quote:

---

Originally posted by Mk 1:
This conclusion is not really warranted if all we look at is military losses or population losses.

There is an intermediate issue between population and military -- and that is the rate at which population (and other resources) are being converted to military capacity. That is a critical consideration, because once one sides capacity to wage war is destroyed, their civilian population (and total resources) are no longer a threat.

So the key issue in winning at attritional warfare is to attrite the enemy's capacity to conduct the war. That means that you must inflict a positive ratio of losses over expansion of warmaking capacity. And that the ratio you achieve must be enough more than the ratio you suffer (if BOTH are positive) to make up for any starting imbalance in forces and potential.

In 1943 the Russians were suffering losses in their military at a faster pace than the Germans. And they were suffering losses in their civilian population faster than the Germans. But they were generating military might FASTER than they were losing it. They were building tanks faster than they were losing them, inducting the population into the military faster than they were losing them, and expanding their war economy faster than it was being destroyed.

Because of their population and resource limitations (and declines) it is clear that their pace of expansion of warmaking capacity was not sustainable indefinitely, and in fact they were probably running out of time when 1945 rolled around. But so long as they were building forces faster than they were losing them, and so long as the Germans were losing forces (and/or expanding the commitments of their forces) faster than they were building them, then THAT was a key issue to achieving "victory through attrition".

It is folly to conduct warfare at a "sustainable" pace if your opponant actually has the potential and the will to "win". Sustainability in this regard would mean converting civilian resources to warmaking capacity at a pace that is no faster than the general expansion of your civilian resource base. If one side seeks to conduct war at a sustainable pace, and the other is willing to forego sustainability in order to win -- guess who holds the advantage? The challenge for national leadership is in converting your resources at a pace that gives you the best chance of winning the war before you consume your resource base.

Once you include the rate of conversion of civilian resources to warmaking capacity, the Soviets were in fact "winning" the war of attrition against the Germans in 1943. Their military might was growing faster than Germany's. Their risk was whether they were "winning" it fast enough to finish the job before they ran out of civilian resources to convert.

-Mark 1

[This message has been edited by Mk 1 (edited 08-13-2003).]

---

Mabye you should try to prove a few of you commments above and elsewhere about the rus and usa being better at converting civ to wartime prod. Despite your belicose staments I have still seen no proof to back them up. Although I have already admitted rus had to do a miricle in 42 and did it at the expenxse of thier already extrmly poor support and services.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Darrin:

The big difference in 44 was that the ger losses in the west which had been minimal before 44 were now very significant. This together with the sov army began to turn the tide of attrition almost in line with difference between the sov and ger pop.

I was talking about attrition on the east front in 43 and the eastern front ...

---

Does this suggest that the loss of Panzer Armee Afrika in Tunisia in early/mid 1943 was not very significant? Is there another single instance on the Western Front where the Germans lost so many soldiers? Does this event, perhaps with Sicily added, not combine to "compete" with German losses in the Normandie campaign?

I understand that the Germans were facing a more urgent need to split their forces after D-Day. But there is strong evidence that they withdrew forces (or failed to re-inforce East) as early as 1942/43. This is not a 1944-only phenominon.

So were the Germans not already feeling their losses in the West? Was a loss almost as big as Stalingrad really not noticeable to their efforts on the Eastern Front in 1943? Or not noticeable to the Soviet replies to the German efforts in 1943?

I am still struggling to understand what changed in 1944, and how the Germans managed to loose so much territory to the Soviets on the Eastern Front if Soviet forces were indeed shrinking in the second half of 1943.

Perhaps there is an "isolation of the battlefield" effect in play for the Germans. Even if their total forces were not shrinking as fast as the Soviets, perhaps the Soviets were getting their forces into battle more productively than the Germans.

Otherwise, I am still at a loss to understand why the Germans were beaten back in an un-interrupted string of Soviet campaigns after mid-43. What changed? The Germans had always retained the initiative, at least in the good-weather portions of th eyear, even when outnumbered, up to that point.

quote:

---

Its pretty obvious that the ger were winning the war of attrition in the east and overall in 43 the manuever quality factor.

---

I grant the issue on quality through 43, and even (on the tactical level, and on average) up to the end of the war. But the issue of winning the war of attrition -- it is not yet obvious to me at all. I struggle with that conclusion. There may yet be a factor we have yet identified, or don't have correct data on.

quote:

---

Its also pretty obvious that the were losing and did lose the war.

---

This is indeed obvious. Any model of analysis or set of data that seems to lead to an alternate conclusion must be questioned, as it is likely to be somehow flawed.

quote:

---

The US, UK and RUS had a GDP 6 times ger and a pop maybe 6 times ger. Togeather these coutries could afford to lose men and material at a high rate and still be said to be winning the attrition war.

---

I have not seen any numbers that cause me to believe a 6x advantage in population. In fact I expect that the advantage in population in 1942 and 1943 was probably closer to 2x or maaayyybeee 3x. Remember if we count Soviet "allies" in the UK and US, we should count German allies too.

quote:

---

But because only rus was suffering the effect up to Dday and they could not be said to be winning the war at all.

---

This is the part I don't understand.

My observation from history is that by the time of the D-Day landings the Germans were on the run on all fronts. They had lost control of more territory in the 18 months leading up to D-Day than probably any other army in any 18-month period in history.

So I have difficulty understanding the assertion that until D-Day they were winning.

I know in 45 it was receiving less and less manpower from the homeland, but instead had to wait for more supply personell to be sent to the front to fight, as well as get the wounded back to the front, after treatment.

I do not think there is an answer in isolation to the question "how long could the Soviets have stayed in the field". It all, of course, depends on the strength of the opposition.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Mk 1:
I must confess that now I am rather confused about the information which Darrin has offered.

I have seen him stating, and offering some statistics to support that:

- The Soviets were NOT increasing production of critical war materials after 1942.

- The Soviets were losing people faster, and by 1942 were already starting to run low.

- The Germans were INCREASING production of critical war materials after 1942.

- The Germans were GAINING population and expanding their wartime human resources after 1942.

- The Soviets were actually LOSING the "war of attrition" after 1942 -- particularly in the second half of 1943 and the first half of 1945, but even if you average first and second half of 1943 the Soviets were not "winning". It has even been asserted that the Soviets were loosing men and material not only faster than the Germans, but faster than they could be replaced. By this we must conclude that Soviet forces were contracting.

- The Germans demonstrated a positive battle loss ratio versus the Soviets throughout this period. While the ratio declined over the war years, the German production and resource base seems to have risen, and Soviet forces are demonstrated to have been contracting.

If I assembled just these observations, I would conclude that the Germans must have won. Clearly they would have been winning in 1943, OK perhaps loosing some of what they took in 44 but growing stronger during that time, and then going back on the winning path in 45.

To what do we attribute this appearant contradiction in terms?

-Mark 1

---

Surprisingly, Darrin is very correct in his production description. The clear answer to the apparent contradiction is the attrition and resources of other THREE Fronts: France, Italy, Combined Bomber Offensive

I will type in below the data from Table 6-3, page 181 of "The Red Army Handbook" by Zaloga & Ness:
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Sov Tk Str: 22600 7700 20600 21100 25400
Ger Tk Str 5262 4896 5648 5266 6284

Sov Tk Prod 6274 24639 19595 16975 4364
Ger Tk Prod 3256 4278 5966 9161 1098

Sov Tk Loss 20500 15000 22400 16900 8700
Ger Tk Loss 2758 2648 6362 6434 7382

Note: German losses are for ALL theatres, not just vs. Soviets, which explains the big jump in 1943 with Tunisia, Siciliy and Italy.

The estimated loss ratio on the Eastern Front is put by Zaloga & Ness as follows:

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Ger:Sov 1:7 1:6 1:4 1:4 1:1.2

Loss summary: Sov: 83,500 Ger: 25,584(all thr)

Surprises continue with Artillery Production, per Table 8.6, Page 221, which again shows peak Soviet Production in 1942, a slight fall off in 43, ands a significant drop in 44.

The following table is from a Jason Long article on website http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/SovWarProd.html

Soviet Tube Artillery Production
1 July 41-30 June 45
Year Anti-tank Field Anti-aircraft Total
1941 ? 10,813 2412 ?
1942 20,099 29,561 6488 56,148
1943 23,200 21,753 10,671 55,624
1944 8510 23,841 10,249 42,600
1945 3700 11,800 2600 18,100
Total 57,732 97,768 32,600 188,100

I think a major point has been missing when the wuestion is asked, how come the Germans did so much better in last half of 1943 vs. summer of 1944 agains Soviet offensives. Of course the role of attrition on personnel quality is a factor, but I will state the critical and over-riding factor: Erich von Manstein vs. Ernst Busch -- possibly the most competent of all operational commanders vs a blindly obedient yes man.

One other point that I only recently became aware of, which relates to the point of "increasing" German manpower from 1943 onwards: Some 60% of the Waffen SS were non Germans! About 400,000 of those who served were Germans or German heritage from outside Germany, while some 600,000 were non Germans. As the Eastern Front appeared to be going less well, evidently the recruiting call for an anti-communist crusade was far more effective than "politically correct" history seems to want to admit.

Makes one think what other possibilities were unused by Hitler in his continued bungling of one military issue after another.

The "numbers" do make a very convincing argument that had Germany followed a sensible military strategy, say post Stalingrad (realizing their resource inferiority and letting that drive their strategy) they possibly could have won the attrition war vs. Soviet Union, seeing as how well they did while following the worst of all possible strategies.

Note: German losses are for ALL theatres, not just vs. Soviets, which explains the big jump in 1943 with Tunisia, Siciliy and Italy.

The estimated loss ratio on the Eastern Front is put by Zaloga & Ness as follows:

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Ger:Sov 1:7 1:6 1:4 1:4 1:1.2

Loss summary: Sov: 83,500 Ger: 25,584(all thr)"

Funny, the loss figures for tanks do not seem to bear much relation to the ratios quoted under. If the Germans lost 7382 tanks on all fronts in 1945 and the Soviets 8700, how can the ratio in the East alone have been 1:1.2? And how can it have been 1:7 in 1941 when the TOTAL German figure compared to the Soviet is already 1:7.4? Take away the (admittedly relatively marginal) number of machines lost on the Balkans and in Africa, and it is higher still.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

"Sov Tk Loss 20500 15000 22400 16900 8700
Ger Tk Loss 2758 2648 6362 6434 7382

Note: German losses are for ALL theatres, not just vs. Soviets, which explains the big jump in 1943 with Tunisia, Siciliy and Italy.

The estimated loss ratio on the Eastern Front is put by Zaloga & Ness as follows:

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Ger:Sov 1:7 1:6 1:4 1:4 1:1.2

Loss summary: Sov: 83,500 Ger: 25,584(all thr)"

Funny, the loss figures for tanks do not seem to bear much relation to the ratios quoted under. If the Germans lost 7382 tanks on all fronts in 1945 and the Soviets 8700, how can the ratio in the East alone have been 1:1.2? And how can it have been 1:7 in 1941 when the TOTAL German figure compared to the Soviet is already 1:7.4? Take away the (admittedly relatively marginal) number of machines lost on the Balkans and in Africa, and it is higher still.

---

Remeber its zolgas estimated loss ratio for just the eastern front. Not some direct numerical calculation betwwen two numbers that include different theaters. The rus just thier active front and the ger was losss everywhere.

The sp guns have to be taken into consideration as well esp to corect this obvious anomoly. The rus made farily few sp guns up to 43 but with the admission of the outdatedness of the T70 they started making the SU-76 on the same chasis and produced and lost huge numbers of these during the last two years of the war.

Similarly the ger tanks and spguns lost on all fronts in 43 exceeded 8000 zetterling kursk 43. The ger put more emp on non turented guns from early to late in the war then the sovs did although by the last part of the war almost half thier tanks made had no turrents.

One other factor is the 45 numbers for the ger and the 41 numbers for the rus are considered inaccurte. Making the relative ratios less meaningfull esp in 45.

Also while the loss ratio in 43 is boosted by the inclusion of all tanks and sp guns lost in africa scily and italy I suspect they number roughly 10% and are a minor consideration.

The ger did suffer more tank losses in 43 then earlier double yearly totals by the above zolgas numbers. One sightly misleading factor here is 41 was a 6 month or half year campaign but all the rest were full yeras except 45. The numbers lost on a per month basis in 41 were very similar to what was lost in 43 per mopnth. Just as tot mil cas were. Now the number of tanks lost by the ger did decline significantly in 42 before going back to its higher levels in 43. Again the same thing also happened with the tot mil cas.

quote:

---

Originally posted by WWII=interest:
Mk1 and Darrin, what are your guys' thoughts on how long the USSR could hold out against Germany.

I know in 45 it was receiving less and less manpower from the homeland, but instead had to wait for more supply personell to be sent to the front to fight, as well as get the wounded back to the front, after treatment.

Any thoughts on a timeframe as to how long the USSR could continue fighting with the loss rates being suffered against the Germans?

---

Well this is a very dificult question to answer but I will try to highlite a few considerations.

The ger although inflicting more loses on the sovs then the sovs were able to sustain were slowly losing ground and battles even by mid 43. They were not losiing the attrition war itself even looking at overall ger and rus numbers until the last year.

Most of the favorable situations in the east in 44 did not happen until after Dday was well underway. The only pre daday event was an att on finland that gained about 10km over a week and the fins never surrendered until late in the summer long after the sov army attention moved elsewhere. The sov bagtration off started on the 22 of jun 12 days after DDay started. The sov off in the south started in late aug and rum declared neturality two days after it started followed by joining the allies two days later.

The dday invasion had a significant effect militarialy and politically in the east as soon as it hapened. The total western allied mil cas did exceed the ger ones in the west by a small margin. A huge chunk of the ger cas were mia, pows and kia ie ireplacable esp late in the war with high attriton happening on both fronts it spelt doom. In aug 44 in the west 86% of the ger force was mia. The ger irrecoverable cas actually exceeded the westetern ircoverable cas by a huge margin from 44-45. A much higher % of the ger cas in the west were irecoverable then on the east. There they peaked a bit in mid 44 but declined to the more normal lower % from before.

As an example of this pow capture difference the west by the end of dec 44 had as many ger in thier pow camps as did the russisans. Despite having a much smaller army attacking for a much smaller time in 44. This was aided by the war going on for 2 years longer in the west and more of it being air and naval and oversees people who might get captured more easily than otherwise. As a futher example of the pow capture difference the west had amlost 8 mil ger pows in custody in the end. This is aprrox three times what the sov were able to capture despite having a much bigger army fighting for a much longer time.

All those permanent cas in the west and east had to be relaced by newly trained inexperienced people. They could not be replaced as they had been earlier in 43 for example by treating trained, experiensed wounded who went back to serve again. The ger werenīt prpared for this at first and thier army started to cllapose due to the lack of replacments. This shortage was partly solved by droping the quality of the replacments.

It seems without Dday and all its immediate mil and political ramifications the rus army is going to keep on gaining minor amounts of ground for too high cost in cas. Long term military victory and attrition was only possible by invading france with the western allies. Otherwise the 8 mil ger pows do not end up in allied camps but fighting the rus on the esatern front. In 44 on the east front the ger cas amounted to a total of 2 mil a tiny fraction of the 8 mil ger soilders I mentioned. Not to mention the 3 mil ger soilders in rus camps of which at least 2 mil were from jan 45 onwards. That makes 10-11 mil ger soilders still around making a nuicence of themselves to the soviets only. The removal of these gers from from the field of battle had been almost entirly driven and assisted by western forces.

Most of the withdrawals the ger did in late 43 in the south were agreeded to by hitlar to withdraw to the don river defensive line. Abandoning the fwd less def lines and pulling back over a month the ger ended up having shorter fronts to defend and less distance for thier supply to move.

Most of the cities in the south the rus took during 43 were ones just behind the ger front line. Many of these such as kharkov they had already retaken and lost during the winter rus and ger spring couter off. The only major new city in the south they ended up taking was Kiev.

A generous high average dis the rus adv in the south would be 300 miles. Over 6 months that amounts to less than 2 miles a day during which time they took almost nothing up north. During the last 6 months the rus lost 3/4 of all thier tanks during this year and lost 3/4 of all tot poersonal period. That ammounts to 100 tanks des during each day or 60 tanks per mile. The tot rus mil cas ammounted to 3500 a day or 2000 a mile.

While the cas levels for the entire year of 43 were unsupportable in the long run for rus. The cas levels during the entire second half across the entire eastern front was even more bloddy and so were tank losses. The great sov off was anything but and really just gave them kiev and a bit of terr at the cost of huge huge cas. During the last half of 43 rus cas tanks and pers rose to triple thier losses from the first 6 months of the same year.

Also, your contention that failing German defeat in Normandy, the Soviets would only have made limited and costly gains falls on its own unreasonability. Firstly, it ignores the large scale Soviet victories of 1943. Secondly, it ignores the fact that the major Soviet victories of 1944 were too contemporary with Normandy to be affected by it, whatever the outcome there. And though you are right that generally speaking MIAs made up a greater share of casulaties in the West, this does not change the fact that German irrecoverable losses in Bagration was much more heavy than in Normandy.

"All those permanent cas in the west and east had to be relaced by newly trained inexperienced people. They could not be replaced as they had been earlier in 43 for example by treating trained, experiensed wounded who went back to serve again. The ger werenīt prpared for this at first and thier army started to cllapose due to the lack of replacments. This shortage was partly solved by droping the quality of the replacments."

This again represents taking a basically valid point much too far. 1944 was not the first time the German army had to deal with the catstrophic loss of whole formations - Stalingrad and Tunisia comes to mind - and they had never been able to make good losses simply through return of wounded. Of course, the problem became more and more acute over time, but it is at least far from clear that Normandy in particular was the difference between sustainability and lack of it.

"Well I might be persuaded that the rus could buy eventual victory at entire 43 cas levels but running out of steam towards the end as hapened hisorically. The actual losses to the rus during the last 6 months in cas and tanks across the entire front was far to high to be sustainable even the rus recognized it. Something had to be changed or thier would be no rus army around when victory came. 1944 was an entirly different affair not just from the rus side... "

"Run out of steam towards the end"? As I recall, they overran all of Eastern Germany and what remained of German controlled Poland in a few short months. Their losses were of course not sustainable "in the long run", but whose are? They don't have to be - they just have to be sustainable for long enough, which they were. If you look at Krivosheev, 1944 was not really anentirely different affair interms of Soviet casulties - they drop somewhat, but not that much.

It seems clear enough to me that the allies in toto and also the Soviets in isolation were winning the attrition battle from 1943 onwards - they were paying a high price, but considering the cost they inflicted on the Germans and the speed with which they overran German territory, the price was not too high. As is indeed borne out by events. Territorial gains and their speed is of relevance in this context because it basically decides how long the attrition process will have to go on. It is meaningless to picture attrition in this conflict as simple exchange of casulaties that conceivably could have gone on indefinitely or until one side ran out of men. This war was not won or lost by inflicting more or less casualties on the opponent - it was won and lost by occupation of territory. In this light, to win the attrition battle was to sustain an ability to take ground from the opponent, and to sustain it for as long as it took to take enough of it to end the war. All indications are that as the war progressed, this became easier and less costly rather than harder and more expensive for the Soviets, thus they were not losing the attrition battle.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Darrin, I think there is a basic lack of reason in your argument. The number of POWs in Western allied hands eventually is not a particularly meaningful point, especially considering the effort most German units made of reaching Western lines to surrender near or after the end, and that the bulk of prisoners taken before the war ended were captured after the issue was long since settled.

Also, your contention that failing German defeat in Normandy, the Soviets would only have made limited and costly gains falls on its own unreasonability. Firstly, it ignores the large scale Soviet victories of 1943. Secondly, it ignores the fact that the major Soviet victories of 1944 were too contemporary with Normandy to be affected by it, whatever the outcome there. And though you are right that generally speaking MIAs made up a greater share of casulaties in the West, this does not change the fact that German irrecoverable losses in Bagration was much more heavy than in Normandy.

"All those permanent cas in the west and east had to be relaced by newly trained inexperienced people. They could not be replaced as they had been earlier in 43 for example by treating trained, experiensed wounded who went back to serve again. The ger werenīt prpared for this at first and thier army started to cllapose due to the lack of replacments. This shortage was partly solved by droping the quality of the replacments."

This again represents taking a basically valid point much too far. 1944 was not the first time the German army had to deal with the catstrophic loss of whole formations - Stalingrad and Tunisia comes to mind - and they had never been able to make good losses simply through return of wounded. Of course, the problem became more and more acute over time, but it is at least far from clear that Normandy in particular was the difference between sustainability and lack of it.

"Well I might be persuaded that the rus could buy eventual victory at entire 43 cas levels but running out of steam towards the end as hapened hisorically. The actual losses to the rus during the last 6 months in cas and tanks across the entire front was far to high to be sustainable even the rus recognized it. Something had to be changed or thier would be no rus army around when victory came. 1944 was an entirly different affair not just from the rus side... "

"Run out of steam towards the end"? As I recall, they overran all of Eastern Germany and what remained of German controlled Poland in a few short months. Their losses were of course not sustainable "in the long run", but whose are? They don't have to be - they just have to be sustainable for long enough, which they were. If you look at Krivosheev, 1944 was not really anentirely different affair interms of Soviet casulties - they drop somewhat, but not that much.

It seems clear enough to me that the allies in toto and also the Soviets in isolation were winning the attrition battle from 1943 onwards - they were paying a high price, but considering the cost they inflicted on the Germans and the speed with which they overran German territory, the price was not too high. As is indeed borne out by events. Territorial gains and their speed is of relevance in this context because it basically decides how long the attrition process will have to go on. It is meaningless to picture attrition in this conflict as simple exchange of casulaties that conceivably could have gone on indefinitely or until one side ran out of men. This war was not won or lost by inflicting more or less casualties on the opponent - it was won and lost by occupation of territory. In this light, to win the attrition battle was to sustain an ability to take ground from the opponent, and to sustain it for as long as it took to take enough of it to end the war. All indications are that as the war progressed, this became easier and less costly rather than harder and more expensive for the Soviets, thus they were not losing the attrition battle.

---

The attriton battle even up to 43 including the total ger sit elsewhere and comparing it with the rus sit alone in 43 was still going the ger way. I never said the ger were winniing it from 44-45 but the factor had more to do with situations out side of rus mil control.

Gaining ground like the rus did is much easier when your the attacker with a huge adv in soilders and wepons attacking a ger army spread out across large bits of terr. Even with this adv whatever gain in late 43 was horrendously expensive it was a true rus type victory. It wasnīt something they could ever repeat the gain of ground is not the sole mesure of victory they only gained ground at a fast enough rate and low enough rus cas and high enough ger cas in summer-fall of 44. As I showed the rus even in 43 were running out of men faster than the ger were not including 41-42. Throw in a few more years like this and the rus army vaishes. I certainly havenīt read or seen anything posted here that dispells this fact.

I was just trying to say that if thier was no western forces to surrender to the ger soilders would have been only two willing to go on fighting the russians until the cows came home. Somthing they had been very sucessful at.

Actually I said no Dday as in no invasion on the axis continent in 44. Either because they decide to wait even longer or the US arenīt ready in time. Also the ger defeat at normandy was not the nail in the ger side but it helped. If the invasion had been defeated by ger it might also delay the dreaded two front war a bit as well forcing the rus to take even more cas. For after Dday started its sucess was almost forgune. Once the foot hold was in france it exanded and even by nov and dec 44 the ger were reporting as many losses in the west as in the east the dreaded two front war had already started.

When you look at kirosheevs numbers make sure to take into account that 1945 was only 4 months long in europe. In 45 the rus suffered the HIGHEST number of tanks des per month since the beging of the war including 41 and late 43. Despite ger being attacked from both sides at the same time. They were certainly were running out of men for thier army was lowest in size since 42 and they suffered. The suffered extremly high tot military cas again only surpased during late 43.

While the ger could not replace every solder just with functioning recovered wounded they could replace most. Plus new gers were coming of age almost every year. To give an example in the east in mid 41 the ger had 3 mil in mid 42 2.5 mil in mid 43 3 mil in mid 44 2.5 mil. There is no serious downward trend but fluctqations around the avg. Even after 2 years of loses in rus stalingrad and tun the ger had the highest number of ger the front as they did at any time. In fact in 44 the heer and whermact reached thier largest size of the war.

During jul-dec 43 the rus sufffered very high cas almost 1 million total a month. A rate much much higher than they could sustain and higher than the 41 monthly rate even higher than the 45 monthly rate. If the rus lost 1 mil men a month for the next two years they would exceed thier already high historical cas by reporting 24 mil tot mil cas. The rus actually reported about 30 mil cas over 4 years which would be exivalent to 15 mil in 2 years. Thats a 60% increase in cas over an already unsustainable cas levls. Plus even higher cas like this would just slow down the war making it take longer and more cas intensive then it was. The rus army in late 43 was certainly far from brillant and basically took a bit of land for an inordinatly high cas in men and tanks.

The second half of 43 was a slightly sucessful offensive but the ground gained was not very significant. The bloody pulp of russian soilders and smoking tanks that was this 'victory' could not be repeated again.

Looking at the operational results during this period I must conclude that the numbers being compared are innadequate.

Please don't tell me the second half of 1943 was a "strategic realignement" by the Germans. Nonsense. They were in full retreat. Burning all as they went, to be sure. And making the Soviets pay for every mile, to be sure. But they had no intention of giving up Russia to the Soviets, and no intention of winning the war on the Dnepr line.

So how do we reconcile numbers that show how the German forces were not declining, that replacements in men and material were exceeding losses, while at the same time observing that Soviet losses were exceeding replacements? And yet the Germans were obviously not holding their own on the battlefield, and in the following year (when they should have reaped the reward of their increased relative strength) they were soundly thrashed.

One proposed consideration is the effects of Soviet allies on German forces in the west. I can see that as a contributor. But it does not seem to be a significant enough factor to me. All of the losses in Tunisia and later in Normandie were meaningful, but only a fraction of the losses that the Germans suffered on the Eastern Front during the same two years -- if the Germans could thrash the Soviets in 1941 and 1942, when outnumbered and with inferior tanks, how could they be loosing in 1943 and the first half of 1944, when they were at the pinnacle of advantage in the quality of their tanks, and the correlation of forces on the Eastern front should have been shifting to their advantage, or at least remaining at an equivelent balance?

I think the missing component is indeed in the numbers represented by the allies. But not the Soviet's allies.

What our analysis fails to take into account is that during the same period where we claim the Germans were "winning the war of attrition" (1942 through 1944), the Roumanians, Hungarians, and Italians lost entire armies on the Eastern Front. These forces represented millions of men. They were fighting on the German side in 1942. The Soviets had to face them, and battle them. Their losses were catastrophic during this time.

If we consider the harm caused by the Soviet allies to the German war effort, we must also consider the harm caused by the Soviets to the war efforts of German allies.

And back to my original observation on the nature of attritional warfare, one of the most important aspects of the second half of the war on the Eastern Front was that the total population from which the Soviets drew their forces was growing, while the total population from which the Germans drew their forces was contracting. The Soviets were re-taking populated portions of the Soviet Union, and later added forces from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. At the same time the Germans were loosing allies which had contributed millions of men to the German war effort.

I wonder if the balance of attrition might look a little different with these factors taken into account...

quote:

---

Originally posted by Mk 1:
Does this suggest that the loss of Panzer Armee Afrika in Tunisia in early/mid 1943 was not very significant? Is there another single instance on the Western Front where the Germans lost so many soldiers? Does this event, perhaps with Sicily added, not combine to "compete" with German losses in the Normandie campaign?

I understand that the Germans were facing a more urgent need to split their forces after D-Day. But there is strong evidence that they withdrew forces (or failed to re-inforce East) as early as 1942/43. This is not a 1944-only phenominon.

So were the Germans not already feeling their losses in the West? Was a loss almost as big as Stalingrad really not noticeable to their efforts on the Eastern Front in 1943? Or not noticeable to the Soviet replies to the German efforts in 1943?

I am still struggling to understand what changed in 1944, and how the Germans managed to loose so much territory to the Soviets on the Eastern Front if Soviet forces were indeed shrinking in the second half of 1943.

Perhaps there is an "isolation of the battlefield" effect in play for the Germans. Even if their total forces were not shrinking as fast as the Soviets, perhaps the Soviets were getting their forces into battle more productively than the Germans.

Otherwise, I am still at a loss to understand why the Germans were beaten back in an un-interrupted string of Soviet campaigns after mid-43. What changed? The Germans had always retained the initiative, at least in the good-weather portions of th eyear, even when outnumbered, up to that point.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Its pretty obvious that the ger were winning the war of attrition in the east and overall in 43 the manuever quality factor.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I grant the issue on quality through 43, and even (on the tactical level, and on average) up to the end of the war. But the issue of winning the war of attrition -- it is not yet obvious to me at all. I struggle with that conclusion. There may yet be a factor we have yet identified, or don't have correct data on.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Its also pretty obvious that the were losing and did lose the war.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is indeed obvious. Any model of analysis or set of data that seems to lead to an alternate conclusion must be questioned, as it is likely to be somehow flawed.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The US, UK and RUS had a GDP 6 times ger and a pop maybe 6 times ger. Togeather these coutries could afford to lose men and material at a high rate and still be said to be winning the attrition war.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I have not seen any numbers that cause me to believe a 6x advantage in population. In fact I expect that the advantage in population in 1942 and 1943 was probably closer to 2x or maaayyybeee 3x. Remember if we count Soviet "allies" in the UK and US, we should count German allies too.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

But because only rus was suffering the effect up to Dday and they could not be said to be winning the war at all.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is the part I don't understand.

My observation from history is that by the time of the D-Day landings the Germans were on the run on all fronts. They had lost control of more territory in the 18 months leading up to D-Day than probably any other army in any 18-month period in history.

So I have difficulty understanding the assertion that until D-Day they were winning.

-Mark 1

-Mark 1[/B]

---

Obviously from 42 to 45 the ger did lose ground and were losing the war. That does not mean they were losing the attritional aspect of the war esp compared to the soviets from 41-43 even considering all the other drains on the ger army. I never said the ger were winning attrition nor do I intend to prove anything about 44-45.

Well the ger lost 100,000 men in tunisa which is less than half the 250,000 ger they lost in normandy itself. Your obviusly displaying a continuing lack of knowledge about the ger forces here.

Again thier is NO EVIDENCE to support your claim that even as late as 43 the ger had to withdraw large force from the east. They certainly had large numbers of men elsewhere in 43 but that does not stop them from reaching the pre war levels in the east. Plus the number of forces commited elswhere and thier losses is a tinny tiny amount compared to what was going on in the east.

You still donīt get the idea of attrition and how it applies to personal so again one last time. Ger loses in stalingad in late 42 early 43 were more easily replaced each year then were equalevnt rus loses even though the rus pop was 2.5 times larger than ger. Thier were more new rus than ger being feed into the sytem but MUCH more rus cas. Using the orig borders of russia which they would not reach again until late 44. Because in 43 the ger were causing at least 4.5 rus cas for each ger military aspect. Even if they recaptured the whole of rus in 43 they were being bleed dry at almost 50% higher mil cas then the ger do to differences in pop and cas. Leaving aside many finer points in this discussion.

If you still donīt believe the rus were shrinking during the second half of 43 then go look at kirosheevs tank numbers. That should convince you and indicates just how out of touch you are with even real russian numbers.

The battlefeild isolation thing is also a no starter idea. Around kursk according the TDI study more of the ger forces were engaged each and every day compared to the rus. Again at kursk the rus planes out numbered ger planes 3-1 but thier number of sorties was equal each ger plane was responsablibe for 5 times as many planes. Also each ger tank des was equivalent at least 3 des rus in 43. Even the inf had the same manuver qualitative adv as the other arms. In fact when you consider these forces were outnumbered by the rus by 2.5-4 times but caused many more cas then they suffered. It wouldn't be much of a stretch to say the idivdual parts of the ger army were nearly 10 times more effective at causing rus cas.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Mk 1:
One proposed consideration is the effects of Soviet allies on German forces in the west. I can see that as a contributor. But it does not seem to be a significant enough factor to me. All of the losses in Tunisia and later in Normandie were meaningful, but only a fraction of the losses that the Germans suffered on the Eastern Front during the same two years

-Mark 1

---

By the end of 44 the western allies had as many ger in thier pow campps as the rus did almost a million. During this time it surrly isnīt the fear of the rus that drove them from poland to france...

quote:

---

Originally posted by Mk 1:
What our analysis fails to take into account is that during the same period where we claim the Germans were "winning the war of attrition" (1942 through 1944), the Roumanians, Hungarians, and Italians lost entire armies on the Eastern Front. These forces represented millions of men. They were fighting on the German side in 1942. The Soviets had to face them, and battle them. Their losses were catastrophic during this time.

-Mark 1

---

While in 41 the number of other axis forces except fin on the eastern front represented a tiny tiny part of the overall number less than 10% just as it did in 43. In 42 the ger army had 2.6 mil people in mid 42 and brought in 600,000 of these forces a considerably larger number than in 41 and 43 maybe 3 times and with the smaller ger force it also represented a bigger part of the armies. Still it represented only 20% of the overall total 600,000 out of 3.2 mil tot ger plus others in the south.

It still represents a tiny part of the overall picture even in 42 and it does not matter for the attrition discusiion. Weather the rus loses were caused by the ger or minor axis it is still the russian loses that are lost compared to rus pop and prod. Then compare this to the ger loses, pop and production to see the relative attriton results. While the minor coutry did contribute forces and suffer losses that they may not have been able to replace means they may of lost the attrition war it is not the minor coutries we are discussing but ger and rus.

Now even if you want to add in the axis minors I donīt know what thier loss rate would be but even at 600,000 tot mil loses in 42 would be 100% loss rate and is close to the rus loss rate at least in 43 on. Now the ger reported 1.1 mil cas for an axis total of maybe 1.7 mil. The tot rus loses reported are 7.4 mil which would be over 6.5 without the minor axis. With the minors axis included but only those loses reorted by kirosheev your ratio drops to over 4. Still highly favorable for the axis.

In 43 the ger suffer 1.6 mil cas and maybe 200,000 sat minor forces are present for a tot of 1.8. The rus reoprted 7.9 mil cas without the minors its still over 4.5 with the minors it drops but is still over 4 much less of an effect in 43.

Still for attrition affects it does not matter if a russsian is killed by a ger or hungarian all that matters is the total number pop and production. Same with the gers.

"One proposed consideration is the effects of Soviet allies on German forces in the west. I can see that as a contributor. But it does not seem to be a significant enough factor to me. All of the losses in Tunisia and later in Normandie were meaningful, but only a fraction of the losses that the Germans suffered on the Eastern Front during the same two years -- if the Germans could thrash the Soviets in 1941 and 1942, when outnumbered and with inferior tanks, how could they be loosing in 1943 and the first half of 1944, when they were at the pinnacle of advantage in the quality of their tanks, and the correlation of forces on the Eastern front should have been shifting to their advantage, or at least remaining at an equivelent balance?"

Well, no. The thing to remember is that the German position relative to the Soviet in terms of strength was dramatically worse in the summer of 1943 than it had been in 1941, or for that matter in 1942. So the correlation of forces was most certainly not shifting to their adavantage, very much the opposite in fact. For the Soviets, the most fundamental leap in strength through the war comes from the summer of 42 to the summer of 43, and particularly in tanks and artillery. The levels achieved by then were the ones they largely maintained through the rest of the war, with some fluctuations of course. It is IMO a reasonable interpretation that that leap in strength put them at a margin of superiority which basically negated German possibilities for operational success on any great scale. As long as they could maintain that level of superiority, they would be winning (barring of course any colossal blunders in deployment or operations on their part). German strength peaked in the summer of 1943, though the increase over previous years were very marginal and was also offset by the dramatic drop in the strength of their allies. Darrin is probably right that the ensuing steady drop in strength in the East after that can to a large extent be explained by the increasing demands of the Western Front. However, I would not see this as vital, as there seems to be no very good reason why the Germans would succeed in 1944 with the same strength level that had brough wholesale defeat in 1943, against Soviet forces that were not significantly smaller and certainly better in quality.

The key point is that attrition of enemy strength and operational success in terms of retention of territory are interrelated as factors in the strategic dilemma. In order to not lose the war, the Germans clearly had to regain a strength relation that was rather dramatically more favourable to them, because all indications are that at the levels prevalent from 1943 onwards, they would be steadily defeated. This could conceivably be done either by inflicting in a short time a very much higher level of losses on the Soviets than the already high levels that they were achieving, or by inflicting a lower level of losses (such as the level they were actually achieving) over a longer period of time. But for the latter to be an option, they could not simultaneously afford to lose the amount of territory they were losing because that would mean the war was over before the Soviet ability to sustain it would be decreased enough to make a big dent in their force levels. This is why Darrin's point about Soviet losses being unsustainable is entirely moot - while Soviet strength does drop towards the end of the war, it does not drop to levels that significantly changes the strength relation that enabled their continued success. They were winning fast enough, and they were coping well enough with the attrition problem. And the reason why is in itself connected fundamentally to attrition - the reason is the force level superiority they had achieved by the summer of 1943 and which proved too much for the Germans to reduce sufficiently in the time remaining to them.

regards,

"By the end of 44 the western allies had as many ger in thier pow campps as the rus did almost a million. During this time it surrly isnīt the fear of the rus that drove them from poland to france...

During the entire year of 44 the ger reported 2 mil cas on the east front. A million pows in western allied camps is half this yearly total and we are not even adding wia and kia from this year. The number of pows taken even well before surrender are certainly significant."

This does not mean that German losses in the West were similar to those in the East for that year, as you seem to write elsewhere in your post. The OKW summaries indicate that losses in the West during the last six months of the year were about half of those in the East - approximately 600,000 and 1.2 million respectively. Moreover, you are using uncomparable figures. Included in the figure of Germans in allied captivity are many categories of personnel not included in the German loss figures in the East.

regards,

K.A.

"So how do we reconcile numbers that show how the German forces were not declining, that replacements in men and material were exceeding losses, while at the same time observing that Soviet losses were exceeding replacements? And yet the Germans were obviously not holding their own on the battlefield, and in the following year (when they should have reaped the reward of their increased relative strength) they were soundly thrashed."

Well, I presume that Darrin's argument is not that German strength in the East after 43 increased (if it is, he is wrong - it did not)but rather that the Germans had the means for an OVERALL increase in strength, and that this was negated by the increased priority that had to be given to forces in the West because of the invasion threat and later to replace casualties suffered there. In this, I believe he is correct as far as it goes. Where I would disagree with him is that an absence of this factor might have sufficed to allow the Germans to win the attrition battle in the East.

"One proposed consideration is the effects of Soviet allies on German forces in the west. I can see that as a contributor. But it does not seem to be a significant enough factor to me. All of the losses in Tunisia and later in Normandie were meaningful, but only a fraction of the losses that the Germans suffered on the Eastern Front during the same two years -- "

As is evident from the figures quoted above, losses in the West from June 1944 onwards amounted to far more than a fraction of losses in the East, though not to so much as Darrin seemingly would have it.

"I think the missing component is indeed in the numbers represented by the allies. But not the Soviet's allies.

What our analysis fails to take into account is that during the same period where we claim the Germans were "winning the war of attrition" (1942 through 1944), the Roumanians, Hungarians, and Italians lost entire armies on the Eastern Front. These forces represented millions of men. They were fighting on the German side in 1942. The Soviets had to face them, and battle them. Their losses were catastrophic during this time."

Here I would agree with Darrin that this is not a very significant factor, and certainly nothing that can be remotely compared to the effects of events in the West. One thing is that allied forces in the East amounted to a modest percentage of the axis total, another is that their contribution to axis combat power was very much less than even this percentage. I do not think this was a factor with a very noticeable impact on the overall outcome.

"And back to my original observation on the nature of attritional warfare, one of the most important aspects of the second half of the war on the Eastern Front was that the total population from which the Soviets drew their forces was growing, while the total population from which the Germans drew their forces was contracting. The Soviets were re-taking populated portions of the Soviet Union, and later added forces from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. At the same time the Germans were loosing allies which had contributed millions of men to the German war effort."

A very good point which further underlines the interrelated nature of attrition and territorial gains.

regards,

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Darrin

"By the end of 44 the western allies had as many ger in thier pow campps as the rus did almost a million. During this time it surrly isnīt the fear of the rus that drove them from poland to france...

During the entire year of 44 the ger reported 2 mil cas on the east front. A million pows in western allied camps is half this yearly total and we are not even adding wia and kia from this year. The number of pows taken even well before surrender are certainly significant."

This does not mean that German losses in the West were similar to those in the East for that year, as you seem to write elsewhere in your post. The OKW summaries indicate that losses in the West during the last six months of the year were about half of those in the East - approximately 600,000 and 1.2 million respectively. Moreover, you are using uncomparable figures. Included in the figure of Germans in allied captivity are many categories of personnel not included in the German loss figures in the East.

regards,

K.A.

---

Of course you are correct. In fact these pows were captured over years as were the pows in rus camps not just during the last 6 months. Now since they were total number of pows in rus and western camps the numbers do seem comparable although perhaps not exactually with the gers own systems. By the end of dec 1 mil ger were reported mia in the east and 700,000 were in rus NKVD camps. A 30% dead or missing rate for ger mia/pows in the east does not seem inconsivable up to this point in the war.

Although one of the biggest factors limiting this is that as of D-1 there were no ger forces in france and on dday thier were only a max of 10 allied div. These slowly rose to about 60 div by mid dec as the invasion forces continued to be brought in. In total about 90 western div would be brought in and used before the end of the war.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Hello MkI, and this is also for Darrin.

The key point is that attrition of enemy strength and operational success in terms of retention of territory are interrelated as factors in the strategic dilemma. In order to not lose the war, the Germans clearly had to regain a strength relation that was rather dramatically more favourable to them, because all indications are that at the levels prevalent from 1943 onwards, they would be steadily defeated. This could conceivably be done either by inflicting in a short time a very much higher level of losses on the Soviets than the already high levels that they were achieving, or by inflicting a lower level of losses (such as the level they were actually achieving) over a longer period of time. But for the latter to be an option, they could not simultaneously afford to lose the amount of territory they were losing because that would mean the war was over before the Soviet ability to sustain it would be decreased enough to make a big dent in their force levels. This is why Darrin's point about Soviet losses being unsustainable is entirely moot - while Soviet strength does drop towards the end of the war, it does not drop to levels that significantly changes the strength relation that enabled their continued success. They were winning fast enough, and they were coping well enough with the attrition problem. And the reason why is in itself connected fundamentally to attrition - the reason is the force level superiority they had achieved by the summer of 1943 and which proved too much for the Germans to reduce sufficiently in the time remaining to them.

regards,

K.A.

---

I agree with your idea about the ger needing to cause more loses to the rus army to increse thier chance of holding territory. But difficult to do if the rus can chose where and when to att which they could from early 43 on since ger was on the strategic def and had lost the initiative.

In 44 on the east front the ger had 2.6 mil people and suffered 2 mil tot mil cas. In past years the size of the force had gone up and down betttween 2.6 an 3.1 mil and the cas from 1 to 1.6 mil had flucuated in line with the size of the army. In 44 the army on the EF shrunk to its smallest size as before but for the first time it cas levels increased to levels never seen before. 44 certainly wasnīt a good year for the germans in the east. But even that was mainly confined from jun 22 until the end of aug.

Attrition the size of the rus army on the front declined from mid 44 onwards. IT was componsated for with the additon of rum, cheq, hun etc forces which increased the overall str of the communist hordes to levels above the highest point of the war.

In 44 on the east front the ger had 2.6 mil people and suffered 2 mil tot mil cas. In past years the size of the force had gone up and down betttween 2.6 an 3.1 mil and the cas from 1 to 1.6 mil had flucuated in line with the size of the army. In 44 the army on the EF shrunk to its smallest size as before but for the first time it cas levels increased to levels never seen before. 44 certainly wasnīt a good year for the germans in the east. But that was mainly confined to jun 22 until the aug.

The soviets did a post war census and found that in mid 45 the country had shrunk from 200 mil in mid 41 to 180 mil. All living rus civ and pows were returned and accoutned for in this post war numbers. Once the missing growth rate was taken into account it was calculated almost 28 mil people died during the war from the overall pop civ and mil due to all causes. A country decreses in size and doesnīt grow for 4 years that sounds like attriton to me.

My problem was basically with comparing this number with the reported casualties in the East in 1944. BTW, what is the source for the Western allied figure?

"Now when rus lauched bagtration they could immediatly call on all thier army not just for imeeditate ops but also for future ops. Its quite expected that with these force ratios the rus should be able to cause more losses in jun, jul and aug then the west. What is suprising is that the ger loses reported in the east and west in sep, oct, nov and dec were very close. That is what I meant by casuing equal loses at least in tot mil cas towards the end of 44. Despite the very huge size adv for the rus army."

I looked up the figures, and actually you seem to be correct with the notable exception of October, somewhat to my own surprise I must admit. A quick manual tally of the totals for those four months gives these approximate figures:

East/West

KIA 62,000 - 34,000
WIA 196,000 - 121,000
MIA 85,000 - 188,000

Totals 343,000 - 343,000

It would seem hard to argue that those figures are not relatively similar .
And they should be exactly comparable, as they come from the same report (adjusted Meldung Heeresartzt OKH, Blutige Verluste, date not known to me).

regards,

Yes, it is. Which is one of the reasons they were not winning either the attrition battle or the war.

"In 44 on the east front the ger had 2.6 mil people and suffered 2 mil tot mil cas. In past years the size of the force had gone up and down betttween 2.6 an 3.1 mil and the cas from 1 to 1.6 mil had flucuated in line with the size of the army. In 44 the army on the EF shrunk to its smallest size as before but for the first time it cas levels increased to levels never seen before. 44 certainly wasnīt a good year for the germans in the east. But even that was mainly confined from jun 22 until the end of aug."

True. Another indication they were not winning the attrition battle.

"Attrition the size of the rus army on the front declined from mid 44 onwards. IT was componsated for with the additon of rum, cheq, hun etc forces which increased the overall str of the communist hordes to levels above the highest point of the war."

In other words, they were not losing the attrition battle. And I'd lay off the "communist hordes" wording.

"The soviets did a post war census and found that in mid 45 the country had shrunk from 200 mil in mid 41 to 180 mil. All living rus civ and pows were returned and accoutned for in this post war numbers. Once the missing growth rate was taken into account it was calculated almost 28 mil people died during the war from the overall pop civ and mil due to all causes. A country decreses in size and doesnīt grow for 4 years that sounds like attriton to me."

Yes, of course this was attrition. The point under discussion is however not if the Soviets suffered attrition, of course they were, but whether the Soviets were winning or losing the attrition battle. You leave me in some confusion as to what is the position you are actually arguing. Perhaps you could clarify it.

regards,

quote:

---

Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
"Of course you are correct. In fact these pows were captured over years as were the pows in rus camps not just during the last 6 months. Now since they were total number of pows in rus and western camps the numbers do seem comparable although perhaps not exactually with the gers own systems. By the end of dec 1 mil ger were reported mia in the east and 700,000 were in rus NKVD camps. A 30% dead or missing rate for ger mia/pows in the east does not seem inconsivable up to this point in the war."

My problem was basically with comparing this number with the reported casualties in the East in 1944. BTW, what is the source for the Western allied figure?

"Now when rus lauched bagtration they could immediatly call on all thier army not just for imeeditate ops but also for future ops. Its quite expected that with these force ratios the rus should be able to cause more losses in jun, jul and aug then the west. What is suprising is that the ger loses reported in the east and west in sep, oct, nov and dec were very close. That is what I meant by casuing equal loses at least in tot mil cas towards the end of 44. Despite the very huge size adv for the rus army."

I looked up the figures, and actually you seem to be correct with the notable exception of October, somewhat to my own surprise I must admit. A quick manual tally of the totals for those four months gives these approximate figures:

East/West

KIA 62,000 - 34,000
WIA 196,000 - 121,000
MIA 85,000 - 188,000

Totals 343,000 - 343,000

It would seem hard to argue that those figures are not relatively similar .
And they should be exactly comparable, as they come from the same report (adjusted Meldung Heeresartzt OKH, Blutige Verluste, date not known to me).

regards,

K.A.

---

In other words, they were not losing the attrition battle. And I'd lay off the "communist hordes" wording.

-----

Just a bit of a joke Iīll say soviet allies in the future. But rus itself declined even if they compensated by using more minor allies.

-----

"The soviets did a post war census and found that in mid 45 the country had shrunk from 200 mil in mid 41 to 180 mil. All living rus civ and pows were returned and accoutned for in this post war numbers. Once the missing growth rate was taken into account it was calculated almost 28 mil people died during the war from the overall pop civ and mil due to all causes. A country decreses in size and doesnīt grow for 4 years that sounds like attriton to me."

Yes, of course this was attrition. The point under discussion is however not if the Soviets suffered attrition, of course they were, but whether the Soviets were winning or losing the attrition battle. You leave me in some confusion as to what is the position you are actually arguing. Perhaps you could clarify it.

-----

Well in 43 the soviet mil reported total military cas that were over 4.5 times what the gers suffered on the east front. Yet they had a pop in 43 that might be double the ger pop. The russians in 43 were running out of men twice as fast as the ger after taking into account of thier larger pop to draw from.

And this does not take into account the high cas to the overall pop numbers. Only a max of 12 mil rus are reported dead in the offical army stats but more than twice this disappear from the pop by the end of the war. The overall effect since attrition is not just loses to the mil but ability to reinforce and manufacture etc... The actual effect may be rus was running out of men 4 times faster then the ger after taking into account thier larger pop to draw from.

Now according to one rus study they said their pop droped by 28 mil during the 4 year war untill mid 45. Iīve never seen anthing similar done for ger but they suffered 4 mil dead and missing soilderds on all fronts. Iīve never seen civ loses which were low until the closing day maybe 1 mil. That 5 mil people over 6 years most of this made up by natural births. The ger pop may have declined slighlty during this time but no where as much as rus.