Yep, just saw it, will reply with good news by the end of the evening.

quote:

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
These are good points, well worth discussing, as they had to be considered by the decision makers at the time.

– Morale is difficult to judge. The Germans seems to have retained high enough morale for most of the war, despite innumerable retreats. However, the situation in December 1941 might have been different, as it was the first major set back for the German army.

– Command and control would have been easier for the Germans if the stood fast. On the other hand, a more fluid battle would have made command and control more difficult for the Red Army too.

- The Red Army mobility advantage is a valid argument, although it is more difficult to assess the extent of the advantage and its impact on the operations.

- Shelters is a two-sided argument, as it could just as well be argued that retreats might bring the German forces into positions providing better shelter.

- Reduced losses of equipment might be an argument provided the positions were successfully held. It is doubtful that a forced retreated would result in lower losses than a voluntary. The latter is one of my primary arguments against the order to stand. In many areas Army Group Center did not manage to hold on to the positions it was order to defend.

---

There is also a further point to consider, namely that while a retreat might not have brought the units back to a line that was any more prepared than their current positions, it could at least be a more rational defensive position. Most of the armies stood in a posture badly suited to defense, and with unneccessarily extended frontages. The problems resulting from this became even worse than normally exactly because of the lack of mobility and the forced use of strongpoint tactics.

For example, According to a 1 December AOK 2 Lagebeurteilung, the army was defending a 300 km frontage with 5 divisions and 2 schnelle Vbde. The two mobile divisions were to be withdrawn, and replaced by a single ID (56.), yielding an average frontage of 25 km per Inf.Rgt, and 3 km per company. As the report remarks, in such a situation “kann man nur sichern, aber nicht halten".

Regards, K.A.

Many thanks for the data! Any data on equipment losses? According to Ziemke that was the key concern.

All the best

These are equipment losses for all fronts in January and February;

11,100 MG
1,502 l.PAK
269 schw. PAK
602 s.GRWF
510 l.IG
165 s.IG
1307 l.FH
361 s.FH32 M18

Bestand am 1.2: (Feldheer)
MG: 208,500
s.GRW: 11,021
l.IG: 3,775
s.IG: 791
L.FH: 6,155
s.FH: 2,514
M18: 404

Tank losses:

December

Pz Abg/Zug1.-10.
I 2/0
II 32/0
III 66/0
t 48/0
IV 25/0
StuG 9/1

11.-20.:I 17/0
II 22/0
III 26/0
t 54/0
IV 12/0
StuG 2/0

21.-31.
I –
II 7/0
III 27/0
t 18/0
IV 12/0
StuG 42/0

Ab 22.6.:
I 428/12
II 424/24
III 660/277
t 796/108
IV 348/80
StuG 96/12

January

Pz Abg/Zug
1.-10.
I 22/12
II 43/0
III 90/0
t 2/0
IV 24/0
StuG 3/3

11.-20.
I 0/18
II 18/31
III 43/55
t 7/0
IV 12/22
StuG 8/0

February

Pz Abg./Zug.
1.-10.
I 0/12
II 0/3
III 0/26
t 8/0
IV 0/9
StuG 8/0

11.-20.
I 19/0
II 42/1
III 150/0
t 1/24
IV 42/2
StuG 0/1

Not quite complete, and I have no idea how reliable they are as I haven't checked them against anything. They come from the ten-daily WFSt summaries.

Finally, vehicle losses during the course of the winter;

Verluste/Zuweisungen Winter:
KrRd: 22,496/938
Pkw: 18,292/2,469
Lkw: 31,143/3,542
ZugM: 2,252/492

These are from Müller-Hillebrand, "Das Heer".

quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:
If I understand Ziemke correctly, 2. Armee was in the worst position of all. 4. Armee was apparently in fortified positions.

Many thanks for the data! Any data on equipment losses? According to Ziemke that was the key concern.

All the best

Andreas

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:

However, as it turned, he did on occasion sanction retreats. Thus, he did not rigidly adhere to the policy of holding all positions to the last.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by I.M.A:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
[b]
However, as it turned, he did on occasion sanction retreats. Thus, he did not rigidly adhere to the policy of holding all positions to the last.

---

[/B][/QUOTE]

Yes, and not only smaller units. If I recall correctly, the 3rd or 4th Panzer Group retreated to the so-called Lama-Rusa line after Hitler allowed retreat, but I would better check this. However, such decisions were usually preceded by much time consuming discussions.

In terms of authorising retreats, it is important to keep in mind that a large number of commanders were sacked over unauthorised retreats in AG Centre (Guderian, Hoth, Hoepner, the latter also being expulsed from the army with loss of decorations/rank/pay/pension, and others). I am at the moment not sure if the 3/4 Panzergroup retreat had in fact been authorised. I have my doubts about it, considering that both Panzergroup commanders lost their job. Hitler did not actually order a retreat until later in January. It is also important to keep in mind that the advice he was given was by no means unanimous - some commanders did believe that staying and digging in was the better option, while von Bock in December (before he was sacked) managed to discuss both options while not proposing either. He had good fence-sitting skills, it appears.

What is apparent from the discussion in Ziemke/Bauer is the contempt which they have for the behaviour of both von Bock and von Kluge in this process, and by the way they describe the behaviour of these two characters, it is contempt easily shared.

All the best

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
As you will be in Freiburg next week Kjetil, perhaps file RH 21-2/v.171a might be of use. It contains some reports from various divisions showing losses in the winter 1941-42. For example, the 293. Inf.Div. reported the following losses in the period 16 November - 31 December:
217 dead, 533 wounded, 99 missing, 806 sick, 330 frostbite and 83 officers and men who had left the division for other reasons. In this case non-combat losses surpassed combat losses by quite a margin. I have a few copies from this file, but perhaps there are more data in it.

---

Thanks Niklas, I believe I went through that the last time. One thing however to be aware of concerning the loss data in the Zustandsberichte is that actually only the wounded who remained on the Etat of the unit is normally included, ie, the opposite of what is the case with many other reports - this according to Müller-Hillebrand in "Statistische System". I wonder if sonstige Abgänge, of which there is frequently a large number can perhaps be those who have been abtransportiert with recovery times exceeding the 3-week limit.

Anyway, today I looked at AOK 4 Armeearzt data for December and January, and they actually had a lot of reporting trouble - Nachmeldungen all over the place, some as much as 6 weeks or more after the action. More on this when I have more time.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:

What is apparent from the discussion in Ziemke/Bauer is the contempt which they have for the behaviour of both von Bock and von Kluge in this process, and by the way they describe the behaviour of these two characters, it is contempt easily shared.

All the best

Andreas

---

http://i228.photobucket.com/albums/ee112/kjetilaasland/I-12.jpg

(Errata here: 137.ID not added to sum, total should be 3,680)

http://i228.photobucket.com/albums/ee112/kjetilaasland/II-12.jpg

http://i228.photobucket.com/albums/ee112/kjetilaasland/III-12.jpg

http://i228.photobucket.com/albums/ee112/kjetilaasland/I-1.jpg

http://i228.photobucket.com/albums/ee112/kjetilaasland/II-1.jpg

http://i228.photobucket.com/albums/ee112/kjetilaasland/III-1.jpg

Just click once on the image, and it will zoom to readable quality. Note that the first report for III-12 has not survived, and that the figures quoted here are all from Nachmeldungen.

What is immediatly clear here is that AOK 4 had considerable reporting problems. The 8 December daily report of the Heeresarzt notes this fact, and attributes it to "Leitungsstörung und überbelastung des Nachrichtennetzes". For several days after this, no figures for either combat losses or non-combat losses appear in the daily reports. This is not subsequently the case, but i is clear both from the extent of the Nachmeldungen and the long periods that elapse before these were finalised that the problem persisted.

2. Armeearzt reports compared to Heeresarzt ten-day summaries:

Dekade....Armeearzt 4 ()*....Heeresarzt 10-d
I-12.......3,680 (3,646).........3,533
II-12......2,593 (1,409).........2,953
III-12.....3,262 (-).............3,083

I-1........4,113 (3,009)........6,012
II-1.......3,950 (2,156)........2,718
III-1......6,108 (5,836)........5,837

(*) shows how the figures work out if the Nachmeldungen are not added to the appropriate period, but instead to the Dekade in which they were reported.

As mentioned, the III-12 figure only consists of later Nachmeldungen, and these cover only roughly half the formations of the army. From the comparison with the Heeresarzt summaries, it seems likely that 3,000 or so of the I-1 figure from the latter source might i nreality pertain to III-12.

3. AOK 4 combat losses compared to PzAOK 3 losses

For PzAOK 3 it is unfortunately the case that the III Dekade January report from the Armeearzt is missing. The Heeresarzt summaries give a figure of some 2,300, but given that it also gives 0 for the II Dekade, it is difficult to say how much of these are Nachmeldungen. It seems best therefore to accept that the January figure is incomplete, and compare it here to the AOK 4 figures for the first two Dekaden. If we accept that roughly 3,000 casualties need to be added to the III-12 AOK 4 figures, we get the following comparison:

Command.....December.....January
PzAOK 3.....7,689........3,108 (only I-II)
AOK 4.......12,500.......8,063 (only I-II)

4. Losses per Division by Dekade(AOK 4 16 in December/17-12 in January, PzAOK 3 7-7-9 in Dec/9-8 in Jan):

Period.....PzAOK 3.....AOK4
I-12.......300.........230
II-12......254.........162
III-12.....455.........391
I-1........173.........241
II-1.......194.........329

5. Sick and Frostbites

AOK 4

Dekade....Krankenstand....Frostbites
I-12.......5,750
II-12......5,257
III-12.....incomplete
I-1........7,130...........2,602 *
II-1.......6,409...........2,972

* - some Divisions missing

PzAOK 3

II-1
Krankenstand: 1,898
Frostbites: 1,101

The Krankenstand is unfortunately a less useful measure than one could wish for, when acertaining the development of sickness cases because it is a composite expression of several factors, the relation among whom is not predictable. What it gives is the number of sick soldiers held by the medical installations of the army on the last day of the Dekade (the reason why the figure for Armeetruppen is so high is that it includes all men in the Armee-Sanitätseinrichtungen). How it develops compared to the previous date depends on:

a) the number of soldiers returned to service in the intervening period
b) the number of soldiers who died of illness in medical installations
c) the number of soldiers evacuated out of the army zone
d) the number of new sickness cases

Nevertheless, it is probably reasonable to assume that a sharp increase in sickness cases would also normally lead to a significant increase in the Krankenbestand.

-----------

So, here we have some data. What we also have in the operations of these two armies in the period is:

a, at least one case of voluntary retreat (ie, PzAOK 3's retreat from Klin)
b, some cases of involuntary retreat
c, some periods of standing fast.

Does somebody have some specifics (dates, scope) at hand concerning a and b? We ought then to have some basis for assessing both the relative costliness of each of them, and also their impact on the reliability of the reporting. There will doubtless be further issues with the data, but it is perhaps best to deal with that progressively.

Regards, K.A.

I also turn out to have data for PzAOK 4, which also contain numerous Nachmeldungen for December and January, and which includes data for sick and frostbites in January. These can be added to the mix if useful.

The bottom line of all 3 books is that Hitler’s decision to hold at all costs was the only possible thing to do under those circumstances.

It was based on the following:

1. Logistics were broken down
2. moral of the troops was questionable
3. long withdrawal would mean loss of most heavy weapons (esp. arty)
4. there was no rearward position that offered a chance to hold it, especially with reduced numbers of heavy weapons (see above)
5. there were no reinforcements close at hand – (on Dec 15th Hitler ordered the mobilization of 4 Ersatzheer divisions and further ordered 5 divisions redeployed from the west, but those units would be of dubious combat value and would need weeks to get to HG Mitte)
6. Bock and others also favoured holding the front, if reinforcements arrived fast
7. Confronted with the fact, that there were no reinforcements readily available Bock lost his nerve and (on Dec 13th) stated that he had no more proposals to make. Either HG Mitte holds the line and may be destroyed or HG Mitte withdraws, which would be impossible without great (material) losses.
8. Hitlers holding order must therefore also be assessed as a solution to a leadership crisis.

Klaus Reinhardt adds that the negative side of this order was that Hitler forbade even local withdrawals to straighten the front.

During the next weeks local or even operational withdrawals were ordered by many commanders against Hitler's order(some were sacked..) but at least there was no all-out move to the rear…that was the decisive point (IMHO)

quote:

---

Originally posted by vkun:
[B]
It was based on the following:

1. Logistics were broken down
2. moral of the troops was questionable
3. long withdrawal would mean loss of most heavy weapons (esp. arty)
4. there was no rearward position that offered a chance to hold it, especially with reduced numbers of heavy weapons (see above)
/B]

---

I do not have much confidence in these points, for the following reasons:

1. Logistics were in a very bad condition, yeas, but I doubt that broken down accurately describes the situation. Furthermore, it is not clear that holding an extended line in positions far forward was a better proposition from a logistical perspective.

2. I have not seen anything suggesting that the morale of the troops was questionable. To the contrary, the many reports I have from lower command echelons(war diaries and after action reports from battalion level, reports from field surgeons etc) suggest that morale was not a significant problem.

3. Withdrawals certainly entail the risk of losing equipment. However, so did the option to stand firm.

4. While there was not prepared rear positions, but the positions that the units held at the time was not prepared either.

quote:

---

Originally posted by vkun:

5. there were no reinforcements close at hand – (on Dec 15th Hitler ordered the mobilization of 4 Ersatzheer divisions and further ordered 5 divisions redeployed from the west, but those units would be of dubious combat value and would need weeks to get to HG Mitte)
6. Bock and others also favoured holding the front, if reinforcements arrived fast
7. Confronted with the fact, that there were no reinforcements readily available Bock lost his nerve and (on Dec 13th) stated that he had no more proposals to make. Either HG Mitte holds the line and may be destroyed or HG Mitte withdraws, which would be impossible without great (material) losses.
8. Hitlers holding order must therefore also be assessed as a solution to a leadership crisis.

---

5. The lack of reinforcements is not an argument for a "stand firm" stance. The long front line held would probably need more divisions than a short one reached after a retreat.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
2. I have not seen anything suggesting that the morale of the troops was questionable. To the contrary, the many reports I have from lower command echelons(war diaries and after action reports from battalion level, reports from field surgeons etc) suggest that morale was not a significant problem.

---

I think the psychological term is 'projection'. In this case by the higher command levels onto the soldiers.

I.M.A. 'contempt' is my choice of word, not that of Ziemke/Bauer. The reason why I read their view of these two officers that way is their discussion of their behaviour. Inability to give clear advice upstairs (cf. Bock's nervous breakdown on 13th), followed by obsequiousness when sacked (see again Bock). Also their unwillingness to stand up for their lower level commanders to the bullying from Berlin/Wolfschanze (Kluge and Guderian). Both Bock and Kluge knew exactly what was going on at the front, but failed in ensuring that this knowledge was transmitted up the chain of command, or to take the consequences when it became clear that it had failed to lead to consequences.

When their lower level commanders acted in line with the situation, they did not back them, but tried to protect their own rear-ends. I am sure that the old German proverb of 'den Bock zum Gärtner machen' (appointing the goat as gardener) was used widely in AG Centre during December 1941.

All the best

Andreas

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
So, here we have some data. What we also have in the operations of these two armies in the period is:

a, at least one case of voluntary retreat (ie, PzAOK 3's retreat from Klin)
b, some cases of involuntary retreat
c, some periods of standing fast.

---

Very nice. Do you have comparative manpower strength in the period as well?

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Does somebody have some specifics (dates, scope) at hand concerning a and b? We ought then to have some basis for assessing both the relative costliness of each of them, and also their impact on the reliability of the reporting. There will doubtless be further issues with the data, but it is perhaps best to deal with that progressively.

---

I'll try to tabulate that up on an army basis over the next few days.

Had a good time, and a good haul at Duxford, BTW.

All the best

Andreas

I do have AOK strength figures for the period (monthly), but their basis is somewhat mysterious. I think I might have some Gefechtsstärke figures too, will have a look. In any case, the divisional count ought in this case to provide a rough approximation.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Andreas:
I think the psychological term is 'projection'. In this case by the higher command levels onto the soldiers.

---

You might have hit the nail on the head. :-)

This was a 21 December report to Heeresgruppe Mitte, based on similar situation reports from the AKs of the army. Apparently, XXVII AK concluded that its three divisions were capable of holding 6 km of frontline each, if put in a position where it had to defend against heavy attacks. The two other AKs of the army, VI and XXIII, had also stressed the need for shortened frontages. The estimation of the opponent across the whole army sector was that the Soviets had both the intention and the means to keep up their attacks in similar strength for an extended period.

The report states as a simple fact that the initiative has been lost to the enemy, and argues that "We will not regain it by ordering the troops to sacrifice themselves in unprepared lines that we know they lack the strength to adequately defend. In this case there is a significant risk of losing not only valuable people, but also valuable materiel. There is no shortage of will either in officers or men. However, with a thinly held front there is little scope for the example set by officers to make itself felt, or for their will to take effect. On the other hand, the possibility of regaining the initiative exists if we maintain combat-worthy, concentrated units that remain mobile, and move to a line that is short enough to be successfully defended." Hence, the report argues, a withdrawal ought to be made to the Gshatsk-Volga line, which would cut down the army frontage significantly and also reduce the risk of flank attack.

It gies on to argue that "The withdrawal of the front is possible as long as the “hochwinter” does not commence. It will lead to the loss of immobile equipment, but the mass of equipment will be brought along by the troops. The optimal solution would be to reach this shortened line at the same time as Hochwinter sets in."

All in all a pretty unequivocal argument against standing fast, and seemingly based on a broad consensus in the army and its subordinate commands. Of particular interest is the conviction that morale is not a problem, and also that it would be possible to bring along the bulk of the equipment, if a move is made swiftly and before the worst of the winter sets in.

Regards, K.A.

Possibly the top commanders (i.e. above army and corps level) were anxious that a slow retreat would turn into a rout, but – at least with hindsight – there seems to be little suggesting that a rout was a likely outcome.

1 Dec
258 Div breaks through Soviet defenses on the Moscow-Smolensk Highway.
Soviet side:
Vasilevski talks to Konev about counter-offensive and to be ready to start in one or tzo days; Konev thinks it is not possible due to lack of tanks and infantry.

2 Dec
NW of Tula 2nd PzA starts its hook west to pich off Tula and get the right of 4th Army started.
Bock tells Kluge, Reinhard, Hoepner that he thinks Soviets are close to breaking. Talking to Halder later he is more doubtful;

3 December
Kluge proposes to give up 4th Army attack since it would not get through. Bock wants to wait 2-3 days before making the decision.
Late in the afternoon 258 Division has to fight its way out of encirclement, westward.
4th PzGrp reports offensive strength "in the main exhausted".
3rd PzGrp embroiled with 1st Shock Army at Yakhroma.
2nd PzA advancing through blizzard NE of Tula
Bock tells Jodl he will stay on the attack, since this was preferable to go over to the defensive in exposed positions with weak forces.
Heavy snowfall throughout the day.

4 Dec
Temp fall to -4F (-20C) during the day.
4th Army goes over to the defensive.
4th PzGrp repels seceral tank-led counter-attacks SW of Krasnaya Polyana, but reports unable to advance until 3rd PzGrp draws up.
3rd PzGrp gets pressure from NW of Yakhroma from Soviet reinforcements, some of which Reinhard believes to be Siberians.
2nd PzA is regrouping to try again for Tula.
Bock reports to OKH that counter-offensive unlikely, not enough forces for the enemy. Believes reports of half-dozen new divisions are just units shifted along the front.
Soviet side:
STAVKA decides to go on the offensive, setting the date for 5 or 6 Dec. Order applies to Kalinin, Southwest, West Front.
Vasilevsky to Kalinin Front HQ during the night.
Timoshenko at SW Front receives order to attack 2nd Army on 6th Dec.

5 Dec
During the night temp drops to -25F (-32C) - one German regiment reports 300 frostbites on a night march and the death of several of its wounded. Tanks won't start, MGs and artillery won't fire, all armies report numerous frostbites.
29 Army attacks at Kalinin and breaks into a depth of 1 mile into 9 Army position.
Reinhard and Hoepner report fresh troops. Reinhard's attack at Krasnaya Polyana fails.
Guderian in the morning thinks Tula can be taken, in the evening proposes retreat to the Don and Shats rivers, evacuating the bulge east of Tula.
All German panzer forces are stopped.
Soviet side:
West Front receives detailed attack orders.

6 Dec
Temp -38F (-39C) at daybreak.
During the night Bock has approved Guderian's withdrawal. Reinhard and Hoepner told to pullback to a line covering Klin. Schmidt at 2nd Army told to better stop not to be out in front alone, but they still take Yelets.
At noon Reinhard reports need to pull back to free armour for dealing with 30 Army's attack. This will force 4 PzGrp to pull back too.
Kluge suggests to Bock to keep withdrawal speeds low to preserve equipment and supplies.
Hitler and Halder discuss directive for winter campaign. Hitler points out to Halder that while German losses are high, Soviet losses are much higher, and the Red Army is weak. AG North should continue to move to the Svir, and AGC stand fast. AGS should be able to retake Rostov and maybe the entire Donets basin with some reinforcements.
Soviet side:
first full day of counteroffensive, 30 Army makes the best showing by breaking into 3rd PzGrp's deep flank NE of Klin to a depth of 8 miles.
In the afternoon all attacks stall.

To be continued.

All the best

Andreas

Regards, K.A.

[This message has been edited by Kjetil Aasland (edited 11-14-2007).]

All the best