First according to the best as I can figure, the Germans started with either 198 or 200 Panthers, and either 2 or 4 Berge Panthers (and either 2 light half tracks (250/1) and 4 heavy half tracks (251/8) or 4 250/1 and 2 251/8)).

All German reports clearly identify 200 Panthers (190 Panthers and 10 command Panthers) by the 10th of July. On the 3rd of July the Rgt Hq and 51st Bn reports 104 Panther, of which 2 are Berge Panthers (= 102 Panthers with guns). This would mean that there was a shortfall of 2 Panthers in this group (96 Panthers per battalion, 8 in Rgt HQ = 104). When the 52nd Bn arrives (96 Panthers), then there are now 198 Panthers.

The other two Panthers either also arrived on the 3rd/4th with the 52nd Bn, or arrived at some point before the 11th.

In the case of the other two Berge Panthers, we have no direct evidence they were there on the 3/4th, but they were definately there on the 11th. There is a report on the 20th that states that they had "In need of recovery" 55 Pz V and 3 tank chassis. These "tank chassis" are probably the Berge Panthers. As one was about 6 km south of Dubrova, 1 was at Butovo and 1 was at the road juction [turn-off] at Alexeyevka, then this would indicate that they were all out of action on the 4th through the 6th (probaly mechnical). This would argue for all four Berge Panthers being there on the 4th. The problem with this theory, is that in the report on the 10th, they are all reported as ready-for-action.

In the case of the halftracks, the tank status report for 7/10 24:00 stated that there are 2 250/1 and 4 251/8s. This may be a typo (reversed the numbers) as I have a report for the 20th and for the 31st of July for the 51st Bn that shows it authorized (and with) 2 250/1 and 1 251/8. As there were two battalions....

Therefore, before the fighting started, the Germans started with either 198 or 200 Panthers (10 command), 2 or 4 Berge Panthers, 2 or 4 250/1, and 2 or 4 251/8. I do not know if they had 20mm AA guns or not (although I have one secondary source claiming that they did).

This is what Zetterling says about Panther strength at Kursk:

...There exists differing information relating to the number of Panthers operational during Zitadelle. Three such sets of figures are presented here:

1.- According to Tagesmeldungen (daily reports) and Nachmeldungen (supplementary reports) from operations section of XLVIII Pz Korps staff to 4th Panzer Army the following number of Panthers were operational:

July

6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17
40 - 43 - ? - 16 - 33 - 30 - 25 - 43 - 36 - 20 - 43 - 44

2.- Another set of figures is presented by the Quartermaster section of the staff of XLVIII Panzer Korps in its daily report:

July

6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17
135 - 43 - ? - ? - 33 - (38) - 38 - 51 - 56 - 56 - 43 - 44

3.- Finally lets look at a set of figures concerning the number of operational Panthers presented by Thomas L. Jentz in his excellent book about the Panther tank:

July

6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17
166 - 40 - ? - 16 - 10 - 30 - 23 - 43 - 36 - 20 - 43

The difference between these reports may be explained by the fact they do not apply to the same time on the respective days, but all of them seem to refer to the status between 1700 and 2400 hrs on the given date. "

Chris,

I appreciate you addressing the issue, I'm not trying to be difficult*, I'm just REALLY curious, and since you once mentioned that some Lauchert correspondence you had obtained contained some info - I've become even MORE curious. If you don't feel comfortable sharing the info in a public forum, I certainly understand - but you must promise full disclosure in published format a.s.a.p.!

For those interested in the background to this thread, you can check out Panthers at Kursk.

* My wife says I do a great job even when not trying.

Anyhow, to finish the thread on starting strength:

There is one other peice of evidence to argue to a starting strength of 198 (vice 200). There is a quatermaster report for 2400 7/10 which states that the regiment had 170 "Ist", of which 33 were ready for action and 137 were in repair. It also reports 28 totally destroyed, for a total of 198 Panthers.

The following day, the quuatermaster report for 11:00 records an "ist" of 169, with 38 ready for action and 31 totally destroyed. This comes out to 200 Panthers and agrees with the Regimental status report of 7/11/43.

On the 4th, the 48th Pz Corps quartermaster report for 7/04 reports "1 Panzer V burned out on 4 July (51st Panzer Bn) (T314, R1169, pg 730). Another report on the 20th states that "2 totally lost, becuase they burned up during the march of 4 July and had to be towed (commander of the demolition party: Col. Ziersdorff).

This figure of "two" is confirmed in other reports. There is a quartermaster report for the 10th covering 76 tank losses up to the 10th, that records 4 total losses. There is a letter on the 11th from Mellenthin to Guderian on "Operational failures (from cuases other than enemy action) of Pz Vs of the 39th Panzer Regiment during the period 409 July, 1943" that also reports under the category "Motor with attachments" of 4 cases of "Total loss of the vehicle through self-combustion."

There is also a report in the corps on the 7th that "The heavy losses of Panthers are not the result of Soviet artillery fire (up to the present time only two Panthers have been pierced), but are due to "infantile sickness" [bugs!] on the new and untested machines."

I have come to the conclusion that all this means that as far as they knew, two Panthers caught fire and were destroyed on the march up on the 4th and two (or more) were destroyed due to artillery fire on the 5th and 6th (more on that tomorrow).

This leads me to there now being 198 Panthers at the end of the day on the 4th with two destroyed.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
4 July:

This leads me to there now being 198 Panthers at the end of the day on the 4th with two destroyed.

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Now for the contradictory evidence. As you may be aware, I had Major General Brand (Bundeswehr, ret) conduct interviews of 28 Germans veterans for me, including two gentlemen who served in the 52nd Panzer Bn, Walter Rahn and Oswald Filla. Mr. Rahn had also done up a briefing on the 52nd Panzer Bn at Kursk which I gather has recieved wide distribution.

To quote from them (more correctly, to quote from Gen. Brand's transcription of his interview with them):

Rahn:

"At least six of the Panther tanks caught fire during the march and burned out.:

Battle Report:

"In the course of the following overland travel, a total of 6 Panthers in both battalions caught fire due to leaking fuel lines and burned out completely. A further 20 tanks had broken down due to mechanical problems. Thus, the Panther Regiment had over 10% for their vehicles disabled while moving towards the assembly area at Moshtshenoye."

Filla:
"Several tanks caught fire while on the move. I am not aware of the exact figures regarding the incidents."

So, I have primary source reports that clearly state two burned, I have Rahn's claim of 6 (and 20 broken down). I suspect Rahn is the source of Jentz matching claim, but as I don't have Jentz, you will have to check the bibliography/footnotes for me.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
...including two gentlemen who served in the 52nd Panzer Bn, Walter Rahn and Oswald Filla.

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These guys knew Strachwitz! I bet they can shed light on the mine damage and the tactical soundness of the graf's decisions.

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Rahn:
"At least six of the Panther tanks caught fire during the march and burned out."

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This tallies with Hans-Joachim Jung's "History of PzRg GD".

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You with me so far.

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There are only two reports of Panther strength for the 5th. One is a report at 0820 that states "The Corps Commander expects that with the commitment of 160 new Panterh tanks, the GD PzGrD will quickly break through the Soviet defenses and capture ground to the north."

This could provide an argument that by 0820 July 5th, that 40 (or 38) Panthers had broken down, as they had yet to see combat.

As of 1105, GD Division reports two crossings were ready and ten tank were across the ravine. As of 1300, 15 tanks, "none of them Panthers", were on the northern side of the Berezovyii Ravine. At 1600 the GD Division had 30 Panthers, 15 Mk IV, four infantry battalions and an AT unit across the ravine.

The GD daily report of 1700 reports taht so far the 39th Panzer Regiment has reported only 3 total losses.

Second is the quatermaster report dated the 6th, 2400, that records 194 "ist" (argueing for 6 destroyed on the march?) with a 135 ready-for-action and 4 totally destroyed. The 194 figure clearly indicates that they believed there were 198 Panthers (194 + 4 destroyed). The Quatermaster report continues reporting this figure of 198 until the 10th when they change it to 200. Does this mean that there were 198 Panthers originally, and two burned on the march and two more replacements were recieved around the 10th, or were there 200 originally, 2 burned on the march and the quartermaster report got the figures mixed up, but corrected them on the 10th (when the 10-day armor reports are done)?
The figure of 4 totally destroyed matches later aggregate reports made on the 10th, and one is left to conclude that two were lost on the 4th, one on the 5th and one on the 6th.

Finally, there is the daily report for 7/07 24:00, for the 4th Panzer Army that states:

"The 76 out-of-commission PZ Vs were put into workshops of the 48th Pz Corps. According to reprot by the troops, other PZ Vs are still in the field [abandoned] with light damage. On the moring of 7 July, 43 PZ Vs were ready for action."

It does seem that the total ready-for-action at the end of the day on the 6th was 40. We have two reports that support this (40 in the afternoon and 43 on the morning of the 7th). We have one report that contradicts this (135). Simple democracy would dictate against this report, but lets look further.

First there is no way to get to 135 from any of the later summary reports of losses (which tend to indicate 76, or 81 or more tanks were lost). 200 - 76 = 124. All reports indicate that there was more lost than that.
Second, the daily ready-for-action reports tend to be the reports we use for everyone for determining tank strengths. Consistency would argue for remaining with them.
Third, it is not unusual for the German rear area reports to lag a day or so. We definately see this with other units, both for equipment losses and the casualties.

Therefore, in light of this, the most believable report is the report on 40 for the 6th. The report of 135 by the quartermaster is clearly an interim report as the situation worsened. What is not know is how many were lost each day. With 2 destroyed on the 4th, that leaves 158 to be attritted over two days. I just broke it evenly between the two days (after all, my data base is daily). This was for two reasons:

1. There was no strong reason not to divide it evenly.
2. It does appear that the two totally destroyed tanks during this period were lost evening (one on the 5th and one on the 6th).

If they started with 200 tanks, lost two burned up on the march, then the figures would be:

Ready-for-action Destroyed Damaged
4 198 2
5 119 1 78
6 40 1 78

From Rahn's interview (edited by follow-on letters from Rahn):

Excerpt for the letter:

"Using his heavy artillery, the enemy fired such a magnificent volley of fire into our assembled forces that my company along immediately lost two tanks. One slid into a deep trench with its track, and the other one was completely destroyed by way of an unfortunately direct hit, killed the 4th platoon's leader Master Sergeant Grund together with his entire crew. Given that this dangerous situation saw no orders materializing from battalion command, I ran over to the commander's tank as fast as I could. It was essential that the battalion be pulled away form the fire barrage so as to avoid any further misfortune. As I looked into the turret from above I saw the battalion commander, shaking in distress and incapable of taking nay action. It was Major Teepe from the Armor Training School in Putlos, whom I knew in the rank of captain from my time at that institution. This, then, was the replacement we received last night for Sievers (the actually battalion commander, who had fallen ill). It was obvious that this kind of baptism of fire during his first day of action at the front was too much for him. After I had made it clear to him that we had to move forward immediately, so as to prevent any further senseless casualties, all he could reply was; "Yes, Gabriel, get the battalion out of here!". While I dashed ahead with my tanks by quite a margin, I gave orders to the rest of the battalion via radio: "Follow my tank in direction of attack, move forward immediately!" Now, Russian infantry raised themselves by the droves at over 1000 yards distance and retreated swiftly. I then made a fire halt so as to let the other tanks in the battalion catch up with me. After the second round fired out my gun, towards the retreating Russians, I was severely hit by an anti-tank round which penetrated the munitions chamber at the left side, causing the later to explode immediately. Following the burst of flames which had to escape upwards via the cupola, I was likely unconscious for a moment. Only glowing shreds of my dress, such as suspenders, collar, ties, and the Knight's Cross, remained on my chest. I tore off the smoldering headset and microphone with my severely burnt hands, which already had the fingernails popped off. Then the gunner was pushing on from below, but I had to push back his head so as to first get out o the turret myself. This all happened very fast. I extinguished the glowing remains by rolling in the weeds on the field. I even managed to get the wedding ring off my finger before my hands started to swell. After me, the gunner was still able to rescue himself. He had suffered burns mainly in his face. He already appeared to be losing his mind at the main clearing station that afternoon and was dead by the next morning. Driver and radio operator had suffered only mine injuries. Each of them could still grab a pistol when we made our way towards the rear. Only the loader appeared to have been killed immediately by the impact of the shell and remained inside the burning tank. He was a war-reporter who was supposed to film the attack through the machine gun embrasure."

First Lieutenant Gabriel, who had been severely wounded by a shot into the abdomen on July 26, 1942, had just returned to the front after convalescence. Two days after suffering the severe burns, he was flown to a military hospital in Breslau in a Ju-52 transport and survived.

Gabriel does state in a letter sent to Rahn dated May 19, 1971 that this event took place on July 7, 1943, however this cannot be correct. The battalion was at Dubrova on the morning of the 7th. This is confirmed by the diary record of battalion's doctor, Dr. Weinberger:

"July 6: In the morning, the field track makes for slow progress,. We move along the roadway used for advance by the "Grossdeutschland-Division". First engagement. Took care of Gabriel under fire...."

"The next image I recall is the gathering of force in the Cherkasskoye area for the attack towards Dubrova. I remember the name of this location so well, because the attack on Dubrova on the July 6th was recognized as my 26th armored attack. By the same token, the attack on the hill range eastward of Syrtzev on July 7th was recognized as my 27th day in action.

We remained longer in the assembly area at Cherkasskoye as was customary in an armored attack. it was only after the war that I learned the reason for the wait, namely because the Panzer-Regiment "Grossdeutschland" had been unable to catch up in time. We were then caught by extremely sever enemy artillery fire at that assembly area. There was one artillery barrage after another, and I remember seeing a Panther tank torn to pieces as in a flash of lightning by a direct hit from an artillery shell. In any normal scenario, orders via read to move forward or towards the rear so as to withdraw from the impact of the barrage would not have been long in coming. Regrettably, I no longer recall how the situation was resolved in the end. It was only later that I learned that one of our experienced company commanders, First Lieutenant Gabriel had taken the initiative. He was hit shortly thereafter and suffered horrible burns."

I have no idea where this last report came from and it is not supported by any data I have found. As it is a secondary source, I have chosen not to use it.

July 6:

0935 "There is no report from the GD PzGrD, but the corps liaison officer report by radio that the division's lead tanks have been counterattacked by Soviet tanks in the are two kilometers northeast of Hill 246.0. Involved are the units of Colonel Strachwitz's panzer regiment which had advance through Yarki. There is still no contact with the Panther Brigade and the rest of the armored force. Colonel Strachwitz, now commander of the GD Panzer Regiment, is urging attack and ask for immediate order from the division putting all force under his command, since he has no contact with the Panther Brigade."

1025 "The GD PzGrD reports that it still has no contact with the Panther Brigade, and it is not clear whether the brigade has entered combat. The division had issued immediate attack orders to Strachwitz's panzer regiment. The advance elements of the regiment are under heavy flanking artillery fire from Alekseyevka."

1330 "The panzer regiment (??) of the GD PzGrD Division reached hill 254.5 at the crossroad leading to Yakovlevo, and the tanks turn northwest toward Hill 230.1. If this report is correct it would mean that the second defense zone has been broken through and the road to the north is open. The Chief of Staff asks whether there could be doubts as to the reliability of the regiment's report. The Division Commander says the report was clear, but he has asked for confirmation.

1350 "Forward elements of the panzer regiment of the GD Division are advancing along the road and have reached the Bolshoi ravine. The Panther units are advancing on the left flank, but their exact location is unknown. It is assumed that they are near hill 254.5."

1500 "The Corps liaison officer of the Panther Brigade of the GD PzGrD Division reports that the attempt to break through the Soviet positions near Dubrova was unsuccessful, and the previous report that Hill 254.5 on the road to Yakovlevo was reached is erroneous. The Panthers are still south of the Soviet positions.

1510: "The Corps Commander reports to the Army the error about Hill 254.5."

1512: "The Army informs that Corps that the II SS Panzer Corps.....Both Corps are at approximately the same line, and luckily the mistaken report about Hill 254.5 will not have serious consequences.

1615: "Colonel Decker, Commander of the Panther Brigade of the GD PzGrD, who is at the division command post, is having difficulties in commanding the brigade because his staff has not yet arrived. The Corps Commander decides that as of 1625 command of the Panther Brigade will be given to Colonel Strachwitz, Commander of the GD Panzer Regiment. The corps expects tighter control over the armor. Colonel Decker, until the arrival of his staff, will be at the disposal of the Corps."

"Dear General!
As requested, after the first combat operation was over for us, I am reporting on my activities here. I succeded in arriving on schedule with my adjutants. My staff arrived on 11 July. I was happy to have them since permission for their requisition was downright deplorable.

The Panzer Brigade was attached to the GD. The second regiment under command was PzRg GD with its eight PzKw IV Kompanien and a Tiger Kompanie. The commander of PzRg GD was Graf Strachwitz, the 'Panzer Loewe' (Tank Lion). Working with him was very unpleasant. During the attack, he simply did not come on the radio and operated independently. This went on so far that I was ordered to appear before General von Knobelsdorff (commanding general, XXXXVIII PzK) to answer for the brigade HQ not functioning. In the interim, Strachwitz directed the Panzer-Brigade and employed the Panthers outright crazily. This resulted in continuous mine damage and flank protection was never built up. Therefore the Panthers, whose sides are vulnerable, were shot up.

On 5 July, I started a major attack with the Panzer Brigade but got no farther than to a ravine. In ignorance of our outstanding main gun, eight "General Lee" tanks approached within 2200 meters. With a few shots they were set on fire and burned like Christmas tree sparklers. My gunner, who was my adjutant, shot up one of this eight. Next day, in an attack with 300 Panzers, I charged up to the second defensive position. After very successfully completing this attack with few losses, I was ordered to report to General von Knobelsdorff.

When I returned after four days, in comparison to the 200 with which we started, the number of operational Panthers had shrunk to 12 due to idiotic tactical employment. Major von Lauchert was desperate and welcomed my return....

...Grossdeutschland is very reasonable, which can't be said about the commanding general (Hoernlein)."

I have not gotten a translation yet of the Lauchert letters, but will bug thier owner as see if he will get them done.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Alex, I think the data speaks for itself.

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It was on the 7th that the regiment runs into a minefield and comes under direct fire from dug-in tanks.

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"...As the first wave, Panzerregimend "Grossdeutschland" attacked early on the morning of 5 July followed by the Panther-Regiment. The attack was spearheaded by the 1. Kompanie and the Tiger company; its initial objective was Tscherkasskoje. The bottom land before the town was strongly guarded by wire obstacles and minefields. The fusiliers of the escorting infantry suffered heavy casualties. Panzer-Regiment "Grossdeutschland" was met by fierce defensive fire from the Russians. Tanks drove over mines, and the commanding officer of II. Abteilung, Oberstleutnant Graf Saurma, the brother in law of the Oberst Graf Strachwitz, was hit in his turret and died later in hospital. Hauptmann von Gottberg assumed temporary command of the II. Abteilung."

"...The regiment's remaining tanks sought to cross the stream 1,500 meters further west. At about 0815 hours the Panthers of Panzerregiment 39 and those of the headquarters of Panzerbrigade 10, to which Panzerregiment "Grossdeutschland" was now also attached, moved off from the assembly area. Engine failures and fires put several Panthers out of action during the approach to the battlefield (six were total losses as a result of engine fires)*."

"...After struggling across the marshy bottom land, the tanks had to fight off a Soviet counterattack with American-built General Lee tanks. Six of the enemy tanks were destroyed. Hill 232.4, located northeast of Tscherkasskoje, was to be taken first, however this proved impossible as numerous enemy tanks were dug in there. The tanks now halted and waited. The tally of Panzerbrigade 10: six tanks knocked out, three heavy antitank guns destroyed, one close support aircraft shot down."

Serviceable tanks:

4 Pz II
12 Pz III
51 Pz IV
3 Pz VI
12 Flammpanzer
ca. 80 Panzer V

Losses to that point: 18 Pz V "

Jung gives the Panzer strength at the end of July 5th as "circa 80 Pz V". Ok, so not very accurate, but he was there, so this is yet another data point to throw into the fray.

Now for July 6th:

"...Early on the morning of 6 July the tanks formed up and attacked in the direction of point 241.1 and Butowo with the Panthers on the left and Panzerregiment "Grossdeutschland" on the right. The antitank trench there was reached, however, a minefield had to be cleared first. The antitank trench was crossed at about 1400 hours and Hill 241.1 was taken. There then followed heavy defensive fire from approximately fifty dug-in tanks and 30 or 40 antitank guns. In spite of that, the attackers forced their way through to Hill 247.2. Unfortunately a Panther which had become misoriented was misidentified as an enemy tank and knocked out by a Panzer IV of Panzerregiment 15 of the 11 Panzerdivision. The crew was unable to get out and died in its tank.

Serviceable tanks:

4 Pz II
9 Pz III
21 Pz IV
3 Pz VI
50 Pz V
12 Flammpanzer

Losses:

37 Panzer V "

Jung is somewhat vague with his numbers (as you can appreciate), but according to his account, about 37 Panthers were lost on the 6th. He definitely mentions encountering minefields on both the 5th and the 5th, unfortunately he does not break down losses by cause, but all losses reported are Panthers.

Here is what he has to say about the Strachwitz-Lauchert-Decker-Streit-Guderian soap:

"...Oberst Graf von Strachwitz had anticipated the difficult task facing the tank soldiers and the problems associated with this quick breakthrough operation. He expressed these concerns to the author in a personal discussion, even though he was an Oberst and I was an Oberleutnant. Nevertheless, he was confident of success. Command problems and differences of opinion concerning the employment of tanks among Oberst Decker, Oberst Graf von Strachwitz, Division "Grossdeutschland" and the XLVIII Panzer Korps under General Knobelsdorff surely played a role. As an example, on 6 July Oberst Decker was summoned by General von Knobelsdorff to brief him on the work of the staff of Panzerbrigade 10 had been doing (an unusual step). At the same time, it was alleged by Decker in a letter he had written to Guderian that, in Decker's opinion, Oberst Graf von Strachwitz had employed his tanks 'idiotically'. This hardly seems plausible, for the Panzer Graf was one of the Wehrmacht's most experienced and proven armor commanders."

The hasty formation of the brigade headquarters, its late arrival for the offensive, the lack of time to familiarize itself with its mission, inadequate reconnaissance, and, finally,the lack of trust between the Panther-Regiment of von Lauchert and the brigade headquarters and Panzerregiment "Grossdeutschland" may have been the causes for many difficulties."

This tells me Jung was aware of the controversy - and he has sided with the Graf.

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I will get to that tomorrow. It does appear that Decker's letter is very self-serving and factually incorrect, especially as to how many Panthers were there when he left the unit, or the nature of the operations on the 6th (which appear to have been independently conducted by Stachwitz).

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Perhaps he was off on the number of operational Panthers when he left, but the Graf is not off the hook yet, whether we agree or not on the number of operational Panthers on the 5th, the period of highest losses (6, 7 & 8 July) still fall under the Graf's command.

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I have not gotten a translation yet of the Lauchert letters, but will bug thier owner as see if he will get them done.

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Aarrgghhhh!

It reminds me of when I was little and the Batman episode ended with "...same bat-time, samd bat channel... tune in next week..".

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By the way, what was your source for the Decker letter?

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I need an interpreter!

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Strachwitz had 43 Panthers to lose, not 200.

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This is what Hans-Joachim Jung says about it:

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There is no question that the Panthers encountered mines on the 5th of July. This was expected and known about, and all 10 attacking Panzer Regiments had to deal with them. At this point, the 10th Brigade was nominally under command of Decker.

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The bottom land before the town was strongly guarded by wire obstacles and minefields.

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This actually may give one the wrong picture. The Berezovyii ravine crossing point for the fusilier regiment was about 2-3 kilometers ESE of Cherkaskoye. The "bottom land" really is a small ravine with a creek in it. Translation problem here.

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The tally of Panzerbrigade 10: six tanks knocked out, three heavy antitank guns destroyed, one close support aircraft shot down."

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The figure of 6 destroyed on the 5th does not match up with the Corps, Army and Inspector General of Armor records. They initially report only 4 tanks totally destroyed (although I understand that this report could be wrong), two in the march on the 4th, and two after that (probably for the 5th and 6th, at this is the report for 76 tanks that is first mentioned on the morning of the 7th). What is the source for Jung's figure of 6?

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Serviceable tanks:

4 Pz II
12 Pz III
51 Pz IV
3 Pz VI
12 Flammpanzer
ca. 80 Panzer V

Losses to that point: 18 Pz V "

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Again, where is Jung getting these figures? At the end of the day, they were certainly not 51 PZ IV's operational. Furthermore, his figures leave out the Pz III Flame, the Pz III Command tanks, the 30+ StuG IIIs and the 19 Marder IIs.

Where does Jung get the strength figure for the Panthers of 80, or loss figures of 18? I have not located any documents that state these figures.

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Jung gives the Panzer strength at the end of July 5th as "circa 80 Pz V". Ok, so not very accurate, but he was there, so this is yet another data point to throw into the fray.

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So, what was the balance in your checking account on 5 July 1993 (no fair looking)? While I actually do find Jung's estimate credible, I have no data to support it. All I know for certain is that on the evening of 6 July there were 40 Panthers reported ready for action out of 200 "Ist" (not even sure if they were all ready for action).
A "straight line estimate" (subtracting the two tanks burned on the 4th)would give 119 ready-for-action on the 5th. As it is certainly believable that they did not break down or get damaged at the same rate for both days, then having 80 ready for action at the end of the 5th is certainly a believable figure, I just don't know if its right.
Still, the commander was Decker at this time.

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Serviceable tanks:

4 Pz II
9 Pz III
21 Pz IV
3 Pz VI
50 Pz V
12 Flammpanzer

Losses:

37 Panzer V "

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The GD figures pretty much match mine (he still leaves out the PZ III 75mm (2) the PZ IV short (1), PZ III Command, etc.). Again, I have no idea what is the source of the Panther figures. The actual report we have for the 6th says 40, and on the morning of the 7th, the report is 43, so not sure where 50 comes from.
Decker was still in command until 1625 this day.

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He definitely mentions encountering minefields on both the 5th and the 5th, unfortunately he does not break down losses by cause, but all losses reported are Panthers

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We have a report from GD on the 5th that states that they lost 20 tanks and 5 assualt guns to mines. Suspect this report does not include Panthers.

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At the same time, it was alleged by Decker in a letter he had written to Guderian that, in Decker's opinion, Oberst Graf von Strachwitz had employed his tanks 'idiotically'. This hardly seems plausible, for...

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Don't like his reasoning thereafter, but in light of the defenses and the situation, it does look like the GD Panzer Regiment on the 5th and 6th was energetically and well handled. Furthermore, the Regiment (under Strachwitz) had move quickly to cut off elements of the 67th Guards Rifle Division and initiate the attack on Dubrova in the afternoon. It was a pretty dynamic piece of work. It does appear that the Panther regiment was lagging behind.
Of course, all the Panzer Regiments were taking mine losses, with the 3rd PzD reporting 7 lost on the 5th due to mines, 11th PzD 8, LSSAH 20, Totokopf 12, Das Reich 12 (there are some questions on these figures, but the point is....everyone was dealing with mines).

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.... but the Graf is not off the hook yet, whether we agree or not on the number of operational Panthers on the 5th, the period of highest losses (6, 7 & 8 July) still fall under the Graf's command.

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Actually Graf is off the hook for the 5th and 6th, and his actions on the 5th could be labeled "determined", but the operations of his regiment on the 6th really were quite good. I will get to the 7th "tomorrow".

Just waiting for more ammo....

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Don't like his reasoning thereafter...

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That was very cryptic, why?

quote:

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Originally posted by Alex H:
Just waiting for more ammo....

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I will give you some shortly for the 7th, but its does look like Stachwitz outperformed Decker on the 5th and 6th, and this resulted in his temporary replacement by the rather obnoxious count.

quote:

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That was very cryptic, why?

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He stated: "This hardly seems plausible, for the Panzer Graf was one of the Wehrmacht's most experienced and proven armor commanders."

Most in any army at the rank of Colonel and General are expereinced and proven. Yet, history shows no shortage of mistakes and bad commanders. Simply not a valid explanation for why someone could not make a mistake.

The Germans report 40 Panthers ready for action by the evening of the 6th (usually this means 1800, Berlin time). They report 43 Panthers ready-for-action on the morning of the 7th (from which one could infer that 3 were repaired). The next report is on the 8th, which shows 16 Panthers. I have nothing from the records that tell me what happened during the day on the 7th and the 8th. Twenty-seven Panthers were lost, but I do not know when and how.

But, I do have interviews:
July 7:

Rahn:

"A typical encounter in the deep system of enemy fortifications developed on the morning of July 7. The detachment, its fight strength whittled down to less than half its original size, attacked in formations with the 10th Panzer Brigade starting from the Dubrova area in the general direction of Syrtzev through a valley floor and toward a gradual, semicircular incline, gunner had to observe while being blinded by a bright blue sky. Suddenly, the first tanks hit a mine obstacle and the attack faltered. simultaneously, extremely well camouflaged, dug-in T-34 tanks opened fire. Our formation was caught up front, particularly at the flanks. Fire from these enemy tanks was very precise, because it was fired from a fixed position.

On the other hand, the enemy tanks were not be recognized except for the split second when they actually fired. Within only a few moments we suffered sever losses; I believe we lost close to 30 Panther's there. After those tanks that remained serviceable had retreated out of the enemy's gun range, a tenaciously fought battle resumed. The Panther's decided it to their advantage due to their excellent gun and the superior range. Eventually, the enemy's position was undermined from the flank and free passage was achieved. Nevertheless, we felt the day was a defeat and long thereafter referred to the "Panther cemetery at Dubrova". We had by far the highest casualty rate in that engagement.

A few day later an embittered Colonel General Guderian visited the scene of this engagement and supposedly criticized the unresourceful leadership of this formation. In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel K. had been replaced by a Major from the command post at the Putlos firing range. However, he knew no more about leading an armored formation than did his predecessor. He, too, was relieved with two days by the one-armed Captain Baumunk. That was an experienced tanker who we were acquainted with and who had our confidence. He then lead the detachment well."

Filla:

"The next thing I vividly remember is the fighting on July 7th. I don't recall the specific orders on that day and what was said about the expected enemy resistance. The fact is that we encountered fierce enemy resistance soon after moving forward out of the Dubrova area., This much have been a careful prepared defense, because here again there was probably a combined fire from tanks and anti-tank guns with mine obstacles and artillery. Of course I did not notice this in such clarity during the fighting going on at the time. As a tank commander, you only see what's happening in a 50 or 100 yard radius around your tank. There would be moments where you wouldn't be under direct artillery fire yourself and could watch the neighboring unit being hit by it. the next moment, shells would burst right next to your own tank again and it was only later that we could see who of us had been hit.

These engagements between Dubrova and Syrtsev were extremely fierce. I remember the extensive exchange of fire against dug in tanks. Here, we could make the best use of our superior cannon, while there were other more fluid engagements against enemy tanks attacking in different number. As a whole, this day was one of the most intense fighting I remember and the Soviet units really fought like there was no tomorrow. However, I am by now unable to gather details on the course of individual engagements."

Therefore, for the sake of having a daily count, I therefore record 40 tanks as of the evening of the 6th, three repaired on the 7th and 30 lost in battle, resulting in 13 ready-for-action as of the evening of the 7th, and 16 ready for action on the evening of the 8th (3 more repaired). Such a construct means that no tanks were lost on the eight, which may be questionable. There are a few other ways one could interpret this data (27 lost on the 7th, with end of day strength for the 7th and 8th being 16 and no tanks repaired on the 8th), but regardless, it looks like 27 to 30 tanks were lost on the 7th.

Up through the 6th, the Germans are clearly reporting only 4 Panthers totally destroyed (which does contradict Jung and my interview with Rahn, who I suspect is Jung's source).

There is a report on the morning of the 7th which states "The heavy losses of Panthers are not the result of Soviet artillery fire (up to the present time only two Panthers have been pierced) but are due to "infantile sickness" ("bugs" in Amercian parlance) on the new and untested machines (HERO Report #xx, DNA 4124F, pg 141).

From this and the reports of two tanks burning, a gather that on the 4th, two tanks burned and on the 5th and 6th, two were totally destroyed by artillery and anti-tank guns, one of which was observed destroyed on the 6th by three different people we interviewed ("we" meaning MG Brand, as I did not do the German interviews).

There are two reports of 76 tanks lost up to this day. One is the daily report for 7/07, which states "The 76 out-of-commision PZ Vs were put into workshops of the 48th Pz Corps. According to reports by the troops, other Pz Vs are still in the field [abandoned] with light damage. On the morning of 7 July, 43 Pz Vs were ready for action."

and at 1820 from the corps:

"Panther losses, especially becuase of technical breakdown, are extra-ordinarily high. So far 76 have been lost".

Because these reports of 76 Panthers lost (and being shipped to the repair shop) first appear on the morning of the 7th (along with a ready-for-action figure), then it is assumed that this report covers the period from 4 to 6 July. It also notes that there are more in the field broken down. Therefore, I gather that on the morning of the 7th, 43 were ready-for-action, 76 had been sent back to repair or destroyed, and 81 others still have not been reported on.

There is a quartermaster report on the 10th that reports the losses as 76 tanks up to the 10th (this is certianly the same 76 tanks as mentioned earlier). It categorizes the losses as follows:

4 Total loss
13 Lost due to engine failure
33 Fuel pump failure
4 Gun failure
4 Drive failure
18 Minor failure (with most caused by mines).

14 will be ready for action by the 10th."

Chris,

1. There was no strong reason not to divide it evenly."

Are you COMPLETELY comfortable with these assertions?

Have you queried Zetterling on this issue? I'm just curious as to what he has to say. No response from Jentz yet, anything new on the Lauchert correspondence?

[This message has been edited by Alex H (edited 05-29-2001).]