quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
This is an issue I will try to address next year. Hence, I have not yet made any serious effort to obtain a clear answer to the question.
However, I doubt the wisdom of the order. After all, there are many examples of German withdrawals, which did not end in disasters, during the period.

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That is an interesting view running counter to the generally accepted wisdom (which may well be wrong). I can think of only one large-scale retreat, and even that was at a smaller scale than what would have been faced by AGC - the retreat of 1st Panzer Army and (elements?) of 17th Army from Rostov into the Mius position. The retreat from Tikhvin was on a much smaller scale, and was not a pleasant experience for anyone involved. If there are other examples (particularly larger scale) of successful large-scale retreats under winter conditions, I would be interested in hearing more about them.

The difference I see between these and the possible retreat of AGC is first of all scale, secondly distance (which would have been greater in the case of AGC), thirdly flank security (where AGC was more exposed than 1st PA), and finally the availability of a line on which to anchor the retreat - the Volkhov in AGN sector, and the Mius in AGS sector.

I am therefore not convinced that the hold fast order was an error.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Furthermore, it seems reasonably clear that lack of winter equipment and troublesome supply lines hampered the Germans significantly. Such probles could at least have been alleviated to some extent by retreats.

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While that is correct, it depends fundamentally on the ability to shore up a line again, i.e. to conduct an orderly retreat, otherwise the supplies would be issued by Red Army quartermasters.

Edit - this map site is helpful in getting an overview frontline developments.

USMA Map German Offensive

USMA Map Soviet Offensive

All the best

Andreas

quote:

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Originally posted by I.M.A:
"The difference I see between these and the possible retreat of AGC is first of all scale, secondly distance (which would have been greater in the case of AGC), thirdly flank security (where AGC was more exposed than 1st PA), and finally the availability of a line on which to anchor the retreat - the Volkhov in AGN sector, and the Mius in AGS sector."
Well, Andreas, the "winter line" for AGC in '41 was supposed to be a hundred or so miles behind the main front line if memory serves me correctly. Also, as I stated earlier, I do remember that 2nd Army, 2nd Panzer Army, and 9th Army had carried out unauthorized withdrawals before the stand-fast order and no large scale panic or loss of equipment had occurred.

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I think 'was supposed' is the key term. There was no winter line as far as I know, apart from a stroke of a pen on a map.

What distance were these withdrawals carried out over? What was the scale - did the whole army retreat in each case, or was it a case of divisions/corps-level retreats? How much did the fact that they did not retreat in concert affect the success of the retreat (i.e. while they retreated, other forces covered their flanks)?

As for 'no large scale-losses' occured in these retreats, I would be interested in seeing some figures on that. Please also note the discussion of Guderian's retreat in Wray 'Standing Fast'.

There is also a more detailed map of the AGC situation in Wray:

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/wray/images/map6.gif

Mind you, I am not saying that the opinion of Niklas is wrong, but it is certainly counter to the received wisdom, and therefore would need to be well supported in any argument.

This Site quotes von Kluge's chief of staff as follows:

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"Hitler's fanatical order that the troops must hold fast regardless, in every position and in the most impossible circumstances, was undoubtedly correct. Hitler realized instinctively that any retreat across the snow and ice must, within a few days, lead to the dissolution of the front and that if this happened the Wehrmacht would suffer the same fate that had befallen the Grande Armée."

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I am reminded about the remark made by Caesar to his secretary in the HBO series 'Rome', on the eve of the battle of Pharsalos: "We must win or die, Pompei's troops have other options."

All the best

Andreas

All the best

quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:
I would look forward to an interesting debate here now, actually, rather than a book in 2010.

All the best

Andreas

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In many cases I would agree that the person who put forward an argument that goes against established wisdom will have to assume the burden of proof. However, in this particular case I don't think so, as I have never seen any argument supporting the so called wisdom.
I do of course not say that retreats would have been neat and clean operations. Certainly they would have meant losses, in particular of equipment (as is clear from actual examples I know of). However, from there, it is a huge step to argue that the "halt order" saved the German army.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
I own a copy of Ziemke's "Moscow to Stalingrad" but on loan currently. I have not read in the last few years, but as far as I recall, he extensively describes the actions fought on the sector west of Moscow in 1941-2 and this includes many retreats that did not end in disintegration and complete rout.

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The discussion of the battle in Ziemke is very good, in my view, and I will check to see what he says on the matter.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
In many cases I would agree that the person who put forward an argument that goes against established wisdom will have to assume the burden of proof. However, in this particular case I don't think so, as I have never seen any argument supporting the so called wisdom.

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I provided the quote from one high-ranking officer, and here are others:

quote:

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von Tippelskirch:It was Hitler’s one great achievement. At that critical moment the troops were remembering what they had heard about Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow, and living under the shadow of it. If they had once begun a retreat, it might have turned into a panic flight.

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quote:

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Blumentritt:Hitler’s fanatical order that the troops must hold fast regardless in every position and in the most impossible circumstances was undoubtedly correct. The withdrawal could only be carried out across the open country since the roads and tracks were blocked with snow. After a few nights this would prove too much for the troops, who would simply lie down and die wherever they found themselves. There were no prepared positions in the rear into which they could be withdrawn, nor any sort of line to which they could hold on.

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While these are of course 'after the party' comments, it is interesting to note that they speak positively of Hitler, who otherwise was made the scapegoat (rightly or wrongly) for anything that went wrong with the Wehrmacht in the course of the war. While I would also say that they do not appear to be strong arguments, they are arguments nevertheless.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
I do of course not say that retreats would have been neat and clean operations. Certainly they would have meant losses, in particular of equipment (as is clear from actual examples I know of). However, from there, it is a huge step to argue that the "halt order" saved the German army.

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The historical fact is that the Army Group survived as a combat-capable entity. The question is whether this was despite or because of Hitler's order, or whether that order made a difference at all. A few generals at least suggest that Hitler's order made a positive difference, and that is what one finds himself arguing with.

A second interesting question than is whether a general retreat order, given when the scale of the Soviet attack was realised, would have led to a better outcome, i.e. reduced men and equipment losses.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
My intention is to gather data from German divisions, showing the condition of the units at the beginning of December and comparing this to the strength returns after retreats. So far I have data on a handful of the divisions in Guderian's Panzer Group, which suggest that they did not suffer undue losses in December 1941, despite retreats. However, I will have to check with more units before actually draw some kind conclusions.

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Kjetil is the expert on this, but I would be surprised if the loss reports are time-accurate to a degree that this conclusion can be drawn, considering the importance of the time element, i.e. whether it is possible to tell with confidence whether losses were suffered before or after 15 December, and during retreat or normal defensive operations.

In any case, an interesting comparative analysis might be the losses of 3rd Panzer Army suffered in the retreat from its very exposed position at Klin. Of course, for that army there was no alternative, to stand fast would have meant to die in place, but it maybe an interesting data point on a retreat under pressure.

For info, I have found the following equipment losses of the Wehrmacht in December (presumably the whole of the east? It is not clear):

496 tanks
983 pieces of artillery amongst which:
452 lFH (enough to equip 13 divisions)
200 sFH (enough to equip 17 divisions)
473 81mm mortars (enough to equip 6 divisions)
800 AT guns (enough to equip 11 divisions)

Source for these is Robert Forczyk's 'Moscow 1941' by Osprey.

Personnel losses for the whole of December appear to be 104,000 in AG Centre (see post by Michate in this thread quoting Reinhardt).

I'll look into Wagener and Ziemke tonight.

All the best

Andreas

quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Kjetil is the expert on this, but I would be surprised if the loss reports are time-accurate to a degree that this conclusion can be drawn, considering the importance of the time element, i.e. whether it is possible to tell with confidence whether losses were suffered before or after 15 December, and during retreat or normal defensive operations.

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quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:

In any case, an interesting comparative analysis might be the losses of 3rd Panzer Army suffered in the retreat from its very exposed position at Klin. Of course, for that army there was no alternative, to stand fast would have meant to die in place, but it maybe an interesting data point on a retreat under pressure.

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Yes, 3rd Panzer Army is one of my candidates to study, but I have not yet began searching for data on that army.

quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:

496 tanks
983 pieces of artillery amongst which:
452 lFH (enough to equip 13 divisions)
200 sFH (enough to equip 17 divisions)
473 81mm mortars (enough to equip 6 divisions)
800 AT guns (enough to equip 11 divisions)

Source for these is Robert Forczyk's 'Moscow 1941' by Osprey.

Personnel losses for the whole of December appear to be 104,000 in AG Centre (see post by Michate in this thread quoting Reinhardt).

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quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:

The historical fact is that the Army Group survived as a combat-capable entity. The question is whether this was despite or because of Hitler's order, or whether that order made a difference at all. A few generals at least suggest that Hitler's order made a positive difference, and that is what one finds himself arguing with.

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Another approach is to establish what problems were avoided by the "stand fast" order.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Originally posted by Andreas:
Kjetil is the expert on this, but I would be surprised if the loss reports are time-accurate to a degree that this conclusion can be drawn, considering the importance of the time element, i.e. whether it is possible to tell with confidence whether losses were suffered before or after 15 December, and during retreat or normal defensive operations.
Why do you suspect that? As far as I have seen from the records of the divisions I have checked, there seem to be no particular problem with the reporting. Certainly there are Nachmeldungen, etc, but nothing extraordinarily.

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I have no basis for that other than a suspicion that in the generally chaotic situation record-keeping may not have been of the highest importance. That may easily be a completely unfounded suspicion borne out of my ignorance of working with the material.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Yes, 3rd Panzer Army is one of my candidates to study, but I have not yet began searching for data on that army.

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There is the short section in 'Operations of Encircled Forces', in which the presumably German authors claim that the 1. PD made it out of encirclement without undue losses:

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/BOOKS/WWII/20234/2.html

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Originally posted by Andreas:

496 tanks
983 pieces of artillery amongst which:
452 lFH (enough to equip 13 divisions)
200 sFH (enough to equip 17 divisions)
473 81mm mortars (enough to equip 6 divisions)
800 AT guns (enough to equip 11 divisions)

Source for these is Robert Forczyk's 'Moscow 1941' by Osprey.

Personnel losses for the whole of December appear to be 104,000 in AG Centre (see post by Michate in this thread quoting Reinhardt).
It is unclear if these losses support or contradict the thesis that Hitler's order saved army group Centre. After all, it did retreat in places, it held in places and it tried unsuccessfully to hold certain sectors.

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Absolutely. I just posted this as information, not to make a point in either direction.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Originally posted by Andreas:

The historical fact is that the Army Group survived as a combat-capable entity. The question is whether this was despite or because of Hitler's order, or whether that order made a difference at all. A few generals at least suggest that Hitler's order made a positive difference, and that is what one finds himself arguing with.
Yes, this is the question. As army group Center did retreat, as well as held successfully and also failed to hold firmly, it is difficult to answer the question without looking at the specific front sectors.

Another approach is to establish what problems were avoided by the "stand fast" order.

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Some things that come to mind that may have been helped by the order are:

- morale (as suggested by von Tippelskirch and others)
- command and control (it is easier to control static forces rather than a mobile battle) both on tactical and operational level
- negating the mobility advantage of the Red Army by forcing it into combat against organised formations and fortified positions
- ability to hold on to shelter (by basing positions on villages), while forcing the attacker out into the open; this includes the ability to continue care under cover for wounded who otherwise may have died due to exposure (AIUI having open wounds in sub-zero temperature is not recommended)
- reduced losses of equipment for which transport means were lacking (primarily artillery)

All the best

Andreas

As a matter of fact I have just been working with PzAOK 3 Heeresarzt reports for this period during the last few days, and so can provide some data.

My impression from HG Mitte loss data for the period is essentially in line with what Niklas states, namely that they do not appear particularly problematic. The losses are relatively low, with no special indications of incompleteness. Even if loss reports often do not specify Nachmeldungen, they usually do specify if the figures are known to be incomplete.

Sorry about the terrible formatting of the tables, which generally does not have zeroes in it where no losses have been recorded. It may help readability to remember that the last figure is always the total. If 1 figure is missing it is almost certainly missing, if 2 are missing it is almost certainly killed and missing.

PzAOK 3 losses in December by Dekade:

1-12
Div Nr Gef Verw verm GES
1 pz 38 117 155
2 pz 72 296 368
36 mot 53 194 60 307
XXXXI 2 9 2 13
6 pz 77 281 39 397
7 pz 76 361 5 442
14 mot 50 197 23 270
Lehr 900 13 100 3 116
Armeetr 10 10
LVI 1 18 3 22

II-12
Div Nr Gef Verw verm GES
1 pz 30 96 126
2 pz 60 241 4 305
36 mot 58 223 12 293
XXXXI 6 19 25
6 pz 50 134 19 203
7 pz 44 132 8 184
14 mot 120 268 15 403
Lehr900 18 142 2 162
Armeetr 6 17 23
LVI 7 22 22 51

III-12

Div Nr Gef Verw verm GES
1 pz 18 53 71
2 pz 117 347 18 482
36 mot 51 134 12 197
XXXXI 15 57 2 74
6 pz 146 407 182 735
7 pz 102 288 62 452
14 mot 33 152 21 206
Lehr 900 0
Armeetr 0
LVI 0
23 147 460 83 690
35 81 357 14 452
106 112 549 25 686
V 11 35 3 49

The roman numerals refer to Korpstruppen of the AK of that designation.

In all, 2100 in I, 1775 in II, 4094 in III - not very high losses at all. These are of course just blutige Verluste, frostbites and sick not included. There is as far as I can see nothing in the reports of the following months that indicate any very significant Nachmeldungen for this period. It is worth emphasising that these reports, which are part of the Wehrmacht Verlustwesen records and originate with Armeearzt 3, show higher figures than the Heeresarzt ten-day summaries which were normally issued within 2-3 days of the period. According to Müller-Hillebrand in the post-war study "Statistical Systems" samples indicated that these reports normally tended to underestimate losses by roughly 10%.

Both the Armeearzt reports and the IIa reports seem to have varied in format from army to army. What might have cleared this matter up conclusively was if I had had the PzAOK 2 IIa reports for this period, because these uniquely does not only liste Nachmeldungen, they also list exactly when the Nachmeldungen pertain to. Unfortunately, the earliest I have so far is April 1942.

Hope this is of some use,

Regards, K.A.

quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
My impression from HG Mitte loss data for the period is essentially in line with what Niklas states, namely that they do not appear particularly problematic.

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That's great, always happy to be corrected.

quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

In all, 2100 in I, 1775 in II, 4094 in III - not very high losses at all. These are of course just blutige Verluste, frostbites and sick not included.

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That's a shame - I think in the context of this discussion, the medical losses not included in these figures would be of considerable interest as well, to see if there was a difference in them depending on whether the units were moving or stationary.

All the best

Andreas

quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Some things that come to mind that may have been helped by the order are:

- morale (as suggested by von Tippelskirch and others)
- command and control (it is easier to control static forces rather than a mobile battle) both on tactical and operational level
- negating the mobility advantage of the Red Army by forcing it into combat against organised formations and fortified positions
- ability to hold on to shelter (by basing positions on villages), while forcing the attacker out into the open; this includes the ability to continue care under cover for wounded who otherwise may have died due to exposure (AIUI having open wounds in sub-zero temperature is not recommended)
- reduced losses of equipment for which transport means were lacking (primarily artillery)

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These are good points, well worth discussing, as they had to be considered by the decision makers at the time.

– Morale is difficult to judge. The Germans seems to have retained high enough morale for most of the war, despite innumerable retreats. However, the situation in December 1941 might have been different, as it was the first major set back for the German army.

– Command and control would have been easier for the Germans if the stood fast. On the other hand, a more fluid battle would have made command and control more difficult for the Red Army too.

- The Red Army mobility advantage is a valid argument, although it is more difficult to assess the extent of the advantage and its impact on the operations.

- Shelters is a two-sided argument, as it could just as well be argued that retreats might bring the German forces into positions providing better shelter.

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Wagener

He is highly critical of the order, making clear his astonishment that it is lauded in some historical works. He blames it for the total loss of the ability of higher commands to exercise operational control, to no purpose, because the order did still allow retreat under direct pressure, IOW did not materially change the situation. If anyone is interested I can eventually provide a direct translation.

Ziemke will take some more time, and I am in London for the long weekend, so that will have to wait.

All the best

I've never seen any indication of sickness cases tending to rise under mobile conditions and can't think of any good reason why they would either. However, there are very strong indications that activity level had a very great effect on the incidence of frostbites. The earliest data I have is from January, when 25,890 cases were recorded during the first ten days of January alone, and a total of 92,563 (cumulative since the beginning of the winter) had been recorded by the end of the month. This may mean that there was not a very large number in December.

What we need to look at however is how the incidence of frostbite varied between different commands, to see if it is evenly distributed, and, if it isn't, whether it correlates with the nature of the operations undertaken by the different armies. Unfortunately I have no such data for 1941, but I do have it for the winter 1942-43:

AOK Total

18 6184
16 22078
9 66704
P2 4365
4 75
6 7780
Hollidt 9712
Fr.Pi. 11659
P4 1510
17 1596
P1 941

Total 132,604

First it should be noted that the data omit AOK 2 and PzAOK 3, and hence must be regarded as incomplete. However, the March WFSt summary refers to a total of 141,957 reported frostbite cases, which should account for this omission. It also notes that 1,424 amputations had resulted from these injuries – a ratio of 1%. These data suggest certain things quite clearly. Firstly, the overall volume of frostbite-related losses in the Ostheer was still very high in the second winter of the campaign – the total for the winter is higher than the combat losses in most single months during that timespan, though they only roughly half the 280,000 or so cases suffered in 1941/42. According to Krivosheev, the Red Army only suffered 21,157 frostbite cases during this winter, though it is of course difficult to be sure if the level of inclusion is similar.

Secondly, there is an extremely large degree of variation between different commands. In fact, more than half the cases recorded were in AOK 9, while neigbouring command AOK 4, with similar climatic conditions, suffered barely any cases. The other heavily represented command is AOK 16, and there are notably high figures also for Hollidt, Fretter-Pico and AOK 6 (which must I think be presumed to not be complete). What this suggests is a clear connection with the intensity of combat . Hence it can be concluded that the Ostheer had achieved the capacity to protect its soldiers from the effects of winter, as long as they were not forced to undertake very active operations requiring protracted exposure to the elements. When this was the case however, very notable losses could still result from frostbites.

Conditions were of course different in 1941, and it seems plausible that frostbite losses were probably less strongly tied to the nature of operations since the troops were more generally ill-equipped for the conditions, and also because they were to a much smaller extent occupying prepared positions.

Note however that what frostbite incidence seems to correlate with is not so much movement as combat. Note that AOK 17 and PzAOK 1, who did little fighting but a lot of movement, did not suffer notably. Granted, they were at the warmest part of the front but they nevertheless also carried out extensive movement in very cold areas. And staying in place in 1941 was pretty much a guarantee for receiving the maximum possible amount of combat.