quote:

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Originally posted by Darrin:
The russians in 43 were running out of men twice as fast as the ger after taking into account of thier larger pop to draw from.

And this does not take into account the high cas to the overall pop numbers. ... The overall effect since attrition is not just loses to the mil but ability to reinforce and manufacture etc... The actual effect may be rus was running out of men 4 times faster then the ger after taking into account thier larger pop to draw from.

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This is where I think the numbers we look at are not valid. They may or may not be correct, but even IF correct they are not valid. Not for reaching the conclusion that "the Soviets were losing the war of attrition."

To say that the Soviets were running out of men four times faster than the Germans is not correct. It is so far from correct that it is stunning to see one drawn into this conclusion -- it demonstrates far too much faith in arithmetic, not nearly enough questioning of assumptions.

From late 1942 to the end of 1943 the population from which the Soviet Union could draw its military strength INCREASED by many tens of millions. It did not decline.

From late 1942 to the end of 1943 the population from which the Nazi's could draw their military strength DECLINED by many tens of millions. It did not increase.

In this conclusion I am not considering the populations of the Western Allies, and how they may also have contributed to Soviet military strength. Let us keep that item seperate for now. Assume there was no Western Front. Let us look only at the question of fighting on the Eastern Front, and its impact on the Soviet's and German'S abilities to mobilize resources for military purposes.

(Assuming no lend lease is more complicated, as there is little agreement on the impact of LL during the particular period we discuss. There is more consensus on the impact of LL in 1944. Some might still debate even that, but not me.)

By the middle of 1942 the Soviet population was probably about 100-120 million. (This is MY own guesstimate. I can offer no concrete source. But consider that the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltics, and much of Armenia and Azerbaijian were outside of the Soviet borders at that time.)

At the end of 1943 the Soviet population had probably seen the return of 30-40 million people, due just to the movement of the frontier. The Soviets did not hesitate for a moment to mobilize from this population for military purposes.

Again at the beginning of this same period the Germans had the populations of Italy, Romania, and Hungary providing armies to fight under German operational control in war on the Eastern Front. Finland also contributed armies to fight the Soviets on the Eastern Front, although not under any form of German control.

At the end of 1943 Italy and Romania were out of the fight. Romania would reappear contributing to the German cause briefly later in 1944 (for less than a week) when the Soviets crossed their border, but at the end of 1943 they were no longer providing resources for the German OOB.

In 1944 the issue of the shift in the resource pool became even more extreme, but here it is no longer possible to discount or divorce the Western Front from the question. Throughout 1943 the Germans were still mobilizing civilian resources from Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Holland and Hungary. By the end of 1944 not only were all but the Austrians and Danes out of the German resource base, but Czechoslovakia, Finland, Poland, and Romania were actually providing resources TO the Soviet war effort (again with Finland's forces NOT being under Soviet control, but fighting the Germans none-the-less).

To conclude that the Germans were winning the war of attrition on the Eastern Front by looking only on German casualties over the "pure theoretical" population of Germany versus the Soviet casualties over the "pure theoretical" population of the Soviet Union fails fundamentally to recognize that the issue of attrition must be measured in its affect on a country's ability to convert civilian resources into military might. The Soviets were expanding their ability to generate military might, and the Germans were losing theirs.

The swing in the balance of national power was not a question of 200,000 or 400,000 soldiers. We are talking about shifts of tens or hundreds of millions of people in the total resource pool.

That the Germans never effectively capitalized on the resource pool available to them does not minimize this issue. Rather it amplifies their apperant failure to understand the fundamental aspects of attritional warfare.

They were loosing, and loosing badly.

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Originally posted by michael kenny:
The number of abreviations and non-sequiters in your posts make them difficult for me to understand and I would welcome a clarification of your case.

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This has been descr many times in pas, but w this part pers it is diff to show how some may not get all val points or compr full mess when real words not avail. Or may don care. Also may seem more diff for speaks of for langs like rus or ger or fin to und engl mess or need clarif can be found in words that not in dict. We all may troub spell from t-to-t, but usually not qt so willful.

But we try.

This is where I think the numbers we look at are not valid. They may or may not be correct, but even IF correct they are not valid. Not for reaching the conclusion that "the Soviets were losing the war of attrition."

To say that the Soviets were running out of men four times faster than the Germans is not correct. It is so far from correct that it is stunning to see one drawn into this conclusion -- it demonstrates far too much faith in arithmetic, not nearly enough questioning of assumptions.

From late 1942 to the end of 1943 the population from which the Soviet Union could draw its military strength INCREASED by many tens of millions. It did not decline.

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WRONG! Iīm tired or reiterating this point but the sov pop pre 41 was 200 mil at most that is 2.5 times greater than the ger pop in mid 39 at 80 mil. Even by late 43 they certainly didnīt reconquer all that terr from germany going up to the baltic states etc... They gainded 10s of mils of pop during this year but that is already more than included above. If you donīt understand that maybe you canīt understand attrition due to your lack of arithmatic understanding.

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From late 1942 to the end of 1943 the population from which the Nazi's could draw their military strength DECLINED by many tens of millions. It did not increase.

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Well since I am talking about the atrition of ger and rus this point is also WRONG. What ger pop was actually occupied in 43 by anyone? Certainly not the 10s of mil of people in your fantasy.

Iīve only been using the base ger pop of 80mil from with thier army and production mainly came. So any axis minor or occupied terr loss is a minor consideration. I havenīt included them.

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To conclude that the Germans were winning the war of attrition on the Eastern Front by looking only on German casualties over the "pure theoretical" population of Germany versus the Soviet casualties over the "pure theoretical" population of the Soviet Union fails fundamentally to recognize that the issue of attrition must be measured in its affect on a country's ability to convert civilian resources into military might. The Soviets were expanding their ability to generate military might, and the Germans were losing theirs.

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I was discussing the realtive losses of rus and ger esp compared to what thier pop and production was able to accomadate up to 43. ITs a mute point to discuss 44-45 as I have already said the situation for many reasons began to change.

28 mil rus died according to thier offical numbers during the war. Over 4 years those are not theoortical numbers but a real contraction of thier post war pop due to many reasons. One of which was the army losing people at a higher rate then it could afford. Maybe you shold try to explain away this figure. Before eliciting mumbo jambo that you donīt understand and time frames that are irelevent.

Now if the rus pop shurck by 20 mil and did not grow as well as the ger pop it shrunk by 28 mil people dieing. Now by your own definiton of attrition a shrinking of civ recorces it obviously was a huge rus attrtion haping over 4 years.

Thats 7 mil peple dead each year. At that rate the rus would run out of people assuming a 160 mil pop in rus controlled area by end of 43 which is high. In something like 5 years assuming a quarter of the peole were absol needed for mil service and industy. That takes us to 1948 when the rus would bleed dry. We arenīt adding in rus pows taken, wia who donīt return and decling troop numbers and quality having an effect on the rus and ger loss ratio...

What I meant by attrition is that the rus army and pop was taking loses at a rate it could not even keep with even with its large pop. Rus was rus not china or india even they admitted thier mil cas were much higher than the gers and were when you compare the two pop unsustainable by the rus.

If you look at zetterling kursk 43 in the first chapter he dicuss this point there and his numbers point in the same direction mine do. IT is not some mumbo jumbo drembed up by me but even one of the best res of ger army documents finds this to be true.

Rus suffered from attriton to a much larger degree than ger in mil cas and civ losses after adjusting for thier larger pop. If you want to keep believing the opposite thats your right just donīt expect me to answer anymore.

1. number-crunching can only do justice for so much. should qualitative factors be included as well? (for example: the German/Soviet tactical effectiveness differential is the greatest in 1941, while much less so by 1944; difference in running respective wartime economies; difference in respective senior military leadership during the course of the war, etc.)

2. 'theoretical mobilization potential' is not the same as 'what i have available for a given operation and its immediate follow-up'

3. it is perfectly possible to 'win' the statistical aspect of attrition, yet lose the war.

4. (from 3.) the rate of attrition inflicted by the Germans upon the Soviets, however the statistics favor the Germans, was inadequate during the war.

5. the impact of Allied bombing: it diverted increasing portion of Luftwaffe away from the Eastern Front.

6. the impact of Allied Land-Lease: the Soviets particularly valued Allied items like trucks, telephone cables, radios, food -- items that the Soviet economy was not at its best.

7. German manpower mismanagement? the Germans effectively had three separate 'fiefdoms': OKH/OKW (Wehrmacht), Göring (Luftwaffe), and Himmler (Waffen-SS). such a bureaucratic division hardly contributed to the German war effort.

8. the 'infantry' war? when we think of the Germans, we tend to imagine their panzers and panzergrenadiers, while, similarly, we think of the Soviets in terms of their tanks. nay ...... the bulk of both sides consisted of foot-marching infantry divisions w/ horses moving heavy equipments and supplies. the history of the erosion of regular German infantry divisions is depressing; so does the history of the erosion of regular Soviet infantry divisions ......

1. MK 1 is, I believe, perfectly right in that Darrin is approaching the issue in a much too arithmetical way. It matters exactly zip if the Soviets would have been bled dry by 1948 because they had the capabilityto end the war long before that.

2.Mk 1 is however overstating the case with regard to relative attrition. The Soviet capability to generate military power does not seem to have increased over the last year and a half of the war, but rather to decline slightly. Conversely, nor does German ability to generate military power appear to have declined appreciably between 1943 and 1944. Also, I do think there is a fundamental difference on the German side between allied and occupied population and German population. The former could not in any very meaningful way be utilised for military purposes.

3. Comparison of populations is not a particularly meaningful starting point. What matters is male population of military age. Here the USSR had a marked advantage compared to Germany relative to their overall populations, because their population was markedly younger.

4. Darrin: "One of which was the army losing people at a higher rate then it could afford." You are still consistently missing the point, which is that they COULD afford their losses as is all too evident from events. Not interminably, but for long enough. They won the war, remember?

5. "If you look at zetterling kursk 43 in the first chapter he dicuss this point there and his numbers point in the same direction mine do. IT is not some mumbo jumbo drembed up by me but even one of the best res of ger army documents finds this to be true.

Rus suffered from attriton to a much larger degree than ger in mil cas and civ losses after adjusting for thier larger pop. If you want to keep believing the opposite thats your right just donīt expect me to answer anymore."

Quite honestly I think you might well spare us this sort of silly and infantile petulance. Nobody's arguing against the point that Soviet losses through the war were higher than German, absolutely and relatively. The point is that this does not equal the USSR losing the attrition battle. And you can't just shout "Zetterling!" as if that solved everything (or as if he were arguing the same point as you). I have his book in my shelf too, and I'm sure I'm not the only one.

Please bear in mind this:

a. Attrition is not reducible to relative casualty infliction compared to overall population.
b. Attrition cannot be isolated for one front - for the Germans, losses on other fronts constitutes attrition just as much as losses in the East, and impact on their position there just as much as the losses caused by the Soviet.
c. Attrition is logically entirely dissimlar to f.e. combat efficiency in that here it is the results alone that count. This is not about who outperformed who. If you lose the war, you have not won the battle of attrition - it is a contradiction in terms. If in terms of losses inflicted the Germans were outperforming the Soviets, they were not doing it fast enough or well enough relative to the amount of territory they were losing to avoid losing the war, as is all too clear from the outcome.

To Acetone

"1. number-crunching can only do justice for so much. should qualitative factors be included as well? (for example: the German/Soviet tactical effectiveness differential is the greatest in 1941, while much less so by 1944; difference in running respective wartime economies; difference in respective senior military leadership during the course of the war, etc.)"

I agree. The qualitative factors, while to an extent expressed by and in the figures (f.e., industrial efficiency will be reflected in the actual number of tanks or whatever produced), also has a significance beyond this. For instance, if Soviet combat effectiveness improved from 1943 to 1944, they could absorb a corresponding drop in strength without losing actual combat power.

"3. it is perfectly possible to 'win' the statistical aspect of attrition, yet lose the war."

An obvious point, but judging by this thread, obviously not so obvious that it doesn't have to be pointed out

"4. (from 3.) the rate of attrition inflicted by the Germans upon the Soviets, however the statistics favor the Germans, was inadequate during the war."

Ditto

"7. German manpower mismanagement? the Germans effectively had three separate 'armies': the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, and the Waffen-SS. though it was the Wehrmacht that took the brunt of the war, it was not always given priority over replacements. there were some 20 Luftwaffe infantry divisions; but it was not used to replenish the Wehrmacht, but instead sent to combat under Luftwaffe leadership. Waffen-SS had priority over replacements, especially armored vehicles. essentially, the problem was that there was three separate fiefdoms of the OKH/OKW (Wehrmacht), Göring (Luftwaffe), and Himmler (SS), competing for increasingly scarce resources!"

I would agree up to a point. There is no doubt that the LW Field divisions represented a monumental misuse of personnel. Also, they do not seem to have been wholly successful in achieving the optimal balance between the three services in allocation of new recruits. The W-SS point is IMO much more questionable. For most of the war, the organisation not only used a very limited number of German personnel, they were also facing severe recruitment restrictions in Germany (which in fact was aprime impetus towards the creation of foreign volunteer units and the widespread utilisation of Volksdeutsche fromother countries). There does not appear, at least for most of the war, to be much of a case either for any SS priority in replacements of men or equipment. And except the fact that W-SS Panzer Divisions had larger structures, they mostly do not seem to have been better equipped than Heer counterparts, in the sense of having any particular priority in the issuing of better weapons.

Regards,

K.A.

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Originally posted by acetone:
i just happened to read this thread. some of my thoughts:

3. it is perfectly possible to 'win' the statistical aspect of attrition, yet lose the war.

4. (from 3.) the rate of attrition inflicted by the Germans upon the Soviets, however the statistics favor the Germans, was inadequate during the war.

[This message has been edited by acetone (edited 09-05-2003).]

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Now obviously the ger did not run thier country perfectly during the war but no one did.

Yes as it came out the gers caused more cas to the rus then the rus were able to deal with but not enough to really stop them from 43 onwards. The ger pop base eroded only slightly during the war but the rus pop shrunk by a huge margin during the war. If the war had lasted longer the soviet army would have been bleed dry. Now it didnīt and victory was thiers but 43 is quite different from 44 and 45. Which I am trying not to discuss as things changed for many resons.

The ger and rus trucks

Most books leave the impression that the sovs had the adv in this dept but that just wasnīt true at least until late in the war. During the first 2 years in the war from 39-41 ger made as many trucks as rus did during the entire 4 year war. Once you know this it shouldīt come as a suprise that the ger army as a whole had more trucks in 39 than they rus did in 41 by a huge margin. In fact it takes until late in the war 44 or so with all those LL trucks that the rus to even equal what the ger had in 39. Not even counting future polish french etc... trucks put to use.

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Originally posted by Darrin:

Iīm tired or reiterating this point but the sov pop pre 41 was 200 mil at most that is 2.5 times greater than the ger pop in mid 39 at 80 mil. Even by late 43 they certainly didnīt reconquer all that terr from germany going up to the baltic states etc... They gainded 10s of mils of pop during this year but that is already more than included above. If you donīt understand that maybe you canīt understand attrition due to your lack of arithmatic understanding.

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I can understand it quite well, thank you.

And you can assert your arithmatic is correct for the rest of the year, I don't really mind. I don't assert your arithmatic is incorrect, I assert it is uncorrelated to the conclusion you reach.

Saying that 50 or 60 million people who were living in territories under German control were available to the Soviets for their war effort may be fine for the purposes of your arithmatic, but it fails a very basic test of reasonableness when considering how the Soivets generated their military might. Those resources were NOT available to the Soviets in 1942. Some of them WERE available to the Soviets by the end of 1943. That means the Sovier resource pool was increasing from 1942 to 1943.

You can say you have already counted those people. Fine. You have. You were wrong to, but you have. The Soviets couldn't count them, but you could. Great. Good arithmatic. Just not relavent, is all.

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Well since I am talking about the atrition of ger and rus this point is also WRONG. What ger pop was actually occupied in 43 by anyone? Certainly not the 10s of mil of people in your fantasy.

Iīve only been using the base ger pop of 80mil from with thier army and production mainly came. So any axis minor or occupied terr loss is a minor consideration. I havenīt included them.

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I know you haven't included them. And I'm sure you have also not included any of the tanks built for the Germans in Czechoslovakia, have you? Or any trucks or aircraft engines built in France? Or any oil from Romania? Or any steel that came from Sweden through Norway? Or those hundreds of thousands of Finnish, Italian, Hungarian, or Rumanian soldiers that were fighting against the Soviets?

Its fine that you don't count those resources. It makes your arithmatic easier. But the Soviets had to count them. They weren't so easily dismisssed when they were engaged in a daily war of attrition. They were much more easily dismissed when they were no longer a part of the forces opposing the Soviets on the battlefield. The fact that the Soviets managed to get those resources OUT of the battle ceretainly affected the total balance of power, and there is some clear indications that the Soviets explicitly targetted reducing Germany's access to foriegn resources in their grand war strategies. But your arithmatic works just find without them. It fails to be relavent, but the numbers add up well.

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I was discussing the realtive losses of rus and ger esp compared to what thier pop and production was able to accomadate up to 43.

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And I was discussing the total resource base from which the Soviets could generate military might, compared to the total resource base from which the Germans could generate military might.

Discussing batting averages and ERAs is fine. But its the points on the scoreboard that actually affect the outcome of the game.

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28 mil rus died according to thier offical numbers during the war. Over 4 years those are not theoortical numbers but a real contraction of thier post war pop due to many reasons. One of which was the army losing people at a higher rate then it could afford. Maybe you shold try to explain away this figure. Before eliciting mumbo jambo that you donīt understand and time frames that are irelevent.

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I have no need to explain away any figures. Saying the Soviets had bunches of people in 1940 is fine. But many of them were not available to the Soviets in 1942. You say that timeframe is somehow not relevant? How can the Soviet population in 1942 be less relevant than the Soviet pre-war population to the Soviet war effort in 1942 and 1943? How can the expansion of the Soviet population over the course of 1943 be less relevant than the Soviet pre-war population to the issue of whether they were losing people faster than they could replace them in 1943?

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Now by your own definiton of attrition a shrinking of civ recorces it obviously was a huge rus attrtion haping over 4 years.

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Averages are useful for some things, not for others.

If you lose 7 pints of blood through hemorraging, and get 7 pints of blood in transfusions, on average you have lost nothing.

If you lose those 7 BEFORE you get the 7 back in transfusions, you blead to death. But on average you lose no blood. See how useful correct arithmetic is?

The Soviets suffered HUGE losses in 1941, and still more HUGE losses in 1942. In the second half of 1943 they began to REAQUIRE some of those lost resources.

Similarly, in 1942 Germany had almost ALL of Europe contributing to their war effort against the Soviets. Throughout 1943 this resource base erroded sharply.

You may ignore these factors in your calculations if you chose. It will not make your arithmatic wrong. Just your conclusions.

If you chose to limit the factors you consider, you can always build a model that defines success from failure. It is like the doctor who asserts that the operation was a success, but the the patient died.

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Thats 7 mil peple dead each year. At that rate the rus would run out of people assuming a 160 mil pop in rus controlled area by end of 43 which is high.

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The Soviets lost something like 80 million people in ONE year. THAT is what THEY had to consider when they built their military machine.

The Soviets got some 30 or 40 million of those people BACK in the second half of 1943. THAT made a material contribution to their available manpower pool.

At the same time, countries with combined populations of something like 60 to 80 million people, which HAD been contributing armies to the German war effort in 1942, were NOT contributing armies to the German war effort at the end of 1943. THAT made a material contribution to the German's total available manpower pool.

All I'm suggesting is that before you conclude who was winning the war of attrition, you MIGHT want to consider these factors. I'm sure the Soviets did.

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What I meant by attrition is that the rus army and pop was taking loses at a rate it could not even keep with even with its large pop. ... Rus suffered from attriton to a much larger degree than ger in mil cas and civ losses after adjusting for thier larger pop. If you want to keep believing the opposite thats your right just donīt expect me to answer anymore.

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If you want to keep believing that swings of of a hundred million or more in the population pool from which the two sides could mobilize military might are not relevent, than that is your right too.

It only shows that you don't understand what the war of attrition was really about. But then, I don't think the Germans did, either, so you aren't alone.

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Originally posted by Kjetil:
The Soviet capability to generate military power does not seem to have increased over the last year and a half of the war, but rather to decline slightly. Conversely, nor does German ability to generate military power appear to have declined appreciably between 1943 and 1944.

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If 1943 had gone like 1941 or 1942, I think the Soviets would have been knocked out of the war. They did not have the ability to suffer the loss of another 30 or 40 million civilians from their population base, and still generate the military might to continue effectively resisting. From that perspective, simply sustaining their ability to generate military might was a significant shift in the attritional balance.

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Also, I do think there is a fundamental difference on the German side between allied and occupied population and German population. The former could not in any very meaningful way be utilised for military purposes.

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There was a fundamental difference. But this only demonstrates how poorly the Germans approached the issue of mobilizing resources.

To say that allies or occupied populations did not contribute in a meaningful way, though, is in error. Many resources came from allied or occupied territories, including raw materials, food, arms and munitions, slave labor, and soldiers. These contributions to the German war effort in 1942 and 1943 were probably as significant as Lend Lease contributions to the Soviet war effort in 1944/45. (<-- ALERT: unsupported assertion ... update with facts as available)

The Soviets may not have increased the levels at which they were generating military might from 1942 to 1944, but their ability to sustain that might was expanding notably. It was still unsustainable in the long run, but the length of the run was continually extended. By this I mean that they may have had 12 months' ability to sustain their military efforts in 1942, and only 6 months in 1945 -- but they didn't run out in 1943 like their 1942 rate indicated they would...

And the exact opposite was happening to the Germans in the same timeframe.

This is the issue of balancing available resources and rate of conversion versus losses, of one side versus the other, that I have tried to articulate as the essence of attritional warfare.

-Mark 1

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Originally posted by Mk 1:

The Soviets may not have increased the levels at which they were generating military might from 1942 to 1944, but their ability to sustain that might was expanding notably. It was still unsustainable in the long run, but the length of the run was continually extended. By this I mean that they may have had 12 months' ability to sustain their military efforts in 1942, and only 6 months in 1945 -- but they didn't run out in 1943 like their 1942 rate indicated they would...

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One last point about your attrtion model is that thier is a big gap between when a person suddenly falls behind enemy lines and actually contributes in even a tiny bit to supprt his enemy. So your numbers esp for 42-43 on the eastern front but for the whole war are very threortical.

Plus while rus may have gained back some of thier native pop in 43 that helped thier efforts. Ger lost in the east front recently caputed enemy pop that they were still in the process of trying to utalize and had to keep policing because of partizans. The ger loss was much less sig than the rus gain due to the GDP per person factor.

Economics

Each ger also contributed more to thier countries GDP than a rus. By a factor of almost three in 43 and that is only including the central ger GDP nothing out side of ger areas bordering ger that were asssimilated during the war.

Yes I inclided cheq tanks in the ger production numbers but never mentioned anything else you mention french motors etc...

The rus GDP incresed by just 10% from 270 in 42 to 300 in 43. And by just 20 % from 43-44 to end up at about 360. The rus GDP in 45 during a year mainly of peace and with all that terr and pop actually dropped to 340.

The central ger GDP remained almost the same from 42-44 with only a tinny tiny increse. Of course what happened as with rus was a larger and larger share of the GDP was devoted to the military.

Now even in 43 the french cap GDP was 110. add this together with the itas which were mainly free but losing italian pop and terr for most of the year at almost 140. You get almost 250 in 43 within 15% of your of so might russias. Notice that even these mainly surrendered pop produced almost as much GDP per preson as your mighty russia.

Russia underutalized thier resources from an economic perspectives compared to ger. Ger did a good job with captured french and italian terr as good as rus was able to manage with thier own. And if some other indep ger ally did a worse job than ger that is to be expected and is due to that contrys fault not germanys.

Once you examine the facts you see that rus being better at utalizing ecomomic resources was more myth than fact. This GDP per person also points out how many more people the rus needed compared to the gers. Ive actually heard of one US eng who said it was like a kindergarten. Now Iīm trying not to dicuss attrition but I sure would like to hear any actual reasoning to support this myth. These numbers are taken from the on war site and supposedly come from mark harrison a book I think you have.

PS If you lose 7 pint of blood and get 7 back then its fine. The problem was they lost 28 mil rus from thier pop over 4 years that they NEVER got back. Still wrong...

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Originally posted by Darrin:
The rus GDP incresed by just 10% from 270 in 42 to 300 in 43. And by just 20 % from 43-44 to end up at about 360. The rus GDP in 45 during a year mainly of peace and with all that terr and pop actually dropped to 340.

The central ger GDP remained almost the same from 42-44 with only a tinny tiny increse. Of course what happened as with rus was a larger and larger share of the GDP was devoted to the military.

Now even in 43 the french cap GDP was 110. add this together with the itas which were mainly free but losing italian pop and terr for most of the year at almost 140. You get almost 250 in 43 within 15% of your of so might russias. Notice that even these mainly surrendered pop produced almost as much GDP per preson as your mighty russia.

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Darrin, just out of curiosity, where are your figures coming from, and what do they mean? What is a GDP of 100? 100 What? I know that Harrison reported Soviet economic output by different measures during the war, but I have never seen a GDP quote for the Soviets. I have seen the following:

Mobilization of the workforce in war-related industry
USA 1940 8.4%, 1943 19 %
UK 1939 15.8%, 1943 23%
USSR 1940 8%, 1943 23%
Germany 1939 14.1%, 1943 14.2%

Annual Expenditure for Combat Munitions in $-billion at US 1944 munitions prices
USA 1935-39 $0.3, 1940 $1.5, 1941 $4.5, 1942 $20, 1943 $38, 1944 $42
Canada 1935-39 $0, 1940 $0, 1941 $0.5, 1942 $1, 1943 $1.5, 1944 $1.5
UK 1935-39 $0.5, 1940 $3.5, 1941 $6.5, 1942 $9, 1943 $11, 1944 $11
USSR 1935-39 $1.6, 1940 $5, 1941 $8.5, 1942 $11.5, 1943 $14, 1944 $16
Germany 1935-39 $2.4, 1940 $6, 1941 $6, 1942 $8.5, $1943 13.5, 1944 $17

Net Imports as percent of National Income (1938/1939/1940/1941/1942/1943/1944/1945)
USA -2, -1, -2, -2, -4, -6, -6
UK 5, 8, 17, 14, 11, 10, 9, 11
USSR ?, ?, ?, ?, 9, 18, 17, ?
Germany -1, 1, 7, 12, 17, 16, ?, ?

Mobilization of Net National Product for War (as a percent of national income, 1938/1939/1940/1941/1942/1943/1944/1945)

National utilization of resources (for the US less net exports)
USA 1, 1, 1, 13, 36, 47, 47, -
UK 7, 16, 48, 55, 54, 57, 56, 47
USSR -, -, 20, 75, 76, 69, -
Germany 17, 25, 44, 56, 69, 76

Domestic finance of resources (for the UK, USSR and Germany less net imports)
USA -, 2, 3, 14, 40, 53, 54, 44
UK 2, 8, 31, 41, 43, 47, 47, 36
USSR -, -, 20, 66, 58, 52, -
Germany 18, 24, 36, 44, 52, 60, -, -

Real National Product Growth (normalized 100 as of the start date)
USA 1939-100, 1940-108, 1941-125, 1942-137, 1943-149, 1944-152
UK 1938-100, 1939-103, 1940-120, 1941-127, 1942-128, 1943-131, 1944-124, 1945-115
USSR 1937-100, 1938-101, 1939-107, 1940-117, 1941-94, 1942-66, 1943-77, 1944-93, 1945-92
Germany 1939-100, 1940-100, 1941-102, 1942-105, 1943-116

Productivity Ranking (with USA 1935-1938 = 100)
USA 1935-38 100, 1944 100
UK 1935-38 36, 1944 41
USSR 1935-38 36, 1944 39
Germany 1935-38 41, 1944 48

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
Darrin, just out of curiosity, where are your figures coming from, and what do they mean? What is a GDP of 100? 100 What? I know that Harrison reported Soviet economic output by different measures during the war, but I have never seen a GDP quote for the Soviets. I have seen the following:

Mobilization of the workforce in war-related industry
USA 1940 8.4%, 1943 19 %
UK 1939 15.8%, 1943 23%
USSR 1940 8%, 1943 23%
Germany 1939 14.1%, 1943 14.2%

Annual Expenditure for Combat Munitions in $-billion at US 1944 munitions prices
USA 1935-39 $0.3, 1940 $1.5, 1941 $4.5, 1942 $20, 1943 $38, 1944 $42
Canada 1935-39 $0, 1940 $0, 1941 $0.5, 1942 $1, 1943 $1.5, 1944 $1.5
UK 1935-39 $0.5, 1940 $3.5, 1941 $6.5, 1942 $9, 1943 $11, 1944 $11
USSR 1935-39 $1.6, 1940 $5, 1941 $8.5, 1942 $11.5, 1943 $14, 1944 $16
Germany 1935-39 $2.4, 1940 $6, 1941 $6, 1942 $8.5, $1943 13.5, 1944 $17

Net Imports as percent of National Income (1938/1939/1940/1941/1942/1943/1944/1945)
USA -2, -1, -2, -2, -4, -6, -6
UK 5, 8, 17, 14, 11, 10, 9, 11
USSR ?, ?, ?, ?, 9, 18, 17, ?
Germany -1, 1, 7, 12, 17, 16, ?, ?

Mobilization of Net National Product for War (as a percent of national income, 1938/1939/1940/1941/1942/1943/1944/1945)

National utilization of resources (for the US less net exports)
USA 1, 1, 1, 13, 36, 47, 47, -
UK 7, 16, 48, 55, 54, 57, 56, 47
USSR -, -, 20, 75, 76, 69, -
Germany 17, 25, 44, 56, 69, 76

Domestic finance of resources (for the UK, USSR and Germany less net imports)
USA -, 2, 3, 14, 40, 53, 54, 44
UK 2, 8, 31, 41, 43, 47, 47, 36
USSR -, -, 20, 66, 58, 52, -
Germany 18, 24, 36, 44, 52, 60, -, -

Real National Product Growth (normalized 100 as of the start date)
USA 1939-100, 1940-108, 1941-125, 1942-137, 1943-149, 1944-152
UK 1938-100, 1939-103, 1940-120, 1941-127, 1942-128, 1943-131, 1944-124, 1945-115
USSR 1937-100, 1938-101, 1939-107, 1940-117, 1941-94, 1942-66, 1943-77, 1944-93, 1945-92
Germany 1939-100, 1940-100, 1941-102, 1942-105, 1943-116

Productivity Ranking (with USA 1935-1938 = 100)
USA 1935-38 100, 1944 100
UK 1935-38 36, 1944 41
USSR 1935-38 36, 1944 39
Germany 1935-38 41, 1944 48

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As I said above the numbers come from the on war site this is the exact article. The reference appears to be one of harrisons books but I donīt know how accuuate it or the author is. The values as you can see for yourself are all adujusted to billions of 1990 international dollors.

http://www.onwar.com/articles/f0302.htm

If you are trying to suggest thier is no GDP reported for russia somewhere then you must be mistaken.

Certainly - the levels they had achieved by the summer of 1943 proved quite sufficient for continuing success as long as they were largely maintined. My point was just that Soviet strength in fact appears to have diminished somewhat over the last year-and-a-half of the war, in spite of the fact that their material and territorial base expanded and that losses in personnel at least were relatively similar in 1942 and 1943.

"There was a fundamental difference. But this only demonstrates how poorly the Germans approached the issue of mobilizing resources.

To say that allies or occupied populations did not contribute in a meaningful way, though, is in error. Many resources came from allied or occupied territories, including raw materials, food, arms and munitions, slave labor, and soldiers. These contributions to the German war effort in 1942 and 1943 were probably as significant as Lend Lease contributions to the Soviet war effort in 1944/45. (<-- ALERT: unsupported assertion ... update with facts as available)"

Well, no - it does not reflect ONLY poor German resource management. Regardless how well the Germans organised things, they could not draw meaningfully on Polish or French manpower for military purposes. In this sense, the distinction is a fundamental one. And though Romania or Hungary could field several hundred thousand troops at any given time, their combat value was and would remain limited - and certainly nothing comparable to a similar number of Germans. The EF stood or fell with the German Army. Germany of course could and did draw on natural resources and productive capacity in occupied and allied territories. The point however is not that 30 million Romanians and Hungarians did not contribute to the German war effort, just that the loss of them is not directly comparable to the loss of 30 million Soviet citizens for the USSR.

"The Soviets may not have increased the levels at which they were generating military might from 1942 to 1944, but their ability to sustain that might was expanding notably. It was still unsustainable in the long run, but the length of the run was continually extended. By this I mean that they may have had 12 months' ability to sustain their military efforts in 1942, and only 6 months in 1945 -- but they didn't run out in 1943 like their 1942 rate indicated they would...

And the exact opposite was happening to the Germans in the same timeframe.

This is the issue of balancing available resources and rate of conversion versus losses, of one side versus the other, that I have tried to articulate as the essence of attritional warfare."

I agree entirely with this, and I think we would be in agreement concerning the basic issues under discussion on this thread.

regards,

K.A.

"a curious point is the erosion of German combat power. in 1941, they were able to launch simultaneous offensives in three distinct axes: Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine. in 1942, two distinct axes: the Caucasus and Stalingrad. in 1943, only one axis: the Kursk bulge. "

Not really curious is it, in light of the changing strength relation between the two sides? If anything is curious I think it is the fact that the Germans chose to attack at all in 19943, considering the crushing Soviet overall superiority.

quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Not really curious is it, in light of the changing strength relation between the two sides? If anything is curious I think it is the fact that the Germans chose to attack at all in 19943, considering the crushing Soviet overall superiority.

cheers

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Well, basically the point is that the Soviets were able to do much more than rebuild their forces from 1942 to 1943 - they increased them dramatically. And up until that point, German strength were not really eroding - it drops slightly from June 1941 to June 1942, and then actually peaks in the summer of 1943. The point I am making is that German strength June 1941 - June 1943 is by and large stable, whereas Soviet strength increases, and that the fluctuations of the strategic battle generally corresponds with the development in the overall force level.

regards,

quote:

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Originally posted by Darrin:

If you are trying to suggest thier is no GDP reported for russia somewhere then you must be mistaken.

It seems even your newer numbers do not paint a picture of rus being better at utalizing its resources than ger. Although I would like to hear you show how they do. Let alone ger utalalaztion of conquered and allied people which this does not even mention just the big four.

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quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
Darrin, I asked you what your source was and what the numbers meant - nicely. And stated that I had not seen Soviet GDP figures. I made no judgment of your figures, nor did I make any comment on the rather asinine argument that has been going on on this forum, of which I am one of the administrators. So please keep a civil tongue in your typing fingers.

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This is my post just before you asked for a source. Note the VERY last sentance indicated in bold. If you couldnīt find the source you have only yourself to blame. I did you the coutersty of providing an eaxct link the second time.

I will keep writing whatever way I wish to you or to mk1 thats my right. If you what to ban me then go ahead and do so thats your right. There was nothing I said in my last post to you that warants banning me from the site but it your decision.

quote:

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Originally posted by Darrin:

Economics

Each ger also contributed more to thier countries GDP than a rus. By a factor of almost three in 43 and that is only including the central ger GDP nothing out side of ger areas bordering ger that were asssimilated during the war.

Yes I inclided cheq tanks in the ger production numbers but never mentioned anything else you mention french motors etc...

The rus GDP incresed by just 10% from 270 in 42 to 300 in 43. And by just 20 % from 43-44 to end up at about 360. The rus GDP in 45 during a year mainly of peace and with all that terr and pop actually dropped to 340.

The central ger GDP remained almost the same from 42-44 with only a tinny tiny increse. Of course what happened as with rus was a larger and larger share of the GDP was devoted to the military.

Now even in 43 the french cap GDP was 110. add this together with the itas which were mainly free but losing italian pop and terr for most of the year at almost 140. You get almost 250 in 43 within 15% of your of so might russias. Notice that even these mainly surrendered pop produced almost as much GDP per preson as your mighty russia.

Russia underutalized thier resources from an economic perspectives compared to ger. Ger did a good job with captured french and italian terr as good as rus was able to manage with thier own. And if some other indep ger ally did a worse job than ger that is to be expected and is due to that contrys fault not germanys.

Once you examine the facts you see that rus being better at utalizing ecomomic resources was more myth than fact. This GDP per person also points out how many more people the rus needed compared to the gers. Ive actually heard of one US eng who said it was like a kindergarten. Now Iīm trying not to dicuss attrition but I sure would like to hear any actual reasoning to support this myth. These numbers are taken from the on war site and supposedly come from mark harrison a book I think you have.

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quote:

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Originally posted by Darrin:

PS. I cut a few opening and closing sentances out.

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Darrin, nobody said anything about banning - I simply asked for some civility on your part. Humour, poking fun and so forth is one thing, nastiness is another. And I have a right to ask for that, since we pay for this site.

And I'm sorry I missed your reference to OnWar's distillation of Mark Harrison's economic survey. I must confess I haven't been reading this thread carefully, it was really your reference to Soviet GDP that caught my attention. You will see that if you look carefully at Harrison's original (and I believe at the OnWar article) you will find that the Soviet figures are actually NNP or NDP and not GDP. That was an old Soviet trick used to bolster the image of their economy, I'm not sure that GDP figures were ever published during the Soviet regime. Which means those figures are not really comparable to the GDP figures of another nation.

That is the question I was asking. I wasn't criticizing your argument, in fact the Germans probably did mobilize more effectively than any other nation, and certainly better than did the SU (Soviet ammo production figures are one amusing case). So if you have a problem with me agreeing with your premise, then maybe you should ban yourself from this site.

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
Darrin, nobody said anything about banning - I simply asked for some civility on your part. Humour, poking fun and so forth is one thing, nastiness is another. And I have a right to ask for that, since we pay for this site.

And I'm sorry I missed your reference to OnWar's distillation of Mark Harrison's economic survey. I must confess I haven't been reading this thread carefully, it was really your reference to Soviet GDP that caught my attention. You will see that if you look carefully at Harrison's original (and I believe at the OnWar article) you will find that the Soviet figures are actually NNP or NDP and not GDP. That was an old Soviet trick used to bolster the image of their economy, I'm not sure that GDP figures were ever published during the Soviet regime. Which means those figures are not really comparable to the GDP figures of another nation.

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As I said I will continue to write the way I have if you have a problem with this then ban me. I certainly havenīt been 'naster' than other people here. Maybe you should have paid more attention to the entire thread before singling me out. Rest assured if you try to ban me for such triviality as disagreeing with some one and actually trying to present facts to bolter my point then I wonīt be back. Which Iīm sure will rejoice you and markie to no end.

The only thing I hate more than someone trying to limit what I say is someone esle running around as administrator unfairly enforcing the 'rules' against me. If you want to disagree with the agrument then disagree with the argument instead of insunitating things that are not true.

The GDP figures are not mine but harriosn so if you want to complain about these do so to him not me. Also his book was pub in 98 so your complaint about soviet era seems empty. Also while the sovs may not have published sov WWII GDP figures it would be folly of them not to keep them at the time.

Your failure to find ralphs on war article or even read it correctly makes it appears you have more intrest in proving me wrong then finding truth. The article at on war list GDP for everyone and compares them it even mentions that harrison compared them in his book. It appears you are wrong please try to reread the article since Iīve posted it twice.

So we have three different possibilites harrison was wrong, ralph was wrong or you were wrong. Yes even gods make mistakes and you misread 3 things about ralphs on war article that were wrong. Unfortunatly as I donīt have the book which I also have posted at least once above I canīt tell who was wrong. What I can say is none of your complaints are echoed or proved in any way by ralphs article on war. The exact oppiste was true you were wrong and maybe you are wrong yet again.

quote:

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Originally posted by michael kenny:
Darrin there could be a fourth possibility, i.e. you were wrong. Maybe you read the sources wrongly and this agressive response whenever anyone disagrees with you does nothing for your case. Try to be more polite when disagreeing with posters and despite what you think the world isn't against you. I have had many a spat with you and if only you could be more flexible about 'the facts' as you see them we could all get along better.
Rich's post was very conciliatory and I read it as a half-apology to you. Your reply must have him seething. I hope he waits before replying.

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I have no intrest in being forced to get along with you. Especially if the pre-reqs are agreeing with wahtever you say even if I THINK you are wrong. I donīt mind you saying what ever you want but expect me to do the same. Its called free speech over hear maybe you should go join a forum that practices censorship. I might percsive the facts wrongly compared to YOU but its my RIGHT to think and say what I want.

Except I went and checked ralphs article again and again before and after posting my ideas here. According to ralphs article which anybody could go read and check I did not read it wrong.

-It says GDP. No where does it say NNP or NGP.

-It presents a chart from harrions book were he adds togeather and makes ratios using the numbers. Harriosn must think they are equvallent.

-Ralph even goes on to add and make his own slightly different ratios from the numbers even he thinks they are equvlent.

regards,

quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Quite frankly Darrin, I consider those last two posts of yours to constitute low points in both courtesy, sense, maturity and self-insight. It appears to me as obvious that you are not being singled out out of any unfairness or vindictiveness towards your person, but in fact because your tone and arguments so far has merited the comments you have received. Your last two petulant posts are unlikely to get you treated with any more respect, to put it gently.

regards,

K.A.

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I never said I wanted people to treat me with respect a rare comodity on the internet. I said I will continue to write the way I want about what I want thats my right. If rich desides to ban me because of my TONE and ARGUMENT thats his right. Until he does I will continue to do exactly as I have done previously on this forum. Donīt expect a single iota of reform I rarly curse and usually make referencees avilavle to those who ask.

I would ratrher be banned then forced to agree with someone who considers themself the sole gardien of the truth. Even if they are a real histrian and Iīm just a dumb scientist who canīt even spell. Its my descion what I want to believe even if it is considered wrong by everyone else here.

quote:

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Originally posted by Darrin:
I never said I wanted people to treat me with respect a rare comodity on the internet. I said I will continue to write the way I want about what I want thats my right. If rich desides to ban me because of my TONE and ARGUMENT thats his right.

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Darrin, I will try one more time. I asked you for civility, you have refused it, time after time even though I have not begun to suggest that your argument is wrong, or that I am arguing against it. I have not said that I will ban you, nor would I. I have exercised my power as moderator exactly once in the three years we have been on the net, and that was to remove a grossly offensive post. I asked you a question, that is all. Why exactly do you have such a problem with that?

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
Darrin, I will try one more time. I asked you for civility, you have refused it, time after time [b]even though I have not begun to suggest that your argument is wrong, or that I am arguing against it. I have not said that I will ban you, nor would I. I have exercised my power as moderator exactly once in the three years we have been on the net, and that was to remove a grossly offensive post. I asked you a question, that is all. Why exactly do you have such a problem with that?

[/B]

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