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Originally posted by Alex H:
Are you COMPLETELY comfortable with these assertions?

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Of course not. Part of the reason I am posting this is to see if anyone has additional material, contradictory material or a better explanation of the data than I have.

1. I am pretty comfortable that the Germans after the end of the day of the 6th, morning of the 7th, had 40/43 Panthers. Have absolutely no data to contradict this.

2. I am pretty comfortable with the quatermaster figures lagging or not being complete. I have lot of examples of that.

3. I do not know for certain whether they started with 200 or 198 Panthers. It does appear that 200 is correct.

4. Do not know for certain whether 2 Panthers or 6 burned on the 4th, but given that documentary evidence clearly states two (more than once) that is the figure I am going with.

5. The split of the 158 losses on the 5th and 6th evenly between the two days is arbitrary. I suspect that in fact more Panthers were lost on the 5th than the 6th. The arguements in favor of this assumption include 1) Breakdowns tend to occur early in the life-cycle of equipment, as such, I suspect we would have more breakdowns on the 5th than the 6th. 2) There were clearly some Panthers losses to mines (14 or more). The would more likely be on the 5th than the 6th (the mines in the first defensive belt were about 5 times "thicker" than in the second defensive belt). On the other hand, the Gross Deutchland appears to have lost more tanks on the 6th than the 5th (40 versus 30). Still, the GD Panzer Rgt was ahead of the Panther Rgt on the 6th.

I will tweak Zetterling and see if he wants to take a look at this. Still waiting for word on the Lauchert correspondence.

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Originally posted by Alex H:
"...Therefore, in light of this, the most believable report is the report on 40 for the 6th. The report of 135 by the quartermaster is clearly an interim report as the situation worsened. What is not know is how many were lost each day. With 2 destroyed on the 4th, that leaves 158 to be attritted over two days. I just broke it evenly between the two days (after all, my data base is daily). This was for two reasons:

1. There was no strong reason not to divide it evenly."

Are you COMPLETELY comfortable with these assertions?

Have you queried Zetterling on this issue? I'm just curious as to what he has to say. No response from Jentz yet, anything new on the Lauchert correspondence?

[This message has been edited by Alex H (edited 05-29-2001).]

[This message has been edited by Alex H (edited 05-29-2001).]

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The Panther tank at Kursk seems to be a never-ending source of discussion topics. When Anders Frankson and I wrote “Kursk 1943” we obviously looked for data on daily tank strength and losses. Initially we were not sure about what the records could give. It was soon realized that it was not possible to deduce losses by comparing the number of operational tanks at two dates, checking for any reinforcements or replacements and concluding that the difference was equal to the losses suffered. We soon came to the conclusion that for each German tank permanently destroyed or captured by the enemy, there was about five that were put out of action (due to enemy action or mechanical failure) but subsequently repaired. Perhaps more than 50 tanks were, on average, repaired each day by Army Group South (this is just an estimate). This means that the daily tank strength could vary both due to losses and repairs.
If we look at the German reporting system, we find that corps and army HQ usually worked with a daily tank strength for its subordinate units. This was usually reported once, often at approximately the same time each day. Normally, for commanders at this level, it was not particularly important if a panzer division had 43 or 38 tanks operational, since the division would probably be given the same mission anyway. However, when we look at the Panthers, the number of breakdowns seem to have been so great as to cause much greater fluctuations during the course of a single day, at least during the first period of Zitadelle. This may simply have overstressed the reporting system, which may have caused the true picture not to be apparent immediately in the higher command echelons.
Also the German reporting system contains some inaccuracies. For example, a report should properly contain both the time it is written, the time it is transmitted and also the time at which the situation was as described in the report. Unfortunately this is not always the case. Often only the first time is given and one has to guess for the rest. I have placed an example at http://w1.183.telia.com/~u18313395/AOK4.jpg. This shows a report from 4th Army on 10 August 1944, which gives quite detailed information on assault gun units, except that it is only stated that the report pertains to the situation on 10 August 1944. It makes no allowance for variations during that day. Usually this matters little, because fluctuations were perhaps often within +/- 10 % during a specific day. But this need not have been the case for the Panthers during initial period of Zitadelle. Hence the reporting system may be dysfunctional, causing the great variations among reports. The solution would be to look further down in the military hierarchy. Ideally it might be possible to find reports from workshops where the individual chassis numbers were recorded, but I believe relatively few such reports have survived. Anders and I did look at divisional records for 6th and 7th Panzer division, mainly to serve as a test to see if the reports at higher command echelons were accurate. We did not look for similar data for Panthers, but I believe Chris may have found something on this.
Given this background we opted to just present three sets of figures (in appendix 4) and not elaborate further on the matter.
All this said, when it comes to the reports on operational Panthers, I have to say the following about the three sets of figures Anders and I present in appendix 4 of our book. While I have quite high respect for Jentz books, which are obviously largely based on archival documents (in some cases I have seen exactly those documents he must have used) he has not provided any indication for the primary source he has used for his strength figures for the Panthers at Zitadelle. This, in my opinion, must cause his data to stand back for the other two sets of data presented in the appendix. Hence, the main problem is the number of tanks available on 6 july according the operations section and the quartermaster section of the XXXXVIII. Pz.Korps staff. The only reasonable explanation I can find is that the higher figure is incorrect. The most common problem with reports is probably delays and quite likely the figure of 135 does not, as the document indicates, refer to the evening of 6 July, but to an earlier moment, perhaps even the day before. However, the latter is a “guestimate”. In any case, it would be absolutely wrong to try to establish exact losses for a single day by comparing the number of operational tanks at the beginning and at the end of the day. First of all, losses are usually relatively small, which makes errors in reports significant. Second, addition of replacements, reinforcements and vehicles returning from repairs can. If we knew for certain that on one day 166 Panthers were operational and the following day only 40 were operational, then we could conclude that a major loss had occurred, but to conclude that precisely 126 tanks had been lost is to stretch the quality of the evidence to far.
In any case, I doubt that anyone has a better set of sources than TDI on this battle. Perhaps it is best if Chris is left alone, to give him time to finish his book.

Niklas Zetterling

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
If we knew for certain that on one day 166 Panthers were operational and the following day only 40 were operational, then we could conclude that a major loss had occurred, but to conclude that precisely 126 tanks had been lost is to stretch the quality of the evidence to far.

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No, but we can say that "at least" 126 tanks were lost that day from all causes (destroyed, damaged, accidents and mechanical), assuming that there were no reporting or clerical errors.

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In any case, I doubt that anyone has a better set of sources than TDI on this battle.

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Yes, but it is amazing what one can miss, mis-read and mis-interpret.

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Perhaps it is best if Chris is left alone, to give him time to finish his book.

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Actually, this has all been very useful. It has forced me to carefully and critically evaluate my sources on Panthers, cross-check to other people's work and has lead me to some sources I did not know about. I also located courtesy of another "hobbyist", three letters Lauchert wrote to his wife about Kursk, which no has published (he has the originals). I am waiting now for a translation of them. So, I find these types of discussions very useful, as it does allow me to air and test issues that are bothering me.

Niklas, thanks for taking the time to post.

Actually, the real issue that is bothering me right now is the exact location of the 5th Guards Tank Corps on the 6th and 7th of July, and in particular, the location of their right flank.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
...While I have quite high respect for Jentz books, which are obviously largely based on archival documents (in some cases I have seen exactly those documents he must have used) he has not provided any indication for the primary source he has used for his strength figures for the Panthers at Zitadelle...

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...In any case, I doubt that anyone has a better set of sources than TDI on this battle. Perhaps it is best if Chris is left alone, to give him time to finish his book...
Niklas Zetterling

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What!? He will be bored out of his mind unless us amateurs keep hum busy...

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Originally posted by Alex H:
What!? He will be bored out of his mind unless us amateurs keep hum busy...

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Actually, Alex did come up with an interesting controversy that I was ignoring. Both Decker and Lauchert wrote letters after the battle critical of Count Strachwitz (I have not gotten the Lauchert letters translated yet). Furthermore, the Count and General Hoerlein (GD commander) did not get along. This not at all useful for creating a cohesive combat team. It would appear that Decker was miffed at Strachwitz over his "dismissal" and that his letter is both incorrect and self-serving, but I am still waiting for the translation of the Lauchert letters. While there was a lot of mechanical problems with the Panthers, there was also a lot of problems with the command, selection of officers and training of the regiment. None of this reflects well on Decker, Lauchert or Guderian.

Rahn:

"A typical encounter in the deep system of enemy fortifications developed on the morning of July 7. The detachment, its fight strength whittled down to less than half its original size, attacked in formations with the 10th Panzer Brigade starting from the Dubrova area in the general direction of Syrtzev through a valley floor and toward a gradual, semicircular incline, gunner had to observe while being blinded by a bright blue sky. Suddenly, the first tanks hit a mine obstacle and the attack faltered. simultaneously, extremely well camouflaged, dug-in T-34 tanks opened fire. Our formation was caught up front, particularly at the flanks. Fire from these enemy tanks was very precise, because it was fired from a fixed position.

On the other hand, the enemy tanks were not be recognized except for the split second when they actually fired. Within only a few moments we suffered sever losses; I believe we lost close to 30 Panther's there. After those tanks that remained serviceable had retreated out of the enemy's gun range, a tenaciously fought battle resumed. The Panther's decided it to their advantage due to their excellent gun and the superior range. Eventually, the enemy's position was undermined from the flank and free passage was achieved. Nevertheless, we felt the day was a defeat and long thereafter referred to the "Panther cemetery at Dubrova". We had by far the highest casualty rate in that engagement.

A few days later an embittered Colonel General Guderian visited the scene of this engagement and supposedly criticized the unresourceful leadership of this formation. In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel K. had been replaced by a Major from the command post at the Putlos firing range. However, he knew no more about leading an armored formation than did his predecessor. He, too, was relieved with two days by the one-armed Captain Baumunk. That was an experienced tanker who we were acquainted with and who had our confidence. He then lead the detachment well."

Filla:

"The next thing I vividly remember is the fighting on July 7th. I don't recall the specific orders on that day and what was said about the expected enemy resistance. The fact is that we encountered fierce enemy resistance soon after moving forward out of the Dubrova area., This much have been a careful prepared defense, because here again there was probably a combined fire from tanks and anti-tank guns with mine obstacles and artillery. Of course I did not notice this with such clarity during the fighting going on at the time. As a tank commander, you only see what's happening in a 50 or 100 yard radius around your tank. There would be moments where you wouldn't be under direct artillery fire yourself and could watch the neighboring unit being hit by it. The next moment, shells would burst right next to your own tank again and it was only later that we could see who of us had been hit.

These engagements between Dubrova and Syrtsev were extremely fierce. I remember the extensive exchange of fire against dug in tanks. Here, we could make the best use of our superior cannon, while there were other more fluid engagements against enemy tanks attacking in different number. As a whole, this day was one of the most intense fighting I remember and the Soviet units really fought like there was no tomorrow. However, I am by now unable to gather details on the course of individual engagements."

Could very well be it, although from the narrative it is not immediately apparent what was so terrible about the conduct of the battle, perhaps the Panthers lingered too much without receiving any guidance from Strachwitz? Also, Streit specifically mentions mines and an order to proceed regardless of the lack of pioneer units to clear the way.

Btw, I believe the Putlos officer's name is somewhere in Jung's "Panzerregiment Grossdeutschland" stuff.

I have not seen the Streit reference.

We do have the name of the officers, but at the time the Rahn gave the interview, he could not remember it.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
I have not seen the Streit reference.

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There is a report, quoted in "Panzertruppen 2", from Panzerlehrgange (sp?) Panther, signed by Major Streit, evaluating Pz Bde 10 Panther's performance. He is also critical of the Panther's tactical handling.

Yes, but that criticism would also be developed if they lost 30 tanks in the fight at Syrtsevo. On the other hand, if they lost 120 tanks in the fight at Syrtsevo.....I suspect you would see more than a few veiled references.