Havent heard about it in quite sometime.......

quote:

---

Originally posted by WWII=interest:
So Chris, how is the Kursk book coming?

---

Well, it is now in the editing process. I sent the first eight chapters (out of 30) to three people to edit and have received comments back. I am about to send out chapter 10 for edit (today?) and am in the process of incorporating the comments I have received on the earlier chapters. Over the next week or three, I hope to have done that for the first 12-13 chapters.

At that point, I am going to send it out to a wider range of people for edit and comment (I think about 20 people have volunteered to help edit it) and get the rest of the chapters ready to send out (I still have to assemble some strenth and loss statistics for most of the chapters).

After that process, it will be time to format, set up the graphics and maps, and start getting the book ready for publication. Because of the shear size of the book, all this takes more time than one would expect. Westview Press has been very patient about this.

quote:

---

Havent heard about it in quite sometime.......

---

It is always going on at some pace in the background. The fundamental limitation is that I have to make sure I commit most of my time to paying work.

quote:

---

BTW, still looking forward to it

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
I am looking forward to the day when it is done.

---

Any idea about the size of the book? Or how many pages will be in the book?

Or is that up to the publisher to decide?

quote:

---

Originally posted by WWII=interest:
Any idea about the size of the book? Or how many pages will be in the book?

---

Yes, large --- up to a thousand pages. I suspect some will be cut in the editing, but so far, this has not been happening.

quote:

---

Or is that up to the publisher to decide?

---

The original contract was for something much smaller. As there is obviously a need for an exhuastive book on the battle, the publisher is willing to accept something much larger than they really intended. Still, they need to sell books, so we are talking about putting out a second book that cuts out much of the battle detail, the analysis, etc. and focuses on the main stories and the human interest stories. This would be a much smaller general interest book. It seemed the best way to deal with both worlds (both audiences).

As you sifted through all the information, which one did you go for first, memoirs or documents?

If I were to do it, I dont know which I would choose.

As I hopefully will become a historian and write a book on the east as you yourself are in the process of, can you help me prioritize info here?

quote:

---

Originally posted by WWII=interest:
As you sifted through all the information, which one did you go for first, memoirs or documents?

---

I did not make such a decision. I was hired (re-hired actually) by Trevor N. Dupuy to manage the Kursk Data Base project that he had just gotten the contract for. Therefore, I flipped through enough books to put together a draft order of battle, and then went over to the archives and started xeroxing the appropriate German records. I started reading all the other books, memoirs, etc. later.

quote:

---

As I hopefully will become a historian and write a book on the east as you yourself are in the process of, can you help me prioritize info here?

---

It really helps to know what actually happened in the battle. The starting point for this is the unit records (for both sides!).

For statistics on Soviet casualties (WIA, MIA, KIA, etc..) what source did you go by?

Krivosheev? Sokolov? Or Soviet reports done by regiment, division, and army levels?

quote:

---

Originally posted by WWII=interest:
For statistics on Soviet casualties (WIA, MIA, KIA, etc..) what source did you go by?

---

All of our casualty, strength and inventory reports came from the regiment, division, corps or army records for the unit in question. As such, our total figures for losses during the battle is assembled from each of the unit reports.

Krivosheyev, et al, only has a single loss report covering the whole period, whereas as we have periodic (often daily, sometime every 3-days, sometime longer) for most of the divisions and tank and mechanized corps involved.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:

This does allow me, with a little interpolation (as not every unit provides loss reports for every day) to directly compare German and Soviet strength and losses for each division or corps-sized engagement for each day. It is a much greater degree of fidelity than has previously been done for Eastern Front battles.

---

Are the numbers for German tank losses at the Prokoravka(sp?) engagement as high as many Soviet propagandist say they are?

And, I would not recomment you using Krivosheev anyway Chris. Here is a good reason. On another forum, someone pointed out this, which I think is something you should take note of.

"According to Krivo during the defensive battle of Kursk Central Front had 738,000 men under Rokosovsky's command. During the operation 'Citadel' front lost 15,336 KIA/MIA and 18, 561 WIA and sick for a total of about 33,000. So far so good. Now, between the end of 'Citadel' and the Soviet Orlov offensive the changes in front OOB were as follows- 2 infantry brigades were released and tank brigade was added. If one considers the constant flow of replacement the difference in personnel was insignificant, minus few thousands at most. Yet, according to Krivosheev before Orlov operation Central Front number stood at 645,300 men instead of 700,000. That's 55,000 soldiers as unaccounted for! So much for the official numbers."

quote:

---

Originally posted by WWII=interest:
Are the numbers for German tank losses at the Prokoravka(sp?) engagement as high as many Soviet propagandist say they are?

---

Of course not. That one can be checked with a half day trip to the archives. All three SS units reports ready for action by tank type for each day in their daily reports(except for Totenkopf which reports on the 11th and the 13th). One just needs to subract the number ready-for-action on the 13th (most figures are for the evening) from the 11th, and one comes up with a whole lot less losses than has been published in a lot of books.

quote:

---

And, I would not recomment you using Krivosheev anyway Chris.

---

I do compare Krivosheyev's figure for the south in my book (which I gather he pulled from the Army Group records) with my figures (which I built up from the division, corps and army records). While we cover lightly different time periods and slightly different units, they are not that far apart.

While there is certianly some problems with Krivosheyev with the time periods, unit covered, etc., the problem with Krivosheyev appears to be not with what he has published, but what is not included. The book is not complete.

I just finished reading the newest book about Kursk: "Kursk. The German View"
by Steven H. Newton (Da Capo Press).

It uses the reports by leading German officers who took part in the planning nad conduct of the Battle for Kursk (Raus, Fellgiebel etc.).

These reports have originally been written for the US Army after the war and are presented fully for the first time in this book.

It's an interesting book, with some new (or re-iterated ) criticism raised against Model, Hoth and also von Manstein.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Thomas Titura:
Did you already read it?

---

No. I was not aware of it.

quote:

---

It uses the reports by leading German officers who took part in the planning nad conduct of the Battle for Kursk (Raus, Fellgiebel etc.).

---

These are well-used sources. I went through them all at the beginning of the Kursk project and make some use of them. I tend to rely more on the unit records as I do have an innate distrust of post-war memories.

quote:

---

It's an interesting book, with some new (or re-iterated ) criticism raised against Model, Hoth and also von Manstein.

---

I don't address Model. Neither Hoth or Manstein fare well in my book. It was, at best, an unimaginative plan and somewhat confusing and unfocused in its execution. How Provisional Army Kempf was used is particularly hard to explain and it appears that the overall battle plan in the south was put together by Hoth and Manstein.

quote:

---

Originally posted by vkun:
[B]I find no evidence for this in the sources. Rotmistrov just blundered, the Germans still held the initiative, their operational reserve (XXIV. PzK)was not committed...
[B]

---

I come out and say it, I am not expert on the subject. However, my thoughts on the arguement is that 5th Guards Tank was not deployed to be used as a subsidiary blow to the German force.

The Orel offensive by the Soviets was to draw off German forces in the north, not the fighting by the 5th Guards Tank.

And either way, it probably would not work had the Soviets tried it. The Austrian infantry forces were doing a good job of slowing the Soviets, and AGC also still had the Esebeck(sp?) group, madeup of 3 panzer divisions I believe, to use if necessary, and they were in the Orel salient.

Thats MHO.

quote:

---

Originally posted by vkun:
The argument on Tanknet is that the counterattack of 5th GTA at Prokhorovka was a deliberate and conscious operation to "buy time" for the Kutuzov operation in the Orel salient.

---

Its a pretty absurd arguement. What documentary evidence do they have for this, or are they just speculating?

Rotmistrov did file a report on his attack in September 1943 and no where in that report does he provide this reasoning. Furthermore the Fifth Guards Tank Army was moved up to block the advance on Oboyan two days before....and was then shifted to cover Prokhorovka. This appear to be defensive moves in relation to the battle in the south.

While we were not able to get access to the Voronezh Front files, we did have access to the Army files. There is no indication that the action had anything to do with anything other than the southern offensive.

Again, do this people offer any proof, or are they just inventing this stuff?

quote:

---

Therefore the heavy losses of 5th GTA are irrelevant.

---

High losses are never irrelevent. Furthermore, once you have deployed a force against the enemy and he is aware of it....there is no reason to throw it away, its mere presence serves as a diversion. The high losses indicate that this was not a diversion, but a real (failed) attack.

quote:

---

I don't agree because I find no evidence for this in the sources.

---

If there is no evidence offered, why even debate it?

quote:

---

Rotmistrov just blundered...

---

Well, there were a few others in the area, like Vatutin, Vasilevskii and Khruschev, who had some say in the decision making process.

quote:

---

...., the Germans still held the initiative, their operational reserve (XXIV. PzK)was not committed...

---

This was not much to write home about. It was pretty much most of strategic reserve for Army Group South, a point some people seem to want to studiously ignore. Once committed, you have one other armored division and one reconstituting motorized division to cover the rest of the Army Group South's (so to be crumbling) front.

quote:

---

What sayeth the experts?

---

I sayeth is sounds like the discussion on Tank Net is a waste of time.

The starting point of the whole discussion was Niklas Zetterlings Kursk book with the numbers of Russian losses at Prokhorovka. I stated that the outcome of Prokhorovka was a tactical victory for the Germans (correct me if I am wrong here). This is seen as irrelevant because the tricky Russians sacrificed 5th GTA to buy time .... and so it went on and on again.

I just wanted to add a comment about the content of the book "Kursk. The German view".

It does contain material written during (not after) the war, a very interesting treatment of Hoth's thoughts and planning for the offensive indeed:

It's the report by General of Infantry Friedrich Fangohr (Chief of Staff of Fourth Panzer Army).

I have never read anything about Fangohr's before, nor has it been quoted in other books about Kursk I have read.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Thomas Titura:
It's the report by General of Infantry Friedrich Fangohr (Chief of Staff of Fourth Panzer Army).

---

here you are:

My source is the book by Steven H. Newton: "Kursk. The German View. Firsthand accounts of the German comanders who planned and executed the largest tank battle in History."

Newton writes that Fangohr wrote 3 reports for the US Army (P-031b on the trainig of General Staff officers and P-071 "Region, Climate, Population, and their Influence on Warfare in the Soviet Union") and the one reproduced in Newton's book, starting with an Introduction on page 65. Newton writes that the study is not signed by Fangohr, but from reading the text it becomes clear that only Fangohr himself can have written it (Meetings of Hoth and von Manstein are described from someone who participated, so only the Operations officer Fangohr can be the author). The preparations and planning of the attack are described in such detail (including the reasoning behind it) that Fangohr must be the author (otherwise Hoth would have written it, which can be excluded).

The book also includes the report by Generalmajor Peter von der Groeben, Operations officer of Second Panzer Army and Ninth Army.

Prof. Newton teaches at Delaware State Univ., his e-mail is: snewton@dsc.edu

Maybe he can give you more details about where the Fellgiebel study is located in the archives. Anyway, the study is reproduced at full length in his book.

Writer No. 742, "Zitadelle" [Operation Citadel], Fourth Panzer Army Attack, July 1943 (T-26, Part B, Chapter II)

Writer No. 750, The Battle Fought by the Second Panzer Army and the Ninth Army in the Orel Bend Between 5 July and 18 August, 1943 (T-26, Part B, Chapter III).

Writer No. 762, The "Zitadelle" Offensive, Eastern Front, 1943, Luftwaffe Participation in the Area of the German OREL Armies (T-26).

Writer No. 856, The "Zitadelle" Offensive, Eastern Front, 1943, Sector of Provisional Army Kempf (Part B, Chater I, T-26).

I gather the first one I listed is the one you are refering to as the Fangohr. Would you mind checking his footnotes on that?

unfortunately Prof. Newton doesnÄ't give any specifics at to where he found the study he attributes to Fangohr.

I have contacted him via e-mail to find out more details. As soon as I have his feedback, I'll let you know.

Was there a Soviet Tank Corps in and around the city of Kursk itself? If so, how combat effective was it? Or was it just a Tank HQ?