

62

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Assessment of the Danger of Surprise  
Attack in Europe and of NATO's  
Vulnerability to Surprise (1977)

ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK IN EUROPE  
AND OF NATO'S VULNERABILITY TO SURPRISE

An Interim Report

Prepared for  
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Report . . . . .	.11
Annex A . . . . .	AA1
Cases of Surprise and Deception in General War 1941-1968	
Annex B . . . . .	BB1
Surprise in NATO Context	
Annex C . . . . .	CC1
Selected Case Studies for Intensive Investigation	
Annex D . . . . .	DD1
Part One: Strategic Surprise in the 1944 Soviet Summer-Fall Campaign (Case Study)	
Annex D . . . . .	DD27
Part Two: Surprise in the Battle of The Bulge 1944 (Case Study)	
Annex D . . . . .	DD39
Part Three: El Alamein, 23 October 1942 (Case Study)	
Annex E . . . . .	E1
The Soviet Concept of Surprise	
Annex F . . . . .	F1
AGENDA: Conference on Study on "Surprise in the NATO C Context," Dunn Loring, VA; July 20, 1977	

~~ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK IN EUROPE,~~  
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An Interim Report

This interim report is being submitted under Contract F49620-77-C-0026 as modified by Revised Statement of Work dated 1 August 1977. Since the modification terminated the work as described in the original contract, and directed the balance of the work under that contract toward a completely different objective, this is of necessity an incomplete study and the report being submitted as agreed under the terms of the modification includes the portion of the work which has been done. It is not to be considered final, and all elements of it are subject to revision and addition at length. Had the work on this study not been halted a different and much more complete report would have been submitted.

The objective of the study as originally contracted was to examine relevant historical experience and documentary evidence to assess the likelihood of a possible surprise attack in Europe by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, and the vulnerability of NATO and the United States to such surprise. Particular attention will be given to the following five sub-objectives:

- a. Analyzing and assessing the likely importance of surprise as an element of Soviet planning for potential military operations as revealed by methods, techniques, and goals evident in past cases of strategic and tactical surprise by Soviet armed forces, and in Soviet speeches and writings;
- b. Analyzing the potential relevance to the NATO context of other cases other cases of strategic and tactical surprise in modern history, particularly those affecting Europe and the United States;
- c. Analyzing the problems of interpreting information which was available and could have revealed the surpriser's intentions in the cases examined;
- d. Cataloguing and categorizing the factors, mechanisms, and processes that have been, or are likely to be, significant in the achievement, or frustration, or surprise--both strategic and tactical;
- e. Surveying potential actions whereby NATO and the United States could undertake to assure (1) maximum alertness and readiness to preclude surprise and, simultaneously, (2) appropriate contribution to NATO's deterrent posture through observable alertness and readiness.

As of 20 July, the date upon which work toward this objective halted, the following work had been done:

1. Using the research of Barton Whaley\* as a basis, tentative and incomplete lists of surprise operations, definitions, and categories were developed. These lists were to be reviewed constantly as the study progressed. It was intended that a final list of definitions, as agreed by the participants, would be submitted with the final report. The discussion at the review conference emphasized the need for arriving at clear, agreed definitions of surprise in all its facets and categories. No decision had been made as to what purpose the other two lists were to serve or in what form they would be represented in the final report. The three lists in their tentative form are attached as Annex A.

2. A preliminary outline of the final report was prepared as a guide for work on the study. This was to be subject to considerable revision on the basis of the research to be done. It is attached as Annex B.

3. A selection of operations involving surprise to be studied was made. From this list, divided into Soviet-related, Middle East, and Western Europe and Asia, the operations to become case studies were to be selected on the basis of availability of material. The list is attached as Annex C.

4. Work was begun on three case studies: The Soviet Summer-Fall Campaign of 1944; The Battle of El Alamein (1942); and the Battle of the Bulge (1944). First drafts to these were written, but they were not revised after being reviewed by all the participants. It was intended that further research should be done to seek answers to questions that reviewers have raised and to improve and focus the content. The case studies are attached as Annex D. They are not to be considered final HERO products.

5. On the basis of some research in Soviet sources a rough first draft essay was prepared, entitled, "The Soviet Concept of Surprise." It was intended that further research be done for this section and that it be revised on the basis of the case studies and comments of the participants in the study. The draft is attached as Annex E. It is not to be considered a final HERO product.

6. The review conference that had been scheduled at the start of the contract was held as planned on 20 July. Many useful points were made and it is considered to have been fruitful as a guide toward areas that should be studied when the project is resumed. The agenda and a summary of the discussion is attached as Annex F. Also attached is a paper entitled, "Some Notes on the Phenomenon of Surprise in Military Affairs," prepared after the conference by one of the participants.

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\*Unpublished manuscript entitled, "Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War."

## Comment

Although none of the partial objectives was achieved, sufficient research was done to establish a firm foundation for continuing the work to its completion. No conclusions can be drawn at this stage, but a few observations can be made.

1. The Soviet case study, when viewed with the case studies on El Alamein and the Battle of the Bulge, shows signs of common factors which stand out strongly even though the protagonists were different, only the Germans being participants in all three. For example, the role of airpower operating in cooperation with ground elements to establish an environment in which surprise could be achieved was important in all. And techniques for secretly moving large mechanized formations into position to launch a surprise attack were in all three cases a major element in the achievement of surprise. It can be expected that these and other factors will be found in many other operations to be studied.

2. Of particular importance from the point of view of the defender in an operation is the danger of conscious or subconscious preconceptions. As in the case of the Germany high command in 1944, which was convinced that the Soviets were going to attack in the Ukraine when the main effort actually was directed at the forces north in Byelorussia, preconceptions can easily result in misinterpretation of intelligence and of indications of pre-assault preparations.

3. There is need for clear definition of what constitutes surprise and of various categories of it. The documents in Annex A ~~meet~~ the beginning of an attempt to identify them. From the conference discussion it is apparent that it is important to understand it in all its aspects.

4. Study must be made of the context in which surprise occurred in the past and in attempt to gain insights into conditions which in current or future time frames might be conducive to being surprised.

5. In view of the fact that the Soviets consider surprise the most important element of the military art it is essential that further study be made of their writings on the subject and of the operations which they stress as particularly important examples of it.

6. The work done to date on this study makes it clear that it is a highly important subject and that considerable advantages would come from further study of it. HERO recommends that this study be completed as planned and that it be expanded to include:

- review of classified and unclassified studies of surprise in its various aspects
- a study of the Soviet politico-military conceptual framework and of the Soviet concept of ours, so that we can recognize a developing atmosphere that might signal an imminent attack

- deeper investigation than this study permits of the influence of the nuclear potential on the climate for surprise.

The potential benefits accruing to the United States and its strategic planners from completion and expansion of the study are of such magnitude, and the fraction that has been completed seems so promising, that it is believed essential that it be continued as soon as possible.

- deeper investigation than this study permits of the influence of the nuclear potential on the climate for surprise.

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CASES OF SURPRISE AND DECEPTION  
IN GENERAL WAR

1914-1968

Liege, 4 August 1914  
Ostend Demonstration, 27 August 1914  
Tanga, 2 November 1914  
Winter Battle of Masuria, 7 February 1915  
Neuve Chapelle, 10 March 1915  
Second Battle of Ypres, 22 April 1915  
Gallipoli, 25 April 1915  
Gorlice, 2 May 1915  
Suvla Bay, 6 August 1915  
Serbia, 7 October-31 November 1915  
Evacuation of Suvla Bay and Anzac Beach 20 December 1915  
Evacuation of Helles Point, 9 January 1916  
Verdun, 21 February 1916: Operation "GERICHT"  
Lake Naroch, 18 March 1916  
Battle of Jutland, 31 May 1916  
Brusilov Offensive, 4 June 1916  
Invasion of Rumania, August 1916  
Battles of Scarpe and Vimy Ridge, 9-11 April 1917  
Battle of Messines, 7 June 1917  
Hutier's Riga Offensive, 1 September 1917  
Caporetto, 24 October 1917  
Third Battle of Gaza, 31 October 1917  
Cambrai, 20 November 1917  
German Somme Offensive, 21 March 1918  
German Lys Offensive, April 1917  
Chemin-des-Dames, 27 May-6 June 1917: GOLRZ  
Hamel, 4 July 1918  
Second Battle of the Marne, 15-17 July 1918



Amiens, 9 August 1918  
St. Mihiel, 12 September 1918  
Megiddo, ~~19~~September 1918  
Meuse-Argonne, 26 September 1918  
Warsaw, 16 August 1920  
Battle of Eskishehir, 9-20 July 1921  
Dumlupinar, 26 August 1922  
Battle of the Jarama River, 6 February 1937  
Guadalajara, 12 March 1937  
Brunete, 6 July 1937  
Ebro, 25 July 1938  
Battle of Khalkhin-Gol (Nomonkhan), 20 August 1939  
Poland, 1 September 1939: Operation "WHITE"  
Denmark, 9 April 1940: Exercise "WESER SOUTH"  
Norway, 9 April 1940: Exercise "WESER NORTH"  
Netherlands, 10 May 1940: Case "YELLOW"  
Belgium, 10 May 1940: Case "YELLOW"  
France, 10 May 1940: Case "YELLOW"  
Dakar, 23 September 1940: Operation "MENACE"  
Sidi Barrani, 9 December 1940: Operation "COMPASS"  
Italian East Africa, February-May 1941  
Mersa el Brega, 31 March 1941  
Yugoslavia, 6 April 1941: Undertaking 25  
Crete, 20-31 May 1941: MERKUR  
Russia, 22 June 1941: Case "BARBAROSSA"  
Kiev, 25 August 1941: Fuhrer Directive No. 34--Supplement  
Sidi Rezegh, 19 November 1941: Operation "CRUSADER"  
Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941: Operation "Z"  
Malaya, 7/8 December 1941: Operation No. 1  
Mersa el Brega, 21 January 1942  
Burma, Sittang River, 18-23 Feb 1942  
Burma, Loikaw-Taunggyi, 18-23 April 1942  
Kerch, 8 May 1942: Operation "BUSTARD"  
Gazala (Western Desert), 26 May 1942: Fall "VENEZIA"  
Midway, 3 June 1942: Operation "MI"  
Tobruk 20-21 June 1942: Operation "DOUBLE BED"  
Summer Offensive in Russia, 28 June 1942: Case "BLUE"  
Makin Atoll, 17-18 August 1942  
Dieppe, 19 August 1942: Operation "JUBILEE"

Makin Atoll, 17-18 August 1942  
Dieppe, 19 August 1942; Operation "JUBILEE"  
Alam Halfa, 31 August 1942  
Alamein, 23 October 1942: Operation "LIBHTFOOT"  
North Africa, 8 November 1942: Operation "TORCH"  
Kasserine, 114 February 1943: Operation "SPRING WIND"  
Medenine, 6 March 1943  
Massicault, 6 May 1943: Operation "STRIKE"9(also "VULCAN")  
Huon Peninsula, June-September 1943: Operation "ELKTON III"  
Sicily, 10 July 1943: Operation "HUSKY"  
Bougainville, 1 November 1943: Operation "CHERRYBLOSSOM"  
Tarawa, 20 November 1943: Operation "GALVANIC"  
Battle of the Sangoo, 28 November-2 December 1943  
Monte Camino, 2-10 December 1943: Operation "RAIN COAT"  
Anzio, 22 January 1944: Operation "SHINGLE"  
Kwajalein Atoll, 1 February 1944: Operation "FLINTDOCK"  
Second Counteroffensive at Anzio, 29 February-March 1944  
Chindit Operations, Burma, March 1944  
Crimea, 8 April-12 May 1944  
Ayitkyena, April-May 1944  
Hollandia, 22 April 1944: Operation "RECKLESS"  
4th Battle of Cassino, 11 May 1944: Operation "DIADEM"  
Normandy, 6 June 1944: Operation "OVERLORD"  
Karelia, 10 June 1944  
Siapan, 15 June 1944: Operation "FORAGER"  
Belorussia, 22 June 1944  
Imiphal, 5 March-22 June 1944  
Tinian, 24 July 1944: Part of Operation "FORAGER"  
Normandy Breakthrough, 25 July 1944: Operation "COBRA"  
Southern France, 15 August 1944: Operation "DRAGOON"  
Battle of the Gothic Line, 25 August 1944: Operation "OLIVE"  
Anhem-Najmegen, 17-26 September 1944: Operation "MARKET GARDEN"  
Leyte Island, 20 October 1944: Operation "MUSKETEER II"  
Leyte Gulf, 24 October 1944: Sho I  
Ardennes, 16 December 1944: Operation "WATCH-ON-RHINE"  
Luzon, 99 January 1945: Operation "MUSKETEER III"

Bavarian Redoubt: January-May 1945  
 Battle of the Reichswald, 8 February 1945: Operation "VERITABLE"  
 Irrawaddy, 13 February 1945: Operation "EXTENDED CAPITAL"  
 Iwo Jima, 19 February 1945: Operation "DETACHMENT"  
 Po Valley, 9 April-2 May 1945  
 Hiroshima, 6 August 1945: The S-1 Program  
 Manchuria, 9 August 1945  
 Palestine, 15-22 October 1948: Operation "YOAV"  
 Galilee, 28-30 October 1948: Operation "HIRAM"  
 Israel, 22 December 1948: Operation "AYIN"  
 Korean War: North Korean Invasion, 25 June 1950  
 Korean War: Russian Intervention, 1950-1953  
 Inch'on Landing, 15 September 1950: Operation "CHROMITE"  
 Yalu River, 25 October 1950  
 Kojo Feint, 15 October 1952: Operation "DECOY"  
 Dienbienphu, 20 November 1953-7 May 1954; Operation "CASTOR"  
 Sinai Campaign, 29 October 1956: Operation "KADESH"  
 Suez Canal, 31 October 1956: Operation "MUSKETEER"  
 Bay of Pigs (Cuba), 17 April 1961: Operation "PLUTO"  
 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1961  
 Six-Day War, 5 June 1967  
 Tet Offensive, Vietnam, 1968  
 Czechoslovakia, 20 August 1968

## Categories

### Major Categories:

- Surprise not sought nor achieved
  - Surprise not sought but achieved
  - Surprise sought and achieved without deception
  - Surprise sought and achieved with deception
  - Surprise sought but not achieved without deception
  - Surprise sought but not achieved with deception
  - Strategic surprise
  - Tactical surprise
  - Defensive/Offensive/Counter attack (all of above may be one of these three)
- } - applies to each of the above categories

### Types of Surprise:

- Intent
- Place
- Time
- Strength
- Method

### Means of Surprise:

- a. Active
  - Playing on preconceptions
  - Secrecy/security
  - Mobility
  - Deception
  - Tactical variation/New technology/Dilemma
  - False alarms
  - Intelligence breakthrough
  - Terrain
  - Weather/visibility
  - Insanity/Irrationality
- b. Passive
  - Ignored warnings
  - Failure to perceive/accept option
  - Intelligence failure
  - Excessive security
  - Bureaucratic failure
  - Panic/Irrational Behavior

### Types of Deception:

- Diplomacy/Negotiation
- Diversion (demonstration, feint, false operators)
- Concealment (camouflage, hide)
- Physical simulation
- Disinformation

### Types of Disinformation:

- Overload
- Discredit
- False cover story
- False communications

## SURPRISE DEFINITIONS

- Surprise** - A military action by one adversary which is not anticipated by the victim and catches the latter off balance. The victim's role may be passive (he overlooks or is unaware of the adversary's chose option), or active (he is led to chose the wrong option). G.B.
- Tactical Surprise** - A surprise action affecting battlefield operations. T.N.D.  
Locus of command rests with a field commander in a narrow zone of battle. G.B.  
A condition gained on the field of battle. USMA
- Strategic Surprise** - A surprise action which affects national military strategy or theater strategy of the opponents. T.N.D.  
Locus of command rests with political leaders or military authorities above the tactical field commander and removed from a narrow zone of battle. G.B.  
A condition gained outside the realm of the field of battle. USMA
- Deception** - Act(s) intended by the surpriser to mislead the intended victim concerning all or part of a projected military action. G.B.
- Surprise of Intention** - The victim fails to anticipate the nature or concept of an operation being planned by the surpriser. G.B.
- Surprise of Place** - The victim fails to anticipate the true location of the surpriser's planned surprise action. G.B.
- Surprise of Time** - The victim fails to anticipate the date and/or hour of the surpriser's planned surprise action. G.B.
- Surprise of Strength** - The Victim fails to assess correctly the strength which his surpriser is planning or able to employ in an operation. G.B.
- Surprise of Method** - The victim fails to anticipate the tactics and/or new technology which the adversary is planning to employ in an operation. G.B.
- Diversion** - Movement of units intended to imply a main attack which is used to divert the victim's attention and strength away from the surpriser's main effort. G.B.
- Demonstration** - A diversion involving a commitment of some forces to battle designed to lock the victim's forces in combat and draw off his reserves into an operation of relatively minor significance to the opposing objectives. G.B.
- Feint** - A diversion in which the victim is given the false impression that the surprise is building up forces for an imminent operation: it is employed to divert the victim without tying down ones own forces or incurring battle losses. G.B.

- False Operations** - A diversion involving reconnaissance, bombardment, etc. against much wider areas than are scheduled for attack in order to obscure the exact location of the planned operation. G.B.  
A diversion involving a series of deceptive operations to include feints designed to obscure the exact location and time of the planned operation. R.B.
- Physical Simulation** - The placing of dummy equipment, weapons and/or facilities with the intent of implying to the enemy that forces exist at a given location but which, in fact, are not there. G.B.
- Conceal-  
MENT** - Hiding or withdrawing from observation units or equipment. Can include use of undercover or underground facilities, night movements and/or camouflage, G.B.
- Camouflage--  
flage** - Action taken to make equipment and/or forces appear to be something they are not. G.B.
- Disinfor-  
mation** - The deliberate distribution of information with the intent of misinforming or confusing the enemy. G.B.
- Overload** - The deliberate producing of a heavy volume of communications traffic or information with the intent of so overloading the enemy's processing capability in order to obscure the truth about an intended action. G.B.
- Discredit** - To sow information through credible channels which, in turn, will cause the enemy to doubt the veracity of his own reliable sources. G.B.
- False  
Cover** - The generation of false information and/or rumor designed to mislead the enemy concerning one's own true intentions. G.B.
- False  
Communi-  
cations** - The generation of communications which imply the existence of forces at a location when such forces do not exist in reality. G.B.
- Victim** - The individual or collective body whose response to aggression is impaired by unexpected activities of the surprier. R.B.
- Surprier** - The individual or collective body which perpetrates actions which gain advantage over an opponent by employing a variety of confusing and deceiving measures. R.B.

**KEY to initials:** G.B. Gordon Brown  
R.B. Ray Bell  
T.N.D. Trevor Dupuy  
USMA United States Military Academy

## ANNEX B

### SURPRISE IN NATO CONTEXT

#### Study Outline

#### PREFACE

- Purpose and scope of study
- Credit to key predecessors: Fuller, Leeb, Whaley, Shlaim (?)
- Case selection
- Criteria
- Why non-surprise cases excluded
- Study limitations

#### INTRODUCTION

- Surprise in Principles of War
- Ethics of surprise
- Brief history of surprise and deception
- New developments

#### CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS

#### CONTEXT CONDUCIVE TO SURPRISE

#### CONFRONTING CONCEPTS OF SURPRISE/DECEPTION

- NATO Countries
- USSR

#### POLITICO-MILITARY CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

#### PREVIOUS FINDINGS

- Fuller
- Leeb
- Whaley
- Others

#### ANALYSIS OF SURPRISE CASES

- Qualitative analysis of effects/avoidance/methods of achievement
- Quantitative analysis (statistical)
- Comparative assessment of findings
- Relationship to Fuller/Leeb/Whaley findings

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- What to anticipate from the USSR
- Other potential but non-Soviet forms of surprise

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont)

- Soviet strengths and weaknesses (from past cases)
- NATO strengths and weaknesses (from past cases)
- Recommendations for improvement/new procedures

ANNEX: Case Narratives



ANNEX C

GROUP A Soviet-Related

1940 Karelia (Finland)  
1941 Barbarossa  
1941 Russian Counteroffensive in front of Moscow  
1942 Crimea Amphibious Assault (Kerch)  
1943 Stalingrad  
1943 Manstein's Counteroffensive (Kharkov)  
1943 Kursk  
1944 Soviet Summer-Fall Campaign  
1945 Manchuria  
1968 Russian Invasion of Czechoslovakia

GROUP B Middle East

~~1918~~ 1918 Gaza  
1918 Meggido  
1956 Sinai War  
1967 Six-Day War  
1973 October War

GROUP C Western Europe and Asia

1940 Norway  
1940 Invasion of Low Countries  
1941 Pearl Harbor  
1942 Alam Halfa  
1942 El Alamein  
1943 Diadem (Rome Campaign)  
1944 Hollandia  
1944 Invasion of Normandy  
1944 Battle of the Bulge  
1947 Chinese Operation  
-48  
1950 North Korean attack  
1950 Inch'on Landing  
1950 Intervention of Chinese

ANNEX D

D R A F T\*

STRATEGIC SURPRISE IN THE 1944 SOVIET SUMMER-FALL CAMPAIGN  
(Case Study)

The experience of World War II, as emphasized in many Soviet writings, not only illustrates the major role played by surprise, but also indicates that to achieve surprise on the strategic level, while the war was already going on, was extremely complicated. This can be explained primarily by the fact that with the enemy in possession of a skillful and aggressive intelligence organization it was difficult to conceal not only regrouping and massing of forces, but also the strategic intention of the high command. This is why, the Soviets point out, in order to achieve strategic surprise it was necessary to carry out complex measures of camouflage and deception.

In the spring of 1944, the Soviet High Command faced the problem of how to conceal preparations for the forthcoming summer campaign in Byelorussia and in the Ukraine, and surprise the Germans. Having the strategic initiative, the Soviets believed, would help them immensely in achieving surprise; for it would permit the Soviet Command to dictate its will, and put the Germans in a wait-and-see situation. In other words, the Soviet Command, having the strategic initiative, could concentrate its forces at will, and launch the attack in a time and place which in its view would ensure the best results.

The Soviets realized that to achieve surprise in the forthcoming campaign they must, in the first place, take all measures to conceal the preparation for the offensive. After almost three years of war they had accumulated considerable experience in surprise and deception. Now, the time had arrived to adapt past experience creatively and add new elements which would fit the situation.

\* Subject to expansion and revision.

As the preparation for the offensive commenced the Stavka issued a special directive to the army group commanders in which it was said that:

- all troop movements connected with the regrouping and concentration in the assembly areas were to be carried out at night, with strict adherence to blackout rules;

- the intensity of all types of fire should continue unchanged;

- procedures for firing artillery registration guns should be so designed that the main concentration of artillery would not be detected;

- in the sectors marked for future active offensive operations work should continue on defensive measures;

- combat reconnaissance should be carried out along the entire front and not only in the zones of army groups scheduled for the offensive;

- radio silence should be strictly adhered to;

- no written orders or directives with regard to the future offensive should be issued. Instead, all orders should be given orally only directly to those who would carry them out;

- only a limited number of officers should take part in the planning of the operation.

An extremely important element of strategic surprise was the problem of how to deceive the Germans with regard to the objectives of the operations and to the sector and direction of the main effort. With this in mind the preparation for the campaign was carried out in several sectors of the front. The Soviets decided that they would start the campaign in the secondary sectors (e.g., advance of the Leningrad Army Group toward Vyborgsk) several days before launching the offensive in the main sector.

Only a narrow circle of officers was directly involved in the planning of the summer-fall campaign. Even this limited group did not know all the details of the entire operation. The plan of the campaign in its entirety was known to only six individuals, namely to the Supreme Commander (Stalin), his First Deputy, the Chief of Staff and his deputy, and the Chief of the Operations Directorate and his deputy. Similar restrictions on the number of men involved in planning were placed on the army group and armies. The plan of the operation was hand-written in only one copy. The army group commanders reported details of their plans personally directly to the Commander in Chief.

Soviet writers stress that the concealment of the preparation for the offensive was greatly helped by the Soviet practice of sending representatives of the Stavka to army groups. This made it possible to resolve many problems facing an army group immediately on the spot, without the necessity of carrying on bulky correspondence between the army groups and the General Staff or Stavka.

The success in / the Germans as to the sector of the main effort in the forthcoming offensive was facilitated by the actual deployment of Soviet forces at the end of the spring (1944) operations. The peculiarity of this deployment lay in the fact that the main forces of both sides, and especially their tank troops, were in the southwestern sector of the Soviet-German front. Thus, at the beginning of May 1944 the Soviets had all six of their tank armies and seven separate tank and mechanized corps deployed south of the Pripet River. In that area they had 27 out of 37 tank and mechanized corps, nearly 75% of their total armor strength. Facing these Soviet tank forces was the majority of the German panzer formations deployed on the eastern front, 22 out of 27 panzer divisions.

It was known to the Soviets that, after analyzing the available information on the deployment of Soviet troops, the German Command had concluded

that when the Soviets unleashed the new summer campaign they would launch the main effort in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. This was a major miscalculation. Of course, it was in the Soviet interest to keep them misinformed, and they were doing their best to keep the Germans unaware of the real Soviet intentions.

To make sure that the Germans would continue to believe that the major Soviet offensive would take place on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, the Soviet High Command developed a highly complex and sophisticated deception scheme. The commander of the 3d Ukrainian Army Group was ordered to concentrate a large force consisting of eight rifle divisions, two artillery divisions, and one tank corps in the Kishinev area. Four railroad stations were selected as ostensible places for troop unloading. Between 29 May and 14 July dummy movements of troops and equipment from these stations to various assembly areas were carried out. From 15 June to 5 July the Soviets made it appear that the concentration of forces had been completed and increased the activities of troops in the area in an effort to convince the Germans that they were going to launch a major assault toward Romania. This was intended to prevent the Germans from transferring part of their forces from the south to Byelorussia. Formations and units which took part in the deception were given false identification numbers of rifle and artillery divisions and tank corps, to give the impression of the arrival of fresh troops. In dummy concentration and assembly areas huts and dug-out shelters were built, and models of guns, tanks, airplanes, depots, and radio stations were erected. The dummy concentration areas were defended (protected) by "real" elements of antiaircraft defense and by fighter aviation.

At the same time, the Soviet Commander of the Long Range Air Force was directed to concentrate a large part of his force in the areas to the west and

southwest of Kiev to give an impression that his planes were targeted toward the southwest.

The German Command did not remain indifferent to the Soviet deception moves. It transferred part of the reserves of the Southern Ukraine Army Group from the rear to the tactical defense zone and through increased activities of air reconnaissance tried to find out as much as possible about Soviet intentions.

The inability of the Germans to divine the true Soviet plans, that is, the direction of the Russian main effort, is corroborated in German OKH's Bulletin No. 100 of 21 May 1944\* in which the German Command evaluated the

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\* OKH Foreign Armies East Section, "Brief Evaluation of the Enemy Situation." US National Archives, T-311, Roll 466, Frames 6446152-3.

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situation on the Soviet-German front in the Southern and Northern Ukraine Army Groups' sectors. The bulletin reported that in front of both army groups railroad traffic, including flat cars with tanks, continued to be quite heavy. This, according to the Germans, implied that the Soviets were carrying out large-scale activities aimed at troop reinforcement. "The Soviet deployment," the bulletin pointed out, "suggests that the enemy is preparing his future operations very carefully, and that their aim, as before, is tied to the 'Balkan Decision' (that is a Soviet advance southward toward Romania and Bulgaria.)"

Assuming that the main attack would come south of the Pripet River, OKH ordered Army Group Center to transfer its LVI Panzer Corps to the Northern Ukraine Army Group, effective 30 May 1944. To compensate in part for the loss of the corps, the German Army High Command moved the border line between the two army groups farther north. However, in a message to Colonel General Zeitzler,