quote:

---

Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
[b] Apparently he wrote a critique of Dupuy & Martell's "Great Battles on the Eastern Front" some time ago. I have never seen it and only became aware of it a couple of days ago. Anyone got a copy?

---

Thats the name of the book. And ask what he said to him via email, his words on the HC included his email address. Maybe even IM(what an interesteing conversation that would be)....

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
However, recently I got a letter from a person who intended to criticise one of my books (on a specific issue) in his forthcoming book. I had no objection to that, just wished him good luck.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by WWII=interest:

I dont think there is a clear understanding with you and this statement here Mr. Clemens. What Glantz proposes is that books should only be disected if its major judgements/conclusions are indeed false and untruthful.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by WWII=interest:
And while you make a case for ALL Kursk books, I dont see anybody elses work being dissected besides Glantz.

---

I believe the thread called "Manstein's Conference of 11 July 1943" addresses one of the problems that I had with Nipe's book.

There was an extensive monitoring of what happened to the tanks. The Inspector-General of Panzer Troops kept detailed log of shipments of all tanks that were produced in Germany (or repaired at the factories in Germany). In these papers one finds the shipping date and the unit the tanks were sent to, often even the identification number of the trains used. Then there are reports at the ”Kraftfahrwesen” at the quartermaster section of the army and panzer army staffs. Here we can find reports on the number of tanks received to be distributed among the combat units. Finally we have the reports from the divisions, where the number of tanks is shown. This enables us to check the chain from central agencies down to the combat units. But also we have the reporting in the opposite direction, where number of tanks on hand (operational and in repair) is given. There are many such reporting channels. We have the divisions reporting to the operations section of corps and army staffs. We have the monthly reports to the Inspector-General of Panzer Troops and also there are some ten-day reports to that agency too. Furthermore, the Kraftfahrwesen of the quartermaster section of panzer army staffs (like 4th Panzer Army at Zitadelle) could demand ten-day reports.
There was an extensive reporting on this matter. Also, at the lower echelons (battalions) one can often find re-ports, which not only give the number of tanks, but also the exact chassis numbers. In effect an error in one statement would also show up as an error somewhere else. It could for example be established that a panzer division had received say 50 Panzer IV tanks. If it has actually lost ten of them it would have 40 remaining. If it is to understate this, it will also have to exaggerate its losses, or else the bookkeeping while show an error. Thus it is important to check the records at various levels in the command structure and different kinds of reports to see if there are discrepancies. To be sure I have found disagreements, however they have always been due to some reasonable cause. For example a unit that has been overrun and thus not able to report, the problem around period shifts (tanks issued from Germany towards the end of a month may have arrived at the beginning of the following month, causing them to be recorded in different periods by the two command echelons), pure calculation errors (it is not unusual to find tables with errors of addition, after all, the records were created by humans, not gods) and the like.
As I mentioned above, if weapons holdings were to be understated, in effect losses had to be overstated. However there is one further possibility, that operational vehicles are understated and the number in repair correspondingly overstated. This is a problem that the reporting system will not be able to iron out as easily as pure understating. However, as corps and army commanders frequently visited the division, there was an alternative checking method.
In effect, the Germans had several reporting systems for tank. To consistently abuse them would require a major number of people to do the distortion, in a concerted way, or else the problemm would show up in the reporting.

I have found very few cases of the Germans taking away equipment from one unit and giving it to another. The only cases I have seen are units in rear areas, units that are about to be transferred from the front to the rear areas or units that are dissolved, not units engaged in combat. For example, when a unit left the east front, it often left its heavy weapons to a nearby unit. A well known example is the 1. SS-Pz.Div. which left its tanks to Das Reich and Totenkopf after Zitadelle, when the 1. SS-Pz.Div. left for Italy. Similarly the I./Pz.Rgt. 31 left its Panthers to 11. Pz.Div., when the former battalion was sent to refit in January 1944. Further examples could be given. In combat one occasionally sees that units borrow tanks from each other, but that does not reflect a problem in reporting, rather we speak of neighbouring units fighting together in a confused situation.
Thus units in combat rarely have the need to understate their strength to retain their equipment. This is espe-cially true for the panzer formations in operation Zitadelle, which were part of the major German operation at the time. It is different for units that are in reserve, refit or otherwise in calm areas. One of the very few cases I have ever heard of is such an example. Speaking from memory here, I believe the 9. SS-Pz.Div. just before the Arnhem battle in 1944 understated its equipment holdings. The unit were about to transfer to Germany for refit and was ordered to hand over its operational combat vehicles to 10. SS-Pz.Div. To avoid this the division commander of 9. SS-Pz.Div. (LtCol Harzer acting I believe) ordered that certain parts of the operational vehicles be removed, to avoid giving them away. Note that this did not reduce the overall holdings of the division, it did “redistribute” between operational and in repair.
The other example I know of is the formation of units from PoW:s and locally recruited people in the east. These were of course not regular units and thus they were not included in reporting channels, at least not ini-tially. It seems the German commanders were less willing to report such units, since they could be taken away. This was also accentuated by vacillating German overall policy in these matters.

While I don’t claim that there were no cases of understating, I doubt that this had much, or any, effect on the reporting in operations like Kursk. After all, since this was the major effort by the German army at the time, there was little risk that equipment would be taken away from the units taking part in that battle. Rather they had a clear priority to receive equipment.

Also, I find the alleged statement from the German commanders a little strange from another point of view. In another post Rich brought up the role of Albert Speer (see http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000033.html). Interestingly statements from him seem to support both the view that strategic bombing of Germany had a major impact and that it had little impact. I suspect this is due to two factors. The first is that in an oral communication, nuances are in fact often much less clear than in written. For example, words like often, major, great, substantial, ineffective, minor are highly subjective and give very wide latitude for interpretation. The second is that his answers most likely were affected by those who asked the questions and how they were formulated. This illuminates the risks inherent in statements given under discussion. If they are recorded, like under a court trial, then it is different, because we can better understand the context under which the answers were given. Also, a written statement is of course possible to analyse afterwards.

Another major point is that reinforcements were determined by shortfalls. Eventually, over the course of several months (let alone years) , underreporting strengths would result in recieving reinforcements well in excess of authorized strength. Over the course of an extended campaign, this could result in divisions with significant overages in their authorized strength.

Finally, there is another problem with this. During the war most commanders were promoted several steps. For example, Hermann Balck was a regiment commander in may 1940 and rose to command panzer divisions, panzer corps, panzer armies and also an army group. His career may have been quick even by wartime standards, but we have many other, like Model who commanded 3. Pz.Div. in Barbarossa and rose to field marshal and commanded several different army groups. If the divisional commanders often cheated in this way, then they would most likely suspect that, as commanders of corps or armies, their subordinates did the same. Why they would let that pass seems hard to explain.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
In any case, I have to agree with the following statement by Glantz:

Finally, as much as I would love to spend my time posting to this cite, if I did so routinely, I would get little else done.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:
Frederick who are the "Glantzbots"?

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
First of all, it is meant to be humorous. Secondly, it refers to those who attempt to stifle any criticism of Glantz's work by assassinating the person making the critique.

---

At the end of the day, its just your sources and your understanding of those sources....no one owns the information...its up to joe public to decide for himself.

There are so few people doing this that the more the merrier...there will always be people who see the issue differently than you.No point in bitching about his POV, just get out and write your own history.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
What is the HC forum? Can someone provide the address?

---

History Channel forum.

www.historychannel.com

click discussion

click wars

click WWII

quote:

---

Military history is so vast there are no where near enough modern works published . I honestly think your energies could be better spent writing your own version of 'Kursk' or 'Barbarossa' and let us decide which history we perfer [/B]

---

In the end it is of course the reader who decide which book he thinks is the best. However, if we want the field to advance, I think debating the accuracy of various statements is indespensable. Otherwise we will only be able to see an increase in quantity, not in quality.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
In the end it is of course the reader who decide which book he thinks is the best. However, if we want the field to advance, I think debating the accuracy of various statements is indespensable. Otherwise we will only be able to see an increase in quantity, not in quality.

---

I fully agree with this - I am a social scientist by training, and I think that in history, there are few 'truths' in analysis.

I have read a number of Glantz works, and I am very impressed with them, because they have given me access to a world that I did not know existed. I am far less impressed with his discussion of the world I did know, i.e. the German side. His use of sources is 'interesting' at best (Grossmann for 'Zhukov's Greatest Defeat', Scheibert for 'From the Don to the Dnjepr') and outright hilarious at worst (Carrell, Piekalkiewicz). I have also started reading Soviet officer memoirs (not just the Marshals, but all levels) in German translation from the former NVA printing press. Very interesting too, and very informative, if you are aware of the pitfalls.

I have read a few of his German sources in the original and I am quite a 'fan' of the works in the 'Die Wehrmacht im Kampf' series. There is some excellent stuff in it, so to use it is okay, but going back to the archives is necessary still.

That does, IMO, not diminish his achievement of giving me access to the Soviet decision-making and thought processes. His description of the overreach in the race for the Dnjepr before the Manstein counter-offensive, and the inability to accept failure in Mars is very well done, and quite believable to someone like me, with an organisation science background. I guess I find it comforting to see that armies are just institutions after all, and thus failure-prone.

This does not excuse faults in the work, but I think those should be taken in perspective. The key questions to me are whether we would be as well off without his work, and whether the Soviet archives can add to our understanding of the war. Regarding the former, while for some of the researchers here that may not be the case, for people like me it definitely would be. I do not feel the same about Paul Schmidt (aka Carrell), or the more general works by Janusz Piekalkiewicz for example. A faulty statement about German tank maintenance does not matter as much to me as the insight provided on Soviet planning. It is a matter of weighing. Regarding the latter, I do not believe that the German archives will yield all the information we need, ever. The publications by the senior officers in Marshall's project show very clearly how little they often understood of what was going on on the other side of the hill. Gehlen had a much better understanding, as evidenced by TM-30-430, but I doubt you'll find a lot of that in the German archives. So the answer to these two fundamental questions to me is a resounding 'Yes'.

Another thing entirely when it comes to his treatment of German operations are his edited proceedings from the 'Art of War symposiums', of which I have read 'The early period of war'. I think that one is a splendid piece, full of excellent information from the German side, and a lot of very useful analysis and thinking. It is clear that he does not go to those lengths in many of his other works.

German officer accounts of events are also not always reliable, and the KTBs may have gone 'missing'. A good example for this is Scheibert's account of the New Year's fight 42/43 in the Bistraya Valley by PR11 against 25th TC (IIRC).

1) Major Dr. Bäke (present on the spot as commander, written up 1946, based on regimental KTB) 'Germans get confused Confused nightfighting, about 30 Soviet tanks destroyed.
2) General-Oberst Raus (not present, written 1953 as article in swiss military journal) 'Germans had planned for the event, executed plan, lots of ra-ra heroism on both sides, 90+ tanks destroyed'. Scheibert has a very dry put-down for this...
3) Glantz (presumably writing from the Soviet archives) does not mention it, according to him the Soviets had given up on the 29th to attack in this sector. In the German judgement this was a major Soviet effort though.

The three are very difficult to reconcile - I would go with Bäke, and I will have to email Glantz about this one day I guess.

Glantz' work should be debated, like every other piece of historical writing. He is not, by virtue of his writing, excempt from criticism. The criticism should be put into the perspective of the larger achievement of the work though. I think social scientists may have a tendency to criticise minor things very harshly sometimes. It appears to me that Glantz has not grown up in that tradition, and maybe he does not have the thick skin that would come with it.