a peacetime footing, with, in many cases, large shortfalls in both personnell and equipment and a very large pool of reservists immediately available that it had not yet began to tap into.

regards, K.A.

[This message has been edited by Kjetil Aasland (edited 06-13-2005).]

As for type mix, the faster your rate of production the closer your fielded mix gets to the current production model. The Germans were making 50L60s in 1941 and 75L43 vehicles in 1942. They just didn't have fielded fleets consisting of those vehicles until a year later, because the production rate was so low compared to the stock in the field.

So not only would you double the overall AFV fleet with faster mobilization, you'd get the type transitions 6-9 months sooner. You'd have 50L60s in quantity at the battle of Moscow and 75L43s well before the Stalingrad counterattack.

I mean, take Russian manpower stream, divide by the difference in manpower bases -approximately 2. Do the Germans have a manpower stream as large, relative to their population base, as the Russians have? Answer no, not remotely, their stream is missing a zero. Meaning, it is an order of magnitude smaller than the Russian rate, not half. You can lose a war of attrition despite inflicting 5 to 1 losses, if the other guy has 10 times the replacement stream. But the only way you face 10 times the replacement stream, from an opponent only 2 times as large, is you don't actually use your own base.

The Germans mobilized millions in 1944, those millions would have made all the difference in 1941-2, but they were left unmobilized in 1941-2 out of overconfidence.

German replacements sent east in the first 6 months did not cover losses, that is why the army is weaker at the battle of Moscow than it was on the day of the invasion. The Russians aren't weaker, despite losses 10 times as large. Why? Because they replaced losses 10 times as large with only twice the base to work from, and Germans did not replace their lower ones. The Germans failed to mobilize their manpower into a stream, failed to pit a flow against a flow, failed to expand their fielded forces in the period of their victories. That is why the Russians absorbed their defeats without losing the war of attrition in consequence.

It is really quite simple. If you inflict 5-10 times losses on an enemy with the same industrial base an twice the manpower base, you are well on your way to winning a war of attrition. If and only if, you exert your capacity equally. The Germans had the base and got the loss rate. They failed to supply the own-side replacement rate, aka to exert their capacity.

They could have won a war of attrition against Russia, had the capacity to, but did not. Because they did not try. Because they did not know they would need to exert themselves fully in a war of attrition, until they were already losing it and were 2 years behind in production. Because they were overconfident.

Yes there is a general grinding forward in the south in early 1944. It does not bring losses in excess of the replacement stream, unlike the July to November 1943 period, and the overall force is building through the summer as a result. (Claims of higher losses overall are simply integrating a longer period and more fronts into one total). And the point of main effort is shifted to the center, away from the south, a move the Germans failed to anticipate.

I repeat, the Russian tank fleet is not smaller at the time of Bagration that at the time of Kursk, while its losses exceeded production from the time of Kursk through the end of the 1943 as Zetterling has shown. Ergo, the fleet expanded from the end of the year to the start of Bagration. Replacing all losses of the fall 1943 period (and then some).

The Russians moderated the pace of their losses by moderating the scale of their offensives, to rebuild an operational reserve which they then committed north of the marshes instead of south of them.

When you have a large replacement stream in a war of attrition, you can maintain some ongoing ops and still rebuild reserves. But only if you restrain the scale of those ops sufficiently, to keep the loss rate below the replacement rate. You can push harder than the replacement rate allows for periods, to exploit temporary conditions along a portion of the front. But must pay for those exertions with compensating periods of lower losses, to rebuild reserves.

That is exactly what the Russians did, exerting from Kursk offensive through November to seize most of the Ukraine, slowing ops between November and mid-summer 1944 to build the Bagration force (instead of sending all that material to the south, to sustain the Ukrainian ops and push harder there). Then unleashing the reserve so accumulated.

[This message has been edited by JasonC (edited 06-13-2005).]

quote:

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Originally posted by JasonC:

Visualize an entire fresh Panzer army at the Don bend at the time of the Stalingrad counterattack, instead of less than 100 Pz 38s. Of course it would have made all the difference in the world.

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Not outside Moscow, Tikhvin, and Rostov in 1941. They would still have lost all the material there, and it would still have been filled up again with 50L60 and 75L43, just as it did in reality, but faster. The upgrade you expect to have happened in January to March 1941 had happened, and it was from 37mm Panzer III to 50L42 Panzer III, not to 50L60.

quote:

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Originally posted by JasonC:
As for type mix, the faster your rate of production the closer your fielded mix gets to the current production model. The Germans were making 50L60s in 1941 and 75L43 vehicles in 1942. They just didn't have fielded fleets consisting of those vehicles until a year later, because the production rate was so low compared to the stock in the field.

So not only would you double the overall AFV fleet with faster mobilization, you'd get the type transitions 6-9 months sooner. You'd have 50L60s in quantity at the battle of Moscow and 75L43s well before the Stalingrad counterattack.

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No you don't, because they did only realise what a FU the decision to economise on the 50L42 was after they encountered the T34/KV1. Upping production prior to this realisation and during the development of the improved types only gives you more 50L42 and 75L24 armed tanks. Which were already shown to be not good enough.

quote:

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Originally posted by JasonC:
Since the edge the Russians actually had at the point they took the initiative was 3 times the AFV fleet and T-34s vs. mixed IIIs, that would indeed have made a huge difference. The Russian could not remotely beat 75 long vehicles with 3:2 AFV odds.

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Still, there would not have been any of these prior to Spring 1942, unless you believe that together with improved manufacturing capacity comes the ability to be able to look into the future.

I am still unconvinced. I think that investment/realisation of the logistics issue would have made more of a difference.

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I mean, take Russian manpower stream, divide by the difference in manpower bases -approximately 2. Do the Germans have a manpower stream as large, relative to their population base, as the Russians have? Answer no, not remotely, their stream is missing a zero. Meaning, it is an order of magnitude smaller than the Russian rate, not half. You can lose a war of attrition despite inflicting 5 to 1 losses, if the other guy has 10 times the replacement stream. But the only way you face 10 times the replacement stream, from an opponent only 2 times as large, is you don't actually use your own base.
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Well, what data I have clearly suggest a Soviet force generation roughly 5 times larger than the German in 1942, not ten. Do you have any data that says otherwise? What exactly is wrong in the data on German and Soviet strength and losses posted above?

It is a fundamental logical misunderstanding to compare loss relations to force generation relations - what matters here are the sum of the absolute figures, not the ratios. You can have a casualty ratio of 1:100 and a force generation ratio of 1:2 and still lose attrition-wise, if the losses are very low and the force generation very high in absolute figures. Thus, the problem needs to be put in different, and unfortunately more complex, terms than you put it.

Moreover, you are forgetting two things that factor into this, in addition to the basic point already mentioned twice, namely that German manpower resources were already committed to a much larger extent than the Soviet. One is that the point is not the difference in population, but in male population of military age. Due to the different demographic structures of the Soviet and German populations, the Soviet advantage here is larger than in population generally. Another is, of course, that Germany was fighting a two-front war, which was something that was a substantial drain onGerman resources, including manpower, in a large number of ways. The practical effect of this was always that a considerably larger part of the Soviet armed forces was engaged against the Germans than vice versa. It is fundamentally impossible to analyse German force generation and force potential without any reference to this factor.

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The Germans mobilized millions in 1944, those millions would have made all the difference in 1941-2, but they were left unmobilized in 1941-2 out of overconfidence.
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Well, what data I have seen show me that more German soldiers arrived in the East in 1942 and 1943 than in 1944. Do you have other data, or is this just a general impression ?

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German replacements sent east in the first 6 months did not cover losses, that is why the army is weaker at the battle of Moscow than it was on the day of the invasion. The Russians aren't weaker, despite losses 10 times as large. Why? Because they replaced losses 10 times as large with only twice the base to work from, and Germans did not replace their lower ones.
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You are in serious need of elevating your data from that of vague impressions here. First of all, the soviet losses in 1941 were not ten times as large. If Krivosheev's figures are used, they suffered roughly 5 times larger combat losses (dead, wounded, missing) than the Germans and roughly 4 times greater losses than the Germans if non-combat losses are included also (which they have to be, if one is analysing personnel flow). If their strength is measured by that of the Fighting Fronts, they were almost 1.5 million stronger at year's end than on 22 June, after having suffered roughly 4.5 million casualties, giving a net force generation of roughly 6 million (which of course includes more than a few soldiers who were already in place on 22 June, but not part of the Fronts). The Germans suffered ~1,128,125 casualties (some of the non-combat losses are estimated), of whom some 831,000 were combat losses in 1941. They received 509,000 individual replacements. Exactly what their strength were is frankly and neccessarily somewhat speculative, since there was no Iststärke reporting at this time. But taking into account the losses, replacements and transfer in and out of divisions, it seems likely that the strength had dropped something like 1-200,000 men below the 22 June level. If you reckon the German force generation in the same manner as the soviet (including all formations added to the commands in the East after 22 june, including the OKH reserve here rather than in initial strength) a total of more than a million German troops reached the East as reinforcements or replacements in 1941. In other words, the Soviet force generation in the sense described here was 5-6 times greater than the German. But everything in this year is impacted by the basic insecurity of the Soviet losses, of course.

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They could have won a war of attrition against Russia, had the capacity to, but did not. Because they did not try. Because they did not know they would need to exert themselves fully in a war of attrition, until they were already losing it and were 2 years behind in production. Because they were overconfident.
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Well, nobody is claiming there is nothing at all in that. But with all due respect, neither your data or your consideration of the multiple factors involved in such a complex issue have so far provided anything remotetely adequate for such a sweeping judgment. I think you would profit more at this stage from remaining open to new insights rather than employ such a rigid and monolithic explanatory model and attempt to cram the data into it - it is only partially possible to do so. Ultimately, while any analysis of this issue must certainly contain the judgment you express (ie, the German failure to make the neccessary adjustmentsto the type of attritional war they were engaged in), this is not the only judgment it should contain, and nor was it the only thing that substantially constrained them in this regard.

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As for the reduction in Russian offensive tempo between the Kursk exploitation into the fall, and Bagration, Kiev Defensive is of course defensive, Melitopol is of course before November, Kerch-Crimea and limited scale ops in the center and north are of course side shows and limited ops.
Yes there is a general grinding forward in the south in early 1944. It does not bring losses in excess of the replacement stream, unlike the July to November 1943 period, and the overall force is building through the summer as a result. (Claims of higher losses overall are simply integrating a longer period and more fronts into one total). And the point of main effort is shifted to the center, away from the south, a move the Germans failed to anticipate.
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Well. The above was a general overview of Soviet operations between October 1943 and April 1944, and I think it is quite evident that it indicates no such thing as an operational pause. This period includes, among other things, the largest and most costly of any single Soviet offenisve during the whole war.

The soviet losses tell the same story. They were fairly similar in 1q 44 and 4q 43 - 2,143,503 and 2,157,895 respectively. I am unsure exactly what you mean by " Claims of higher losses overall are simply integrating a longer period and more fronts into one total", but these two figures refer to identical force scopes and time periods. As for the balance of losses and reinforcements (which is of course an irrelevant measure of combat intensity), the Soviet Fronts strength is declining already by autumn 1943, and continues to do so until late spring 1944. These are the average quarterly strengths of active fronts:

3q 43: 6,816,800
4q 43: 6,387,200
1q 44: 6,268,600
2q 44: 6,447,000

So, in sum, I'd say the data indicates a need for you to revise that particular assessment?

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The Russians moderated the pace of their losses by moderating the scale of their offensives, to rebuild an operational reserve which they then committed north of the marshes instead of south of them.
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In broad terms and generally speaking, I'd agree with this. Certainly, the Soviets (at least eventually) generally adjusted the scope of their immediate ambitions to fit the real capabilities of their force levels, something which the German never achieved.

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When you have a large replacement stream in a war of attrition, you can maintain some ongoing ops and still rebuild reserves. But only if you restrain the scale of those ops sufficiently, to keep the loss rate below the replacement rate. You can push harder than the replacement rate allows for periods, to exploit temporary conditions along a portion of the front. But must pay for those exertions with compensating periods of lower losses, to rebuild reserves.

That is exactly what the Russians did, exerting from Kursk offensive through November to seize most of the Ukraine, slowing ops between November and mid-summer 1944 to build the Bagration force (instead of sending all that material to the south, to sustain the Ukrainian ops and push harder there). Then unleashing the reserve so accumulated.
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No general disagreement here, except that the data quite simply fundamentally contradict the notion of an operational pause from November 1943. Not only did major offensive operations continue well into the spring of 1944, the losses also fail to decline and Fronts strength continues to fall. The rebuilding of force levels did not require half a year, but took place in late spring and early summer. This is even clearer from the monthly Front figures than it is from the quarterly averages. for instance, on 1 March, it was 6,391,000, by the end of June it was again above 6.8 million.

So again - good points yes, but also in need of further refinement, and in places, of adjustment, AFAICS. At the present, your thesis is too simplistic, and your data too inaccurate.

regards, K.A.

If I am not much mistaken, Müller-Hillebrand states that the long 75, both as a PAK and as a main armament for the PZ IV, was already fully developed at the outbreak of barbarossa, and that the first encounters with the T-34 in June led to an immediate order placement, which again led to fairly substantial numbers of both being deployed in time for the 42 summer offensive. It thus seems that there was no need for a further development period.

But I agree with you regarding logistics as the key constraint during this period. Considering that they were capable of moving only parts of the supplies, replacements and reinforcements needed and available in late 41, it is hard to see how they would have either provided or maintained large numbers of additional tanks before late spring 42 at best.

quote:

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Originally posted by JasonC:
It is completely crazy to pretend twice many serious AFVs and a faster transition of the fielded fleet to better types wouldn't make a huge difference in the outcome of the campaign. It is in fact the edge the Russians had, historically. Their victory is completely unexplained if you pretend it isn't a decisive factor. They simply would not have had that fielded forces edge, while the German still would have had their continued proven ability to wrack up 5 to 1 kill ratios.

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Can you please explain then how the Germans would have handled the logistical challenge of sustaining twice as many AFVs during the campaign? Stalingrad and the Caucasus were fought at the very end of their logistical system, greatly contributing to their inability to progress further there.

In other words, it is the truth about the war in the east, the Germans lost it because they did not try. But you don't like it.

Where do you think the flood of materiel all the other major combatants have, comes from? The Russians in particular are supplying a larger force, as well as equipping it new. Their industrial base is no larger before the invasion and they lose a third of it in that invasion.

In 1942, 40% of German steel output was still going to civilian industry. Tens of millions of workers are working in completely inessential fields, if your time horizon is the war. Millions are working as domestics, housewives are never mobilized.

There are no bottlenecks in the way of doubling the German mobile arm. They basically do so by the end of the war, anyway. Synthetic oil output increases continually until 1944, only ceasing its rise when allied bombers smash the plants. Modern economies pay more for scarce item replacements but do produce substitutes thereby, making them overall capacity limited not bottleneck limited. In the end, capital and labor inputs are the overall limiters, not particular items.

In 1941-2, Germany has the entire continent of Europe to draw from and more industrial output than the Russians have access to. Their contributions from occupied areas are as large as LL, as a portion of their and the Russians output. There is no reason whatever for the Germans to be outproduced in anything, as far as the war in Russia is concerned. Not trucks, not locomotives, not rails for gauge changes. No more than in tanks.

The Russians had more because they worked harder and sacrificed more on the civilian side, sooner than the Germans did. (By 1944, German civilians under bombing were sacrificing plenty). Not because of any greater capacity. Their output rises to "ceiling" levels in 1942, the Germans get to the same level only gradually (to summer 1944), resulting in half the integral.

After the westerners open a second front that takes more than one corps, their higher production can tell, certainly. The US in particular had far higher overall capacity in industry, labor, and manpower than the Germans did. It is unlikely the Russians would have held that long, against peak German output. Before the US has major land armies in contact, its production is effectively the 7% of Russian output coming from LL, and small distractions of German output. The Germans got that much from the occupied areas. They might still have lost the war to the US later, but they could readily have beaten Russia.

The Germans later withstood 2 1/2 additional years of losses at basically the same rate, plus losses on the order of half a million on other fronts to mid 1944, plus the need to man the army sized Italian theater, plus the larger AG size commitment to France. Then they lost 1.5 million men in a couple of months in mid 1944, as white Russia and France both collapsed. 2 entire army groups disappeared from the German order of battle. Did it run them out of men? No. Three months later, they have a line again, having mobilized enough fresh manpower to hold at the German border in the west, and eastern Poland in the east.

So you can't tell me they were out of manpower in 1941-2. You can't tell me they had mobilize most of their reserve manpower. They hadn't even started trying, actually. They could easily have replaced all their 1941 losses as their occurred and increased their fielded force as well, they could have doubled the mobile force by the summer of 1942, without breaking a sweat in manpower management terms.

Moreover, the ratio of the size of the forces on the day of the invasion was equal to the ratio of the size of the populations - so it is simply inaccurate to say the Germans had already dug deeper into their manpower reserves. Certainly by the end of 1941, when the Russians had lost and replaced millions of men just to stay even, and had also seen a large portion of their population pass under German control, they were using at least as high a portion of their available manpower reserve as the Germans were.