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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
What they did before Ardennes, which was a "back-field shuffle" at the last minute, is similar to how they started the Kursk battle in the south (although they failed to achieve suprise at Kursk). I don't see anything different in December 1944 than what I see them doing from June 30 - July 4 1943, although the results were different (they acheived suprise in the Ardennes).

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My analysis has mostly been from comparing casualty exchange ratios, force ratios, advance rates and outcomes in a series of division-level engagements (see the Capture Rate Study, Phase I and II, available on this site as a download). If one compares a series of similar division-level engagements (similar force ratios, etc.) from one period to another, one has a basis for making such a comparison. It gets a little more nebulus looking at casualties from a single large operation, as one could certianly end up comparing dis-similar operations.

The lower casualty rates in later operations may not indicate improved competency, but could be a sign of lower intensity, less opposition, a more controlled pace, etc.

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This point does not help make the arguement that the Soviet Army was getting better (although I suspect you already appreciate that). It does appear that the Soviet army was making extensive (more?) use of "field replacements", which certianly did not do much for making the infantry experienced cohesive teams. So, after Kursk, there seems to be some reason to believe that the Soviet infantry was in decline.

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German, US or UK in 1943/1944 will do. Again, take a look at our Capture Rate Study, Phase I & II, where we compare the US vs Germans in Italy (1943/44) across a series of division-level engagements, the UK vs Germans in Italy (1943/44), the US vs Germans in Ardennes (late 1944) and the Soviet Union vs Germans at Kursk (1943). While there are differences in performance between the US, UK and Germany, they tend to all be in the "ballpark". On the other hand, the Soviet performance is clearly inferior to German (and by defualt, the US and UK).

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I think you are confusing the use of terms with concepts. That the Germans and Soviets had a term that fit somewhere on the spectrum between strategy and tactics does not mean that the rest of the world were not studying how to conduct corp-level operations.

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I don't think that is a very supportable statement.

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Well now....if this was true (this period is hardly my era of specialty), it would certianly provide some form of explanation for the continued weak performance of the Soviet army. Still, I don't see that the Soviet Corps and Army level operations were superior to German (or US as I gather this is what you mean), and I have a few cases in mind in 1943 where that is clearly not the case (Battle of Kursk examples, to no one's surprise).

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Kursk was a pivotal period for Soviet operations. Tactical inferiority was felt
keenly on the Voronezh Front, because of the lack of initiative. Still, German operations and initiative were disrupted, as continuous Soviet counterattacks upon the flanks of the German panzer spearhead upset assembly and jump-off schedules, reducing German attack effectiveness and advance rates. When Zitadelle was eventually called off, there were still 3 rifle armies, a tank corps and mech corps yet to be committed. Thus, operationally, Voronezh front's operation was a success.

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Again, I am not sure on what basis one can state that one level of warfare was more important that some other level at a different time. Was the operational level of warfare less important than the tactical level during Napoleon's operations?

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But, they had a word for it

It would appear that German corps and army level actions were often conducted with considerable thought.

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Then one may need to look at the null hypothesis, which could be that there was not the degree of success and improvement in the VVS as a result of the Kuban air campaign. A number of the Soviet air units at Kursk had participated in the Kuban.

I have not looked at the Kuban air campaign in any depth.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
It's a mistake to take the USAAF as it was used in Europe, then make a straight comparison with the VVS. In the Western front, The USAAF was not prioritized to be used in support of ground operations. It had primarily a strategic bombing mission, then interdiction, then, last, ground support. USAAF fighters were tasked with mainly escort duties for the bombers, then to fly interdiction on the home leg. At times, they could be used as ground support, but that had to be done under special arrangements. No units of the USAAF was subordinated to any ground unit command. There was some fine cooperation between the US Army and the USAAF, but it was all done per the initiative of the respective commanders, not as a standard practice. Thus, such cooperation was the exception, not the rule.

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Certainly close, but not entirely correct. The story of US Army and Army Air Force cooperation in World War II is pretty convoluted, but essentially developed by experience. It is true that the "Air Forces" were not subordinate to "Ground Forces." But, by August 1944 the structure that you describe was not in effect either. Rather, what developed was a complex command arrangement geared to fill multiple tasks. First, of course , was the strategic task, primarily assigned to the Allied Stategic Air Forces, second was the interdiction task, primarily assigned to the medium and light bombers of the Second (Br) and Ninth (US) Air Force, and third was the tactical support task, assigned to the two Allied tactical air forces. In the US Army each ground army was supported by a tactical air command (note that in strength each of these was similar in size to a Soviet Air Army as assigned to a Front).

The real differance between the two was that the Allied tactical air forces were multi-rolled, rather than dedicated to ground support, more because neither the Brits or US developed a dedicated ground support aircraft during the war. Also, although the headquarters of the TAC's were often co-located with the army headquarters, they were in "support" of the army rather than under the command of the army.

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The real reason why the skies were cleared of the Luftwaffe in western Europe was because the USAAF fighters were given the specific mission of seeking and destroying the Luftwaffe. And the bombers were the bait. That was the real success story of the strategic bombing campaign, not the actual bombing.

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Actually of course that was the result, not the plan. But it worked tremendously better overall than the Soviet system. The reality is that the Western Allies inflicted more attrition on the Luftwaffe in 1944 than were lost on the Eastern Front during the entire war (don't quote me on this though, my numbers are at home, but they are close at least ). Overall, with similar numbers of aircraft committed the Western Allies inflicted much greater losses proportionately, and suffered many fewer losses, on the Luftwaffe than did the Soviets. The idea of specialized aircraft and air units dedicated to limited tasks and tied to specific ground formations in a subordinate role, as practiced by the Soviets, is probably no better an idea than that of "winning wars by strategic bombing."

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VVS fighters were never given this kind of mission, because their mission was entirely dependent on the needs of the ground forces. German fighters were mostly shot down when they tried to interfere with Soviet air (or ground) operations. A very small percentage of VVS fighters were given 'free hunt' missions, and they were usually highly experienced and usually flew as a pair.

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And tieing them exclusively to the ground mission is probably part of what limited their effectiveness. The idea that individual "pairs" of fighters, no matter how experienced, could be effective in a meaningful way, may be part of the problem with the Soviet system.

BTW, I'm not sure how any fighter gets shot down unless it is attempting to interfere (at least in some manner) with somebody else's air or ground operations). (Although there are all those cases of Spits and Mustangs miss-identified as 109's and Jugs as Focke Wulfs, and then there was that Lightning that my Dad's AAA battery shot down because it kept on straffing their column near Argentan - not really an amusing story since the pilot and at least two men in the FA battalion they supported were killed in the incident).

Edited to correct my fuzzy thinking and typing - the caffeine hadn't kicked in yet earlier.

There were 1,314,200 troops involved in the Yassy-Kishinev Strategic Offensive Operation, and of that total 13,197 irrevocable losses resulted. That comes to about 1% of total forces becoming permanent casualties. Of German irrevocable losses the Soviets claim 100,000 dead and 98,000 captured. That's 198,000 total from this operation. So, 198,000 divided by 13,197 is about 15. The Soviets had a 1:15 loss ratio in the Yassy-Kishinev operation. Undoubtedly, the Romanian collapse had a lot to do with this, but still, considering the loss of the 6th Army yet again, that's impressive for a total force composed of between 1/3 to 1/2 conscripts.

The Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation was not so sweeping, but it's results were more impressive, since it pretty much routed AGC. There were a total of 2,331,700 troops involved in this operation, ranging over a sector 1,100km wide (what was the frontage of western Europe in September? Now, remember this was a single Soviet strategic operation of a sector of the Russian front. This was the capability of Soviet operational art, using such massive forces over large distances with impressive dexterity. Operations within operations). Of that total, there were 178,507 irrevocable losses, which is 13% permanent losses of total Soviet forces involved. There were roughly 350,000 losses to AGC during that operation, split up between dead and captured. 350,000 divided by 178,507 equals about 2. So, the Soviet loss ratio there was 1:2. Considering the extent of fortification of that area and the difficulty of the terrain (boggy marsh and heavily forested) that's pretty impressive. And they pretty much fought an all-German force.

Yes, this doesn't mean that there is some sort of conspiracy and that Soviet forces were all Delta troops in disguise. All I'm saying is that when it came to the battles that counted, the Soviet won them. Largely, through their development and practice of Soviet operational art as incorporated into their revised military art.

[edit]
I switched the loss ratios around to make them less confusing.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Chris,
Your comments about casualty rates sort of nudged me to do a bit of researching of my own on the subject. However, I focused on only two operations on the Russian front, the Belorussian and Yassy-Kishinev operations. These were very successful operations in 1944, but not the only ones. First, Yassy-Kishinev.

There were 1,314,200 troops involved in the Yassy-Kishinev Strategic Offensive Operation, and of that total 13,197 irrevocable losses resulted. That comes to about 1% of total forces becoming permanent casualties. Of German irrevocable losses the Soviets claim 100,000 dead and 98,000 captured. That's 198,000 total from this operation. So, 198,000 divided by 13,197 is about 15. The Soviets had a 1:15 loss ratio in the Yassy-Kishinev operation. Undoubtedly, the Romanian collapse had a lot to do with this, but still, considering the loss of the 6th Army yet again, that's impressive for a total force composed of between 1/3 to 1/2 conscripts.

The Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation was not so sweeping, but it's results were more impressive, since it pretty much routed AGC. There were a total of 2,331,700 troops involved in this operation, ranging over a sector 1,100km wide (what was the frontage of western Europe in September? Now, remember this was a single Soviet strategic operation of a sector of the Russian front. This was the capability of Soviet operational art, using such massive forces over large distances with impressive dexterity. Operations within operations). Of that total, there were 178,507 irrevocable losses, which is 13% permanent losses of total Soviet forces involved. There were roughly 350,000 losses to AGC during that operation, split up between dead and captured. 350,000 divided by 178,507 equals about 2. So, the Soviet loss ratio there was 1:2. Considering the extent of fortification of that area and the difficulty of the terrain (boggy marsh and heavily forested) that's pretty impressive. And they pretty much fought an all-German force.

Yes, this doesn't mean that there is some sort of conspiracy and that Soviet forces were all Delta troops in disguise. All I'm saying is that when it came to the battles that counted, the Soviet won them. Largely, through their development and practice of Soviet operational art as incorporated into their revised military art.

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I switched the loss ratios around to make them less confusing.

[This message has been edited by Greg LG (edited 04-22-2003).]

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Also when calculating loss % its proably a good idea to at least give out time periods for it. Othwerwise higher % might be just due to having more time for these losses to occur.

One thing you have to be careful of doing to get accurate ratios of cas is don´t use the rus estimate of ger cas. If you are going to use the offical rus stats then you should also use the offical ger stat. All armies and esp the rus overclaimed thier effect on their enemy.

To give an example your claim that AGC sufferd 350,000 dead and prisoner alone seems unlikely. If you look at the offical ger numbers AGC lost 400,000 tot cas in total including wia over the entire three month period jun, july and aug.

Also one of the other things you have to keep stright is comparing permanent irecoverable losses can have different levels. For example you seem to be talking about dead and pows of the ger you need to use the corrcet numbers for the rus. The overall numbers quite often split up death in combat death, death in pows and pople in pow camps who were eventually recovered. Specific operations generally include all three of these togeather which is what you should do to compare it to the ger numbers.

Now a few warnings about claiming eff of the rus over ger just by comparing dead and pows from both sides during the summer of 44.

Tot cas for the ger were higher in the summer than at any time before but droped to more normal levels from sep to dec.

The big problem for the gers was an extrmemly unusually high % of the tot cas were not wia as was the case both before and after the summer of 44. A HUGLY disporante number of cas were mias who all had to rereplaced none would return from hospitals. Compariong only pows and dead just for the summer will give an overly warped sence of the true potential of the ger army.

From 43 to 44 the number and type of rus cas did not change significantly over the entire front for the entire year. What they did succed in doing was cauing about 25% more cas to the ger in 44 then in 43. They also suceeded at taking more ground. But still the ratio of tot cas for the entire front for the entire year went from over 4:1 on 43 to over 3:1 in 44.

Now even if your actual kill ratios were correct which they aren´t. They surely are only examples of single operations that might have gone unfavorably good for the rus. The ger were still masters of the rus when it came to producing more tot cas even in 44. For the entire year and the enitre front it was over 3:1. Even if you would just like to look at dead and pows the ger over the whole year for the whole fornt still had an edge over the russians.

No one is disputing that the sovs by 44 were able to use operatal art almost as well as the ger. But I would say they could do much preplanned complexity and less dexterity than you suggest. Thier biggest adv though was a better op intel giving them an almost exact idea of where the ger were. The intell supplied by german spys who gave out entire ger op order. Intell comfirmed by more traditonal military methods. By 44 as well the rus had certain adv over the ger that weren´t there in 43 alowing them to achive better results militarialy. LL trucks, rail and avgas present in high numbers to name three.

The idea that somehow the rus were better operational than the ger in 41 and 42 is still preposterous. Why is this so can you give me any proof or evidence to support this theory.

Greg LG

"And this is why deception, and surprise, were so important to Soviet operational art. It provided the means of overcoming the unfavorable kill ratio. You can have a 4:1 kill ratio, but if I inundate you with 8:1 or 16:1 odds tactically, it won't matter. Soviet operational art compensated for this tactical weakness - and then some."

Well, the question is rather how do you achieve 8:1 or 16:1 odds? It seems fanciful to me to see the answer to this as primarily a reflection of Soviet operational art rather than the fact that the Red Army possessed a huge overall numerical superiority along the front as a whole. It also appears fairly obvious that if they had had no substantial overall numerical superiority, the opportunity to employ these operational methods would not have existed - in a situation of relative parity, they would have been compelled to rely on the same basic scheme as the Germans to achieve local superiorities - that is, by outpacing the opposition.

"As to initiative and flexibility, that was one of the strengths of Soviet operational art. Basically, it made unit initiative and flexibility less important, at least during the penetration phase."

Another way of putting it would be to say that they were more or less compelled to develop methods that did not require an ability they lacked.

" First, the method of creating surprise differed significantly between the Germans and Soviets. Surprise itself, is generally the result of force displacement such that the surprised side can do nothing to effectively respond. It doesn't matter so much that it's undetected, so long as it cannot be responded to. In fact, it's probably better to let the enemy know they're about to be hit at 10:1 odds right beforehand just to spread the fear of god a little.

The Germans believed in creating surprise primarily through mobility and C&C. Basically, the principle of initiative and flexibility that has been sought after in the west. As long as you could move faster than your opponent, think faster, surprise would be in steady supply. This does require that one is willing to fight for ones intelligence, since there is little time to waste on more extensive methods of collection. So, for the Germans time was precious, since they weren't necessarily trying to mask anything, but attempting to get inside the decision loop of their enemy."

Again, I think it becomes a little pointless to evaluate these two approaches without bearing in mind the fact that one side could eventually rely on a very large numerical superiority whereas the other never could. The Soviet approach required and presupposed such a superiority, the German did not. Looking at the cost with which victories were bought, there seems to be little to suggest that there was any intrinsic superiority in the former approach - quite the contrary.

"It was prepared to be numerically superior at the operational level, and especially so at the tactical level in main sectors, and this was accomplished through deception"

I think it would be more basically true to say that it was accomplished through overall superiority in force levels. Deception obviously increased effectiveness, but the Soviets would in most cases have been capable of building the neccessary superiority regardless of it.

"Very crucial to the veracity of your statement is the definition of a "good western style army." If this refers to what existed in WWII for either western allies or Germans, then I must disagree, because operational art was not recognized by the west at that time. In fact, it wasn't really recognized until the 1980s, and because of that, western military art remained rudimentary, or unclear and conflicting, at the operational level. "

I think you are overestimating the significance of "recognizing operational art" at the doctrinal or theoretical level. In fact, I would say that the main focus of the German outlook was precisely on the operational level. They did not approach this in the same methodical way as the Soviet Army, but then their operational approach was different, as were the constraints in the situation they faced. Reliance on lower-echelon initiative cannot IMO neccessarily be interpreted as reflecting a tactical preoccupation, but rather I think represents a different approach to the operational level - and one, I would argue, with greater intrinsic merits than the Soviet approach. Also, I think it is a fallacy to assume that a more methodical and unitary theoretically elaborate approach is neccessarily superior, and the actual results of operations both in that conflict and elsewhere do not IMO suggest that this is the case.

"As early as the 1920s Soviet military analysts were coming to the conclusion that the tactical level (up to division formations) was not as important as the operational level."

With which I suspect most German officers would have agreed, in the sense that it is on the operational level that battles are decided. But then, the level of tactical proficiency of subordinate formations heavily impacts on the range of operational options available, as does the overall force level situation.

"On the other hand, that the Germans didn't recognize operational art as a distinct level of warfare was an even greater weakness in German military art. This meant that they might've won more battles than the Soviets, but lost the ones that were needed for achieving operational and strategic goals, and thus winning the war."

Sorry, but I think this line of thinking is more than a little blinkered in the sense that that it sees nothing but elaborated doctrine. German military thinking since long before Hitler was focussed primarily exactly on the operational level, on the deployment of corps and armies to achieve the defeat of the enemy's armed forces on the battlefield. What else is, f.e., the Vernichtungsschlacht concept but an operational one? German military thinking dealt with the operational level as a matter of course and had done so since long before there was a Red Army at all, in this light it matters little whether or not they employed the phrase "operational level". And which battles did the Germans lose because of shortcomings in the operational approach?

".......success after force multipliers provided by operational art."

Sorry to keep harping on this, but what basically enabled the Soviets to amass 10:1 superiorities in the critical sectors - "operational art", or a very large overall force level superiority? Would "operational art" have given them such odds in a situation of relative overall parity?

"But, unlike the Soviets, the Germans were chronically unable to maintain their gains or achieve their ultimate operational objectives. So, while the Germans accomplished some very impressive advance rates, they also conducted some fairly considerable retreats afterwards."

This is correct in itself, as far as the EF and North Africa is concerned (but not, I might add, in Poland, Norway, the low countries, France, Yugoslavia and Greece). And this you see as primarily a reflection of different approaches to the operational level? What about such factors as insufficient force levels and logistical shortcomings? What you are basically pointing out is that Germany was unable to decisively defeat the Soviet Union, the reasons for which rather obviously belongs to the strategic level IMO.

"They had a word for 'operations,' no doubt. But did they have a word for the development and practice of operations? What I'm trying to illustrate is that while operations were well known in the world military community at that time, the Soviets actually recognized its place within military art and developed it, then put it into practice as best they knew how. While the Germans or Americans, for that matter, could most likely have had a better form of operational art than the Soviets, the fact remains that they didn't - because they still had yet to recognize operational art as a military art that bridged the gap between the tactical level and the strategic. "

Sorry, but I disagree, and would say that the fact remains that they did. Both the Germans and the Western allies were capable of achieving operational victories of similar magnitudes casualty-wise, temporally and spatially, and at much lower cost, and, as far as the Germans are concerned in the East in 1941-42, without a significant overall force superiority - this in marked contrast to the Soviets in 1943-45.

T"There were 1,314,200 troops involved in the Yassy-Kishinev Strategic Offensive Operation, and of that total 13,197 irrevocable losses resulted. That comes to about 1% of total forces becoming permanent casualties. Of German irrevocable losses the Soviets claim 100,000 dead and 98,000 captured. That's 198,000 total from this operation. So, 198,000 divided by 13,197 is about 15. The Soviets had a 1:15 loss ratio in the Yassy-Kishinev operation. Undoubtedly, the Romanian collapse had a lot to do with this, but still, considering the loss of the 6th Army yet again, that's impressive for a total force composed of between 1/3 to 1/2 conscripts."

Ahem. Firstly, what the Soviets claim the Germans lost are neither here nor there, as it is unlikely to bear any resemblance to reality. 100,000 German dead against 13,000 Soviet is a figure so blatantly implausible that it can be dismissed without further ado. Compare it with the fact that Soviet casualties in Bagration was roughly twice the German figures despite several hundred thousand German POWs, and that overall casualty levels in 1944, a year in which almost all major fighting came in the form of victorious Soviet operations, was almost 4:1 in the German favour, and a 15:1 Soviet edge in losses at Yassi-Kishinev....Secondly, this comparison in any case neatly illustrates the pointlessness of the IL concept when one is discussing combat efficiency. The large numbers of prisoners reflects primarily the outcome of the operation, not the effectiveness with which it was carried out.

"Of that total, there were 178,507 irrevocable losses, which is 13% permanent losses of total Soviet forces involved. There were roughly 350,000 losses to AGC during that operation, split up between dead and captured. 350,000 divided by 178,507 equals about 2. So, the Soviet loss ratio there was 1:2. "

See above. If you include all casualties, rather than just what is included in the somewhat arbitrary IL construct, the ratio is the other way around 1:2 in the German favour.

Sorry if I seem negative - I do consider that
the Soviets succeeded in developing methods which allowed them to capitalise on their main assets to win the war. However, these methods I think reflect the shortcomings of the red army more than it reflects doctrinal excellence, and the nature of their main assets - above all a large force level superiority - remains the basic reason for their success. Without it, their operational concepts would have been neither practicable, sustainable or effective.

"Well, the question is rather how do you achieve 8:1 or 16:1 odds? It seems fanciful to me to see the answer to this as primarily a reflection of Soviet operational art rather than the fact that the Red Army possessed a huge overall numerical superiority along the front as a whole. It also appears fairly obvious that if they had had no substantial overall numerical superiority, the opportunity to employ these operational methods would not have existed - in a situation of relative parity, they would have been compelled to rely on the same basic scheme as the Germans to achieve local superiorities - that is, by outpacing the opposition."

Undoubtedly, numerical superiority was crucial to Soviet tactical art. They didn't possess the qualitative ability to best the Germans, thus their quantitative factor was essential. Soviet operational art provided the means of insuring and enhancing this advantage. And though the Soviets enjoyed numerical superiority throughout most of the war, it didn't reach an overall 3:1 advantage until October 1944. A Soviet numerical advantage of 2:1 wasn't first attained until February 1943, then fell below this mark until October of 1943 when it was reached once more.

"Another way of putting it would be to say that they were more or less compelled to develop methods that did not require an ability they lacked."

Very true. Or, at least lacked to the degree to be competitive purely on that basis alone.

"Again, I think it becomes a little pointless to evaluate these two approaches without bearing in mind the fact that one side could eventually rely on a very large numerical superiority whereas the other never could. The Soviet approach required and presupposed such a superiority, the German did not. Looking at the cost with which victories were bought, there seems to be little to suggest that there was any intrinsic superiority in the former approach - quite the contrary."

I'm a little confused by the reference to 'intrinsic superiority.' Is that a reference to the German method? As to the Soviet method, yes, it presupposed numerical superiority. But, the Germans presupposed that they had superior mobility and C&C ability, which they had. Thus, I'm not sure what you're driving at. Unless, you are saying that numerical superiority is somehow inferior. Many military figures might disagree, if I'm reading you correctly.

"I think it would be more basically true to say that it was accomplished through overall superiority in force levels. Deception obviously increased effectiveness, but the Soviets would in most cases have been capable of building the neccessary superiority regardless of it."

This I disagree with, especially when one realizes the sort of kill ratio the Germans had over the Soviets in general. If I have an overall 2:1 advantage over an opponent, it doesn't mean I can just accumulate a 5:1 or 7:1 operational advantage at whim. Especially against a foe as adept in the use of mobile reserves, and possessing superior intrinsic combat effectiveness.

"I think you are overestimating the significance of "recognizing operational art" at the doctrinal or theoretical level. In fact, I would say that the main focus of the German outlook was precisely on the operational level. They did not approach this in the same methodical way as the Soviet Army, but then their operational approach was different, as were the constraints in the situation they faced. Reliance on lower-echelon initiative cannot IMO neccessarily be interpreted as reflecting a tactical preoccupation, but rather I think represents a different approach to the operational level - and one, I would argue, with greater intrinsic merits than the Soviet approach. Also, I think it is a fallacy to assume that a more methodical and unitary theoretically elaborate approach is neccessarily superior, and the actual results of operations both in that conflict and elsewhere do not IMO suggest that this is the case."

I will be more precise on this. German operational art was limited to the tactical-operational linkage. It did not consider the operational-strategic linkage, because of doctrine. The quick decisive war advocated by the Germans did not give due consideration to extended operations. The focus was primarily on the operation itself, at the operational level. Thus, the Germans focused on the use of tactical actions in a successive, supporting manner, working toward an operational goal. They didn't go much further than that. The Soviets, on the other hand, did. They focused on the use of operations in a successive, supporting manner, toward either an operational or strategic goal. The Germans had nothing in this regard, likely because their doctrine of a quick war saw it as redundant.

As for tactical preoccupation, I contend this was exactly what happened in the German Army, primarily because their tactical art was defined, whereas their operational art was not. Hence, German operational art was an almost intuitive process for your average German operator.

“With which I suspect most German officers would have agreed, in the sense that it is on the operational level that battles are decided. But then, the level of tactical proficiency of subordinate formations heavily impacts on the range of operational options available, as does the overall force level situation.”

When a military force highlights flexibility and versatility, tactical proficiency of tactical formations is nearly a must. Must a force highlight tactical flexibility and versatility to win? It depends on the situation and the nature of the forces involved.

“Sorry, but I think this line of thinking is more than a little blinkered in the sense that that it sees nothing but elaborated doctrine. German military thinking since long before Hitler was focussed primarily exactly on the operational level, on the deployment of corps and armies to achieve the defeat of the enemy's armed forces on the battlefield. What else is, f.e., the Vernichtungsschlacht concept but an operational one? German military thinking dealt with the operational level as a matter of course and had done so since long before there was a Red Army at all, in this light it matters little whether or not they employed the phrase "operational level". And which battles did the Germans lose because of shortcomings in the operational approach?”

The Germans undoubtedly were working on these processes, but WWI showed they still had a ways to go in developing tactical success into operational success. The sense of the “operation” was very alive during that time, but the means of implementing it successfully in practice was not. Without doctrine, there is no definition, which leaves it open to interpretation and even intuition. As for lost German battles, there were the engagements around Leningrad and Moscow in 1941, Stalingrad in 1942-43, and Kursk, 1943. We can debate about Kursk, but the fact remains that when it came to deciding on Zitadelle, Hitler decided it wasn’t progressing as well as it should have. With the western Allies in Italy, he called it off. Actually, many of these would be more accurately described as German pyrrhic victories, though failing to reach an assigned objective does qualify as a defeat by my understanding.

“Sorry to keep harping on this, but what basically enabled the Soviets to amass 10:1 superiorities in the critical sectors – ‘operational art’, or a very large overall force level superiority? Would ‘operational art’ have given them such odds in a situation of relative overall parity?”

Maybe I should elaborate on Soviet operational art. It was an operational art specific to the Soviet military and political structure. It would not have worked with the Germans or the Americans or anyone else very well, because of that. For the Soviets, numbers were their bread and butter, their ‘ace in the hole.’ I’ll never deny that. And to be perfectly honest, I find nothing inferior about that, so long as one can determine the best method of capitalizing on it. Soviet operational art provided that methodology. I could elaborate on the whole spectrum of Soviet operational art, but I get the impression that isn’t what you’re looking for necessarily.

Regarding the perception of massive Soviet numerical superiority, are you of the contention that the Red Army could’ve simply amassed enough troops to not only create high tactical odds in assigned sectors, but to also amass the necessary overall numbers to create this sort of situation on a scale that would allow the development of tactical success to operational success? What I mean to say is, if you’re going to attack the line with the intent of creating operational success, there needs to be a minimum frontage beyond which enemy reserves cannot respond to in time or in adequate quantity. By 1929, Soviet military analysts had already determined that the minimum grouping for such an attack was roughly 3 armies. That’s anywhere from 240,000 to 300,000 troops that need to be regrouped. Is this something the Germans would’ve missed, assuming no deception on the Soviets’ part, and if not, then they wouldn’t have responded to by shifting reserves? I say this, because the Soviets did not possess enough numbers to attack at whim without significant regrouping.

“This is correct in itself, as far as the EF and North Africa is concerned (but not, I might add, in Poland, Norway, the low countries, France, Yugoslavia and Greece). And this you see as primarily a reflection of different approaches to the operational level? What about such factors as insufficient force levels and logistical shortcomings? What you are basically pointing out is that Germany was unable to decisively defeat the Soviet Union, the reasons for which rather obviously belongs to the strategic level IMO.”

Force levels can be seen as a strategic shortcoming with respect to the Russian front. Logistical shortcoming, however, are operational, as well as strategic.

“Sorry, but I disagree, and would say that the fact remains that they did. Both the Germans and the Western allies were capable of achieving operational victories of similar magnitudes casualty-wise, temporally and spatially, and at much lower cost, and, as far as the Germans are concerned in the East in 1941-42, without a significant overall force superiority - this in marked contrast to the Soviets in 1943-45.”

I’ve already given my impression of German operations. As for American operations, two things come to mind: cautious and on a broad front. The Americans were even more dependent upon their firepower than the Soviets. Patton was the exception. He would’ve made a fine Soviet tank army commander. I doubt their capabilities were developed enough to conduct something of the complexity of a Belorussian or Vistula-Oder or Manchurian operation, and American operations never manifested an ability for it in WWII.

“Ahem. Firstly, what the Soviets claim the Germans lost are neither here nor there, as it is unlikely to bear any resemblance to reality. 100,000 German dead against 13,000 Soviet is a figure so blatantly implausible that it can be dismissed without further ado. Compare it with the fact that Soviet casualties in Bagration was roughly twice the German figures despite several hundred thousand German POWs, and that overall casualty levels in 1944, a year in which almost all major fighting came in the form of victorious Soviet operations, was almost 4:1 in the German favour, and a 15:1 Soviet edge in losses at Yassi-Kishinev....Secondly, this comparison in any case neatly illustrates the pointlessness of the IL concept when one is discussing combat efficiency. The large numbers of prisoners reflects primarily the outcome of the operation, not the effectiveness with which it was carried out.”

I’m sorry, but disregarding values out of hand, because of the propaganda label is getting tiresome, to say the least.

“See above. If you include all casualties, rather than just what is included in the somewhat arbitrary IL construct, the ratio is the other way around 1:2 in the German favour.

Sorry if I seem negative - I do consider that
the Soviets succeeded in developing methods which allowed them to capitalise on their main assets to win the war. However, these methods I think reflect the shortcomings of the red army more than it reflects doctrinal excellence, and the nature of their main assets - above all a large force level superiority - remains the basic reason for their success. Without it, their operational concepts would have been neither practicable, sustainable or effective.”

2:1 in German favor, by your reckoning? That indicates to me a German effectiveness in Bagration that is half of overall German abilities in 1944. Interesting.

So, by your definition Soviet shortcomings were based on their lack of flexibility and versatility at the tactical level? But you see Soviet numerical superiority as … what? An unfair advantage? A transient factor? When I speak of Soviet operational art, I speak of it as a Soviet methodology for war at the operational level that facilitates the Soviet tactical level, and provides an effective means of achieving Soviet strategic goals. It provided the Red Army with the means of minimizing their weakness (tactical versatility) while maximizing their strength (numerical superiority). Soviet numerical strength was a national characteristic, a strategic factor that had implications all the way down to the tactical level. It wasn’t going to go away. I’ve never read of commanders who were ready to eschew numbers if it meant victory.

Also while the ger plans might have been for a quick war they did not roll over and die just because the war went longer then anytime before. They kept succeding operationalally and even strategically for at least 18 months. Over 10 times longer then any war before. Aiming for a quick victory but adapting for what ever happened is the best strtegy. It was only rus immense size that prevented total victory early on.

Whille the ger may not of suceed in meeting every one of thier objectives they did succeed in meeting over 90% of them thats why they got as far as they did by late 42. Now at this point how many of the sov objectives had been meet?

Logistical shortcommings can be at every level but the reasons for it are more strategical then tactical with a bit of operational thrown in.

In 1941 to 42 the ger were victorius in rus despite being at war with two other coutries at the same time. Conducting operations from the atlantic to north africa nad england and germany with some degree of sucess. The strategic situation by mid 43 produced a sit where ger in the east was limited to minor attacking alone. The ger deafeats in 43 were not caused by any tactical or even operational shortcoming with respect to the rus. What they were the result of the incredibly poor strategic situation. Add up the GDP of all these coutryies thier pop army size etc... And compare it to ger in 43 without even italy to help them.

By 1944 when the ger suffered defeat in the east and west the sov numercal adv was even higher more rus less ger and other axis changing side. Plus the strategic situation for ger with a real two front war was even worse. By 1944 the US GDP alone was 4 times germanys and the US had an armed forces almost equal in size to the gers. Meanwhile during 44 the ger lost thier ocupied terr and thier alllies.

Now somehow you think of the ger defeat as mainly operational without any evidence to prove otherwise. It seems the biggest problem for ger was not any unproven operational shortcoming but thier incredibly poor srtategic situation.

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Your ideas that ger had no concept of operational art up to the end of 42 and that the sov were somehow superman is presposterous.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
A grossly inaccurate interpretation of my comments, to say the least. Darrin, it's this sort of intellectual sloppiness that compels me to refrain from responding to your replies. Your comments are often little more than propaganda, shocking as that may sound to you.

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The difference was that the Soviets had not only conducted in-depth studies on the nature of operations and their sustainment, but also the nature, tempo and sustainment of series of supporting operations.

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I think any good staff starts preparing for follow-on operations while they are conducting their current effort. That the Soviets had codified "successive operations" is a reflection of how they wrote/studied, not that they were doing something that nobody else was doing.

In general, one gets a lot of disconnects between what was written in the Soviet system and what was actually done.

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Also, the Soviets were very concerned with the sustainment of operations...

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Then they probably should have concentrated a little more on logistics.

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Tactical inferiority was felt
keenly on the Voronezh Front, because of the lack of initiative.

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Their operational manuever in the defensive phase at Kursk was sorely lacking also. They were holding onto troops in the wrong sectors, leaving sectors open, not supporting units, not protecting thier flanks, dashing hither and dither in almost what appeared to be a panic, recalling units on the march, etc.

I don't see a lot of operational art in this operation. I can list out a dozen or more examples to support this.

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Thus, operationally, Voronezh front's operation was a success.

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Yes, they did stop the German attack, but at three times the losses. This was due to failures at the tactical level (which I gather you consider division-level) but also in their corps and army-level operations.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Your comments about casualty rates sort of nudged me to do a bit of researching of my own on the subject.

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Ah yes, quantitative analysis. It should be the starting point of any understanding of the military affairs. Thanks for trying.

Couple of points:

1) Really need to have a number of cases to make such analysis effective. This requires more than 2 (which is a lot of work, which is why most people don't bother).

2) You really need to have a mix of cases, i.e. comparing those cases of the Germans on the attack, vice the Soviets vice the US (for example, as we are developing with our CADB, Campaign Data Base, covering Army-level operations).

3) You really need to make sure your figures are good.

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Of German irrevocable losses the Soviets claim 100,000 dead and 98,000 captured.

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Okay, this is a fundamental mistake. One should not rely on the other sides figures for losses, especially in the case of the Soviet Union. Just to establish this point, in my book I do actually report the Soviet claims compared to actual German losses to show how far off they can be. This is the basis for the creation of the myth of Prokhorovka.

It is important that time is spent to make sure the data is right. 1) If the data is wrong, the conclusions are left with no support (although not necessarily not correct). See Appendix VII of our Urban Warfare report (available as a download) for an example of someone who builds an entire study and conclusions with very flawed application of data (the case is the RAND report "Heavy Matter" written by Glenn).

2) Nobody ever checks the data....so if you do something wrong, it could stand for a very long time (Ptolomy's fudging of his data stood for almost 2,000 years, even though the data has errors in it!).

Granted there is one major author on the Eastern Front regularly quotes Soviet claims of German losses without further comment, but this is a fundamental flaw of his work and his subsequent analysis drawn from it.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Undoubtedly, numerical superiority was crucial to Soviet tactical art.

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Numerical superiority, in terms of combat power, is crucial to everybodies tactical art.

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They didn't possess the qualitative ability to best the Germans, thus their quantitative factor was essential. Soviet operational art provided the means of insuring and enhancing this advantage. And though the Soviets enjoyed numerical superiority throughout most of the war, it didn't reach an overall 3:1 advantage until October 1944. A Soviet numerical advantage of 2:1 wasn't first attained until February 1943, then fell below this mark until October of 1943 when it was reached once more.

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An overall theater superiority of 2:1 can make acheiving local superiorities very simple. For instance, if that superiority is 1,000 versus 500, it is possible for the superior force to concentrate 400 on 400, and 600 on 100, establishing a simple 6:1 superiority. If the attacker is willing to accept lesser odds on some fronts these superiorities can be even greater and are of course magnified when the numbers reach millions.

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This I disagree with, especially when one realizes the sort of kill ratio the Germans had over the Soviets in general. If I have an overall 2:1 advantage over an opponent, it doesn't mean I can just accumulate a 5:1 or 7:1 operational advantage at whim. Especially against a foe as adept in the use of mobile reserves, and possessing superior intrinsic combat effectiveness.

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Of course not "at whim." That in fact is the essence of operational art, since it is actually unusual for one side to acheive such superiorities. Operational art is in acheiving superiorities, the methods are varied and ancient. It is the implication that the Soviets "invented" a "superior" or "unique" method of operational art that I have problems with (not that I am saying that is what you claim ).

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I will be more precise on this. German operational art was limited to the tactical-operational linkage. It did not consider the operational-strategic linkage, because of doctrine. The quick decisive war advocated by the Germans did not give due consideration to extended operations. The focus was primarily on the operation itself, at the operational level. Thus, the Germans focused on the use of tactical actions in a successive, supporting manner, working toward an operational goal. They didn't go much further than that. The Soviets, on the other hand, did. They focused on the use of operations in a successive, supporting manner, toward either an operational or strategic goal. The Germans had nothing in this regard, likely because their doctrine of a quick war saw it as redundant.

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This is all quite true and something that Chris and I have discussed for some length over the past ten-odd years. But the absence of German operational-strategic and strategic planning does not imply that the same did not exist for the Americans and the British.

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As for tactical preoccupation, I contend this was exactly what happened in the German Army, primarily because their tactical art was defined, whereas their operational art was not. Hence, German operational art was an almost intuitive process for your average German operator.

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A bit lyric (not a criticism BTW), but accurate.

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I’ve already given my impression of German operations. As for American operations, two things come to mind: cautious and on a broad front.

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Given the experience with German tactical superiority caution was most warranted. And the "broad front" business is a straw man and always has been, fronts don't get much broader than the Eastern Front. I suggest you check some of the operational densities acheived by the Allies and compare them with the Soviets (but first omit the plethora of 82mm and 120mm mortars and 76.2 mm regimental and divisional guns forming the backbone of the Soviet artillery) the results are often surprising (I doubt that any army every acheived the densities of Ninth Army in eliminating the Geilenkirchen salient).

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The Americans were even more dependent upon their firepower than the Soviets.

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A statement I have seen more than once and which always leaves me bewildered. Absent being dependent on firepower you have maneuver and shock, neither of which kills, and operations do not succeed without killing. The Germans also relied heavily on firepower, but were more dependent, like the Soviets, upon direct fire.

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Patton was the exception. He would’ve made a fine Soviet tank army commander.

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Wow, damning with faint praise at the same time as you miss the essence of the man. Patton was both a doctrinaire American firepower amn and a cavalryman, Soviet tank armies required cavalry skills only.

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I doubt their capabilities were developed enough to conduct something of the complexity of a Belorussian or Vistula-Oder or Manchurian operation, and American operations never manifested an ability for it in WWII.

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Operations HUSKY, AVALANCHE, OVERLORD, DRAGOON, COBRA-TOTALIZE, GRENADE, and VARSITY are just of few of the examples that can be used to dispute that.

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I’m sorry, but disregarding values out of hand, because of the propaganda label is getting tiresome, to say the least.

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No propaganda problem here, just one of good sense. Casualties should be assessed whenever possible from the operational reports of both opposing sides. That Soviet claims of German losses are inaccurate is a simple fact of life, the same way that British and American claims of German losses are inaccurate. Note that the reverse applies as well. The problem with your analysis is that the actual German losses are easily accessible and may be compared to those of the Soviets.

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<snip>Soviet military art served Soviet purposes just fine, allowing them to conduct a land-locked war on a huge scale for over a period of roughly four years. And, for three of those years with key areas of their country occupied. Would it have served well for a massive amphibious operation like Overlord? No. Would it have done any good on an island hopping campaign across the Pacific? Probably not. But, the Soviets had no intentions in that regard, much less interest. It did not serve their strategic goals.

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"Undoubtedly, numerical superiority was crucial to Soviet tactical art. They didn't possess the qualitative ability to best the Germans, thus their quantitative factor was essential. Soviet operational art provided the means of insuring and enhancing this advantage. "

Agreed - but the question then is how much of the results can be attributed to the quantitative factor, and how much to the operational art that enhanced it? It seemed to me you are uncomfortably close to seeing the resulting operations as too much a direct reflection of the latter alone.

"And though the Soviets enjoyed numerical superiority throughout most of the war, it didn't reach an overall 3:1 advantage until October 1944. A Soviet numerical advantage of 2:1 wasn't first attained until February 1943, then fell below this mark until October of 1943 when it was reached once more."

Rich pointed out the crucial factor here - a given overall numerical advantage should usually result in much larger local ones, and the more so the longer the front is (because a longer front requires a larger number of troops simply to man anything like a continous defensive line). I would also point tothe fact that the Soviet numerical superiority in tanks and artillery was much, much more pronounced than their superiority in manpower, and these superiorities are of course particularly relevant to offensive operations.

"As to the Soviet method, yes, it presupposed numerical superiority. But, the Germans presupposed that they had superior mobility and C&C ability, which they had. Thus, I'm not sure what you're driving at. "

Well, the former is a quantitative factor, the latter a qualitative. My admittedly implicit assumption was that the latter is basically internal to doctrine as it reflects perhaps chiefly a chosen way to allow staffs at all levels to function and is as much a product of command approach as of material factors, whereas the former is basically an extraneous factor. A further underlying assumption is that an effective doctrine or operational method that does not rely on superior numbers for success is inherently superior to one that does, because the measure of military effectiveness is pretty much the amount of combat power you can generate per man and weapons system you employ. This may of course be somewhat debatable.

" For the Soviets, numbers were their bread and butter, their ‘ace in the hole.’ I’ll never deny that. And to be perfectly honest, I find nothing inferior about that, so long as one can determine the best method of capitalizing on it. "

and

" Must a force highlight tactical flexibility and versatility to win? It depends on the situation and the nature of the forces involved."

It also depends on the cost you are preapred to pay for victory. Whatever the merits of the Soviet approach, it consistently purchased gains at a disproportionate cost, which must I think also be assessed as part of the equation, and one that IMO does not suggest that there is no problem as such with relying on numbers.

"
By 1929, Soviet military analysts had already determined that the minimum grouping for such an attack was roughly 3 armies. That’s anywhere from 240,000 to 300,000 troops that need to be regrouped. Is this something the Germans would’ve missed, assuming no deception on the Soviets’ part, and if not, then they wouldn’t have responded to by shifting reserves? I say this, because the Soviets did not possess enough numbers to attack at whim without significant regrouping."

That's assuming that the Germans possessed sufficient reserves to shift, which they on the whole did not. Bagration might be a good example of both the significance of deception and it's limitations as an explanatory factor. The Germans were duped into massing their reserves in the South, which of course contributed significantly to Bagration's success. On the other hand, even if they hadn't, it seems quite unlikely that they would have been able to accumulate sufficient forces in the Mitte area to deal effectively with the offensive. And the Soviets also did have the ability to execute several large offensive drives at once, as they di during the summer of 1943.

"
I’m sorry, but disregarding values out of hand, because of the propaganda label is getting tiresome, to say the least."

As Rich and Chris have already pointed out, the issue is rather that if you choose to use a value you need to be reasonably certain it is relatively accurate. Since Soviet claims concerning German losses generally is very far from that, this simply is not a relevant value because it is essentially unsourced. It may of course conceivably be right, but the only way to find out is to dig up the German figure, in which case you do not need the Soviet figure any more.

"2:1 in German favor, by your reckoning? That indicates to me a German effectiveness in Bagration that is half of overall German abilities in 1944. Interesting."

How? Considering that this was possibly the worst catastrophe to enguld the German army during the whole war, and that the vast bulk of casualties came in the form of POWs as whole armies were encircled and destroyed, one would hardly expect the casualty exchange ratio to be average or better? The startling thing is really rather that a battle that could hardly have ended more catastrphically than it did for the Germans still saw them inflicting casualties a positive ratio.

Apart from all this I must say you do make several valid and well-reasoned points, and I too would like to say thanks for a quite interesting discussion.

regards,

KA

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An overall theater superiority of 2:1 can make acheiving local superiorities very simple. For instance, if that superiority is 1,000 versus 500, it is possible for the superior force to concentrate 400 on 400, and 600 on 100, establishing a simple 6:1 superiority. If the attacker is willing to accept lesser odds on some fronts these superiorities can be even greater and are of course magnified when the numbers reach millions.

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Or.....to quote a letter:

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Executive Mansion
September 19, 1863

Major General Halleck:

By General Meade's despatch to you of yesterday it appears that he desires your views and those of the government as to whether he shall advance upon the enemy. I am not prepared to order, or even advise, an advance in this case, wherein I know so little of the particulars, and wherein he, in the field, thinks the risk is so great, and the promise of advantage so small.

And yet the case presents matters for very serious consideration in another aspect. These two armies confront each other across a small river, substantially mind-way between the two capitals, each defending its own capital, and menacing the other. General Meade estimates the enemy's infantry in front of him at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add fifty per cent to this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men stretching as far as Richomnd, making the whole force of the enemy 60,000.

General Meade, as shown by the returns, has with him, and between him and Washington, of the same classes of well men, over 90,000. Neither can bring the whole of his men into a battle; but each can bring as large a percentage in as the other. For a battle, then, General Meade has three men to General Lee's two. Yet it having been determined that choosing ground and standing on the defensive give so great advantage that the three cannot safely attack the two, the three are left simply standing on the defensive also. If the enemy 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of ours keep their 60,000 away from Washington, leaving us 50,000 to put to some other use? Having practically come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to employ twice as many men for that object as are needed. With no object, certianly, to mislead myself, I can percieve no fault in this statement, unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy, man for man. I hope you will consider it.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his intrenchments at Richmond, and then to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year.

My judgement is so clear against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to made if the general in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city.

Yours truly,

A. Lincoln

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Your most recent post still doesn't address my point.

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We appear to be speaking in different languages.

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It is not so much a question as to whether the Soviets could've massed sufficient forces tactically to create higher odds than the overall numerical ratio, as it is to whether they could've successfully massed sufficient forces to create [b]operational success.[/b]

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The two kind of go together, and once you have massed enough forces, you kind of have both aspects. Certianly if you mass sufficient forces to create operational success you will also have higher odds (or at least higher combat power), and conversely, if you have high enough odds (or combat power) for "tactical success" then you have at least made a good start on acheiving operational success.

I simply do not understand how you are seperating the two issues so distinctly.

Lincoln was clearly talking "operational art" here, even though the term did not exist at the time (but the term "Grand Tactics" was in use, which basically means the same thing).

"Kjetil was of the opinion that German reserves did not exist in sufficient quantity to effectively respond to such massive Soviet regroupings. I feel otherwise, but it is just conjecture at this point."

Well, by late July 1943 (when the overall force ratio was considerably less favourable to the Soviets than a year later), the Germans were effectively engaged in four major operations simultaneously: A Soviet offensive against HG Nord, The offensive against the Orel salient, their own attack at Kursk and the Soviet offensive against the Mius line. Uncommitted operational reserves were effectively down to a single 3-division Panzer Corps. It is notable that even at Kursk, where the Germans were themselves attacking and had made every effort to concentrate maximum fighting power, the Soviets were able to achieve a significantly better strength ratio than along the front as a whole, successfully oppose the German drive and simultaneously carry out three relatively successful major offensives of their own. This I think hardly suggests that your feeling is accurate. On the contrary, it suggests that the Soviets possessed the resources neccessary to swamp their adversary with operations which he simply lacked the resources to counter effectively. This of course required solid strategic handling, but I do not see that it essentially required concealment of intention or any special art of force concentration (which is after all something that any competent army is capable of).

Also agree with Chris' comments.

regards,

His reference two personal interviews with greman army group intell officers during the war. And a ger document captured by the west indicating the ger armys offical opion in the matter.

Now the book was first pub in 1978 25 years ago. But its was written and reserched maybe 30 years ago. The two interviews occured in 1970 and 72. And no date or author is given for the document just a reference to look it up.

Obviously other data may have came out in the last 30 years that may have some bearing on Davids postion. Also deppending on when the document refereed to early vs late war may also be a factor. But two ger intel officers who served with at least two different army groups and remianed active till the end of war are of the opinon deception rarly suceeded.

Now that is just thier opion offered 25 years after the war. But they were in a postion they should have noticed any deceptions. I should also like to point out that although Khan says no deceptions succseeded ie were not found out it seems more likly that very few succeeded in NOT being found out before launch. And while he is not a russian expert whether or not deceptions failed really calls for expert knoledge of the ger system which he is and uses references to prove.

Also it seems quite likly that although maybe 10% of rus decption may have suceeded in not being noticed many other had a large effect even if noticed. The problem was decptions even when uncovrered may have to little notice to act to. It might take a few days to notice the first clue a few more days to have this first info confirmed. Then this info has to move up and down the chain of command. Divs have to be moved sometimes from 1000s of km away in the face of air power, partisan etc... Then the divs have to be not in combat to move rapidly and also hopefully be near full str. Then of cource you need to have enough divs to have an effect. As I said as of 22 jun 44 almost half of all the ger PDs were tied up agaisnt the west.

Deceptions rarly suceeded in remaining unknown. It was delay in seeing the decep and moving forces to deal with it which was more of the problem. Also not getting most divs tied down fighting on the front and keeping these forces near full str was a factor. Especially latter in the war when over a third of the ger divs were tied down not just fighting the rus forces but also the west.

Also you have to remeber intel was never a perfect stroy. It was a best guess at what the enemy had and was tring to do. The first being easier than the second. Failure is too be expected here on a regular bais. The fact that acoording to the ger army most soviet deceptions were discovered points to the germas being able see through the rus haze.

Also just because the deceptions seeemed to bear fruit sometimes does not mean they actually were not detected before launch. It could be dalays in getting forces to the postion and finding free combat capable forces to move was more of the problem then real decpetion.

While numerical superiority at the operational level will most certainly translate into numerical superiority at the tactical level, the converse is not true. WWI proved that many times. The battle of Cambrai and the 1918 Ludendorff offensive both serve as well known examples in this regard. By WWII, along the Russian front under general stable conditions an offensive conducted by 50,000 troops would've had limited success. You would've needed at least three to four times that number, which is also three to four times the level of activity within a given area.

Kjetil,

It's interesting you picked 1943 as an example. The summer counteroffensive of 1943 was pretty much planned as front-wide, and because of it casualties were quite heavy. Very heavy, in fact. Partially because of these losses the STAVKA made a decision to attempt no further front-wide offensives. Two other reasons were that the front would eventually contract as the advance continued westwards, and the terrain would become more defensible due to more varied geography and urban development. So, while late 1943 saw some substantial Soviet advances, it came at a heavy cost. With Soviet manpower beginning to run dry, the STAVKA determined something else had to be developed to insure operational success.

So, yes, I agree that 1943 was generally an example of the typical perception of the 'Soviet hordes,' but even in 1943 there were exceptions. For example, the Kiev operation where von Manstein seemed to have thought Soviets were massed all along the front when in fact they were initially massed at the Bukrin Bend, then secretly regrouped at Lyutezh. The Zhitomer-Berdichev is another one where von Mellenthin seems to have not been aware of the regrouping that went on there until it was too late.

From 1944 on, however, the image of the ever present 'Soviet hordes' is flawed.

That's the problem with half-truths like this. One can say the Soviets had numbers, but fail to understand, or admit, that it was more complex than that. Numbers can mean success, but to what degree? And at what point might those numbers begin to produce diminishing returns due to exposure from such widespread pre-operational activity? Just what sort of odds were needed to defeat a tactically superior foe? Delve into these questions more deeply and one may find that the Soviets actually didn't have enough to go around for unlimited operational success.

Darrin,

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
While numerical superiority at the operational level will most certainly translate into numerical superiority at the tactical level, the converse is not true.

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Greg,

I am not sure how to respond to this, as I fear I must interpret it first and am afraid that I will misinterpret it. I am also not sure as to which of my points we are debating. If I have numerical superiority at the tactical level, I may or may not have it at the operational level...but I am not sure exactly what is the point of this. If your point is that 50,000 troops was not enough to make a big difference on the Eastern Front, than this is not suprising considering the size and scale of the front.