quote:

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Originally posted by Tristan at www.1jma.dk/default.asp:

2 weeks after start of French campaign made the German War Economical and Armament Agency (WiRüAmt) a favourable assessment on the common war situation and came to the solution NOT to extend production-facilities which only would come into use during the running year or later, because traded the opinion to end the war with available capacities. 5 weeks after start of French campaign calculated also Hitler with a soon and victorious end, stating that "the tasks of Heer shall generally be completed". Consequently was a Heer-reduction to 120 divisions ordered. A commission was set up to supervise the common armament reduction, the first step for demobilization and return to peace-time economy. The available industrial capacities were ordered to focus on air-armament against GB, all previous Führer-orders regarding production of munition, weapons and equipments got suspended, like also raw material allocations for 3rd quarter 1940. Commander Reserve Army, Fromm, signed on 20.6.1940 a regulation: "Ersatz-Heer gets dissolved asap". The rest is known: jumping Hitler confused again the armament managers and ordered surprisingly the "Barbarossa" material package to be completed within a few month (sept 1940 - april 1941) with available installations. The shit started boiling after "Barbarossa" went to material crisis already during july/august 1941, because of higher than expected material expenditure and improvising orders flooded the war industries and a hole was filled and 2 others opened. Since Barbarossa-armament programme was executed by the same (temporarely demobilized) labour force which later went to arms to execute the campaign, such now war-occupied manpower was not anymore availabe to cure the arising production problems and demands of constantly enlarged ToW´s. The degenerating "limited capaign"-ideas paired with Hitler´s jumping decisions, the paradigm-change from "driver" to "driven" fucked off any serious and long term planning and production in Nazi Germany.

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Which got me to thinking. I too had read that Hitler had ordered a partial demobilization, but had never really dug into exactly how this had effected Germanys war effort. So it struck me that the important thing was not whether or not Hitler had had these discussions and had approved some form of demobilization - it appears that he did. Rather, what was important was the actual effect that these orders had on the expansion (or contraction) of the Wehrmacht and upon the industrial production of the Reich. So let us look at a couple of different subjects.

Demobilization in the Heer is a long standing story, but what was the actual effect of the “demobilization”?

Panzer Divisions. There were ten in existence at the beginning of the French Campaign. Then, between the end of the French campaign and the opening of the spring campaigns in the Balkan’s, ten more (11 if you count 5. Leichte Panzer) new divisions were formed.

11. Panzer-Division on 1 August 1940 from 11. Schuetzen-Brigade and Panzer-Regiment 15.
12. Panzer-Division on 10 January 1941 from the reorganized 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.).
13. Panzer-Division on 9 October 1940 from the reorganized 13. Infanterie-Division (mot.).
14. Panzer-Division on 15 August 1940 from the 4. Infanterie-Division.
15. Panzer-Division on 11 November 1940 from the 33. Infanterie-Division.
16. Panzer-Division on 2 August 1940 from the 16. Infanterie-Division.
17. Panzer-Division on 1 November 1940 from the 27. Infanterie-Division.
18. Panzer-Division on 15 October 1940 in Wehrkreis IV, partly from the specialized Tauchpanzer developed for and equipping Panzer-Regiment 18.
19. Panzer-Division on 1 November 1940 from the 19. Infanterie-Division.
20. Panzer-Division on 1 November 1940, also from elements of the 19. Infanterie-Division.

So, the Heer lost two Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.) and five Infanterie-Divisionen, but gained ten Panzer-Divisionen. Thus the net increase was three.

Motorized Infantry Divisions. As seen, two of the existing four Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.) were converted to Panzer-Divisionen after the end of the French Campaign. Seven more were created by motorizing existing Infanterie-Divisionen, so there was no net increase or decrease in the overall size of the Heer.

3. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in fall 1940 from the reorganized 3. Infanterie-Division.
10. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 10. Infanterie-Division.
14. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 14. Infanterie-Division.
16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 2 August 1940 from the reorganized 16. Infanterie-Division.
18. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 18. Infanterie-Division.
25. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 25. Infanterie-Division.
36. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 36. Infanterie-Division.
60. Infanterie-Division (mot.) on 17 July 1940 from the reorganized 60. Infanterie-Division.

Mountain Divisions. The existing three divisions were reinforced by the creation of three more during 1940. All were active by the fall. Thus this represents a net increase of three divisions in the Heer, all during 1940.

Light Divisions. Four new divisions were created, all after the end of the French Campaign. Thus this represents a net increase of four divisions in the Heer, all during 1940.

97. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
99. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
100. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
101. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.

Infantry Divisions. Before the beginning of the French Campaign, ten new divisions were created (290., 291., 292., 293., 294., 295., 296., 297., 298., and 299. Infanterie-Divisionen). All were formed in January-February 1940 and were barely operationally ready by 10 May 1940. In addition. a total of 34 Infanterie-Divisionen, mostly of the 11.-14. Welle, were formed after the close of the French Campaign.

102. Infanterie-Division was formed 10 December 1940.
106. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
110. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
111. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 November 1940.
112. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
113. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
121 Infanterie-Division was formed on 6 October 1940.
122. Infanterie-Division was formed on 2 October 1940.
123. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 October 1940.
125. Infanterie-Division was formed on 2 October 1940.
126. Infanterie-Division was formed on 23 September 1940.
129. Infanterie-Division was formed on 22 October 1940.
131. Infanterie-Division was formed on 17 September 1940.
132. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.
134. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.
137. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.
199. Infanterie-Division was formed on 1 November 1940 in Norway from existing elements of other divisions in garrison there.
302. Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 November 1940.
304. Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 November 1940.
305 Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 December 1940.
306. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
319. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
320. Infanterie-Division was formed 18 November 1940.
321. Infanterie-Division was formed 2 December 1940.
323. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
327. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
332. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
333. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
335. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
336. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 December 1940.
337. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
339. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 December 1940.
340. Infanterie-Division was formed 16 November 1940.
342. Infanterie-Division was formed 21 October 1940.

This completed the mobilization through the 14. Welle.

The “disbanded” infantry divisions. Some 19 or 20 divisions are usually said to have been “disbanded after the end of the French Campaign. Of those, four were Landwehr divisions (209., 228., 331. Infanterie-Division, and 358. Infanterie-Division). In common with the other Landwehr divisions (205., 205., 208., 211., 212., 213., 214., 215., 216., 217., 218., 2221., 223., 225., 227., and 228. were not demobilized) they were mainly composed of older and often married men, some of the more senior of them Great War veterans. Their mobilization probably had had an adverse effect upon the Reichs economy as a whole. The equipment of the divisions was often obsolescent.

A six other divisions, most of them Landwehr, were converted to field commands occupying conquered territories. These included:

365. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 365.
372. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 372.
379. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 379.
393. Infanterie-Divisiom, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 393.
395. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 395.
399. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 399.

Finally, 15 Infanterie-Divisionen (271., 272., 273., 276., 277, 307., 310., 311., 317., 341., 351, 380., 555., 556., and 557.) were all supposedly formed shortly before, and disbanded shortly after, the French Campaign. Some of these (555., 556., and 557.) were created in February 1940 by the renaming of Fortress divisions (Stellungs-Divisionen) as Infantry divisions, which did little to increase either their mobility or their combat readiness (556. Infanterie-Division was formed on 11 February 1940 from Divisions-Kommando z.b.V. 426 and Landsesschuetzen Batallion II/XVII). However, many left little or nothing in the way of records behind and it is unclear how far along their organization was before they were disbanded. It is also unclear if the personnel that had been mustered for these divisions were in fact discharged or were incorporated into the other divisions whose formation was completed. It is curious that all three of the former Stellungs-Divisionen
were disbanded as of 1 October 1940, just as the first of the 11. Welle divisions began activating.

Thus, the Heer created approximately 69 new divisions in the Feld-Heer by the end of 1940. In the same period 19 divisions were disbanded, for a net increase of 50 divisions.

Part Two. Industrial Demobilization.

This is actually easier to address than the military demobilization and, quite simply the story does not appear to have much substance.

Looking first at a simple metric, AFV production, we find the following:

From February 1934 when the first Pz-I Ausf A (ohne Aufbau) was produced, to 1 January 1938, a total of 1,879 Panzer and 190 Panzerbefehlwagen were built for an average of 517.25 per year.

In 1938, 804 Panzer and 26 Panzerbefehlwagen were built for an increase over the previous yearly average of 162.4 percent.

In 1939, 743 Panzer (including 150 Czech 38) and 44 Panzerbefehlwagen were built for a decrease over the previous year of 5.5 percent. And, lest we assume that Hitler was demobilizing, let us remember that this change was due to the reduction in Pz-II and increase in Pz-III and Pz-IV production.

Now the critical years of comparison. In 1940, 1,515 Panzer, 34 Panzerbefehlwagen, 44 Flammpanzer, and 184 Sturmgeschuetz were built. That was an increase of 225.8 percent.

Then, in 1941, 3,114 Panzer, 132 Panzerbefehlwagen, 39 Flammpanzer, and 548 Sturmgeschuetz were produced for an increase of 215.7 percent.

So production doubled two years in a row, despite the industrial “demobilization”?

Then in 1942 the expansion began to taper off. A total of 4,276 Panzer, 131 Panzerbefehlwagen, 29 Flammpanzer, and 823 Sturmgeschuetz (and Sturmartillerie) were produced for an increase of ‘only’ 137.2 percent. Was there another industrial “demobilization” ordered in 1942?

In 1943 the slower pace of production increases continued. “Only” 5,663 Panzer, 14 Panzerbefehlwagen, 100 Flammpanzer, and 3,312 Sturmgeschuetz were built for an increase of 172.8 percent. That was an improvement over the previous years increase, but still not on a par with 1940 and 1941.

Finally, in the last full year of production, 1944, 7,975 Panzer, 41 Panzerbefehlwagen, 20 Flammpanzer, and 6,208 Sturmgeschuetz were built for an increase of 156.7 percent.

Similar production statistics can be shown for other major items, such as ammunition, aircraft, artillery pieces, and so forth. None show significant drops in production during the timeframe of the “demobilization.”

Other economic studies confirm that the German military industrial expansion was fairly steady from 1938 onwards. The net utilization of resources supplied to the war effort as a share of the net national product in Germany was:

1938 17 percent
1939 25 percent, an increase of 8 percent
1940 44 percent, an increase of 19 percent
1941 56 percent, an increase of 12 percent
1942 69 percent, an increase of 13 percent
1943 76 percent, an increase of 13 percent

Note that the greatest increase was in 1940, which is to be expected since that was the first full year of “wartime” military spending. After that the increase remained fairly constant.

There are at least two points against seeing the demobilization as a myth:
- Hitler was impulsive in his decision-making and not known as a good business manager so this on-off apporach to running the Reich fits with his other behavior.
- What is missing is the POTENTIAL expansion which the Wehrmacht could have achieved if the brakes hadn't been applied temporarily. Although the military production continues to expand at a steady rate, does that rate of expansion compare favorably with the other industrial countries in the conflict?

Another factor in the German war economy during that period were the Soviet deliveries of goods to Germany. There is information about those online here:
http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/sovexports.html
and a quote from this site
http://www.switzerland.taskforce.ch/W/W2/W2b/b4_e.htm
"As can be read in the standard work of the Military History Research Office at Freiburg im Breisgau "Das deutsche Reich and der Zweite Welkrieg" (The German Reich and World War II), the Soviet Union had supported Hitler’s Germany "to a high degree" and indeed through political propaganda as well as economically. The figures indicated there actually appear gigantic: 1 million tons of oil, 800,000 tons of iron ore, 500,000 tons of phosphate, 100,000 tons of cotton, 100,000 tons of chrome ore (!), 80,000 tons of manganese, 10,800 tons of copper, 1,575 tons of nickel, 1,300 tons of Indian rubber, 985 tons of tin, etc. as well as 2.22 million tons of grain. Molotov, the foreign minister at the time and architect of the disreputable Hitler-Stalin Pact, several times recalls quite openly that the Soviet deliveries "were not without influence on the great German victories." And the German author of that contribution noted: "Of vital importance for Germany up until 1941 was the fact that the Soviet Union sent the Reich economic goods of the broadest range - raw materials it lacked - to make it capable of waging a long war of attrition against the Western Powers." And Hitler rejoiced that the British blockade would be thwarted completely as a result."

Like everybody else, I have seen many references to demobilisation between the French and Russian campaigns. But are you sure that such demobilisations neccessarily had to take the form of disbandment of units? As I have understood it, it was temporary in character and also selective according to the needs of the economy.As such, the temporarily demobilised might have been drawn from many different units, in effect making these temporarily understrength. I have an idea I've seen something on this in the appropriate volume of the MGFA's "Germany and the Second World War", I'll try to look it up tonight.

Your industrial numbers fly in the face of many widely held conceptions. No appreciable Speer effect in other words?

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

Your industrial numbers fly in the face of many widely held conceptions. No appreciable Speer effect in other words?

cheers

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Yes, it seems that the Allies were so busy patting themselves on the back at the end of the war that they missed just how amazing the German economic performance had been. Speer coming along and saying that it was only his own cleverness that saved German sounded good, so it seems everyone decided to ignore simple facts, and anyway, it is easier to believe in neat stories.

Thus, the legend of Hitler and the role of women in the German economy. We all "know" that untill Speer convinced Hitler that letting women work in industry was a good idea, that it simply wasn't allowed. Kinder, Kueche, Kirche, - children, kitchen and church were where German women belonged, right?

But sad to say, before the war women had a much greater presence in the workforce than in most other industrial nations, and much higher than that in the US. Prewar Germany's women workforce was 37.4 percent of the total civilian workforce; in the US it was 25.8 percent. By 1944 the German female workforce peaked at about 51.1 percent of the total; in the US the peak was 37.4 percent. Only the Soviet Union and UK had a higher peak, at just about 60 percent of the workforce by 1945.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:

This seems to be just another example that it is not only the Soviet Union that is poorly covered and thus in need of more research. It is true that there is much more published on the German side, but it seems that this is rather a disadvantage than an advantage, given the poor accuracy.

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Well, at least in part I think this has happened for a similar reason to that that affected the Soviet accounts. Postwar our early understanding of what went on in Germany was governed militarily by the interviews conducted with the senior German commanders, and politically by the documentation of the war crimes trials. As progandists have noted, the first and loudest voice, especially if it says what one wants to hear, is that one which gets heard most. The later intrusion of facts into the matter have little impact.

So Speer said what the west wanted to hear. Germany's war economy was a shambles because of the inefficiencies of the Nazi system and because of the petty empire building of the Nazi leaders (hmmm, so nobody noticed that Speer had his own empire that he carefully built?). And of course he appealed to both the pro and anti strategic bombing advocates, since on the one hand he claimed that without the bombing the German production would have been much greater than it was (hmm, where was all the raw materials to come from?) and on the other hand production did increase even with the Allied bombing campaign.

Thus, the legend of Hitler and the role of women in the German economy. We all "know" that untill Speer convinced Hitler that letting women work in industry was a good idea, that it simply wasn't allowed. Kinder, Kueche, Kirche, - children, kitchen and church were where German women belonged, right?

But sad to say, before the war women had a much greater presence in the workforce than in most other industrial nations, and much higher than that in the US. Prewar Germany's women workforce was 37.4 percent of the total civilian workforce; in the US it was 25.8 percent. By 1944 the German female workforce peaked at about 51.1 percent of the total; in the US the peak was 37.4 percent. Only the Soviet Union and UK had a higher peak, at just about 60 percent of the workforce by 1945."

Actually, Germany in this period was a mass of contradictions on the subject of women in the labour force. Germany had a high percentage of women working, yes. However, loss of potential is an important point, as mentioned above in other aspects of German military-industrial expansion. During the Weimar period, the combination of a lot of socialist ideals and the best educated society in the world resulted in a comparitively high proportion of German women working and going to higher educational institutions, even getting involved in the government. (They gained suffrage in the same year as women in the US.) In fact the Nazi party owed a lot in it's own political campaign to the contribition of female supporters and political figures. There is a book out on the subject, but it's title escapes me at the moment.

However, this was not a trend at all encouraged by Hitler or the main elements of the Nazi party. After they secured power, they began serious efforts to restrict women's role in society. They did not succeed in eradicating women's role, becuase of how strongly it had developed. However, they did succeed in keeping it from expanding in the period just before the war. Those percentages are the of the labour force. They do not reflect what that labour was up to. Mnay German "working" women were doing service in the BDM as helpers on farms, an incredible waste of their time. What Hitler did was ensure that most of those women were farmhand/maid/babysitters not trained in technical and mechanical fields so vitally needed in the war industry. Of course, the war itself countered Hilter's effort, and pushed many of those women back into industrial work. Hitler was not Germany, and he could neither entirely halt German social development, nor negate the inherent pragmatism that any nation adopts in crisis. But he did retard the role of women in German industry, just as he retarded the war industry in other areas, such as the conscription of a large portion of the skilled labour force, required replacements to be trained, with the resulting loss of time and efficiency.

Basically, Germany was too advanced in education, social development and social idealism for Hitler to ruin it, but that doesn't mean he didn't hurt it a lot. German industrial production was amazing, but then, it should have been, given Germany at the time. But it also could have been a lot better.

With regard to Albert Speer, I think an important point has been made. Speer did NOT fix the German economy. He did conrtibute to greater efficiency, as did many other men. But he built upon a solidly established foundation. Interestingly a large part of that foundation was built by none other than Hermann Goering! We have become accustomed to snickering at Goering, because of his drug habit, his clothes, his personal extravagence, and his tendency to exaggerate. However, though his ability was hampered by these defects, the fact remains that he was an exceptional character, and economics was one of his strongest subjects. Firsty, he achieved the highest scores ever achieved at the famous Lichterfelde military acadamy (232), which was why one of the buildings at the academy was named after him.
He later became famous as the last commander of the Richtofen Geschwader, having served as Ricchtofen's second in command, and a fighter ace. He studied for and obtained a degree in economics, a subject that greatly interested him. He later reformed German hunting and animal protection laws and his reforms remain the basis for most European hunting and animal protection laws. He was an excellent shot with rifle, pistol and bow, and seemed to have a kind of animal magnetism that caused even lions to be his docile companions. (He kept two.) It was the drive and speech making ability of Goering that, more than any single person, got the Nazis elected. (At the famous Nuremberg rally of 1935,as well as the others, he made most of the speeches, something conviently edited out of Leni Reifenstahl's films.) It was only because of him that Hinderburg even accepted Hitler (whom he despised) as chancellor. Once in power, he became famous for his abiliity to get things done because he completely ignored established procedures. He made the deals the built much of Hitler's war machine, and secured the raw materials it was made out of. Hitler's economic miracle was actually Goering's. He has been unfairly blamed for the cancellation of Operation Sealion, something which many German Army officers were quick to pick up on. Actually, he was prepared to support it. The OHL (Brauchitsch and Halder) and Hilter were the ones who backed out, despite the zeal many of their juniors had for the operation. True to the Hilterian legacy of playing everyone off against each other,he became one of the great scapegoats. Speer merely buuilt upon what Goering had already achieved.

An important point here is the basic fallacy involved in attributing the achievements of massive institutions and social organizations to single individuals. No one ever does it by themselves. Even Napoleon had Berthier, Davout and many others, as well as a solid foundation of tactical ideas to build on, something we should remember when we listen to Speer's claims.

The resulting two year gap was enough that the Germans could never catch up and Panthers, Stugs and PzIV's were doomed to be swamped by masses of T-34's. Was this actually the case?

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Well, yes. The Soviet Union did produce a far greater number of tanks and aircraft than Germany, and from a smaller industrial base. I have yet to see a really satisfactory explanation why, though some of the factors are well-known.

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One of the other factors which rus was able to correct was its icredibly low tank production in 40-41. Up to this point rus made 95% light tanks but had stopped this production altogheather the T34s med were supposed to relace this. But the design and production problem kept the T34 from being produced in large numbers until late 42. After germany attacked the rus strted production of a new light the T60 which would be the mainstay of rus tank production and use until early 43. Raising light tanks prod to such levels whould have been easy for rus in 1941. The T60 was not a step fwd over early rus light tanks if anything it was a step backward.

One other factor in German production was the disruption of the rail network especialy in 44 / 45.

Compared to the soviets in 43-45 this comparirison is false. The rus T34s weighed 30 tons at this point and light tank production was stopped. SU-76M production continued though but even this was reduced signifactly towards the end and used more for HE direct fire than attacking tanks. The SU-76M weighed 12 tons. The rus produced the same proportion of KV and IS varients including spATG as the ger produced thier own 45 ton panther varients. The only ger tank that was produced that had no equiv was the tiger varients at around 60 tons. But the number of tiger varients would be less than 2000 which is only 4% of total ger tank and spATG production.

Except for the tiger and panther varients the vast majority of ger tanks and apATG OVER 80% were all under 25tons. From the heteztzer a 16 ton spATG about 2500 of which were produced during 44-45. To the stug III and PZ IVs the mainstays of ger tank production during the last half of the war. It seems obvious to me the rus tanks were on avg heavier than the germans in 43-45.

Finally I found the notes I was looking for. Production of war material needs resources and if one increase the production more resources are needed. Thus it is not always enough to count only number of vehicles produced because a production of 100 Panzerkampfwagen II demands less resources than 100 Köningstiger.

German armoured Vehicles Production in tonnes
1940 - 37 235
1941 - 83 188 increase by 223%
1942 - 140 454 increase by 169%
1943 - 369 416 increase by 263%
1944 - 622 322 increase by 168%

Thus in weight the Production 1940 amounts to 6% of the Production 1944.

But regarding the industrial “demobilization” one should not look on the production of armoured vehicles as after Poland and France the Panzertruppe had become the weapon of the future. Several new Panzerdivisions as Rich wrote were formed.

A more interesting aspect is the production of shells for the artillery.
1940 – 20 290 000
1941 – 9 400 000 a decrease of 54%
1942 – 32 500 000
1943 – 56 000 000
1944– 67 600 000

Same applies to ammunition-production to small-arms, 1940 - 2 952 500 000 rounds while 1941 – 1 343 700 000. And the ammunition-production for tankguns and AT-guns was cut with 50% 1941 compared to 1940. The exception was ammunition for heavy AA-guns which rose with 420%.

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Originally posted by Anders E.Frankson:

Changes in production

Finally I found the notes I was looking for. Production of war material needs resources and if one increase the production more resources are needed. Thus it is not always enough to count only number of vehicles produced because a production of 100 Panzerkampfwagen II demands less resources than 100 Köningstiger.

German armoured Vehicles Production in tonnes
1940 - 37 235
1941 - 83 188 increase by 223%
1942 - 140 454 increase by 169%
1943 - 369 416 increase by 263%
1944 - 622 322 increase by 168%

Thus in weight the Production 1940 amounts to 6% of the Production 1944.

But regarding the industrial “demobilization” one should not look on the production of armoured vehicles as after Poland and France the Panzertruppe had become the weapon of the future. Several new Panzerdivisions as Rich wrote were formed.

A more interesting aspect is the production of shells for the artillery.
1940 – 20 290 000
1941 – 9 400 000 a decrease of 54%
1942 – 32 500 000
1943 – 56 000 000
1944– 67 600 000

Same applies to ammunition-production to small-arms, 1940 - 2 952 500 000 rounds while 1941 – 1 343 700 000. And the ammunition-production for tankguns and AT-guns was cut with 50% 1941 compared to 1940. The exception was ammunition for heavy AA-guns which rose with 420%.

Anders

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One of the problems with looking at something like ammo is it is consumption based. You produce it to maintain a certain stockpile after you get to this level the production of ammo can drop. In peacetime the stockpiles last a long time. While the gers were not at peace for early 41 they were minimally engaged on land but activly training. On the other hand an almost 4 fold increse in heavy AAA ammo production is due to the continual and increasing stratgic bombing.

And while production of panzers may have been empazied. When you look at non ammo production you don´t see a huge drop in production. Look at weapon systems as a better indicator. While the ger may not have demobilized any divs they as rich pointed out may have realsed some inndividual. It might even be possible that the div in ger esp the inf might have been expected to preform certain duties. This does not point to a huge emergency in production but more to a desire to optamize production possibilites.

quote:

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Originally posted by Anders E.Frankson:

Changes in production

German armoured Vehicles Production in tonnes
1940 - 37 235
1941 - 83 188 increase by 223%
1942 - 140 454 increase by 169%
1943 - 369 416 increase by 263%
1944 - 622 322 increase by 168%

Thus in weight the Production 1940 amounts to 6% of the Production 1944.

But regarding the industrial “demobilization” one should not look on the production of armoured vehicles as after Poland and France the Panzertruppe had become the weapon of the future. Several new Panzerdivisions as Rich wrote were formed.

A more interesting aspect is the production of shells for the artillery.
1940 – 20 290 000
1941 – 9 400 000 a decrease of 54%
1942 – 32 500 000
1943 – 56 000 000
1944– 67 600 000

Same applies to ammunition-production to small-arms, 1940 - 2 952 500 000 rounds while 1941 – 1 343 700 000. And the ammunition-production for tankguns and AT-guns was cut with 50% 1941 compared to 1940. The exception was ammunition for heavy AA-guns which rose with 420%.

Anders

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Anders, this is all very true, but one reason I focused on the expansion of the AFV production program was because it's initial growth spurt was at least partly responsible for the decrease in ammunition production. In other words, they robbed Peter to pay Paul, largely due to continuing restrictions in the production of raw steel. This effect is discussed to some length in "Consumption of Ammunition by Land Forces Since 1939" the Bundeswehr study from 1986. In 1940 it was decided at the highest levels (likely the OKW Fuehrungsstab) to shift raw materiel priorities from ammunition production to production of armaments (i.e., guns, tanks, submarines, and aircraft), even though the OKH and especially 6 Abteilung/General Stabes des Heeres recommended against it (the Army had not acheived its pre-war planning stockpile of 4 combat months - 40 combat days - of ammunition), and even though the OKW's own WiRustAmt in July 1940, ordered a reexamination of ammunition production requirements be done based upon the experience of the French Campaign! This was completed and published in a memo of 28 August 1940, which declared the intention was to develop a 12-month stockpile (i.e. at least 4 times the existing stockpile!) for a 180 division field army and the equivalent of 20 divisions in the replacement army - in other words, a larger army - and to have it all done by 1 April 1941. Of course that proved to be impossible, so the army went into the Russian Campaign with stockpiles that were proportionately slightly smaller than those available at the start of the French Campaign.

Complicating all of this was that the pre-war expectation was that most ammunition production would be done by small factories throughout Germany, as had happened in World War I. They then rationalized that this meant that modern facilities and machinery were not required for the wartime expansion of ammunition production - despite numerous memos from the technical staffs that said exactly the opposite.

So what does this tell us? Quite possibly the most important thing may be that it highlights just how poor the German military, political and economic leadership was at long-term strategic (or even mid-term operational) planning. And just how bad they were at interservice (and it appears even intraservice and intradepartmental) planning coordination. It appears that this may have been the one area that Speer's appointement and the "carte blanche" he was given over industrial coodination did have an impact.

The cut in ammoproduction created a huge problem for the Germans, which would haunt during the rest of war. Artillery-ammunition need a large overhead so the supplysystem can function smoothly. During 1941 the production was small compared to the use on the Eastern Front, from 22 June to the end of 1941. They used up artilleryammo quicker than they produced. During 1942 the production reached similar level as the use.
This problem (cutting down on the ammunitionproduction) could have caused the notion of a German industrial “demobilization” after France 1940.

The Germans had two standard field pieces, 10,5 cm howitzer and 15 cm howitzer.
Production of 10,5 cm
1939 – 483
1940 – 1380
1941 – 1160 as decrease of 16%.
1942 – 1237.
1943 – 3533.
1944 – 8836.

Production of 15 cm howitzer
1939 – 190.
1940 – 580.
1941 – 516. a decrease of 11%
1942 – 636.
1943 – 785.
1944 – 2295.

As seen there is a small decrease in the production of artillery pieces 1941.

Anders

I am currently reading
"War and economy in the third reich"
by R.J. Overy
This book does not get to deep into army logistics but contains a huge reference to other sources and a good background for German rearmment 1934-45.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

One of the problems with looking at something like ammo is it is consumption based. You produce it to maintain a certain stockpile after you get to this level the production of ammo can drop. In peacetime the stockpiles last a long time.

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Consumtion based is partly correct but in this case we have to look at forcasted ammo expenditure.
And you must have the production facilities available to match demand with supply.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

And while production of panzers may have been empazied. When you look at non ammo production you don´t see a huge drop in production. Look at weapon systems as a better indicator.

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I do agree on that so it looks like we all share Rich's views on the question

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Originally posted by Rich:
So, what exactly was the reason for Hitler's decision and was there some effect of it that I have missed. Furthermore, how did it become accepted that these decisions had a momentous affect on the outcome of the war? Where did this story start?

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Production capacity of ammo was there in 1940 over 20 m were produced. The ger just reassinged HALF the capacity in 41 to produce something else. Then the ammount of ammo produced reached the level of consumption in 42 at 30 million.

This is a very interesting and complicated discussion.

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Originally posted by Rich:
This effect is discussed to some length in "Consumption of Ammunition by Land Forces Since 1939" the Bundeswehr study from 1986.

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Dear Sir
Would you please provide me with full title and ISBN?
This is exactly what I have been looking for the last couple of months!

In particular I am looking for info on the expected ammo consumtion before the start of WW2. I have a working hypothesis that the perception was that "the next war" would be even more ammo consuming than the great war.

The thing Anders and Rich are missing (IMHO) is the German stockpiles of ammo at the start of WW2. These where quite large,
The stocks in Sept 1939 of 105mm leFH18 ammo was as big as the production during 1940 -
According to Jason Long.
Initial stocks can be found here:
http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/GermAmmoPoland.html

Production:
http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/GermWeapProd.html#monthly

So my personal idea is that the drop in German production in 1941 was due to war time experience from France indicating a quick war and relatively low ammo consumtion,
(Relative to WW1).
THEN in the end of 1941 came the static, huge eastern front.

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Originally posted by Rich:

In 1940 it was decided at the highest levels (likely the OKW Fuehrungsstab) to shift raw materiel priorities from ammunition production to production of armaments (i.e., guns, tanks, submarines, and aircraft), even though the OKH and especially 6 Abteilung/General Stabes des Heeres recommended against it (the Army had not acheived its pre-war planning stockpile of 4 combat months - 40 combat days - of ammunition), and even though the OKW's own WiRustAmt in July 1940, ordered a reexamination of ammunition production requirements be done based upon the experience of the French Campaign! This was completed and published in a memo of 28 August 1940, which declared the intention was to develop a 12-month stockpile (i.e. at least 4 times the existing stockpile!) for a 180 division field army and the equivalent of 20 divisions in the replacement army - in other words, a larger army - and to have it all done by 1 April 1941.

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But to what extent was this a product of "Initial bid for a budget" rather than actual need of 12 month stockpiles?
"The more the merrier" are always the saying of quartermasters.
The only reasons I find for 12 month supplies are:

1. a margin of safety. (no more 'dolkstuss')

2. Stores in transit and/or dispersed across a huge German Reich (all the way to Vladivostock?)

The decision was made against OKH but does it means that OKH was right?

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Originally posted by Rich:

So what does this tell us? Quite possibly the most important thing may be that it highlights just how poor the German military, political and economic leadership was at long-term strategic (or even mid-term operational) planning. And just how bad they were at interservice (and it appears even intraservice and intradepartmental) planning coordination.

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Note that in the Strategical context Speed is not always the optimum solution.
We have a number of too Quick German descisions:
BoB- Attacking London
Atlantic - Stopped targeting escorts
etcetera ...

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Originally posted by Rich:

It appears that this may have been the one area that Speer's appointement and the "carte blanche" he was given over industrial coodination did have an impact.

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As I have understood it it was only USSR and USA who had any kind of efficient "warlike" procurement organization before WW2.

Happy end of the Year (as we say in Sweden)
to all who bothered to read this far.

/John T.
Stockholm

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Originally posted by Darrin:

This is a very interesting and complicated discussion.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

For example when looking at the first sourse avaiable the production of smaller ammo seems to have taken the big hit with a normal production of larger ammo. A reduction of 50% in tot numbers of shells while reduction in total tonnage would be less.

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The study in question was never AFAIK published, thus no ISBN/ISSN number. It was produced as a report by the Bundeswehr Research and Training Office, Reserach Branch, by a Lt.Col. Jung, in June 1986. The report title was "Ammo-Consumption -- Military History" report number 36 63 12 A (I will try and remember to post the German language title when I am in the office on Monday, I do not have it here at home). The address was:
5060 Friederich Ebert Strasse 72
Bergisch Gladbach 1

Phone: (02203) 12 015
Extension 15

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Originally posted by Rich:
The net utilization of resources supplied to the war effort as a share of the net national product in Germany was:

1938 17 percent
1939 25 percent, an increase of 8 percent
1940 44 percent, an increase of 19 percent
1941 56 percent, an increase of 12 percent
1942 69 percent, an increase of 13 percent
1943 76 percent, an increase of 13 percent

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