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Originally posted by Greg LG:

When it was first put to me by Mr. Zetterling that he didn’t understand what was meant by historians researching from ‘a German or Soviet side,’ I wasn’t sure quite what to make of it. I’ve never had someone dispute this simple human fact.

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I don't exactly remember how I phrased it, but what I meant was ‘a German or Soviet view’
This is not a simple human fact. I would say that there are many German views. Memoirs, archival documents, publications by serious German historians, works by amateurish German historians, etc don't have a unified German view, but can actually differ quite a lot. Also, if we are to be strict, there has been another Germany, the German "Democratic" Republic, which was fed the official Soviet version of the war. Futhermore, the Germans (the federal republic that is) have not been shy of using Soviet sources. If you look at the "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg", the closest thing to an official German history of WWII, you will find many Soviet sources. Also, I am well acquainted wth Dr. Karl-Heinz Frieser at the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, who is one the researchers working on this twelve volume work. He has probably made more research in Soviet archives than Glantz. It is possible that the British or American version of the "German view" has been more or less monolithic, but why look in the English speaking world for a "German view".
There may have been a unified Soviet view, but I am not sure of that either.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:

The main points of his book far outweigh any minor numerical discrepancies.

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Which are his main points?

This is no rethoric question. I can form my opinion of what his main points are, you may form your. They need not coincide, thus I can't argue with you unless these (or some of them) points are stated, unless I take the risk of making my conclusions of reading Glantz as yours.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:

As to the general criticism being placed over him, regarding Col. Glantz’ use of secondary Soviet sources, it is far too sweeping for my tastes.

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It is not that he at all uses them, but how he uses them. I have used them myself and probably will do so to some extent in the future too.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
History, human history to be exact, is anything but an exact science, and to assume that Soviet sources are useless because they possess political biases is to risk coming at odds with a fundamental human truth – humanity is ultimately self-serving and therefore biased.

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So much greater the need for careful and critical use of sources.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Glantz’ work, however you may feel about his emphases or his source material, is providing a valid perspective from the Soviet side upon which comparisons can be usefully drawn with previous and current German-based works.

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But the problem is that there is no abundancy of good "German-based works". We are not in a situation where the German side is well covered and that we have to add in the Soviet side, we are far from a good coverage of the Germans too.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
The source material Glantz uses is from credible military works within Soviet military circles, and as such provides many insightful details into the theory and practice of Soviet military operations in WWII.

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How do you know they are credible?

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Political propaganda is always a concern with Soviet material, but given the nature and intended use of these sources, it seems rather extreme to suspect their overall veracity simply because of politically biased side notes.

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This is almost an insult. We have judged them by cross-checking statements.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
As I stated earlier the study of human history is an inexact science. This requires that a ‘collage’ of works are needed, all from divergent and differing perspectives in order that a proper judgement can be made and useful conclusions drawn for as complex a process as the social interactions of humanity.

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No one has disputed this, but it in no way makes a careful scrutinization of source superflous.

Responding to the Response
December 10 2002 at 10:03 AM
Frederick L Clemens)

Response to Response to Chris Lawrence Critique

Col Glantz, although I have enjoyed attending your lectures on the East Front, I must say that this response of yours is very weak at best and slanderous at worst. It is certainly your privilege to decide how, when, and where you respond to a critique of any of your books, but your decision to respond here, instead of where the criticisms are under debate, and to primarily engage in a smear of Chris Lawrence, instead of directly addressing his points, does not serve you well. This type of indirect counter-attack runs the risk of converting an academic debate into a personal grudge match, the very behavior that you claim to be above.
Over the past year, I have provided Chris Lawrence with material from primary German sources for his book. During that time, I have had plenty of opportunity to observe his research methods and discuss various controversial points of the Kursk battle with him. Naturally, the subject of the prior books on Kursk, yours among them, has come up. Of course, every book has its flaws, but the main point for Chris (and for others like me) has always been the source methodology behind the research for those books, not every small detail as you try to make it appear.
I don’t wish to restate the entire debate here. I would like to just say that it all comes down to how one handles the relative value of primary versus secondary sources and how one judges the reliability of historical sources from a totalitarian propaganda state. These are the core issues and from them stem the great majority of criticisms of the facts, figures, and judgments in your books.
Everyone in the debate is well aware that history writing for the Eastern Front is difficult and we all acknowledge that you have done a great service in translating and publicizing a great deal of Soviet source material. However, questions remain over the details and the conclusions that can be reached when the sources are suspect. Especially, when you chose to cite Soviet info on German forces where contradictory information is available from German primary sources.

Now, to address the main points in your response -
- You claim to be most disturbed by Chris's violation of an informal code among the East Front Illuminati. This is elitist in the worst sense. No one who packages history and sells it to the public in a democracy built on free speech can expect to be above criticism. Come down from Mount Olympus and engage your fellow researchers as well as your customers in honest and open debate!
- You say that your works have been vetted by the Keepers of the Code and therefore are free of "errors and …embarrassing mistakes". That is demonstrably not true in your Kursk book. Or perhaps you and the other Keepers are the only ones privileged enough to declare errors and mistakes.
- You find Chris’ critique "petty, often wrong, and utterly self-serving." Very strong charges, yet what have you offered in the way of proof? Perhaps your unwritten code again?
- You mention that Chris’ work is based on a project originally funded by the US government. Maybe you are suggesting that Chris has taken advantage of US funding in his authoring efforts in a way that you have never done as a former head of the Soviet Military Studies Office, Colonel?
- Lastly, in your final punch line, you conclude that, "at least in part, the strident criticism was essentially an advertising effort." In fact, Chris draws fire for critiquing your book and most likely will lose as many customers as he theoretically makes from this alleged covert marketing strategy. Again, somehow you make a business of and routinely advertise your publications and somehow this does not taint your efforts.

And other places since he is being a bit "caustic" about government funded vs commercially funded ventures.

Since the nature of bias is exclusionary, it behooves the historian to combat this by including any and all primary perspectives that are pertinent to the respective research.

Yes. But who decides what is pertinent ?

I doubt in years to come the history of former Yugoslavia will be assesed using what the Serbs regard as pertinent as the sole yard stick.

If we are to better understand the Soviet-German War it is necessary that each perspective be given, German, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, Finnish, and Soviet.

I hope you do not condone the methodology "big" names like Ziemke and Glanzt use when they explain the Finnish perspective using the German and Soviet perception respectively to explain the actions of the Finns during the war.

At the very least the perceptions of the major combatants, German and Soviet, need to be present if there is to be any level of understanding.

That is a totally wrong assumption. At least when you are using the term perception. If you are using perceptions you automatically assume you also use the set of facts as seen by them. If you draw conclusions of the actions of a third party (Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, Finnish) using the perception of the the facts of the Germans and the Soviets the picture you get will be distorted and even fraudulent compared to the actual, historical events. If you then draw further conclusions from these rigged conclusions all your subsequent research on the issue is fundamentally distorted and flawed.

Given that in the West the large majority of works on the Soviet-German War are from a German perspective indicates to me a dire need for more material from a Soviet perspective.

Indeed. But why not cut the corner already driven with the German data and use primary sources and independent research. Coupled perhaps with an open mind. Mr Glantz is doing the same fundamental mistake the earlier researchers have done with the German data. He has the raw German data available to him, he is supposed to have the raw Soviet data available to him. And in this day and age he also has the raw Romanian, Hungarian, Italian Finnish data available to him. Why not start from a clear table and not fall into the same pits his predecessors have fallen when they only had the German data openly available to them ?

Otherwise, historical research on the Soviet-German War will remain an unfinished, incomplete work from which no useful conclusions can be drawn.

Indeed.

Glantz’ work, however you may feel about his emphases or his source material, is providing a valid perspective from the Soviet side upon which comparisons can be usefully drawn with previous and current German-based works.

So why is it marketed as the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth on the matter ? That alone is more detrimental to later research than his actual methodology.
If his works are regarded as gospel truth then any and all subsequent re-evaluation is that much harder and will take that much more work to purge.

The source material Glantz uses is from credible military works within Soviet military circles, and as such provides many insightful details into the theory and practice of Soviet military operations in WWII.

His sources are also riddled with the flaws inherent to the era and histography they represent. And with them his entire framework of research apparently.

Take the Red Army losses during Winter War as an example. The official Soviet number provided by Molotov was 48 000 KIA. The number Kruhstsev provided of 1 million men lost is equally official (if grossly exaggerated). Krivosheev has placed the number at 126 875. (BTW the official Finnish estimate has been 200 000 KIA since 1940)

Mr Glantz chooses to persist with the figure of 48 000 KIA in his works. Apparently because that is the figure his outdated Soviet sources give and despite his undoubted familiarity with Mr Krivoseevs work (which he quotes verbatim elsewhere).

What does that leave you to think of the level of his research ?

Political propaganda is always a concern with Soviet material, but given the nature and intended use of these sources, it seems rather extreme to suspect their overall veracity simply because of politically biased side notes.

You can dismiss the sidenotes but you can not get over the actual bits of falsified data.

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:

I do not believe Mr. Glantz would make them public though, from the type of person he is. I believe he would just find the errors privately and make sure not to put them in any future books of his own. He might tell you in private, but I doubt it.

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:
I do not believe Mr. Glantz would make them public though, from the type of person he is.

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Apparently he wrote a critique of Dupuy & Martell's "Great Battles on the Eastern Front" some time ago. I have never seen it and only became aware of it a couple of days ago. Anyone got a copy?

"When it was first put to me by Mr. Zetterling that he didn’t understand what was meant by historians researching from ‘a German or Soviet side,’ I wasn’t sure quite what to make of it. I’ve never had someone dispute this simple human fact."

My reaction was actually one of amazement that this needed to be pointed out at all, which evidently it did - to me this is totally self-evident. War is an activity that involves two sides. It is not possible to understand a war without a clear understanding of both of them, and their interaction. And a clear understanding of each of them can generally only be gleaned from their own primary sources - otherwise, what you get a picture of is the perception one side has of the other.

I think you fundamentally misjudge both the implications of subjectivity, the limitations of historiography and the usefulness of quantitative data.

Firstly, many things in history as in life is a matter of perspective. The number of tanks the Soviet army lost in a given operation or the size of the German forces involved is however not a matter of perspective. Secondly, each of the warring parties certainly have a perspective on the conflict. I fail to see why a historian should limit himself to one of those two among the many possible overall perspectives he can choose to apply - they are after all probably the two perspectives least likely to result in any balanced judgment of either fact or assesment. Why would it be so difficult for an historian to acquaint himself with both perspectives and to build his own understanding and interpretation on this basis? Three, history is not science in the strict sense. This does not mean and have never meant that history is merely an expression of the writers subjective views. The historian is working from a certain amount of information. Much of it must be transformed into judgments, but not every conclusion from the available information is equally reasonable. History can never be fully objective, but it has always attempted to be as objective as possible. Four, history is not a purely quantitative business. However, in military history numbers inevitably must establish certain parameters for interpretation. It is simply not possible to meaningfully understand or interpret any battle without a reasonably accurate picture of quantitative factors such as strength and casualties. And these factors are neither subjective nor matters of perspective. They are facts, they are not the whole story and the beginning and end of everything, but they are inevitably crucial. It is no more possible to analyse military operations free from quantitative factors than it is to write economic history without them. This does not mean that there is an ambition to turn military history into mathematics.

"As I stated earlier the study of human history is an inexact science. This requires that a ‘collage’ of works are needed, all from divergent and differing perspectives in order that a proper judgement can be made and useful conclusions drawn for as complex a process as the social interactions of humanity"

Why? What is stopping me or others from moving that collage to my own mind? How is learning served by the presence of several contradictory accounts that have all based themselves on insufficient sources because they have chosen to espouse someone else's "perspective"? If you have two accounts of the same action, one based purely on German sources and the other purely on Soviet, they do not equal balanced truth. They equal two worthless accounts.

cheers

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From Glantz reply:

First, and, in general, most historians who have researched and written extensively on the illusive subject of Soviet-German War understand that there is considerable risk when attempting to cite specific numbers regarding such things as force strength, weapons, losses, etc. This is so because of the tremendous number of discrepancies in various sources, as well as differences in definition (such as ration as opposed to combat strength of units), and the congenital tendency among commanders, particularly German, to understate their strength (particularly in weapons) and sometimes their losses. For example, while it is nice to have actual ration strength of certain divisions, as anyone who has served in a US or German division understands, there is a significant difference between that and actual combat strength.

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I would like to comment on some of the points in this section.

Surely there are risk when being specific, whether we talk of number or anything else, but I can not see how this problem is solved by for example using Soviet sources for data on German units.
I can agree that there are tremendous discrepancies in the sources, if we include the vast literature of poor secondary books. However, the archival research I have done does not suggest that. Surely one finds discrepancies, but rarely something I would call tremendeous.
The fact that there are many categories of manpower strength does as I see it just emphasize the need for archival research. I don’t know, but I strongly suspect that the Red Army did this too. Again, the need for primary sources.
To distinguish between ration strength and actual combat strength poses no particular problem, if archival sources are used, as long as one is aware that there is a difference between the two (unfortunately I have seen a PhD thesis which shows a lack of understanding of these and related manpower categories). Which is best to use of course depends on the question to be answered.
If it is a congenital tendency among commanders to understate their strength is probably an unproved statement. Even more dubious is the statement that it would be particularly common among German commanders. Furthermore, when do they understate, in their memoirs, in their wartime reports, etc.

I can not escape the conclusion that this reply was written in a haste.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
[B]I fail to see why a historian should limit himself to one of those two among the many possible overall perspectives he can choose to apply - they are after all probably the two perspectives least likely to result in any balanced judgment of either fact or assesment. Why would it be so difficult for an historian to acquaint himself with both perspectives and to build his own understanding and interpretation on this basis?[B]

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Under ideal circumstances, where the historian is a master of all languages and national histories - and he can walk into any archive at any time, you are correct. However, haven't we already discussed the relative difficulty of providing the "Soviet view" in light of the pitfalls of propaganda and the limited access to primary documents? In this environment, a historian must be wary of thinking he can achieve a balanced perspective and he must constantly alert his readers to possible distortions.

Certainly. I do not intend to imply that the truth is neccessarily some place between the "German" and the "Soviet" view, in the cases where such can be defined - this would I believe be a fallacy. But there is still no really viable alternative to consulting Soviet sources for Soviet figures, to the extent that they are available. These sources must naturally be treated in an appropriately critical way, like all sources.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
But there is still no really viable alternative to consulting Soviet sources for Soviet figures, to the extent that they are available. These sources must naturally be treated in an appropriately critical way, like all sources.

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Yep, and therein lies the heart of the debate. Whether to believe that the Soviet secondary sources add "unprecedented new detail" and "strip away the myths" as Glantz claims or to continue cross-checking those sources and to use and present them with greater caution is the question.

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:
You have a point, Mr WWII Interest, but didn't you start this thread? (just teasing)
I do believe that the thread has been internationally overblown as a Glantz Witchhunt. It has always been meant as a Kursk discussion, including all the facts and mis-facts (is that a word?) that have appeared in ALL the Kursk books so far. All books are game for dissection and all authors are free to rebut, as I see it.

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Yes, but I had no idea how it would turn out. If I could go back, I probably would not have asked for examplesas I see all the problems and heat coming from it.

And while you make a case for ALL Kursk books, I dont see anybody elses work being dissected besides Glantz.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
WWII Interest: Back on November 14, you specifically asked: "I respect that Mr. Zetterling. and can you provide me with some examples of what you or others disagree with in Glantz's book?" This is what generated this thread, for better or worse.

So, I provided some examples by just starting on page one and working my way through. It was in support of my previous statement that some works have an error a page.

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I think it turned out for worse, for everybody. You, Mr. Zetterling, Glantz, etc...

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:
And I had no idea that you were going to dissect it page by page by page by page by page. I though it would be a simple "a few times in his book he states", or "a few times he refers to this, when it is actually this".

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Yes, WWII=interest, but it works like this - Once a criticism is ventured of a work by someone considered to be an authority (Glantz in this case), then the INEVITABLE reply is "Ok, but you have just pointed out one (two, three, etc.) mistakes and that is minor in a book of over 400 pages." The person making the critique is then pushed further into the position of "put up or shut up". Chris could have either stopped at that point, leaving the Glantzbots to jeer, or, as he chose instead, he could back up with further examples - which of course caused the Glantzbots and Glantz himself to cry foul.

Col Glantz and his Glantzbots have advanced a number of explanations why Chris and the rest of us (the Lawrencoids?) have no right to criticize the works of Glantz. These reasons include breech of etiquette, financial motive, and generally poor hygiene.
I'd like to call attention to another nonsensical claim buried within Glantz's response. Read his following two sentences carefully (quoted warts and all) -

"To begin to study the intricacies of Kursk requires a thoroughly understand of the war which provided it context."

"Historians like John Erickson, the dean of the Soviet military historical community, Malcolm Mackintosh, Albert Seaton, Earl Ziemke, any many others, including me, understand how difficult it has been to solve the puzzle of what actually occurred during the Soviet-German War and both why and how it happened. Given that understanding, plus the knowledge that up to 40 percent of the war remains obscure, we have adhered to a code that postulates cooperation rather than confrontation."

What else is there to say, gentlemen? I believe I'm done, finally and truly. All the best.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
That a community of historians was able to transcend such bickering is highly commendable, and the late Erickson, Glantz, Ziemke, and others have my admiration and thanks.

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We need alot more David Glantz digging in to these matters, not try to turn David Glantz into some kind of super historian.

I've always found that the editorizing thats done by most historians is done on behalf of the producers/editors who are looking at what 'they think' the readers want to see....I'd much rather have more and clearer details presented about what happened in this particular battle as opposed to that particular battle.

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Originally posted by Frederick L Clemens:

Essentially, Glantz warns all of us that we are unqualified to write about Kursk (or criticize his writing) unless we "thoroughly understand" the entire war!
Then he announces that up to 40 percent of the war remains obscure - hence the need for a code among the Illuminati!
So there you have it - we must know the unknowable before we dare critique his work. I can only shudder at the initiation rites necessary to enter his fraternity!

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I dont think there is a clear understanding with you and this statement here Mr. Clemens. What Glantz proposes is that books should only be disected if its major judgements/conclusions are indeed false and untruthful. Glantz also has degraded 2 books he remebers doing so to, "Icebreakers"(which is a major reason why he wrote "Stumbling Colossus") and a Dupuy book which I cant remeber the exact name of.

And if you have not seen it yet, here is what Glantz added on the HC forum under "Criticism of Glantz's work" by T71Herb:

"I do appreciate the supportive remarks. When all is said and done, however, every book rises or falls on its ouwn merits. In this case, as in the case of the any topic concerning the German-Soviet War, there is still much to be learned. After all, operationally, about 40 percent of the war remains obscure for a variety of reasons. I recommend all read Chris' book and judge it on its own merits. Since I know some of the materials he had access to, particularly Soviet, it should contain much of interest. As is proper, reviewers can then have their day.

Re, the query, as any veteran will understand, commanders often understate their weapons strength so as to avoid having them taken away and given to another unit that needs them more. I have discussed this with many former Wehrmacht panzer veterans (1st, 6th, 7th Panzer Divisions) and those I worked with at the War College symposia in the 1980s.

Finally, as much as I would love to spend my time posting to this cite, if I did so routinely, I would get little else done. For example, I have been struggling for a year with the follow-on to Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army in the Eve of War, entitled Colossus Reborn: The Red Army 1941-1943. Unlike other books, this one has about killed me, since there is so much that needs to be said. At 700 pages and counting, my publisher is already splitting his gut over its length.

In any case, should anyone have a burning question that just MUST be answered, contact me a Rzhev@aol.com and if time permits, I will oblige. Yes, even 15 year olds for they are the next generation of historians.

David Glantz "

I agree with Mr. Glantz on form your own opinions on Chris's book.