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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
I have enjoyed reading this thread for the interesting ideas and debate. Thanks to everyone.
(snip) So perhaps Hitler was motivated more by the urge to finish his enemies on the cheap than by over-confidence?

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I too have enjoyed reading this thread, but have been hesitating to comment. And I think you have a good point here Frederick. But I also think it is important to remember a few other things.

The later wartime expansion of the German military production was due to a number of important factors. The German economy in 1939 was hardly robust, having only partly recovered from the depression and the German treasury was threadbare, partly because of the extensive tax incentives that had been given to expand munitions-related industry. At the same time social services provided by the government were an important element in creating widespread support of the Nazi regime, so government funding was perforce split between the two sectors.

Furthermore production of heavy equipment cannot be started by waving a magic wand. In 1934 when the first major production facility for tanks began operation, there were already about a dozen plants in the Soviet Union producing tanks. And by 1939, despite massive government spending, just six plants were in operation, the last German plant MIAG, beginning production only in 1939. The industry then expanded by the aquisition of Skoda and BMM in Czechoslovakia and the construction of the
Nibelungenwerk in Austria, while VOMAG and MNH were converted to tank production and other planst were expanded, which more than doubled the plant capacity. But it is important to realize that there was little incentive prior to the end of 1942 to accelerate expansion, because through 1942 production exceeded losses in every month except July 1941 and even then the loss was made up in the following two months production. And of course, such expansion required capital and time, much of the effects of the expansion weren't felt until 1943.

And in a related point, tank and other production increases (primarily aircraft) were also partly developed by robbing Peter to pay Paul. What was done was that much motor vehicle production was curtailed or eliminated during 1939-1942 with the production capacity diverted to making subassemblies for tanks and aircraft, as well as other systems. For instance, by the end of 1942 all of the BMW motorcycle production line at Munich had been converted to build aircraft engines, the Steyr-Daimler-Puch motorcycle plant was producing tank components and the Maybach auto plant at Frederichshafen was building tank engines. The problem of course was that since German industrial capacity wasn't infinite, motorcycle, auto and truck production was severely reduced, proportionate to the plant capabilities. For example, in 1939 truck production was 101,745, almost a four-fold increase from the 28,452 produced in 1934, but production in 1940 dropped to 63,296 and only reached 109,085 in 1943 as much of the plant capacity - and raw materials - was diverted to other critical industry.

The premise that German manpower (including womanpower) was underutilized also dosen't really fit the facts. In 1939 18.3% of the working population of Germany were in war-related work (14.1% industry and 4.2% military). By 1943 those figures were 37.6, 14.2 and 23.4 respectively. In comparison, the figures for 1939 in the USSR were 14% in war related work (8% industry and 5.9% military) and in 1943 were 54% (31% and 23%). The figures for the UK in 1943 were 45.3% (23% and 22.3%) while the US was 35.4% (19% and 16.4%). Thus all were in similar ranges. Nor did the Germans stint on women labor albeit the Nazi Party did prat on about "Kinder, Kueche, Kirche". Pre-war, women made up 37.4% of the civilian labor force and peaked at 51.1%, while in the US pre-war women were 25.8% of the workforce, peaking at 35.8% in 1944 (figures in the Soviet Union were 38% in 1940 and 53% in 1942).

As to economic and manpower problems during Barbarossa, in July 1941 the air force and the navy were given priority over the army. In autumn 1941 one sees the size of the army (number of men) stagnating, while the size of the air force increases from 1.6 to nearly 2 million men (can look up the figures). At the same time production of key equipment for the army is decreasing, exactly at the time when the gap between losses and replacements of men and weapons in the east is becoming dangerously.

Generally what is often forgotten today is that the Nazis as well (as many others) approached the war to a large extent from their WW1 experiences, which was only 25 years back at the time. As WW1 had ended with a German defeat generally attributed to a "military strike" of parts of the army as well as a home based revolution, the Nazis were very shy to demand too many things from the ordinary Germans.

As all seemeed to go well in the first place, they then became victims of their own propaganda, IIRC there was much reluctance to draft additional "U.K." classified people into the army when the failure of Barbarossa became apparent, because the whole summer 1941 propaganda had told the Germans that the war is already won and much unrest at the home front was feared.
Such unrest was feared again after Stalingrad and after the "Gomorrha" attacks on Hamburg, when the "Walkyrie" (sp?) plans were created.
On the social-populist nature of Nazism in general the book by an academic outsider has stirred up a discussion in Germany recently, who, based on an analysis of German war financing and fiscal policy, explains the support of the ordinary Germans for Hitler until the war's end with the social welfare state established by the Nazis and the Holokaust with the desire to pay that ystem by robbed property of the Jews as the group at the very end of the Nazi value scale (Götz Aly: "Hitler's Volksstaat").

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The Germans later withstood 2 1/2 additional years of losses at basically the same rate, plus losses on the order of half a million on other fronts to mid 1944, plus the need to man the army sized Italian theater, plus the larger AG size commitment to France. Then they lost 1.5 million men in a couple of months in mid 1944, as white Russia and France both collapsed. 2 entire army groups disappeared from the German order of battle. Did it run them out of men? No. Three months later, they have a line again, having mobilized enough fresh manpower to hold at the German border in the west, and eastern Poland in the east. So you can't tell me they were out of manpower in 1941-2. You can't tell me they had mobilize most of their reserve manpower. They hadn't even started trying, actually. They could easily have replaced all their 1941 losses as their occurred and increased their fielded force as well, they could have doubled the mobile force by the summer of 1942, without breaking a sweat in manpower management terms.

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Of course they had not used up most of their available manpower. My point is quite simply that while the German Army had undergone a large expansion since the outbreak of war and were at , the Red Army had not yet mobilised - in the literal sense of the word. It was thus in a posture where its immediate reinforcement with several million men could be effected (and were planned effected) within weeks. Obviously the German army was not in a similar position. This is simply one factor among many to take into consideration.

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Moreover, the ratio of the size of the forces on the day of the invasion was equal to the ratio of the size of the populations -

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Was it? The German forces who toook part in Barbarossa were slightly larger than the Soviet fronts facing them on 22 June. If we are talking in terms of the overall size of their armed forces, the Wehrmacht was at this point in fact larger than the Red Army and Navy.

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so it is simply inaccurate to say the Germans had already dug deeper into their manpower reserves.

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See above point.

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Certainly by the end of 1941, when the Russians had lost and replaced millions of men just to stay even, and had also seen a large portion of their population pass under German control, they were using at least as high a portion of their available manpower reserve as the Germans were.

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The Soviet fronts on the Western border on 22 June fielded roughly 2.7 million men. On 31 December, they fielded more than 4 million. The overall strength of the Red Army, including both the operating Fronts and the rear Military districts, developed thus:

010741............5.5m
110941............7.4m
050542............8.95m
050742............9.2m

They did not just stay even, but on the contrary underwent a rather dramatic expansion in the period 1941-42.

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The Germans weren't outnumbered 5 to 1 by the Russians. The Russian manpower reserve would run out first, taking losses at 5 times the German rate, if the Germans had mobilized at half the rate the Russians did.

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Again, it's logically pointless to compare casualty ratios to force generation ratios, it is the absolute figures that matter - the lower the casualties in absolute figures, the greater the relative impact of the force generation on the development of the force relation, and vice versa. The relation between the casualty ratio and the force generation ratio says absolutely nothing in itself.

Beyond that: Firstly, it does not neccessarily matter "who runs out first", if the war is brought to conclusion before the point at which the first side mathematically runs out of men. Secondly, it fails to take account of the fact that the Germans were facing several drains on their manpower while the USSR was facing only one, thus they cannot be compared directly and unqualifiedly to each other - German mobilisation and German mobilisation for the war in the East are two different things. Both of which, along with several other points raised so far, underlines the need to put that argument on a more adequate and complex footing AFAICS.

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They didn't, not because they could not, but because they did not think they would need to, so they didn't bother. Until it was too late. Men sitting out the war in rear echelons, or not drafted at all, or in the navy, until 1944, could have made a difference in Russia from late 1941 to mid- 1943, but they were not called upon to do so.

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Well, I agree it is well established that the German command did not approach the issue realistically in 1941-42, and continued to underestimate the need for a maximum mobilisation of resources in a timely fashion. I also agree that the difference in force development between the two sides in 1942 was crucial, perhaps even decisive. That failure of effort is a major explanatory factor in this is also clear. But it is not the only one. And most importantly, exactly what they COULD have achieved if a maximum will had been present and whether this would have been sufficient to win the war is not only a separate question to which a given answer cannot be extrapolated from the previous judgment, but which also requires an analysis that is significantly more complex conceptually speaking, that is much wider in range and which is supported by much more extensive data.

regards, K.A.

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Originally posted by JasonC:

K.A. - "nobody is claiming there is nothing at all in that"

In other words, it is the truth about the war in the east, the Germans lost it because they did not try. But you don't like it.

If you look at the previous thread on this subject 2 years ago, you will see it left a standing question, between claims the Germans were capable of winning a war of attrition based on loss figures, and the fact that they did not. There is no mystery, I have supplied the missing "minor". The rest is commentary.

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This simply isn't reasonable.

No offence Jason, but what you have supplied is the crude outlines of an argument that is in its present form conceptually simplistic, fails to take account of several relevant factors and is supported by inadequate data. There's nothing particularly wrong with that, there are not many discussion forum posts adressing general and complex issues about whom one could not say that. But that's all it is.

I recall the previous discussion quite well, having participated extensively in it. That discussion contained just one poster who claimed that the Germans would have won the war in the East attrition-wise given the casualty ratios had it not been for the impact of the Western Front, namely Darrin. The general opinion as far as I recall was rather that the casualty ratios did not enable the Germans to do anything of the sort as long as the Red Army was capable of overrunning Germany before they ran out of men. It did not as I recall contain any generally agreed premise that the Germans ought to have been able to win a war of attrition in the East.

Finally, you strike me as the sort of person who ought to be able to grasp the distinction between making a point that contains a grain of truth and "THE truth".

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Originally posted by Imperious Leader:
With respect to the current topic at hand, aren't you lumping these "replacements" for losses during the initial campaign for the Germans in 1941 with both the actual NEW divisions that were created vs. the levels of new recruits that were invaribly assigned to specific divisions ?

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I can only speak for myself, but I believe I have referred to both - you are of course right that this is an important distinction. "Replacements" refers to replacements (including returning wounded) throughout, "reinforcements" refer to arriving units and "force generation/addition etc" should refer to both replacements and arriving units. Norte that arriving units are by no means neccessarily newly raised units. Especially in the German case in this period, it is usually rather a question of divisions transferred to the East from other fronts (or to other fronts from the East). It is possible to find German figures for replacements, but the manpower impact of unit movements can I think usually only be estimated (provided, of course, that you have a full overview of those movements).

I have never seen any corresponding systematic Soviet data specifiaclly for individual replacements, though doubtless they exist - they are sometimes at hand for more limited time periods or sections of the front. Soviet force generation have simply been extrapolated from the development in Fronts strength seen in conjunction with losses over the same period, at best a crude if also probably roughly accurate measure.

regards, K.A.

One can argue about the tempo of Soviet military operations in specific months, and on specific fronts, etc, but numerous operational results support his thesis that Germany could have defeated the Soviet Union in a continuous front, long-lasting campaign (Jason describes as attrition).

So far the focus has been on personnel numbers – losses, replacements, as well as weapons production. I would like to emphasize and elaborate on Jason’s very accurate assessment that Germany “did not even try” to win a war of attrition.

Take two very different campaign results -- Stalingrad vs. Sycheva (Operation Mars). In both the Soviet combat power was about the same, perhaps slightly higher in Mars, but the German deployment & conduct showed vividly how to win an “attrition” campaign on the one hand, and how to deploy so badly you simply have to lose severely on the other hand.

Bagration is probably an equally incredulous example of how not to deploy, especially when facing a substantially more numerous opponent. Twenty-Five miles of front per under strength Inf Div, without armored reserves of any significance.

I will contend that even more devastating to the German conduct of the war was Hitler forcing advances to lengthen the front in 1942 (recall Halder wanted a defensive 1942 strategy to rebuild & strengthen), and Hitler forbidding local withdrawals to shorten the front to improve defensive posture (in all but a very few instances) – than was their very poor maintenance of combat personnel numbers and lackluster weapons production until 1943. Recall Manstein’s proposal for a defense in Summer of 1943, so when the Soviets struck at Kursk, he would counterblow them against the Sea of Azov.

A mobile defense, trading ground to prevent being hammered by massive Soviet artillery preparations, and having adequate armored reserves (a function of avoiding wastage such as occurred at Kursk, and a function of defensible frontages) was very achievable.

The other key to German success, as it was throughout the war, was Air Superiority. When they had it in 1941, not only did they have periodic close air support, but the more substantial benefit of continuous and quality Air Reconnaissance. This equates to Col. Dupuy’s numerical assessment of the value of SURPRISE.

Had the proper Strategy been adopted, the need for increased Aircraft Production & Air Crew Training would have been recognized as critical for successful Mobile Defense and Counterblow operations.

Throughout the 1941 campaign, German Aerial Reconnaissance kept their commands appraised of Soviet movements – locally as well as deep into reserve areas. German fighter superiority denied Soviet Aerial Reconnaissance anything like equivalent information flows (much like occurred in France in 1940).

How able would Soviet line-ups of hub-to-hub artillery been, given German Air Superiority?

A proper German STRATEGY – using Air Superiority to insure Surprise was in their column, and using Close Air Support to concentrate combat Power at critical junctions – and a Mobile Defense to counterpunch concept – these would have resulted in Operation Mars and Manstein’s Backhand Blow being the Rule and not the Exception.

Darrin’s posts of a couple of years back brought out the horrific losses suffered by the Soviets in their 1943 offensives. The answer is exceedingly simple – von Manstein did not wait for Hitler to authorize Battalion level deployments. He traded terrain for advantageous engagements, and the result was the huge disparity in loss ratios. Darrin, and now Jason, are showing the logic extension that doesn’t take Rocket Scientist brilliance to figure out that had the Germans conducted themselves like this all along, the Soviets simply could not have succeeded in their offensives – eventually running out of manpower

Argue all you want about this number and that number. When proper Strategy was employed, the combat results validate Jason’s contention that Germany could have defeated the Soviet Union in other than a quick blitzkrieg. The problem was solely and completely an incompetent German High Command, ie Hitler & Goering. It really is just that simple!

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Darrin’s posts of a couple of years back brought out the horrific losses suffered by the Soviets in their 1943 offensives. The answer is exceedingly simple – von Manstein did not wait for Hitler to authorize Battalion level deployments. He traded terrain for advantageous engagements, and the result was the huge disparity in loss ratios. Darrin, and now Jason, are showing the logic extension that doesn’t take Rocket Scientist brilliance to figure out that had the Germans conducted themselves like this all along, the Soviets simply could not have succeeded in their offensives – eventually running out of manpower

Argue all you want about this number and that number. When proper Strategy was employed, the combat results validate Jason’s contention that Germany could have defeated the Soviet Union in other than a quick blitzkrieg. The problem was solely and completely an incompetent German High Command, ie Hitler & Goering. It really is just that simple!

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Sorry to be the continual spoilsport, but your own paragraph above is a very vivid demonstration of how it really is not just that simple.

The losses in the summer of 1943 indicates pretty much the exact opposite of what you imply, something that underscores the need to base such an analysis on adequate data and on data seen over longer periods of time. The soviet losses in the 3rd quarter was (almost, except for 3rd quarter 1941) unprecedentedly high, this is true. However, this does not mean that this quarter was an attritional success for the Germans. Their losses were also unprecedentedly high, and the ratio of combat losses was not particularly favourable from the German point of view, when you compare it with earlier quarters - it was, for example, significantly less facourable than in any quarter of 1942, and roughly similar to the last three months of 43. Thus, the summer of 1943 was not any especially successful period for the Germans in terms of relative losses.

Also, they could far well less afford their losses than their opponent. While Soviet Fronts strength actually grew through most of this period (their average strength in the quarter is higher than atc the beginning of it, thanks to continual commitment of reserves and replacements on a great scale), the German strength dropped very markedly. In fact, I do not think there is any 3-month period of the war in the Eats in which the German strength drops more markedly than this quarter - in early July, German strength in the East was at the peak level of more than 3.1 million, on 1 October an Iststärke of 2,568,000 was recorded - levels so low they had not been seen since late 1941. In light of this one could well describe it as one of the most disastrous quarters of the war in the East, attrition-wise from the German point of view. If we are talking about attrition, then this was very much a back-breaking period for the Ostheer. This also illustrates that it is not just a question of the ratio at which losses are incurred, but also of their absolute size relative to the force addition available.

So, what do you think would have happened if "the Germans had conducted themselves in this way all along"? And do you still think it is "really just that simple"?

regards, K.A.

[This message has been edited by Kjetil Aasland (edited 06-24-2005).]

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
One can argue about the tempo of Soviet military operations in specific months, and on specific fronts, etc, but numerous operational results support his thesis that Germany could have defeated the Soviet Union in a continuous front, long-lasting campaign (Jason describes as attrition).

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I do not believe that two occasions (MARS and Manstein’s backhand-blow) warrant the use of the word ‘numerous’.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
Take two very different campaign results -- Stalingrad vs. Sycheva (Operation Mars). In both the Soviet combat power was about the same, perhaps slightly higher in Mars, but the German deployment & conduct showed vividly how to win an “attrition” campaign on the one hand, and how to deploy so badly you simply have to lose severely on the other hand.

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The situation was so fundamentally different, in terms of forces available, terrain, fortifications, and distances, as to make these operations almost incomparable, in my view.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
Bagration is probably an equally incredulous example of how not to deploy, especially when facing a substantially more numerous opponent. Twenty-Five miles of front per under strength Inf Div, without armored reserves of any significance.

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It was far less than 25 miles, 20 miles to be precise, and the infantry divisions were up to strength, as Dunn shows in ‘Soviet Blitzkrieg’. There just were not enough of them, and the distance of frontage meant that they could not bring their artillery to bear in support at every point of their frontline.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
I will contend that even more devastating to the German conduct of the war was Hitler forcing advances to lengthen the front in 1942 (recall Halder wanted a defensive 1942 strategy to rebuild & strengthen), and Hitler forbidding local withdrawals to shorten the front to improve defensive posture (in all but a very few instances) – than was their very poor maintenance of combat personnel numbers and lackluster weapons production until 1943. Recall Manstein’s proposal for a defense in Summer of 1943, so when the Soviets struck at Kursk, he would counterblow them against the Sea of Azov.

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Manstein was the one who originally made the proposal for the Kursk battle as the final stage of his Feb/March campaign. Other German generals pushed for, or fully accepted the battle. The idea that the generals did not want it and it was Hitler’s brainchild is Monday-morning quarterbacking by German generals justifying themselves after the war.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
A mobile defense, trading ground to prevent being hammered by massive Soviet artillery preparations, and having adequate armored reserves (a function of avoiding wastage such as occurred at Kursk, and a function of defensible frontages) was very achievable.

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How can you conduct a mobile defense if 80% or more of your force is fundamentally immobile? The German infantry divisions would never have been able to conduct a truly mobile defense, faced with all-terrain vehicle equipped Soviet breakthrough formations who could travel in one hour what they could travel in one day.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
The other key to German success, as it was throughout the war, was Air Superiority. When they had it in 1941, not only did they have periodic close air support, but the more substantial benefit of continuous and quality Air Reconnaissance. This equates to Col. Dupuy’s numerical assessment of the value of SURPRISE.

Had the proper Strategy been adopted, the need for increased Aircraft Production & Air Crew Training would have been recognized as critical for successful Mobile Defense and Counterblow operations.

Throughout the 1941 campaign, German Aerial Reconnaissance kept their commands appraised of Soviet movements – locally as well as deep into reserve areas. German fighter superiority denied Soviet Aerial Reconnaissance anything like equivalent information flows (much like occurred in France in 1940).

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True for 1941, but right out of cloud-cuckoo land for 1943/4. Fuel shortages and the need to at least try to defend the Reich from the bomber offensive made this impossible to achieve. Also, Soviet recce did not have to rely on aerial reconnaissance, since they could and did use partisans and deep ground recce as well.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
How able would Soviet line-ups of hub-to-hub artillery been, given German Air Superiority?

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Show me a picture of such a line-up from 1943/4. I only know those from 1945.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
A proper German STRATEGY – using Air Superiority to insure Surprise was in their column, and using Close Air Support to concentrate combat Power at critical junctions – and a Mobile Defense to counterpunch concept – these would have resulted in Operation Mars and Manstein’s Backhand Blow being the Rule and not the Exception.

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They could not deny the Soviets intelligence by air superiority – see above. Air superiority was not even achieved everywhere in 1941, there are numerous references to German columns being attacked (ineptly most of the time) by the RKKA. In 1943/4 – again see above.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
Darrin’s posts of a couple of years back brought out the horrific losses suffered by the Soviets in their 1943 offensives. The answer is exceedingly simple – von Manstein did not wait for Hitler to authorize Battalion level deployments. He traded terrain for advantageous engagements, and the result was the huge disparity in loss ratios. Darrin, and now Jason, are showing the logic extension that doesn’t take Rocket Scientist brilliance to figure out that had the Germans conducted themselves like this all along, the Soviets simply could not have succeeded in their offensives – eventually running out of manpower

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What Darrin always forgot to do was to look at a map, to check where those Soviet losses got them. Von Manstein did not ‘trade’ terrain. He lost it. Pure and simple. In losing it he did inflict severe casualties on the attacker, but lose it he did. The period following Kursk was unmitigated disaster for the Ostheer, on all sectors of the front except AG North. It was made slightly more palatable because of the losses inflicted on the Red Army, but to see this being seized now in an attempt to rewrite history and declare this part of the campaign in the east as the model of how the Wehrmacht could have defeated the Red Army defies reason, and in my view can only be based on an absence of an atlas at the home of the person making such a claim.

At the end of this period, the Red Army stood ready to advance to the old Romanian border, to break the supply connections between AG South and the centre east of the Carpathians, to liberate the Crimea and create a bomber threat to Ploesti, and it had removed the strategic threat overhanging the Smolensk land bridge by liberating Smolensk and Orel, had liberated Kiev and broken the Dnepr line.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
The problem was solely and completely an incompetent German High Command, ie Hitler & Goering. It really is just that simple!

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The losses in the summer of 1943 indicates pretty much the exact opposite of what you imply, something that underscores the need to base such an analysis on adequate data and on data seen over longer periods of time. The soviet losses in the 3rd quarter was (almost, except for 3rd quarter 1941) unprecedentedly high, this is true. However, this does not mean that this quarter was an attritional success for the Germans. Their losses were also unprecedentedly high, and the ratio of combat losses was not particularly favourable from the German point of view, when you compare it with earlier quarters - it was, for example, significantly less facourable than in any quarter of 1942, and roughly similar to the last three months of 43. Thus, the summer of 1943 was not any especially successful period for the Germans in terms of relative losses.
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Since the Movers still have my library somewhere in a Moving Van, I need to rely on my memory (usually a rather risky undertaking), but wasn't it Zaloga's Red Army Handbook that indicated the best German ratio of Amored losses, other than in 1941, was in 1943? Consider also that the 1943 Soviet Armor was primarily T-34s in contrast to the antiquated majority in 1941.

We can fully disagree on the level of German losses vs. Soviet losses AUG onwards in 1943. I doubt continued number flinging, always open to interpretation & qualification, will change our fundamental disagreement on this point.

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

Also, they could far well less afford their losses than their opponent. While Soviet Fronts strength actually grew through most of this period (their average strength in the quarter is higher than atc the beginning of it, thanks to continual commitment of reserves and replacements on a great scale), the German strength dropped very markedly. In fact, I do not think there is any 3-month period of the war in the Eats in which the German strength drops more markedly than this quarter - in early July, German strength in the East was at the peak level of more than 3.1 million, on 1 October an Iststärke of 2,568,000 was recorded - levels so low they had not been seen since late 1941. In light of this one could well describe it as one of the most disastrous quarters of the war in the East, attrition-wise from the German point of view. If we are talking about attrition, then this was very much a back-breaking period for the Ostheer. This also illustrates that it is not just a question of the ratio at which losses are incurred, but also of their absolute size relative to the force addition available.
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I think you are lumping the wastage at Kursk, and the subsequent withdrawal of units to Sicily & Italy into your overall strength numbers.

Stalingrad & Bagration were the disasters that "sealed the deal" on the Eastern Front. Hundreds of thousands of Germans lost without being able to inflict their normal kill ratio on the Soviets.

Again, we simply must acknowledge an un-bridgeable difference of opinion in the loss ratios and their impact in the last 1/2 of 1943

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

So, what do you think would have happened if "the Germans had conducted themselves in this way all along"? And do you still think it is "really just that simple"?
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What do YOU think would have happened if Manstein type defenses had been employed, with a condensed frontage, & non-wasted armored reserves --> INSTEAD of the Stalingrad & Bagration deployment disasters?

The "theme" of my original post, that seems to have been lost/ignored much as was Jason's theme, is that the Germans had the clear operational CAPABILITY to thrash the Soviets HAD they employed the strategy to do so.

This German capability was demonstrated on the few occasions that their leadership did not set them up for defeat

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Originally posted by Andreas:

I do not believe that two occasions (MARS and Manstein’s backhand-blow) warrant the use of the word ‘numerous’.

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The objective of the original post was to establish a CAPABILITY -- demonstrated by several historical examples of what occured when a proper strategy was followed -- NOT to review every battle on the Eastern Front.

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Originally posted by Andreas:

The situation [ Mars vs. Stalingrad ] was so fundamentally different, in terms of forces available, terrain, fortifications, and distances, as to make these operations almost incomparable, in my view.

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Of course it was different -- that was the entire point! Why is it so difficult to extrapolate what I posted to mean something like the following?

Had Geman Strategy in 1942 not gone off on the ludicrous expansion of the front to the Volga & Caucasus Mts, but instead formed fortified fronts with abundant Armored Reserves, and waited for the Soviet Offensives -- for the oportunity to apply counter-blows. MARS like results would be very probable.

It was sheer lunacy to conduct the 1942 Summer offensive as was done. The defense by Army Group Center shows what could have & should have been done in 1942 in the South.

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Originally posted by Andreas:

It was far less than 25 miles, 20 miles to be precise, and the infantry divisions were up to strength, as Dunn shows in ‘Soviet Blitzkrieg’. There just were not enough of them, and the distance of frontage meant that they could not bring their artillery to bear in support at every point of their frontline.

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Well, my sources disagree with your sources on average Div frontages. Too bad.

Now, how do you figure an Infantry Division that has gone from 9 to 6 Inf Bns, has reduced Inf Platoons from almost 50 Personnel to the mid 30s, has reduced their artillery, and so on -- is full strength?

These were simply NOT the Inf Divs of 1941, and in no way could they cover even 10 miles of frontage adequately ( 1/3 forces in reserves, def in depth, etc ).

Now, are you going to say Army Group Center had large / significant Armored reserves that were simply defeated 1-on-1 by Soviet Armor? Kind of like the 5th Pz Div near Minsk, right? Lets hear that one!

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Originally posted by Andreas:

Manstein was the one who originally made the proposal for the Kursk battle as the final stage of his Feb/March campaign. Other German generals pushed for, or fully accepted the battle. The idea that the generals did not want it and it was Hitler’s brainchild is Monday-morning quarterbacking by German generals justifying themselves after the war

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Your understanding of history is way off! Manstein wanted to continue his Backhand blow in March, but the weather intervened. He agreed to the Kursk offensive up to an early May start, after which he proposed cancellation. He put forthe the very different and superior strategy of awaiting a Soviet Attack then counter-attacking (smash Soviet spearheads against the Sea of Azov) in the same type of mobile warfare so successfully completed. Ain't no "Monday morning quaterbacking" whatsoever.

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Originally posted by Andreas:

How can you conduct a mobile defense if 80% or more of your force is fundamentally immobile? The German infantry divisions would never have been able to conduct a truly mobile defense, faced with all-terrain vehicle equipped Soviet breakthrough formations who could travel in one hour what they could travel in one day.

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Mobile means movement, not necessary at 30 MPH! What was the composition of attacking Soviet forces -- do you think they were fully mobile in their thousands of half-tracks?

The idea is NOT to be cut-off / surrounded unless prepared for same by an all-around defense with stockpiled supplies. Separate the attacking tanks from their infantry -- allow the tanks to proceed into ATG belts in depth -- if the infantry can be repulsed. If not, withdraw to the flank to prevent encirclement. Use Armored Reserves to plow into the Soviet spearheads, while your infantry hold the "shoulders" of the penetration. This simply isn't that novel.

Attrition savvy strategy would prevent your forces from being encircled -- so they can exact a very unequal kill ratio. If terrain must be given up to do so, so be it. TERRAIN CAN ALWAYS BE RETAKEN. QUALITY SOLDIERS CANNOT BE EASILY REPLACED!!

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Originally posted by Andreas:

They could not deny the Soviets intelligence by air superiority – see above. Air superiority was not even achieved everywhere in 1941 ...

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Was my original post that hard to understand? I specified Air Superiority as critical to a successful mobile defense in the German situation. Did I EVER state they had it after 1941? Did I?

The point, which requires more simplistic explanations I guess, is that HAD the National Leadership realized the need for Air Superiority on call for specific sectors of the Eastern front, they COULD Have & WOULD Have ordered expansion of the Luftwaffe to enable same, and they would have prioritized the Luftwaffe's deployment to insure same. What good did the limited Air Forces do against 5000 Allied aircraft in Sicily?

CAPABILITY does not equate to ACTUALITY! Just because they did not, does not mean they could not have!

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Originally posted by Andreas:\

but to see this being seized now in an attempt to rewrite history and declare this part of the campaign in the east as the model of how the Wehrmacht could have defeated the Red Army defies reason, and in my view can only be based on an absence of an atlas at the home of the person making such a claim.
At the end of this period, the Red Army stood ready to advance to ...

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Rewrite History? Do I need to review capability yet again? Manstein's defense demonstrates several key points regarding CAPABILITY --> there is no need for huge encirclements of German forces to occur, and the Soviets can be made to pay for terrain gained with horrific losses.

The "Hitler" view of terrain capture being so important is just simply a violation of a most basic Military Principle -- the objective is to destroy the opponents army, not simply capture terrain.

Manstein would have been cusscessful in his defense had the points specified in my original post been in effect -- no wastage of the Armored units as occured at Kursk, better deployment to reduce div frontages, and local Air Superiority as needed. Loss of units to Sicily would probably have insured "defeat" in the sense of terrain, but not in attrition.

By the way, if the Red Army was "ready to ..." why didn't it? Because it has been bludgeoned into stopping, until whole new armies could be brought up, supplies stockpiled, etc. The Soviets did conduct moderate level offensives in the winter of 43-44, that is true, but nothing like the tempo of the Fall of 43.

As Jason tried on several occasions to explain, clear to me at least, just because the Wehrmacht failed to win in the Eastern Front, does not mean it could not have done so -- given just a reasonably intelligent national leadership that adopted an attrition strategy (in ALL its components)

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
I think you are lumping the wastage at Kursk, and the subsequent withdrawal of units to Sicily & Italy into your overall strength numbers.

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I am afraid not. Far more important than the withdrawal of units to Sicily were the Soviet offensives on the Mius and in the Orel salient, followed by the campaign to liberate Ukraine.

The withdrawal of forces to Italy was irrelevant. Quite apart from the fact that Italy sent more divisions to the east than it received from there in the period August to October 1943 (sent east 76.ID, 26., 24.PD, 2.FJD; received from east 5.Geb.D), and that those sent east were of higher quality.

The Germans dissolved 41 divisions between July 43 and May 44, compared to 32 lost at Stalingrad and in North Africa together. Of the 42, 27 were kept as Divisionsgruppen (regimental size), 6 were completely dissolved, and 8 LW-Felddivisionen were used to bring other formations up to strength. A net loss of 32 divisions. 24 of the dissolved divisions were with AGs South Ukraine/A and South/North Ukraine. 18 divisions were dissolved by October, and the remaining 23 during the winter, indicating that the mobility and winter readyness state of German divisions simply did not allow a moving battle such as envisaged by those who believe that backhand blows could have rescued the Wehrmacht in the east.

The Ostheer lost (KIA/MIA/evacuated sick/wounded) ca. 490,000 men (net) by the end of October, another ca.285,000 net by the end of March, and then gained a wooping ca. 17,000 net by the end of May. This does not include the movement of formations to or from the front.

The Iststaerke of the Ostheer dropped from 3,138,000 on 1st July 43 to 2,579,000 by 1st November 1943. This despite receiving more formations from other areas than it lost to other areas.

Source for all this is Mueller-Hillebrand.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
Hundreds of thousands of Germans lost without being able to inflict their normal kill ratio on the Soviets.

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What was the 'normal' kill ratio? I think you are confusing 'normal' and 'ideal'.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
Again, we simply must acknowledge an un-bridgeable difference of opinion in the loss ratios and their impact in the last 1/2 of 1943.

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I have no trouble acknowledging the difference in the loss ratio, but I have serious trouble acknowledging nonsense such as that this was indicative of some form of success other than on the tactical level. Operationally and strategically the Wehrmacht was outfought from the end of Zitadelle, and it never regained any superiority on these levels.

The Red Army was losing men faster than the Germans in the year following Zitadelle. But it did so while gaining 200 - 1000km on the Germans across the whole of front, and left them ripe for the next blow.

Edited because I posted before my first coffee.

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
By the way, if the Red Army was "ready to ..." why didn't it? Because it has been bludgeoned into stopping, until whole new armies could be brought up, supplies stockpiled, etc. The Soviets did conduct moderate level offensives in the winter of 43-44, that is true, but nothing like the tempo of the Fall of 43.

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Would this be a good point to remind you of the old adage that 'Amateurs study tactics, while professionals study logistics'? Of course they needed to regroup. That is normal. Of course they were smarting from the losses they suffered - but that does not mean they were beginning to lose the war and that at this point it could have been turned around, or that this was destined to go on once they had started to bring up their logistical tail.

Also, your statement that the Red Army conducted moderate level offensives in winter 1943 is totally wrong. The Red Army conducted successive and simultaneous front-level operations throughout the winter until the end of April, and limited operations in May. There was no pause.

Leningrad, Crimea, Cherkassy, Kamenets-Podolsk, Crimea and right-bank Ukraine are the battles which I think you ought to look up.

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Since the Movers still have my library somewhere in a Moving Van, I need to rely on my memory (usually a rather risky undertaking), but wasn't it Zaloga's Red Army Handbook that indicated the best German ratio of Amored losses, other than in 1941, was in 1943? Consider also that the 1943 Soviet Armor was primarily T-34s in contrast to the antiquated majority in 1941.

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Armor losses is a different cup of tea from personnell, of course. Soviet losses here were certainly very high in 1943. But how does this change the matter? Do you have data suggesting a declining Soviet adavantge in this area over time?

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We can fully disagree on the level of German losses vs. Soviet losses AUG onwards in 1943. I doubt continued number flinging, always open to interpretation & qualification, will change our fundamental disagreement on this point.

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There is not really anything to disagree on - the losses of both sides in the summer of 1943 are well established and clear. Nor do I think we disagree on what they were. The point is what those losses led to, and whether they were particularly favorable for the Germans compared to other periods. Again, here it is well documented that the result of this quarters fighting was a very clear drop in German strength in the East, somthing that is confirmed by every document I have seen providing strengths for this period. It is also very clear that the ratio of combat losses were less favorable than any quarter of 1941 or 1942, and within the context of the whole war in the East, fairly averagely good from the German point of view. So, again, not to put too fine a point on it, this is not a question of disagreement, but of an interpretation that is far too bluntly contradicted by the relevant data to be viable.

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I think you are lumping the wastage at Kursk, and the subsequent withdrawal of units to Sicily & Italy into your overall strength numbers.

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"Wastage at Kursk"? I am talking about the overall German combat losses in the East July-September 1943. These amounted to some 530,000. If for some reason you prefer to isolate out the Kursk losses, these represented about 56,000 of these. Transfer of forces are naturally not included in losses. For strength, I am using the Iststärke figures of the Ostheer, which naturally do reflect units transferred to and from the East, among other things. But the grand total of unit withdrawals to Italy or Sicily in this period is 1.-SS-PzD. Since 113. and 162. ID arrived in the East from other fronts during the same period, the net balance of unit movements is positive for the East, to the extent there is any impact at all. If we stretch the time perspective a little longer, it becomes VERY positive, as numerous divisions arrived from other fronts during the last three months of the year, while only two divisions appear to have been withdrawn from the East during the same period.

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Stalingrad & Bagration were the disasters that "sealed the deal" on the Eastern Front. Hundreds of thousands of Germans lost without being able to inflict their normal kill ratio on the Soviets.

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The casualty ratios were uncommonly unfavorable for the Germans in these periods (ie, 1st quarter of 43 and the 3rd quarter of 44), yes. But how does this make the summer of 1943 especially favorable?

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Again, we simply must acknowledge an un-bridgeable difference of opinion in the loss ratios and their impact in the last 1/2 of 1943

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J, there is no difference in opinion involved here. You simply have no data to support your contention, and the relevant data all bluntly contradict it. That German strength dropped very markedly as a result of this period's fighting is, quite simply, a fact.

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What do YOU think would have happened if Manstein type defenses had been employed, with a condensed frontage, & non-wasted armored reserves --> INSTEAD of the Stalingrad & Bagration deployment disasters?

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Who knows? But the Germans did not fight according to such methods in the summer of 1943. And the results they achieved were not favorable for them by any reasonable definition.

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The "theme" of my original post, that seems to have been lost/ignored much as was Jason's theme, is that the Germans had the clear operational CAPABILITY to thrash the Soviets HAD they employed the strategy to do so.

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I know, but that theme remains hanging in the air as long as the argument is based on several fundamental misunderstandings. See also below.

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This German capability was demonstrated on the few occasions that their leadership did not set them up for defeat

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Was it? It most certainly was not demonstrated in the summer of 1943, which was a period of operational defeat and a grave attritional setback for them. When else? Kharkov in March, when the prevailing conditions were fundamentally different from what was in place a few months later? Personally, I do not think the Germans had any real opportunity for operational success, defensive or offensive, as long as the prevailing force relations were in place and given the absence of catastrophic blunders by the Stavka. But this of course, unlike the fundamental outlook of the losses and their impact on the strength, is something that one can disagree on.

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Because Germany's national leadership failed to employ their forces with any level of even average competence, does not mean defeat was inevitable or preordained.

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I agree. But nor does it mean that in the absence of such incompetence, their victory would have been assured, or for that matter, neccessarily that it would have been feasible.

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Manstein would have been cusscessful in his defense had the points specified in my original post been in effect -- no wastage of the Armored units as occured at Kursk, better deployment to reduce div frontages, and local Air Superiority as needed. Loss of units to Sicily would probably have insured "defeat" in the sense of terrain, but not in attrition.

By the way, if the Red Army was "ready to ..." why didn't it? Because it has been bludgeoned into stopping, until whole new armies could be brought up, supplies stockpiled, etc. The Soviets did conduct moderate level offensives in the winter of 43-44, that is true, but nothing like the tempo of the Fall of 43.

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I am sorry, but this is again so much freewheeling with little or no connect to realities, and demonstrates how utterly futile it is to launch into wide-ranging speculation involving factors that one has only the most tentative grip on.

For instance, the importance you attach to the "loss of units to Sicily". Not a single German division were transferred from the Eastern Front to Sicily. A grand total of three German divisions left the Eastern Front during the whole second half of 1943. One of them - 1.SS-PzD - returned within 3 months. Another was the 162. (Turkoman) division, which had only recently arrived and didn't prove much use to anyone anywhere. This leaves us with the 5.Geb.D. when it comes to the supposed force drain away from the East. By contrast, 13 German divisions arrived in the East between 1 October and 31 December (in addition to the two who arrived between 1 July and 31 September). More than half of these were Panzer or Panzer Grenadier divisions, and most came from Italy.

As for the Red Army being "bludgeoned into stopping", I suggest you simply have a look at the "moderate" operations it carried out during the period, preferably in the company of a good map, and then follow it up by a quick peak at the actual Soviet strength figures and losses at the time. The Soviet Fronts averaged roughly 6.8 million in monthly strength July-September, and roughly 6.3 million in the following six month period. Reduced strength, certainly, but not exactly "bludgeoned into stopping". Especially considering that they demonstrably did not stop - see overview in previous post, and please explain to me what is "moderate" about these advances while you're at it. By comparison, the Ostheer started the summer campaign with almost 3.2 million men, were down to a monthly average of less than 2.6 million during the last three months of the year and little more than 2.4 million during the first quarter of 1944. Tempted as I am to put this in capital letters since it does not seem to go through: The Red Army fought the Ostheer on BETTER terms in late 43 and early 44 than it did furing the summer of 1943 - it had a more favorable force relation. So why on earth should it be "bludgeoned into stopping", or into slowing down? As for the losses, these remained pretty consistently high through the whole period July 43 - 1 April 44. German combat losses amounted to roughly 530,000 in 3q 43, a little less than 400,000 in 4q 43 and little more than 400,000 in 1q 44. The Soviet combat losses were 2.6 million, 1.9 million and 1.9 million respectively. The realities simply do not fit the conception of the red army burning the candle in both ends through the summer of 1943, and then being forced to pause to regain its strength. There was no pause. There was no great relention in the pressure. And in relative terms, the Ostheer was the bludgeoned side by 1 October, being in a worse position to counter their opponent than they had been three months earlier.

If I may sum up a little here, your argument goes something like this (and please correct me if I am wrong): When the Germans fought according to sound operational principles, as in the summer of 1943, they achieved such favorable casualty ratios that they would have been unsustainable for the Red Army. However, when they did not, they suffered losses at a much less favorable ratio, and thus denied themselves the opportunity for an attritional victory that was attainable.

The problems with this are the following.
1) It is difficult to demonstrate that the Germans did in fact fight in the manner which you describe during the summer of 1943. Rather, their approach appears to have been one of stubborn defense of ground with inadequate forces, essentially along the same lines that characterised their defensive operations for the remainder of the war.
2) The casualty ratio they did achieve does not stand out as especially good, compared to other periods. Rather, it is fairly typical for the period.
3) The result of the quarter’s fighting was not just a clear drop in German strength, but also a less favorable force relation. Another quarter with a similar drop in strength would have brought the Ostheer down to late 44 levels, and one more would have rendered it even weaker than it was at virtually any point in 1945. Of course, the Red Army could not have sustained its force levels either in the face of such enormous casualties over such a long time, but the point here is that it was better able to do so than the Wehrmacht was, even in a situation where they were incurring roughly five times as many casualties as the Germans were.
4) Hence, in what sense can this period be used as an example of something that might have won the Germans the war?
5) Your implied essential contrast between the summer of 1943 and other periods, in terms of the ratio of losses, their impact on force levels and the methods employed, is fundamentally illusory.

regards, K.A.

[This message has been edited by Kjetil Aasland (edited 07-05-2005).]

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The Red Army was losing men faster than the Germans in the year following Zitadelle. But it did so while gaining 200 - 1000km on the Germans across the whole of front, and left them ripe for the next blow.

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And even more importantly - unlike the Ostheer, it was on the whole capable of replacing them.

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Edited because I posted before my first coffee.

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Always a bad mistake I find.

regards, K.A.

Thanks for the post. I fully agree with you.

I also see a pattern here. Some common fallacies, exhibited by Darrin and now J Gilbert, in no particular order:

- Loss ratios are somehow of value without regard to the underlying fundamentals from which they are derived
- Manstein's Kharkov counter-stroke was something the Wehrmacht could have done anywhere and anytime
- Buy into the 'Verlorene Siege' school of history, where Kursk was lost because of the invasion of Sicily.
- Soviet tank losses spelt doom for the Red Army, while not understanding how the Soviet replacement/reinforcement system worked, or indeed checking that the absolute number (as opposed to the location) of Soviet tanks available was not materially affected by them
- The loss of Ukraine did not matter/was an example of trading terrain/has never been heard about
- Ignorance of fundamental data, such as frontages, force strengths, etc.
- Creation of fantasy scenarios that have no bearing on reality, and are not even credible what-ifs (where somehow the allied bomber offensive does not matter, availability of fuel for all those planes is magically assured, or whole strategic offensives are dreamt away - I have one as well, of the same kind: if Stalin had not purged his officer corps, and had not abolished the Mech Corps, and had not interfered continually in operations, and had not trusted Hitler until 22 June 1941, and had built up a defense in depth along the border in prepared positions reaching as far as the Dnepr and the Leningrad approaches, the Soviets would never have lost the border battles, and Germany would have lost Barbarossa there and then).

I am quite sure the list is not exhaustive.

Regarding the challenge to my data on frontages - my numbers are from the most detailed study on the subject I know, Niepold's 'Mittlere Ostfront 1944', and from memory the average is something like 32km, or 20 miles. I may have made a mistake in memory, but I do not think so. The study is based on German KTBs. What are your sources J?

As for the point that German infantry divisions were understrength - they were not. End of story. They were no longer organised like the 1941 divisions, but within the new tables of organisation they were pretty full up. It is clear that it would have been better if they had been full up on the old tables, but that is a different issue entirely, and can not be described with the word 'understrength'. That is leading into a discussion of comparative capability, and the issue is not as clear-cut. The problem was not a lack of strength within the divisions, but a lack of divisions. If you can not comprehend that these are two fundamentally different problems, I am not sure how to make it simpler.

In general you are firmly in the realm of fact-free opinionating, in my view. Your claim for 'wastage of armoured units at Kursk' is the best proof for this judgement. There was no wastage of armoured units at Kursk. 248 tanks and Stugs were lost until the mid of July on the WHOLE eastern front, less than 8% of the number present at Zitadelle, and well within the capability for replacement. The tanks and Stugs were lost after Kursk, when an additional 1083 were lost, equalling the capability for replacement. As a result the total number of tanks in the German arsenal stayed flat during the summer(frontline strength was much worse). That is during the period which you believe proves that the German army could have won the war by using an attritional strategy, if it had continued in the same way. Data from Toeppel's dissertation 'Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943'.

Wishing things to be does not make them so. Better bring some data to support your opinions if you expect them to be taken seriously.

In AG Centre before Bagration, divisional sectors were up to 32km in 4. Armee sector (3 divisions, a further 6 divisions had 22-27 km, and one had 17km), defended by 6-9 battalions. In 9. Armee, Korps sectors were 123km (5 divisions - average 24.6km), 69km (3 divisions, avg. 33km) and 114km (2 divisions! - avg. 57km), for an average of 30.8km.

For IX.AK, the battalion frontages were:

252.ID - 30.1km
I./461 - 7km (46 men/km)
III.461 - 5.3km (57 men/km)
III./7 - 8.3km (48 men/km)
FuesBtl 252 ID - 6.0 (59 men/km)
I.7 - 3.5 (80 men/km)

Korps-Abt. D 30.8km

IR171
I./171 - 3.4 (80 men/km)
FuesBtl 56 - 6.0 (59 men/km)

DivGrp 262
RgtGrp 462 - 5.4 (67 men/km)
Rgtgrp 482 - 6.3 (56 men/km)

IR234
III./234 - 4.7 (79 men/km)
II./234 - 5.3 (74 men/km)

These strengths probably exclude battalion supply echelon and refer to what the Germans called 'Gefechtsstaerke'.

There are NO average 25 mile divisional sectors here, and the only two real outliers were presumably covering sectors where force density was multiplied by terrain.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Incidentally: I have seen at least one document which gives a Fehlstellen of somewhat less than 200,000 in the Ostheer as of 1 June 1944. That would indicate a Fehl of, say, more than 25,000 and less than 100,000 men in HG Mitte one would think? Not too bad considering the strength of the HG.

regards, K.A.

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Hi Kjetil

Thanks for that.

Then you have to consider that in the intervening three weeks before the start of Bagration, further reinforcements were received, and combat activity was low. I dimly seem to recall (but will check tonight) that e.g. Korpsabteilung C in AG North Ukraine was actually overstrength in June.

All the best

Andreas

Please use the "quote" function when quoting material from another poster. It helps facilitate reading of your post and is a courtesy to other readers trying to follow the argument.

If you are unsure how to do so, it is quite simple. To start a quote type open bracket, i.e., [, then the word "quote", then a closed bracket, i.e., ]. To end the quote, type bracket, then a backslash, i.e., /, then the word "quote". The same codes may be used to put a bold or italics in your text, by typing those words between brackets and then ending with the word preceeded by a backslash in brackets.

Lange:
Korpsabteilung C (AG NU): -91 Off; -890 Hiwi; 0 OR

Dunn:
260. ID (AGC): overstrength
134. ID (AGC): overstrength

All of these divisions were also receiving weapon replacements and upgrades.

I checked again in Niepold, 20 miles was the average frontline. The two divisions of LV.AK covering 114km were in the Pripjet sector.

Quite facinating. Wow.

I have a lot of sources to try to obtain. Only have 2 Ziemkie, 2 Erickson, 2 Glantz works. And a bunch of other minor tomes.

It is not that simple at all. There was an ongoing debate between Hitler and the German Army on this point, begining with Fritsch and Beck back in 1938, and contining all throughout the war.

Hitler wanted a bigger army before Poland even happened of course. But the army sizes he demanded were flatly refused by Fritsch and Beck on the following grounds: doing so would have mandated reducing the training time of officers from 2 years to 6 months. It was the admanat opinion of the army that two yaeras was the absoluite minimum amount of time neccessary to train a good officer.

Fritsch told Hitler that he could not get the kind of army expansion he wanted before 1943.

Anything else would have resulted in a possibly irrepairable quality loss.

Throught the war, attempts to expand or even replace army strength was conditioned by the need to have fully trained officer cadres to lead such units.

When such things weren't done, such as with the Luftwaffe Field Divisions, with officers from Luftwaffe air anfd support units, not trained in the mode of warfare they were fighting, the rseklts were disaterous, and the units in question were never anything like up to army standard.

So, while the Germans could have built up their army more rapidly, doing so would have almots vertainly reduced it's quality.

And that would have had an important effect on the attrition exchange rations upon which the premise if built.

They could only tarina officers so fats, and to ensure the quality of that training time, they could only expand their training schools so quickly, since they had to train more onstructors (and even lengthier process to train more officers.

And this isn't limited to officers, though it has the greatest effect there. The Germans, to replace the losses they suffred in 1943-44, had to continually cut corners on training of ordinary soldiers. The army that manned the Wsetwall in late '44 and fought in the Ardenness was nothing like it's predeccesor in early '44, much less pervious years. Basic soldier skills continued to decline, as less time was devoted to training.

Also, as far as equipment, especially tanks: the Germans couldn't just build and drive more tanks by making less sewing machines, or what not.

As Rich has already noted, the whole proces of expanding a particular indutry is expensive and time consuming.

Again, in 1938, Hitler wanted to have a British style all Mechanized/Motorised army. And available data indicated to him that Germany could, if other areas were sacrificed, build enough trucks to do this.

But, were, Fritsch and Beck wanted to know, would Hitler get the fuel for such a force to move?

The Germans were constantly trying to increase their synthetic fuel production, and they succeeded admirably. But it is very questionable of they could have done so much faster than they did. Without adequate fuel, extra tanks in 1941 or 42 make no great difference.

The Germans limited the built up of mehcanized.motorised firces because they did not have access to the fuel. The amount of time and effort Hilter focused on trying to get to the Caususes (ie, the entire southern front, Stalingrad, and all that) should make that clear.

As should what happened to the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe had no desire to reduce pilot training. But fuel shortages meant that pilots logged fewer and few flight hours before being sent into combat. The aces of the glory days dwindled, as they found themselves having to babysit squadrons of newbies who just could't fly at the old standard.

The same problem is present with regard to building more aircrraft, as suggested in Gilbert's post. They only had so much fuel to go around.

Finally, their is the material part of it, literally. Consider tank armour steel: From 1940-42, a 55-80mm plate of armour had specification BHN (Brinnell Hardness Number) of 294-338. That is, the armour was expected to be that hard, when tested, to be acceptable for service.

However, to meet the increased production runs of 1943-44, the Germans had to drop their specifuications for that plate thickness to 266-311, a nearly 9% drop in hardness.

Or aircraft: to achive the 1944 fighter production levels, the Germans switched production away from the Fw-190, an aircfrft that was on par with the best Allied fighters, like the P-51, to to concentrate on the simpler, cheaper Bf/Me-109, a plane whcih, while good, was pretty well outmatched by aircraft like the P-51.

In short, had the Germans done as Jason advises, and built up their army as fast as thei population and indutry could manage, (ie, at 1943-44 levels), they would have had to sacrifice quality in everything, from tank armour to fighter models, right down to the critical area of troop quality.

And again, they would not have been able to drive all those new tanks, nor fly all those new aircraft, much less all the trucks those Panzer divisions needed, and thus would not have been able to train all those drivers and pilots, either.

It is for all those reasons, along with the other important socio-political realities concerning German public opinion, that the Germans did not expand their armed forces at such rates.

Thus, the contention that the Germans didn't fully mobilize their resources because they were overconfident is just wrong.