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Originally posted by Greg LG:
In Glantz' book, Soviet Military Operational Art, he gives a fairly comprehensive overview of TOE's for various Soviet military formations from division to army level, including average total numbers of personnel, guns, SUs and tanks for each formation. Is there something comparable for German forces on the Russian front? I'm interested in operational-strategic level forces, not so much tactical, so formations no lower than division, but certainly corps, army and army group. The key is for average strength levels in personnel and equipment on an annual basis. For example, what would be the average strength, in personnel and equipment, for a German infantry army in 1942 as opposed to 1944? Any assistance would be appreciated.

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I'm not sure what you are looking for? Manpower and equipment strengths at different times for the theater or manpower and equipment strengths for "typical" divisions? Or soemthing else entirely?

For example, in the Red Army there was the basic rifle army. In a year by year basis the force structure for a rifle army was:

1941
5-6 rifle divisions or rifle brigades
1-2 cavalry divisions
1-2 separate tank brigades or battalions
artillery regiments
guards mortar battalions
1 sapper battalion
strength:
70,000 men
20-90 tanks
30-450 guns/mortars
8-19 multiple rocket launchers

1942
6-10 rifle divisions or rifle brigades
2-4 tank brigades, regiments or battalions
1 antiaircraft regiment
artillery regiments
1 guards mortar battalion
1 sapper battalion
1-2 tank corps (optional attachment)
strength:
80,000-100,000 men
250-450 tanks
1,000-2,500 guns/mortars
24-426 MRLs

And, so on and so forth, for 1943, 1944 and 1945. Then the same for rifle corps, cavalry corps, tank and mech corps, cavalry-mech groups, and tank armies. Also, fronts.

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Originally posted by JM Serrano:
...Otherwise I think Tessin's works would be what you need.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
And, so on and so forth, for 1943, 1944 and 1945. Then the same for rifle corps, cavalry corps, tank and mech corps, cavalry-mech groups, and tank armies. Also, fronts.

This is for the Red Army. What would the German Army look like using this format for all major forms of divisions, corps, army and army group formations? If it's too difficult to determine average strengths, than what would be TOE strengths, and what would be average % of TOE strength for major formations or their subunits?

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Unfortunately there was no such thing as a "type" or even "typical" army or corps similar to that of the Soviets. Except for corps and army services the variations were endless and were complicated by the German habit of forming Korps and Armee Abteilungen at the drop of a hat. So I am not really sure how you could address such a thing for the Germans - or the Western Allies for that matter? The schematic would be filled with exceptions and conditional phrases. Probably the only thing you could do would be a hierarchical schematic with comments. Sorry.

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Originally posted by Rich:
Unfortunately there was no such thing as a "type" or even "typical" army or corps similar to that of the Soviets...

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Dang. I was afraid of that. The result of two different foci of military art, of course. One more concerned with the tactical level and the other, the operational level. Oh well, that means I'll have to go over actual Axis OOBs. Lovely

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Dang. I was afraid of that. The result of two different foci of military art, of course. One more concerned with the tactical level and the other, the operational level. Oh well, that means I'll have to go over actual Axis OOBs. Lovely

Many thanks to you both for enlightening me

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Uh, I am not sure how the Soviet organizational hierarchy facilitated either tactical or operational level excellence and I suspect that the reverse is rather true. In other words, the rigidity of the Soviet Corps and Army-level organization may have had an effect more similar to that of their ground controlled air intercept system where the organizational rigidity and inflexable command hierarchy tended to stifle initiative.

OTOH, the chaotic mess of fragmentary corps, divisions and brigades supplemented with a multitude of regimental-level combat support prganizations that was the legacy of Barbarossa and which continued more or less into 1943 was probably worse within the overall Soviet system of command. So in that respect I would say that they did have a fairly steady improvement from the chaotic days of 1941 through 1945. And in any case it is doubtful if the more flexible system used by the Germans and Western Allies would have worked at all for the Soviets.

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Originally posted by Rich:
Uh, I am not sure how the Soviet organizational hierarchy facilitated either tactical or operational level excellence and I suspect that the reverse is rather true. In other words, the rigidity of the Soviet Corps and Army-level organization may have had an effect more similar to that of their ground controlled air intercept system where the organizational rigidity and inflexable command hierarchy tended to stifle initiative.

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OTOH, the chaotic mess of fragmentary corps, divisions and brigades supplemented with a multitude of regimental-level combat support prganizations that was the legacy of Barbarossa and which continued more or less into 1943 was probably worse within the overall Soviet system of command. So in that respect I would say that they did have a fairly steady improvement from the chaotic days of 1941 through 1945. And in any case it is doubtful if the more flexible system used by the Germans and Western Allies would have worked at all for the Soviets.

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First, the method of creating surprise differed significantly between the Germans and Soviets. Surprise itself, is generally the result of force displacement such that the surprised side can do nothing to effectively respond. It doesn't matter so much that it's undetected, so long as it cannot be responded to. In fact, it's probably better to let the enemy know they're about to be hit at 10:1 odds right beforehand just to spread the fear of god a little.

The Germans believed in creating surprise primarily through mobility and C&C. Basically, the principle of initiative and flexibility that has been sought after in the west. As long as you could move faster than your opponent, think faster, surprise would be in steady supply. This does require that one is willing to fight for ones intelligence, since there is little time to waste on more extensive methods of collection. So, for the Germans time was precious, since they weren't necessarily trying to mask anything, but attempting to get inside the decision loop of their enemy.

The Soviet created surprise through deception. This required many different skills, such as the ability to move at night quickly and quietly, the use of camouflage, the use of dummy constructions on a huge scale, false demonstrations both physically and through signal, and even psychology. By the use of deception time was not as crucial, so long as the scope and actual time and locations of the main attack sectors were undetermined. Thus, the Soviets could afford to be a little more deliberate.

Back to the reduced importance of flexibility and initiative. The key to understanding this is to see a post-1943 Soviet offensive operation as a form of commando or special ops operations, at least from the planning phase. Yeah, I know, the bile is starting to rise, but bear with me. While Red Army formations are secretly regrouping into the main attack sectors, an extensive intelligence/reconnaissance operation is underway to determine around an overall 60% of the dispositions of the main German defensive belt, the succeeding belts and on into the operational reserves. This intelligence operation is highly centralized yet allows for a lot of data collection flow both up, down and laterally through the chain of intelligence command. The results of the intelligence operation determines the fire plan for artillery, the obstacles to be removed beforehand by engineers, the AO of air support and its initial targets, and last but not least, the disposition of German positions, guns, mortars and tanks within the tactical, and to a lesser degree, operational depths. Planning is crucial. It is centralized and top-down. The end result would be tactical missions with high degrees of success. For example, a company commander assigned to take out a pillbox in the first trenchline would be given a map overlay, showing the objective, positions of German trenches, MG nests, mines, wire, and anything else that might be relevant to the mission. The same would go for any supporting artillery. Thus, at least initially the Soviets did not usually fight for their intelligence, they knew it beforehand. Sort of like playing a wargame where you see all the enemy units to begin with. Incidently, what became more important for Soviet units was cooperation, since they tended to know what they were up against from the beginning.

While it might be true the ger used less op dec in thier att then did the rus it was not less deception in total nor even none. The ger certainly suprised the sov in 41 as too if they would att and where they would att. Half of the rus forces were deployed in the south but 2/3 of the ge forces were deployed in the north. A similar thing happened in 42 the rus kept thinking the att was happening in the north long after the att in the south happened.

Also the ger certainly achived op suprise in late 44 by att the allies in the ard.

Your sov dec points are interesting but dec does not always work nor does it work forever. It is certainly not time insensitive either.

Also if the rus had some great deception process that was supposed to be better than the ger methods. Then why did rus in 1943 suffer over 4 times as many tanks des and personal cas as the gers. Despite having significant rus advantages in numbers in the field.

The ger even in 43 had ways of getting info just like you described. In fact the rus pows generally provided lots of info about specific rus pos and attacks of which the ger thought 80+% turned out correct.

In 1944 the rus had much more control of the skies. Allowing for them to serch for ger positions by air more effectily and prventing similar ger searchs. This was certainly one of the resons for the success of the rus att in 44 then anything to do with different deception methods.

Also one of the ways the rus were able to create suprise was getting entire ger operational orders via the lucy spy ring. This had little to do with any actual military actions such as you described.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

While suprise or intiative for the ger was moving and thinking faster it was also reacting to your opp moves faster.

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While it might be true the ger used less op dec in thier att then did the rus it was not less deception in total nor even none. The ger certainly suprised the sov in 41 as too if they would att and where they would att. Half of the rus forces were deployed in the south but 2/3 of the ge forces were deployed in the north. A similar thing happened in 42 the rus kept thinking the att was happening in the north long after the att in the south happened.

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Also the ger certainly achived op suprise in late 44 by att the allies in the ard.

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Your sov dec points are interesting but dec does not always work nor does it work forever. It is certainly not time insensitive either.

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Also if the rus had some great deception process that was supposed to be better than the ger methods. Then why did rus in 1943 suffer over 4 times as many tanks des and personal cas as the gers. Despite having significant rus advantages in numbers in the field.

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The ger even in 43 had ways of getting info just like you described. In fact the rus pows generally provided lots of info about specific rus pos and attacks of which the ger thought 80+% turned out correct.

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In 1944 the rus had much more control of the skies. Allowing for them to serch for ger positions by air more effectily and prventing similar ger searchs. This was certainly one of the resons for the success of the rus att in 44 then anything to do with different deception methods.

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Also one of the ways the rus were able to create suprise was getting entire ger operational orders via the lucy spy ring. This had little to do with any actual military actions such as you described.

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Still by 1944 the rus were still suffering over 3 times as many des tanks and pers cas as the germans. Despite an even larger num and intell adv then in 43.

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Originally posted by Greg LG in reference to the second German offensive through the Ardennes (December 1944):

This is very true, and has always been a point of interest, since it was so "Soviet" in style. I wonder if they had learned something from the Russian front, but that's merely conjecture.

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How so? I really don't see the "Soviet" style in that operation.

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This is easily answered. Because, the Germans were better than the Soviets at the tactical level. Granted, this margin of superiority slowly waned as the war progressed, but the Germans held the tactical edge for the great part of the war.

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I have always wondered about that. While they certianly improved since 1941, has there been any quantitative evidence provided showing such improvement from 1943-1945.

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Soviet operational art compensated for this tactical weakness - and then some.

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This is a significant point. Many elements of Soviet operational art were designed to account for or partly compensate for certian weaknesses. If that is accepted as a correct, then one is left with the conclusion that a Soviet style army will always be inferior to a good western style army.

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Soviet air superiority certainly helped, but as many persons will also point out, Luftwaffe air activity was never totally stopped by the VVS (this was more a result of the complete subordination of the VVS to Red Army ground operations, than to the inability of the VVS to actually sweep the Luftwaffe from the Russian skies).

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At least at Kursk in 1943, the performance differential between the opposing air forces were greater than between the ground forces (as measured by casualty effectiveness).

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
How so? I really don't see the "Soviet" style in that operation.

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I have always wondered about that. While they certianly improved since 1941, has there been any quantitative evidence provided showing such improvement from 1943-1945.

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This is a significant point. Many elements of Soviet operational art were designed to account for or partly compensate for certian weaknesses. If that is accepted as a correct, then one is left with the conclusion that a Soviet style army will always be inferior to a good western style army.

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[addendum]
Just wanted to add that while I generally believe the operational level is more important to modern (and post-modern) warfare than the tactical level, that's not to say that Soviet military art couldn't have been better. It was as much a product of the Soviet political system as it was of its military. Versatility and flexibility have great importance in warfare and always will, and that the Soviets were not capable of adding that element to a satisfactory level was a weakness in their tactical, and therefore military, art. On the other hand, that the Germans didn't recognize operational art as a distinct level of warfare was an even greater weakness in German military art. This meant that they might've won more battles than the Soviets, but lost the ones that were needed for achieving operational and strategic goals, and thus winning the war.

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At least at Kursk in 1943, the performance differential between the opposing air forces were greater than between the ground forces (as measured by casualty effectiveness).

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Originally posted by JM Serrano:
I have one lingering doubt: Why was the VVS an underperformer vs. the Luftwaffe in the later part of the war? Were they focused only on CAS or what? In a related question, what was the strength of the VVS in mid-44?

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The Luftwaffe of 1943 possessed superior fighter aircraft until the introduction of the radial engine La-5FN in late summer of 1943, so this might partially explain it. Not totally, however, since the Kuban campaign in spring-summer 1943 was highlighted by the successful use of the lend lease P-39N/Q, a fighter that while very robust at low altitude was still in for a tough ride against a Bf 109G-2. Personally, I think it had to do with the lack of disseminating the lessons learned during the Kuban campaign.

By 1944, I believe those lessons were impressed upon Soviet combat aviators. It also helped that the VVS was finally flying superior fighter aircraft like the La-5FN, Yak-3, La-7 and Yak-9U.

Regarding your question on why the VVS seemed to 'underperform' vs. the Luftwaffe in 1944-45, this was due to air doctrine. The VVS was subordinated to ground forces and expected to support ground operations. While 'supporting ground operations' has been misinterpreted to mean conducting ground support missions, it did mean the VVS was limited to the AO of the ground forces. The largest air formation in the Red Army was the air army, and it was under direct control of front command. Soviet operational art firmly held the belief of attacking the enemy throughout its entire depth during an operation, so the VVS was expected to conduct interdiction in the operational depths. But, all air operations were conducted to support the successful development of ground operations. This basically meant fighter aviation controlling the skies over the main attack sectors while assault and bomber aviation conducted ground attack missions. If it wasn't a main AO, then you probably weren't going to see much of a Soviet air presence.

It's important to realize that no other air force in WWII was as dedicated to supporting ground operations. By 1945 the interaction between air and ground had matured to a great degree - to the point where aviation would be directly alerting mobile groups of German concentrations up ahead through air liaison officers assigned to these mobile groups.

While you accept at least that the ger had a tactical advantage during the whole war. You somehow think the 4-1 kill ratio was only tactically based. Well it was not just the tactical kill ratio but all kills tac, op and strategic for the entire front for a whole year all the suprise and advantages inncluded. The rus overall sucked and this can not soley be due to some sort of huge ger tactial adv balanced out by a soviet op and srtergic adv.

The ger in 41 and 42 achieved sucess on above just the tactical level. In 43 after stalingrad the rus were not hugly sucessful on the op and strategic level. It really took until 44 for these victories but even then other factors than just rus being better op and srtegically played a part. Becasue the ger still managed a kill ratio of greater than 3 for all components for the whole year.

The % of correct info for the sov pows comes from david khans book hitlars spys. It was the ger own est and was based on the second half of the war. The first half it was 95%. While the ger may not have captured to many generals in the second half of the war even a private would know his own units postion which units and weapons are nearby.

The ger tried to find out what was up to 200 km behind the front lines. Even you canīt think 200 miles was solely tactical deepth. I think we could both agreee it was operational intel they were after using various means. Now they had the info and used it well early in the war. Now they still tried to get it later in the war as well. It appears sometimes the intell was wrong but I mean what type of intel was correct all the time. Now if you are trying to say the sovs were better at gathering op intel by some means then let me know.

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Originally posted by JM Serrano:
Sure, but I was going along other way: VVS performance improved or better results were a consequence of the lower strength of the Luftwaffe? By 1944 most of the LW strength was concentrated on home defence (IIRC there was just one fighter Geschwader per Army Group on 22/6/44) so throwing an Air Army (about 650 aircraft) against any sector of the front meant that there was very little to oppose the soviets. I expected that by this time, soviet air superiority would have been as sorely felt as it was on the Western front, since they had more aircraft flying over the front (at least theoretically)

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If you take number of total single engine German fighters servicable on the Russian front in May of both 1943 and 1944, you see this:

1943
LF 5 - 115
LF 1 - 77
LF 6 - 108
LF 4 - 105
TOTAL = 405

1944
LF 5 - 75
LF 1 - 88
LF 6 - 86
LF 4 - 139
LwKdoSudOst - 51
TOTAL = 439

Even if you take away the German fighters stationed in Romania in 1944, you still end up with 388 servicable fighters. So, German fighter levels were roughly the same from 1943 to 1944 on the Russian front. Of course, VVS fighters numbers were on the increase.

It's a mistake to take the USAAF as it was used in Europe, then make a straight comparison with the VVS. In the Western front, The USAAF was not prioritized to be used in support of ground operations. It had primarily a strategic bombing mission, then interdiction, then, last, ground support. USAAF fighters were tasked with mainly escort duties for the bombers, then to fly interdiction on the home leg. At times, they could be used as ground support, but that had to be done under special arrangements. No units of the USAAF was subordinated to any ground unit command. There was some fine cooperation between the US Army and the USAAF, but it was all done per the initiative of the respective commanders, not as a standard practice. Thus, such cooperation was the exception, not the rule.

The real reason why the skies were cleared of the Luftwaffe in western Europe was because the USAAF fighters were given the specific mission of seeking and destroying the Luftwaffe. And the bombers were the bait. That was the real success story of the strategic bombing campaign, not the actual bombing.

VVS fighters were never given this kind of mission, because their mission was entirely dependent on the needs of the ground forces. German fighters were mostly shot down when they tried to interfere with Soviet air (or ground) operations. A very small percentage of VVS fighters were given 'free hunt' missions, and they were usually highly experienced and usually flew as a pair.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

While you might call the deception in 41 strategic I would quibble with the term for 42. What is strategic desecption and why is 42 strategic and not operational? Operational deception is another term you need to define as well.

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While you accept at least that the ger had a tactical advantage during the whole war. You somehow think the 4-1 kill ratio was only tactically based. Well it was not just the tactical kill ratio but all kills tac, op and strategic for the entire front for a whole year all the suprise and advantages inncluded. The rus overall sucked and this can not soley be due to some sort of huge ger tactial adv balanced out by a soviet op and srtergic adv.

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The ger in 41 and 42 achieved sucess on above just the tactical level. In 43 after stalingrad the rus were not hugly sucessful on the op and strategic level. It really took until 44 for these victories but even then other factors than just rus being better op and srtegically played a part. Becasue the ger still managed a kill ratio of greater than 3 for all components for the whole year.

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The % of correct info for the sov pows comes from david khans book hitlars spys. It was the ger own est and was based on the second half of the war. The first half it was 95%. While the ger may not have captured to many generals in the second half of the war even a private would know his own units postion which units and weapons are nearby.

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The ger tried to find out what was up to 200 km behind the front lines. Even you canīt think 200 miles was solely tactical deepth. I think we could both agreee it was operational intel they were after using various means. Now they had the info and used it well early in the war. Now they still tried to get it later in the war as well. It appears sometimes the intell was wrong but I mean what type of intel was correct all the time. Now if you are trying to say the sovs were better at gathering op intel by some means then let me know.

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What the rus and allies had was acess to top germans acting as spys it shouldnīt come as a big shock since there was a large anti hitlar force in the army. Many of the senior germans were appuled at the killing of the jews. The west also had great codebreaking ability. The rus actually recieved entire operational plans from the ger from mid 43 on. The ger never had anything like this and the rus certainly benifited from this non military operational intell.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Very crucial to the veracity of your statement is the definition of a "good western style army." If this refers to what existed in WWII for either western allies or Germans, then I must disagree, because operational art was not recognized by the west at that time. In fact, it wasn't really recognized until the 1980s, and because of that, western military art remained rudimentary, or unclear and conflicting, at the operational level. Thus, while the west was concerned with tactical decision loops, the Soviets were focusing on operational and strategic decision loops, then 'pulling' their tactical level along for the ride, so to speak. As early as the 1920s Soviet military analysts were coming to the conclusion that the tactical level (up to division formations) was not as important as the operational level.

[addendum]
Just wanted to add that while I generally believe the operational level is more important to modern (and post-modern) warfare than the tactical level, that's not to say that Soviet military art couldn't have been better. It was as much a product of the Soviet political system as it was of its military. Versatility and flexibility have great importance in warfare and always will, and that the Soviets were not capable of adding that element to a satisfactory level was a weakness in their tactical, and therefore military, art. On the other hand, that the Germans didn't recognize operational art as a distinct level of warfare was an even greater weakness in German military art. This meant that they might've won more battles than the Soviets, but lost the ones that were needed for achieving operational and strategic goals, and thus winning the war.

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The idea that somehow rus was the sole discover of OPERATIONAL combat up to the 80s is a bit unblievable. Surrly the ideas of operational combat might have exiosted in rus prior to WWII. But ideas fade and making them work is what matters.

In finland or anywhere before like poland 1920s I see no evidence of operational nor even stategic genius on the rus side. In fact what was to become the biggest rus proponet actually called his rus army in poland a horde. For awaile before the war perhaps because they killed its main proponent the rus actually started demobilizing all those mech corps and distributing the tanks to the inf. That was the french approch to the war that ger proved was flase. The ger conc not just tanks into Pz divs but these div into pz corps and even into panzer gropus that the ger used to defeat the even larger allied forces in 1940. It was only once the french idea was proved pointless that the rus stoped disbadment and instead started increasing the number of mech corps.

Now while there may have been operational moves in poland by ger Iīm not as familar with them. In fact that the first really good operation from an operational standpoint was the upper cut in the north of 1940. Which the ger excuted by gathering op intel and acting on it even to the point of suprisng the alles. That seems to be opertional suprise in case you canīt figure out what to call it.

Iīll leave out all the minors again and jump to 41 with the invasion of rus. All those pincer moves in 41 and even 42 etc... were all surly not tactical nor strategic in scope they were in the inbettween operational level. In fact the ger plans for these operationas are commenly called operational plans and operation such and such. Your point about ger has no legs.

The west while I certainly donīt have as much info on. The biggest problem with the west was the small number of divs present to on the continent at any one time. I mean in total every where they had 60 divs to def and att accoross all of euopre including northern italy by the end of 44. As an example ger in 1940 had at least a hundred divs and without ita front a smaller area to place them to att and defend. Also I donīt think any western general thought they would be as good as ger operatianally even in 44. They really didnīt want to stick thier heads into a vise and get dunkirked again. Even so there were some plans that were formed and put into place to some mearsure of sucess. Falise, Landing in southern france and north at same time, market garden and even ardenss. The first real sucess was after the ardennes was completed when the rhur pocket was encircled. Having no operational concept does not hold true even for the western allies in 45 let alone all the way to 1980.

Remebr the american landing at inchon in korea that is not purly a tactical or straegic plan. In fact it was mainly operational in nature. Even the allies called these large plans such as Dday operations.

Having panzer groups and panzer armies working in 1940 for the ger was something the rus never really matched. They very rarly even assized two of thier tank armys to the same front. The rus tank armies were just small ger panzer corps. And they had no permant organized fasihon for making this work until late in the war at least.

The ger during most of the war were able to note where their forces were note where the enmy forces were. Then quickly make and act on these desioncs better than the rus could. That is the intialtive that normally allowed the germans to operate more effectivly than the rus at operational art until at least 44.

Now we know what happened to rus in 41 and 42 and it was more then just losing a few divs at the tactical level. The rus defensive plan on the outset of war failed bitterly at the tactical operational and only scrapped by strategically. It really doesnīt matter what the rus thought if they couldnīt pull it off they failed. They disproved thier own ideas completly.

The ger ended up occupying almost 2/3 of rus pop and at least half thier industry and resources at thier high point. More territtory by area occupied in rus than all europe. That the ger made bad strategic decisons worse then rus on avg I could agree with. Of course rus was forced to make these decisons and was helped by being in a better srtegic postioin vis a vie its allies. That the ger never achieved any operational and strtegic goals fits in more with fantasy then reality.

Also the US and Ger units all had thier own internal operations officers. The ger operations officer existed long before WWII started.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

The idea that somehow rus was the sole discover of OPERATIONAL combat up to the 80s is a bit unblievable. Surrly the ideas of operational combat might have exiosted in rus prior to WWII. But ideas fade and making them work is what matters.

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To be honest, I can find no reference to a specific development and practice of operations that predate the Soviets. How they came about it is a pretty fascinating story in itself, at least I think so. Anyway, the thing about German post-WWI tactical art is that it was a development of the Reichswehr mainly under von Seeckt that saw fruition just before Hitler's rise to power. The very interesting point about this new tactical art, which was a combined arms concept, was that by virtue of its principles (the emphasis on speed and flexibility and interservice cooperation, the concern for an attack throughout the entire tactical depths) it strongly hinted at an extension of itself at the level of operations. Why this was never addressed I cannot say, but it may have a bit to do with the German obsession for a quick, painless war. And, after the nightmare of WWI, who can blame Germany (yeah, they were part of the aggressor force in the Great War, but, boy, did they pay for it - and then some).

The really amazing thing is that operations were nothing new during WWI. But, equally surprising, nobody bothered to really study this concept wrt modern warfare. It was sort of associated with the tactical level, but on the high end of it. Everyone seemed to look at military art as strategy and tactics, then tried to fit operations in there somewhere. That is until the Soviets got the idea of making operations its own level within military art, between strategy and tactics. Once they did that, everything started to fall into place, and war could now be seen clearly in its modern, more massive and destructive guise.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Regarding the Ardennes Offensive, what struck me was the secret regrouping by German forces along the main axis of attack. This was not so much strategic deception as operational deception.

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What they did before Ardennes, which was a "back-field shuffle" at the last minute, is similar to how they started the Kursk battle in the south (although they failed to achieve suprise at Kursk). I don't see anything different in December 1944 than what I see them doing from June 30 - July 4 1943, although the results were different (they acheived suprise in the Ardennes).

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If you look at Soviet casualties from an operation basis, there are some very interesting facts.

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My analysis has mostly been from comparing casualty exchange ratios, force ratios, advance rates and outcomes in a series of division-level engagements (see the Capture Rate Study, Phase I and II, available on this site as a download). If one compares a series of similar division-level engagements (similar force ratios, etc.) from one period to another, one has a basis for making such a comparison. It gets a little more nebulus looking at casualties from a single large operation, as one could certianly end up comparing dis-similar operations.

The lower casualty rates in later operations may not indicate improved competency, but could be a sign of lower intensity, less opposition, a more controlled pace, etc.

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Very interesting side note on the Yassy-Kishinev operation was that prior to it, there was a massive levy of conscripts throughout the region for both the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts. Literally half of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was composed of recent conscripts when this operation commenced, and this was Malinovskii's front which engaged the majority of German forces in the operation.

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This point does not help make the arguement that the Soviet Army was getting better (although I suspect you already appreciate that). It does appear that the Soviet army was making extensive (more?) use of "field replacements", which certianly did not do much for making the infantry experienced cohesive teams. So, after Kursk, there seems to be some reason to believe that the Soviet infantry was in decline.

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Very crucial to the veracity of your statement is the definition of a "good western style army."

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German, US or UK in 1943/1944 will do. Again, take a look at our Capture Rate Study, Phase I & II, where we compare the US vs Germans in Italy (1943/44) across a series of division-level engagements, the UK vs Germans in Italy (1943/44), the US vs Germans in Ardennes (late 1944) and the Soviet Union vs Germans at Kursk (1943). While there are differences in performance between the US, UK and Germany, they tend to all be in the "ballpark". On the other hand, the Soviet performance is clearly inferior to German (and by defualt, the US and UK).

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...either western allies or Germans, then I must disagree, because operational art was not recognized by the west at that time. In fact, it wasn't really recognized until the 1980s,..

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I think you are confusing the use of terms with concepts. That the Germans and Soviets had a term that fit somewhere on the spectrum between strategy and tactics does not mean that the rest of the world were not studying how to conduct corp-level operations.

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..., western military art remained rudimentary, or unclear and conflicting, at the operational level.

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I don't think that is a very supportable statement.

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As early as the 1920s Soviet military analysts were coming to the conclusion that the tactical level (up to division formations) was not as important as the operational level.

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Well now....if this was true (this period is hardly my era of specialty), it would certianly provide some form of explanation for the continued weak performance of the Soviet army. Still, I don't see that the Soviet Corps and Army level operations were superior to German (or US as I gather this is what you mean), and I have a few cases in mind in 1943 where that is clearly not the case (Battle of Kursk examples, to no one's surprise).

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Just wanted to add that while I generally believe the operational level is more important to modern (and post-modern) warfare than the tactical level...

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Again, I am not sure on what basis one can state that one level of warfare was more important that some other level at a different time. Was the operational level of warfare less important than the tactical level during Napoleon's operations?

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It was as much a product of the Soviet political system as it was of its military.

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Again, a significant point.

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On the other hand, that the Germans didn't recognize operational art as a distinct level of warfare was an even greater weakness in German military art.

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But, they had a word for it

It would appear that German corps and army level actions were often conducted with considerable thought.

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After the successes and improvements of the Kuban air campaign, I can't for the life of me figure out why the VVS did so poorly at Kursk.

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Then one may need to look at the null hypothesis, which could be that there was not the degree of success and improvement in the VVS as a result of the Kuban air campaign. A number of the Soviet air units at Kursk had participated in the Kuban.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Regarding your question on why the VVS seemed to 'underperform' vs. the Luftwaffe in 1944-45, this was due to air doctrine. The VVS was subordinated to ground forces and expected to support ground operations. While 'supporting ground operations' has been misinterpreted to mean conducting ground support missions, it did mean the VVS was limited to the AO of the ground forces. The largest air formation in the Red Army was the air army, and it was under direct control of front command. Soviet operational art firmly held the belief of attacking the enemy throughout its entire depth during an operation, so the VVS was expected to conduct interdiction in the operational depths. But, all air operations were conducted to support the successful development of ground operations. This basically meant fighter aviation controlling the skies over the main attack sectors while assault and bomber aviation conducted ground attack missions. If it wasn't a main AO, then you probably weren't going to see much of a Soviet air presence.

It's important to realize that no other air force in WWII was as dedicated to supporting ground operations. By 1945 the interaction between air and ground had matured to a great degree - to the point where aviation would be directly alerting mobile groups of German concentrations up ahead through air liaison officers assigned to these mobile groups.

[This message has been edited by Greg LG (edited 04-21-2003).][/B]

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
If you take number of total single engine German fighters servicable on the Russian front in May of both 1943 and 1944, you see this:

[b]1943
LF 5 - 115
LF 1 - 77
LF 6 - 108
LF 4 - 105
TOTAL = 405

1944
LF 5 - 75
LF 1 - 88
LF 6 - 86
LF 4 - 139
LwKdoSudOst - 51
TOTAL = 439

Even if you take away the German fighters stationed in Romania in 1944, you still end up with 388 servicable fighters. So, German fighter levels were roughly the same from 1943 to 1944 on the Russian front. Of course, VVS fighters numbers were on the increase.

It's a mistake to take the USAAF as it was used in Europe, then make a straight comparison with the VVS. In the Western front, The USAAF was not prioritized to be used in support of ground operations. It had primarily a strategic bombing mission, then interdiction, then, last, ground support. USAAF fighters were tasked with mainly escort duties for the bombers, then to fly interdiction on the home leg. At times, they could be used as ground support, but that had to be done under special arrangements. No units of the USAAF was subordinated to any ground unit command. There was some fine cooperation between the US Army and the USAAF, but it was all done per the initiative of the respective commanders, not as a standard practice. Thus, such cooperation was the exception, not the rule.

The real reason why the skies were cleared of the Luftwaffe in western Europe was because the USAAF fighters were given the specific mission of seeking and destroying the Luftwaffe. And the bombers were the bait. That was the real success story of the strategic bombing campaign, not the actual bombing.

VVS fighters were never given this kind of mission, because their mission was entirely dependent on the needs of the ground forces. German fighters were mostly shot down when they tried to interfere with Soviet air (or ground) operations. A very small percentage of VVS fighters were given 'free hunt' missions, and they were usually highly experienced and usually flew as a pair.

[This message has been edited by Greg LG (edited 04-21-2003).][/B]

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Even if we accept your figures which is for may not june the 22nd it does not mean that much by itself. The amount of fuel for training pilots was limited and ALL ger piolts by 44 were less experianced. By mid 44 it seems unliky the best pilots, fuel etc are being used on the EF. The ger in thier home front were suffering huge losses in ftr much higher than ever before from the US escorted bombers.

The USAF did not exist until after the war. It was called the USAC and it was a part of the army just like the rus air force. Unlike most of the rest. The US during the war adopted a primary SB force because from mid 40 to mid 44 thier were almost no ground campaign to support.

Also from a purly military point of view it was a good descision to spread ger air and aaa resources around ALL of europe. That meant less forces conc in rus to support attacks there and also less of those deadly 88s and all the ammo produced for aaa instead of arty and AT. It also meant they had to constantly rebuild and suffer delays in production and move there industry. The end result was a very slow growth in production until the last year when it declined. If it didnīt have to do these things production could have increased much faster and to higher levels than it ever did.

Also the idea that the US ftr were tasked primarly to escort bombers is wrong. For most of the war thier were no ftrs that could reach that far. It really took until the mustang with its long range and drop tanks that allowed escort. It was also with the aperance of these ftrs in the skis over ger in numbers by early 44 that lead to the declie of the ger air force. Nor could ftrs flying at high levels escorting SB even try to attack targets on the ground. Not to mention that quite often the ftrs would be flying out over water to return.

Now there were entire allied air armies that were full of all those other ftrs besides the mustang that were acting as ftr bombers from the P47 on down. Not just escorting bombers during thier sortie but actually flying sorties themselves. One of the reasons why the ftrs did not have to do much escort duty was thier was a drastic absence of air activity in the west. The west flew perhaps 100 times more combat sorties on Dday then the gers.

The idea that the US ftr bombers only flew ground support in etremly unusually circumstanses is also wrong. They did do this on a number of occasions and lossses amoung these planes due to actions like this was large at least for the first few months after normandy. Also all units of the allied AF even SB were subordanated under eisenhour for the attack in normandy. YOu are wrong again. Obviously you poses a great deal of knowledge about certain thing in the east your US airforce bit needs a bit of brushing up.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Darrin:
[b]
While you might call the deception in 41 strategic I would quibble with the term for 42. What is strategic desecption and why is 42 strategic and not operational? Operational deception is another term you need to define as well.

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While you accept at least that the ger had a tactical advantage during the whole war. You somehow think the 4-1 kill ratio was only tactically based. Well it was not just the tactical kill ratio but all kills tac, op and strategic for the entire front for a whole year all the suprise and advantages inncluded. The rus overall sucked and this can not soley be due to some sort of huge ger tactial adv balanced out by a soviet op and srtergic adv.

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The ger in 41 and 42 achieved sucess on above just the tactical level. In 43 after stalingrad the rus were not hugly sucessful on the op and strategic level. It really took until 44 for these victories but even then other factors than just rus being better op and srtegically played a part. Becasue the ger still managed a kill ratio of greater than 3 for all components for the whole year.

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The % of correct info for the sov pows comes from david khans book hitlars spys. It was the ger own est and was based on the second half of the war. The first half it was 95%. While the ger may not have captured to many generals in the second half of the war even a private would know his own units postion which units and weapons are nearby.

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The ger tried to find out what was up to 200 km behind the front lines. Even you canīt think 200 miles was solely tactical deepth. I think we could both agreee it was operational intel they were after using various means. Now they had the info and used it well early in the war. Now they still tried to get it later in the war as well. It appears sometimes the intell was wrong but I mean what type of intel was correct all the time. Now if you are trying to say the sovs were better at gathering op intel by some means then let me know.

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What the rus and allies had was acess to top germans acting as spys it shouldnīt come as a big shock since there was a large anti hitlar force in the army. Many of the senior germans were appuled at the killing of the jews. The west also had great codebreaking ability. The rus actually recieved entire operational plans from the ger from mid 43 on. The ger never had anything like this and the rus certainly benifited from this non military operational intell.

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I somehow get the feeling that this is not going over well with you, Darrin. For my part, I'm not willing to explain principles you should already understand in order to make an informed opinion. Please don't expect me to do so. You are an intractable person at best, so consider my responses an act of compassion(!) Take the time to study military art as known in the 20th (and 21st) century (might I personally suggest Triandafillov or Svechin?), and I'll put more effort into coming to terms with your ... forum methodology.[/B][/QUOTE]

The ger and everyone else not knowing a thing about operational art until 1980 is just far to proposterous for me to believe. My gut breaks up everytime I think of it. Regardless of what your russian books say it is not true. Iīve certainly given enough evidence to the conter argu that you donīt even try to deal with. All I hear is continued assertion and no evidence argument or proof.

Panzer groups a collection of panzer corps by your own admisson are operational. If cuting up to the coast in 1940 was not an operational art. Then was this operation a tactical or strategic act? I mean if this is the best you can do then donīt even bother.

I know what the three terms mean. If you canīt define what they mean or at least prove why the 42 one is a strat dec and not an operational one then it is mearly an assertion. On one point you praise the ger for using soviet style op dec for the ard where they take thier forces and regroup them to attack on a part of the front. But when they do that in rus in mid 42 all of a sudden it canīt be operational. Well then tell us why assertions alone no mater how often you say do not mean it is so.

As i said that you are obviously confusued with the had a total cas ratio of over 4-1 including whatever you want to call all togeather. Tac, op, strat, suprise, deception etc...

Yet again your previous stament does nothing to adress these questions. If you are trying to say the ger got all the way to stalingrad JUST because they were tactical superior doesnīt hold water. All the way to stalingrad while inflicting a cas ratio of 6:1 and many more pows taken just because the ger were tac sup and the russian army were superior oper and strat. I mean I donīt know what you expect me to beile but more then assertions would be nice.

Well sinced kahns book is about ger intel anythng he says about the rus is certainly less credible. Exactly where in the book did your quote come from.

Ger op intel was poor as evidenced by how many times they blew it. While later in the war they did blow it sometimes. Early in the war they had a good understanding of the rus numbers and OOB and used them to good effect thats who they got all the way to stalingard. With minimal cas suffered and max cas caused.

It wasnīt ger usually used for the missions it was rus in the east. Also they did not have to survive to cross back since they had radios. About 10,000 rus were used for this and the loss rate was around 80%. But of course in 41-43 they were more suscesful then in 44 at this. It was a general method and used other means besides this such as radio and wire intercepts to name two.