Charles Lemmons is curator at the Patton Museum, I ran across these posts of his in another message board, I'm wondering if you have, or know where to find the reference docs he alludes to. Also, can you shed any further light on engagement ranges either in the West or East Front?

Stuff like average range, perhaps some percentage breakdown over different ranges?

Re: is the M4 Sherman misunderstood?
Posted By: charles lemons <Send E-Mail>
Date: Thurs-Dec-2-04 at 14:50 hr
In Response To: Re: is the M4 Sherman misunderstood? (Bill)

I will have to correct myself a little. The following information was drawn from a Ballistic Research Laboratories Report (#590) entitled "The Range and Angular Distribution of A.P. Hits on Tanks" by R. H. Peterson, APG, December 1951. Taking information from both British and American reports in the Northern European theater, the author states that based on the range distributions the Average range of opening combat for tanks was 660 yards. A bit more than I first stated. However, he stated the following "It is to be noted that the range at which the most encounters took place was 300 yards or 1/2 the average range." Noting the graph accompanying part of the report - "For example, from the graph 67% of all engagements were at ranges greater than 200 yards and 65% were at ranges greater than 400 yards. Hence 22% or about 1/5 of all engagements were at ranges between 200 and 400 yards. Only 2% of all engagements were at ranges greater than 2000 yards."

Confusing isn't it.

Re: is the M4 Sherman misunderstood?
Posted By: charles lemons <Send E-Mail>
Date: Tues-Nov-30-04 at 10:41 hr
In Response To: Re: is the M4 Sherman misunderstood? (Bob Smart)

The first Panthers we ran in to were defeated by the Sherman and the TD. Again, with opening ranges of less than 500 yards, the Sherman could hold its own against many of the German tanks - IF IT GOT THE FIRST SHOT - and that shot was anything than a front shot. However, by the time we hit the main land in France - we are up against an enemy which is fighting a mostly defensive war. Most Allied tank casualties come from PAKs - not tanks. A study showed that most allied tanks were knocked out by weapons that they were not engaging. It also showed that the tank which fired first usually won the contest. As much as we talk about the "Cats" - there are a lot more Pz III and Pz IVs on the battlefields of Europe. Most of your Tigers are engaged on the front for which they were designed - the Eastern Front - where the open stepps allowed them to take advantage of the larger, long range, 88mm gun. In France, the lowlands and Germany, ranges were usually a lot less than 500 meters and the tank with the quickest traverse and most stable gun platform often came out the winner in a meeting engagement. Off course, when you run into a PAK front, it takes the loss of a couple of tanks to ID the PAK locations - which you can usually knock out easily with gun, small arms or bombs. Let's face it - knocking out PAKs are not usually counted by Tank Ace afficiandos as a kill.

Re: is the M4 Sherman misunderstood?
Posted By: charles lemons <Send E-Mail>
Date: Mon-Nov-29-04 at 16:02 hr
In Response To: Re: is the M4 Sherman misunderstood? (Bill)

Actually, the Sherman was not designed as an attrition weapon - it was designed (far from the battlefield) as an infantry support weapon. We had a solid design that was adaptable and easy to build - that's one reason we can build nearly 50,000 of them in four years. But because of the established doctrine, a larger, more powerful gun was not going to be approved. The M36B1 Sherman (I think) showed that a 90mm gun turret could be safely mounted on the Sherman tank. You don't build a tank that well if you are just going to throw it away - even though that is what appeared to be happening. What failed here was the doctrine - not the equipment.

Re: is the M4 Sherman-- another clarification
Posted By: charles lemons <Send E-Mail>
Date: Mon-Nov-29-04 at 15:55 hr

In Response To: Re: is the M4 Sherman-- another clarification (DWS (curm))

Of course the fact that the average opening combat range in the European theater was less than 475 yards did mean that if a Sherman caught a Panther or a Tiger I in a side shot, it was dead. The fact that Shermans did knock off the Panther and Tiger I (both of them classed as heavy tanks in the US arsenal) shows that the Sherman was a bit better than some think.

Re: is the M4 Sherman misunderstood?
Posted By: charles lemons <Send E-Mail>
Date: Sun-Nov-28-04 at 12:41 hr
In Response To: is the M4 Sherman misunderstood? (shawn)

The Sherman tank is often mis-understood. I have often said that, for what it was designed to do, it was an excellent vehicle. Dependable, well armored (for 1941), well armed (for its primary mission) and easy to operate. Other things to think about are ease of transportation and (in some ways) the ease at which it could be upgraded without screwing up the supply system. However - it was never intended as a "main battle tank" but rather an infantry support vehicle. The fact that it could defend itself against tanks designed for the anti-tank role is something that should be noted.

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Originally posted by AlexH:

Charles Lemmons is curator at the Patton Museum, I ran across these posts of his in another message board, I'm wondering if you have, or know where to find the reference docs he alludes to.

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I would hazard a guess that the origin of these figures is the study done by E. Benn and R. W. Shephard in December 1951, and available at the PRO, Kew as WO 291/1212, "Ranges of engagement in the ATk battle".

Shephard is one of the authors of "Applied Operations Research" (Plenum Press, New York, 1988, by Shephard, Hartley, Haysman, Thorpe and Bathe) which includes a problem based on this study and a table giving what appears to be the original raw data gleaned from unit war diaries.

The formula

P = 1 – exp (–R/K)

was found to be a good expression for the proportion, P, of engagements that occur at ranges of less than R yards.

For NW Europe, K is about 950 yards.

90% of engagements occur at less than 2200 yards;
80% of engagements occur at less than 1500 yards;
50% of engagements occur at less than 650 yards.

Hope this is of some interest; sorry I can't supply anything for other fronts.

All the best,

John.

[This message has been edited by John D Salt (edited 06-11-2005).]

Thanks for the input, I've been looking for a "hard" read on engagement ranges in both the E&W fronts. Haven't come up with much, Mr. Lemmons' post is at least a clue on where to look. I'll follow up on your quoted source.

I've had the impression that perhaps the firepower gap between German and Allied tanks was mitigated by the fact that engagement ranges fell more often than not within the killing envelope of Allied guns. I'm mainly thinking the US 76mm. For example, IF 50% of engagements took place under 650 yds, then basically whomever got in the first shot was the likely victor. At longer ranges, the Germans would have had the advantage, of course.

Also, it would be interesting to find out if any such analysis was taken into account when decisions were made (or not) about upgunning the Sherman. To me, it is unexplainable why - having proven a 90mm gun was viable in '42 - the Sherman wasn't upgunned until much later.

Btw, I've visited your webpage - great info there.

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Originally posted by AlexH:
Also, it would be interesting to find out if any such analysis was taken into account when decisions were made (or not) about upgunning the Sherman. To me, it is unexplainable why - having proven a 90mm gun was viable in '42 - the Sherman wasn't upgunned until much later.

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Uh, Alex? Just how was "such analysis" that was completed circa 1951 supposed to have been "taken into account" when decisions about upgunning the Sherman would have had to have been made circa 1942?

And where has it "been proven" that a 90mm gun was "viable" in 1942? And what does that mean? The production of the M3 90mm Tank Gun did not begin until August 1943. Production of various types of the 90mm Antiaircraft Gun did actually begin in February 1941, but an antiaircraft gun is not a tank gun and the M1A1 and M2 AA Gun required considerable modification before it became the M3. And are you going to divert all 90mm AA gun production to tank guns by waving a magic wand? But why do that in 1942 when everyone knows the threat is Axis bombers?

And so on and so on....

quote:

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Originally posted by AlexH:
Also, it would be interesting to find out if any such analysis was taken into account when decisions were made (or not) about upgunning the Sherman. To me, it is unexplainable why - having proven a 90mm gun was viable in '42 - the Sherman wasn't upgunned until much later.

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Hi Alex

Depending on when in 1942 we are talking about, it is quite likely that the only threat that was seen was the Panzer IV in an uparmoured variety. Something the 75mm gun was perfectly capable at killing at range over the frontal arc.

Then you have the doctrinal failure that was the Tank Destroyer idea, so having the Sherman with a good gun to combat infantry had some value.

All the best

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Then you have the doctrinal failure that was the Tank Destroyer idea, so having the Sherman with a good gun to combat infantry had some value.

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Over the years I have become less and less convinced of the "Tank Destroyers" doctrinal failure premise. Rather, I see it as more an organizational failure. As conceived the Tank Destroyer was little different from any existing antitank doctrine and like the US armored doctrine borrowed heavily from perceptions of what constituted the German threat. The "failure" though - if there was one - was to overcomplicate the organizational structure in a attempt to "streamline" non-divisional structures in the army, which was a false economy. The plethora of "seperate" combat support units such as engineers and field artillery worked, while the seperate tank and tank destroyer structure was a needless complication that led to tactical and logistical problems.

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Originally posted by Rich:
As conceived the Tank Destroyer was little different from any existing antitank doctrine and like the US armored doctrine borrowed heavily from perceptions of what constituted the German threat.

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Hi Rich

I would argue that any country's doctrine failed, as long as it divided between anti-tank and infantry-support AFVs.

I.e. the doctrinal failure is by no means restricted to the US, and it being similar to other countries' doctrines does not mean it was not a failure, just that the US was not alone in experiencing it. There are certainly good reasons for developing the doctrine, but the analysis based on these reasons led to a faulty outcome, in my view.

This is clearly a 20/20 hindsight judgement, and is not intended to criticise those who came up with the doctrine at the time.

All the best

Andreas

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Originally posted by Rich:
Uh, Alex? Just how was "such analysis" that was completed circa 1951 supposed to have been "taken into account" when decisions about upgunning the Sherman would have had to have been made circa 1942?

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I just knew that you'd pop in if there was a Sherman topic anywhere near "sniffing" range. [ ]

What I meant was that perhaps tactical experience was taken into consideration were taken into account in the decision to upgun (or not) the Sherman. Perhaps someone "knew"(sic) that - for example - what really mattered was penetration at 400yds, not 1000.

quote:

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And where has it "been proven" that a 90mm gun was "viable" in 1942?

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quote:

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Originally posted by AlexH:

I've had the impression that perhaps the firepower gap between German and Allied tanks was mitigated by the fact that engagement ranges fell more often than not within the killing envelope of Allied guns. I'm mainly thinking the US 76mm. For example, IF 50% of engagements took place under 650 yds, then basically whomever got in the first shot was the likely victor. At longer ranges, the Germans would have had the advantage, of course.

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A quick riffle through the bookshelves turns up the following additional information:

AORG Memo no. C6, "A survey of tank warfare in Europe from D-Day to 12 August 1944", by H.G. Gee, May 1952 (available at the PRO as WO 291/1218), is based on 112 tank vs. tank actions fought by 21 AG. It gives the mean engagement ranges for this sample as 400 yards in close country, and 1200 yards in open country.

BRL Memo no. 798, "Data on World War II tank enegagements involving the US Third and Fourth Armored Divisions", by D. C. Hardison, June 1954, is based on 86 tank vs. tank and tank vs. anti-tank engagements fought by the divisions mentioned. It gives the average ranges at which tanks were destroyed, in yards, as follows:

Allied tanks__Enemy tanks__Place
476____________N/A_______Vicinity Stollberg
959____________733_______Roer to Rhein
1000___________833_______Belgian Bulge
1260___________936_______Vicinity Arracourt
1116___________831_______Sarre
731____________915_______Relief of Bastogne

The overall mean casualty ranges are given as 946 yds for Allied and 893 yds for enemy tanks.

Both the above reports mention the very strong apparent influence of firing first on winning an engagement.

PRO document WO 291/180, "Accuracy of anti-tank gunnery", states that probability of a hit is the factor that controls open-fire range for anti-tank guns rather than penetration probability. The paper specifically considers the cases of 6-pdr and 17-pdr anti-tank guns engaging Tiger (presumably with APDS available for 6-pdr).

"Red Army Handbook 1939-1945", by S. J. Zaloga and L. S. Ness, 1998 (Alan Sutton, Thrupp) gives on page 179 a table of the ranges in metres at which Soviet tanks and assault guns were knocked out by 75mm and 88mm guns in 1943-44, as follows

Range_______75mm gun_____88mm gun
100-200_______10.0%_________4.0%
200-400_______26.1%________14.0%
400-600_______33.5%________18.0%
600-800_______14.5%________31.2%
800-1000_______7.0%________13.5%
1000-1200______4.5%_________8.5%
1200-1400______3.6%_________7.6%
1400-1600______0.4%_________2.0%
1600-1800______0.4%_________0.7%
1800-2000______0.0%_________0.5%

The original has omitted the line for 600-800 metres, so I have calculated the entries for that line by subtracting the sum of each column from 100%.

What can we conclude from all this? Well, I think you're clearly right about the importance of the first shot, which is very strongly emphasised by both Gee and Hardison's reports. I also think that the relatively small differences between the US and German casualty ranges in Hardison's report show that there was not that much of a German range advantage, and WO 291/180 specifically states that hit probability matters more than penetration power.

On the question of the 90mm gun for the Sherman, Hunnicutt's wonderful "Sherman: A history of the American medim tank" (Presidio Press, Novato, 1994) covers this matter on p. 212. A BRL study dated 31 October 1942 reported that is was feasible, though awkward, to mount a 90mm gun in the Sherman turret. A new 90mm gun with a shorter cartridge case was suggested, as was a 3-inch gun with very high chamber pressure giving similar penetration performance to the standard 90mm. The story continues:

"By the Fall of 1943, the Armored Board had concluded that only the Sherman could be available in sufficient quantity in time for the Normandy invasion. They then requested that 90mm guns be installed in 1000 M4A3s. Ordnance did not concur, contending that the heavier weapon badly overlaoded the Sherman and that the proper solution was the early production of the new T20 series with the 90mm gun. The Armored Board request was rejected by the Army Ground Forces on the grounds that the destruction of enemy tanks was a job for the artillery and the tank destroyers. It was felt that the provision of such a powerful gun would encourage tank versus tank battles thus diverting tanks from their role as a maneuvering element and weapon of exploitation."

Hunnicutt is of the opinion that, had the need for a high-powered gun been recognised a year before the Normandy landings rather than after them, they certainly could have been made available.

All the best,

John.

quote:

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Originally posted by AlexH:
What I meant was that perhaps tactical experience was taken into consideration were taken into account in the decision to upgun (or not) the Sherman. Perhaps someone "knew"(sic) that - for example - what really mattered was penetration at 400yds, not 1000.

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Despite the risk of belaboring the point I must again ask which "tactical experience" in 1942 by the US Army you think would have resulted in anyone "knowing" anything of the sort? Or am I wasting my time yet again with you? Or are you simply attempting to make my day a little more surreal?

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IIRC at Aberdeen PG, I'm going from memory here, but you know what I'm talking about, we've discussed it before.

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No, the testing at Aberdeen indicated that a 90mm mounted on a Sherman chassis was "practicable", as was proven correct in the M36 - in 1943. But that doesn't make it "viable". Viability for such a program required a number of things, none of which occurred at this time and most of which required some degree of prescience on the part of the principles if they were to have occurred.

1) FDR would be required to junk his plans for CONUS defense based upon interceptor squadrons and masses of 90mm antiaircraft guns, no later than mid 1942.
1a) The alternative would be to expand 90mm production beyond what was originally done, requiring extensive additional plant and capital outlay (gun tubes have always been a bottleneck, it was advantageous to produce 3" guns because it was a standard Army and Navy caliber with existing forge and lathe equipment designed for its production, 90mm was entirely new and production initially was quite slow.
2) The Armored Force would have had to forseen a requirement for armor penetration far exceeding anything believed neccessary prior to 1943.
3) The Ordnance Corps would have had to had the expertise to rapidly transform the "practicable" 90mm installation into an effective installation that fulfilled future Armored Force requirements. Both the M36 and T26 as originally designed could not fulfill requirements when they came to be fielded, resulting in major field modifications to the M36 and a comlete redesign of the T26.

Thanks for the info - its a keeper.

Rich,

You paint a scenario that sounds like procuring 90mm guns would stop the US war effort!

As you know, the US developed entirely new vehicles during the war, A 90mm afv could, and should, have been fielded in 1943. Lets take a look at the development history of various afvs:

M3 Grant/Lee

13-Jun-40 Updated Requirements
11-Jul-40 Standardized as M3
26-Aug-40 Wooden Mockup shown at Aberdeen Proving Grounds
20-Dec-40 Production Drawings 905 Complete
Apr-41 Joint Tank Planning Committee pushes for 2000 tanks per month by July 1941
Feb-41 Design Finished
13-Mar-41 First Pilot Finished
5-May-41 Pilot Tests at Aberdeen Proving Grounds begin
Sep-41 Production of M3 in full swing at 4 manufacturers

M4 Sherman

1-Feb-41 Design Initiated
May-41 Mockup construction recommended
2-Sep-41 Aberdeen Pilot Completed
5-Sep-41 Design Standardized as M4
Feb-42 Production Starts

Two things are important to keep in mind, the time from design to pilot, and the time from pilot to production. In the M3&M4 cases, these average out to roughly 7.5 and 5.5 respectively.

Lets look at the design cycles for other American afvs:

M6

22-May-40 Development Project Initiated
11-Jul-40 Project Approved
24-Oct-40 OCM 1600 (Revised Layout)
22-Nov-40 Revised Layout Approved
Aug-40 Contract for M6 Prototype, Baldwin Locomotive Works
Aug-40 Pilot Tank Assembled
Aug-41 Testing at Baldwin Locomotive Works
8-Dec-41 Tank Officially Presented to the Ordnance Department
13-Apr-42 Standardization of the M6, M6A1
10-Aug-42 Classified as "Limited Procurement Type"
7-Dec-42 Cancellation to the M6 Program
16-Jan-43 First Production M6 Shipped
17-Mar-43 M6 Upgunned to 90mm
14-Aug-44 Conversion of 15 M6 to 105mm gun (15 November 1944 delivery date)

T29/T30/T34

14-Sep-44 Development and Manufacture Recommended (4 prototypes)
1-Mar-45 1200 Unit Procurement recommended
12-Apr-45 Procurement Aproved (1,152)
11-Aug-45 Procurement Cancelled (1.5 vehicles manufactured)
(War ends, project downgraded)
Oct-47 First T29 arrives at Aberdeen Proving Grounds
Apr-48 Additional T29 arrives at Aberdeen Proving Grounds
May-48 Additional T29 arrives at Aberdeen Proving Grounds

T32

7-Dec-44 Army Ground Forces Recommends Development of a "Heavier Pershing"
8-Feb-45 Recommends Construction of 4 Pilots
10-Apr-45 Mock-up almost complete, 80% of Drawings Released
(War ends, project downgraded)
15-Jan-46 Pilots 1 & 2 Delivered (2nd on 19/1/46)

Time to pilot averages out to about 8-9 months - for an entirely new vehicle. Please note that the previous afvs were all heavy tank projects in the 50-80 ton range. The average for the four projects analyzed is 8 months from design to prototype.

Now, lets examine the following:

"M Plus"

8-Dec-41 Chief of Ordnance orders design study of improved Sherman
13-Mar-42 Aberdeen submits layout drawings
Aug-42 Armament Drawings

Since December of '41, the Chief of Ordnance had ordered the development of an M4 "improved" tank. IF, priority had been given to this project, and it had progressed along at the same pace as other wartime projects we have:

8 months development + 5 months to series production = 13 months.
Counting from December of 41, produces a 90mm afv in the early 1943 timeline. Counting from a more realistic date, say October of 42 (when the feasibility of mounting a 90mm gun in the Sherman was reported by Aberdeen), generates the desired afv by late in '43.

Now, let's see about upgunning:

Upgunning

1-Aug-42 76mm M4 Test Fires at Aberdeen
17-Aug-42 76mm Sherman designated Substitute Standard
23-Oct-42 Drawings show rolled armored turret mounting 76mm gun for Sherman
2-Feb-43 Pilot Production 76mm Shermans arrive at Aberdeen
5-Apr-43 Final Report Submitted
3-May-43 Recommendation for T20 76mm Turret mounting on Sherman hulls
17-Aug-43 Firing Tests and Report from Armored Board recommends acceptance and immediate production

The upgunning process went through two complete cycles, each cycle took aprox. 3 months, plus a further 3 months for acceptance trials. What about a 90mm upgrade?

31-Oct-42 Ballistics Research Laboratory at Aberdeen reports feasibility of 90mm mounting on a Sherman turret
Nov-43 Armored Board requests 90mm guns be mounted in 1000 Shermans
Jul-44 General Joseph Holly tasked by Eisenhower to expedite production and shipment of 90mm tanks and TDs.

A similar, double, development cycle plus three months trial acceptance (all along the lines of the 76mm upgunning history), starting in October of '42, produces a 90mm armed Sherman by the Summer of '43.

There is a 12 month gap between the Aberdeen report and the request from the Armored Board, and a further 8 months until the issue became so urgent General Holly is tasked with expediting the delivery of more powerful afvs. That 20 month gap - history demonstrates - was more than enough time to field a 90mm afv, not only by the Normandy invasion, but by sometime in the second half of 1943.

Someone dropped the ball, and that someone was affiliated to the SLS.

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Originally posted by AlexH:
As you know, the US developed entirely new vehicles during the war, A 90mm afv could, and should, have been fielded in 1943.

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The question that strikes me is 'why?'. While it is very easy to see the need to move from the M3 to the M4, there is much less of a need to field something better than the M4, which at the time you think they should have thought about replacing it was far superior to the mainstay of the German tank fleet, the Panzer III with the long 50mm gun, and more than equal in many aspects (e.g. armour, mobility) to the Panzer IV with long 75. Regarding gun performance, its probably a wash.

In October 42 nothing was known about the Panther, and very little (if anything) about the Tiger (I think the first intact Tiger was only captured by the British in Feb. 1943?).

OTOH, moving to yet another design may have had serious implications in terms of ramping up production of the Sherman, with the need for retooling factories that implies. This would have knock-on effects on the ability to field formations with Shermans, and deliver LL Shermans to the Soviets.

Whoever was in charge of developing the next tank would have had to be able to foresee the future in order to perceive the need for a 90mm gun armed tank in October 1942, from what I understand.

quote:

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Originally posted by AlexH:
Rich,

You paint a scenario that sounds like procuring 90mm guns would stop the US war effort!

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No, I am not, I am simply stating the realities of the situation.

In 1942 it was unclear whether or not the US would be able to wrest air superiority from the axis. As a result FDR meddled - as was his wont - in manpower and equipment mobilization plans. Priorities were assigned to an expansion of AAF power much beyond prewar plans, and along with that plan went a comparable expansion of base defense capability, i.e., antiaircraft defense.

As a result, 811 antiaircraft battalions were planned, including nearly 400 gun battalions, a number that wasn't reduced until the October 1943 Troop Basis was issued. Now the basic equipment - not including replacements - of those battalions required about 6,400 90mm gun tubes, but despite the prioritization allotted, only 3,443 guns had been completed by the end of 1942. Quite simply, there wasn't sufficient capacity to build more tht quickly and only the curtailment of the AA program allowed capacity to be shifted to producing 90mm for TD and tank use.

The alternative would have been to mobilize industry even more rapidly than was done, which would have been possible given that the US never fully mobilized her total industrial capacity. Of course, that would have had potential postwar ramifications, while not ensuring that anything different - with respect to tank development and deployment - would have occurred.

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The question that strikes me is 'why?'.

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I question that I have asked Alex for years, without a response. Which is why I try to waste so little time in thses fruitless discussions with him.

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Originally posted by Rich:
I question that I have asked Alex for years, without a response. Which is why I try to waste so little time in thses fruitless discussions with him.

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Originally posted by Andreas:
The question that strikes me is 'why?'.

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Not only that, but it is evident that there was concern about upgunning the Sherman. In the period August-October '42 tests proved both the 76mm & 90mm were candidates.

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In October 42 nothing was known...

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a) It was indeed possible to have an upgunned Sherman sometime from mid-to-late '43. That's a year earlier than historically happened (aprox.)

b) When do you think the Sherman should have been upgunned?

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OTOH, moving to yet another design may have had serious implications in terms of ramping up production of the Sherman

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It shouldn't have, why? Look at the switch from M3 to M4.

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...and deliver LL Shermans to the Soviets.

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Whoever was in charge of developing the next tank would have had to be able to foresee the future in order to perceive the need for a 90mm gun armed tank in October 1942, from what I understand.

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Originally posted by Rich:
In 1942 it was unclear whether or not the US would be able to wrest air superiority from the axis.

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The Sherman wasn't upgunned earlier because of fears about the Axis air forces?

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Originally posted by AlexH:
Because not doing it was clearly a mistake.

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Thus sayeth 20-20 hindsight. Tell you what, tell me next week's lottery numbers, and I grant you that you are right about this matter.

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Originally posted by AlexH:
You make it sound like black magic. In fact, someone figured it out back in '42.

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You are assuming that the someone actually had any idea of the NEED, as opposed to an idea about testing the POSSIBILITY of such an upgrade. Armies test things all the time. That does not mean that they need them or will introduce them. Show documentary evidence telling us something about the reasoning why the testing was done, and why it was decided to not upgun, and you maybe able to make a case. In order for the charge of someone dropping the ball to stick, you need to show that the Army was having serious concerns about the ability of the Sherman to defeat battlefield threats in October 1942. Testing other possibilities does not equal such serious concerns.

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Originally posted by Andreas:
I would appreciate if you did not distort my posts through quoting in a way that makes me say something I did not say.

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Thus sayeth 20-20 hindsight.

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I think it is much superior to, say, 10-20 or even 15-20 hindsight.

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You are assuming that the someone actually had any idea of the NEED, as opposed to an idea about testing the POSSIBILITY of such an upgrade.

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a) It was possible to upgun the Sherman, and that was clear from as early as August of '42.

b) The Sherman was not upgunned in a timely manner, that is why we were scrambling for 90mm tanks in '44.

c) It was clearly a mistake not to upgun earlier.

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Show documentary evidence telling us something about the reasoning why the testing was done, and why it was decided to not upgun, and you maybe able to make a case.

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When I think the Sherman should have been upgunned is totally irrelevant...

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Originally posted by AlexH:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Andreas:
[b]I would appreciate if you did not distort my posts through quoting in a way that makes me say something I did not say.

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I did not say that 'In October 1942 nothing was known', as your quote indicates I did. Quote correctly, or this conversation is over.

You however said that a 90mm Sherman 'should have been fielded in summer 1943'.

The question stands - why? There are two possibilities - either you are telling us something that is so blindingly obvious that it is completely worthless to spend breath on it (a bigger gun Sherman would have been good), or you are saying you think somebody made a mistake by not upgunning in 1942. Well yes, but they could not know it then. So given the limitations of their knowledge, they acted rationally, and one can not in fairness criticise them. Of course maybe you have the habit to berate people for not knowing the lottery numbers in advance either, and to do so appears normal to you.

Your three points:

a) correct

b) correct

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Originally posted by AlexH:
Not too crafty a dodge.

[This message has been edited by AlexH (edited 06-23-2005).]

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quote:

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Originally posted by AlexH:
[QUOTE]The Sherman wasn't upgunned earlier because of fears about the Axis air forces?

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Are you being deliberately obtuse or are you just trying to piss me off again?

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Rich, the Sherman WAS upgunned, the American industrial effort didn't grind to a halt because of it. It could have been done earlier - as has been demonstrated - unfortunately, it was not.

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Yep, you're trying to piss me off, God I get so tired of this!

In case you didn't notice the 76mm and 90mm are two different animals. The piece in question required for your desired upgunning of the Sherman to 90mm is the 90mm M3 Tank Gun, which is not the same as the 90mm M1 Antiaircraft Gun. The later was unsuitable as a tank gun and required extensive changes to be made suitable. Among other things (such as provisions for adequate protected ammunition stowage) it required a new breech ring design, new breech operating handle design and breech operating mechanism, a new breech operating cam, a new trigger mechanism, and a new longitudinal keyway and cylindrical recoil surface that required a complete redesign of the tube, which had a reduced exterior diameter and thinner powder chamber walls. But aside from that it was exactly the same.

The redesign meant that production did not begin until August 1943 when the first four production examples were completed. Nor, as I have already said, was there an excess to requirements of the M1.

So your upgunning that you insist was obviously neccessary in 1942 could only be accomplished with non-existant guns. Of course you've only ever been able to show that the "neccessity" is only "obvious" to you today and not to the actual decision makers then, but heck, that hasn't stopped you yet has it?

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Originally posted by AlexH:
I'm not assuming anything - the FACTS are:

a) It was possible to upgun the Sherman, and that was clear from as early as August of '42.

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No, as "early as August 1942" just 796 M4 had been completed, with nearly half of those being allocated to the British and with 488 being delivered in July - so service testing had just begun. So although it was "clear" that the M4 could be upgunned it was not clear that it needed to be. Nor was it clear what some of the problems associated with that upgunning were going to be. Nor was it clear what upgunning might be required.

And it also wasn't clear what other engineering modifications needed to be made, although some became clear soon enough, with experience. I am curious why you don't also claim that it was "clear" that the M4 needed improved armor casting, forging and welding, an improved suspension system and track design, a commanders cupola (the Brits were telling the Americans as early as fall 1941 that commanders cupolas were useless appendages), "wet" ammunition stowage, an improved APU, and all the other engineering modification that were made? If your hindsight works for the one, then why not for the others?

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b) The Sherman was not upgunned in a timely manner, that is why we were scrambling for 90mm tanks in '44.

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Actually it was a case of almost, but not quite, partly caused by the desire to get enough of what was "almost good enough" rather than the "best", but possibly too late - very real fears in 1942, which affected production into 1943. As it was the first 112 M4A1 76mm were in England in April and May and were followed by 127 M4A3 76mm in June, 168 in July and 122 in August. Ditto the M4 105mm - almost, but not quite.

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c) It was clearly a mistake not to upgun earlier.

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A statement you repeat like a mantra, but for which you have provided little or no evidence.

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Originally posted by Andreas:
I did not say that 'In October 1942 nothing was known', as your quote indicates I did. Quote correctly, or this conversation is over.

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The question stands - why?

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