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Originally posted by Rich:
JohnT: please don't call me "Sir." To use an old US Marine Corps bon mot, "I work for a living."

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Originally posted by Rich:
The study in question was never AFAIK published, thus no ISBN/ISSN number. It was produced as a report by the Bundeswehr Research and Training Office, Reserach Branch, by a Lt.Col. Jung, in June 1986. The report title was "Ammo-Consumption -- Military History" report number 36 63 12 A (I will try and remember to post the German language title when I am in the office on Monday, I do not have it here at home). The address was:
5060 Friederich Ebert Strasse 72
Bergisch Gladbach 1

Phone: (02203) 12 015
Extension 15

But I do not know if those are still good.

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Eventually I got time to evade work and phone but the line is no longer open.
Tried to find the organization through Bundeswehr web page but military history doesn't look like the main focus for Bundeswehr (suprisingly).

I did found a reference to this:

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Jung, Jakob, LTC, Information on Consumption of Ammunition by
Land Forces Since 1939, U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Defense Technical Information Center, June 1986, 49.

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Originally posted by Rich:
<Mega Snip>
Furthermore, how did it become accepted that these decisions had a momentous affect on the outcome of the war? Where did this story start?

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AFAIK
Design for total war by Berenice Caroll, Haag 1968.
I have not read the book, just a review.
The book is in part based on interviews with Gen. Thomas.
The books clue was the concept of "Blitzkrieg economy" as Hitlers way to conquer Europe at a minimum cost and that German consumers influenced Hitlers descisions.

Overy simply quotes Hitler:

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"Everybody's Armed Forces and Government must strive for a short war. But the government must, however, also prepare for a war of from ten to fifteen years' duration. History shows that wars were always expected to be short. In 1914 it was still believed that long wars could not be financed. Even today this idea buzzes in a lot of heads. However, every State will hold out as long as it can. The idea of getting out cheaply is dangerous, there is no such possibility.
" [NCA vii. 851-3, report of a conference with Hitler, 23 May 1939]

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Overys other main point was that German investments early in the war was not converted into output.
German industrial mobilization was much more constant between 1936-44 than the output indicates.
Partly because of inefficient management in general and partly because the industrial base where expanded faster than production.
The economical incentives to German companies where to build two plants and operate them in one-shift rather than convert one plant to two-shift.

Regards,

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Originally posted by JohnT:
Alas the DTIC web page http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/
is only open for those associated with DoD
So I can't see if it is available as PDF.

Any help would be appreciated
Cheers
/John T.

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