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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Essentially I agree with you Gary. Nevertheless, I have encountered critisism of the German koncept. Some, like Shimon Naveh, have argued that encirclement should be seen as a tactical concept, not to be applied at tthe operational level (although I find this highly illogical and unsubstantiated), other argue that there were problems with how the Germans conducted the encirclement operations.
Both these points of view might be of interest for me.

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Let's see if I understand this. Naveh defines 'operational art' as the link between Strategy - the realm of overall plans, and Tactics - the mechanical action of fighting. Operational art ensures that tactical operations are always carried out with an eye towards the ultimate objective. By this definition he puts Monty as 21 AG commander and Krueger as 8th Army commander in the role of tactical commanders. To me this is a different definition than the Soviets used prior to and in WWII. To them operational art was a link between strategy and tactics, yes, but it was specifically the activity surrounding the planning of large scale operations, the scientific calculations which went into it, and linking successive Army or Front offensives into larger offensives.

It seems to me that the question hinges fundamentally on whether or not one accepts the premiss that operational success implies the destruction of the main enemy force on the battlefield. If you do, it seems obvious that successful encirclement offers better gains than any other way of conducting operations. If however you instead stress the attainment of geographical objectives, the advantage of that approach is no longer obvious - as long as you have the neccessary superiority of force, it may be possible to go directly for chosen objectives while keeping enemy forces sufficiently off-balance to prevent him from interfering decisively with their attainment, despite the absence of the sort of annihilation victory only attainable through envelopment.

In the specific case of Barbarossa, it can in my opinion be argued that not only were encirclements the best way to carry out the German strategy, but also that it was the only way. The strategy as far as I can tell more or less boils down to annihilating the Red Army west of the Dvina/Dnepr line, which could not have been achieved in any other way.

The usual criticism of the German encircelement battles in 1941, and especially in 1942, seems to center on the claim that they weren't effective enough (ie, that due to the thinness of the ring significant elements were able to escape, which again is connected to the mobility differential between infantry and motorised divisions, which again implies that the Germans were implementing an operational concept they lacked the structural basis for). This is however a judgment that appears to me to be substantially based on an insufficient overview of the Soviet force flow. In 1941, the failure of the summer encirclement battles to end the campaign is sometimes linked to these escapees, the implication being that the Red Army was able to fight on because the cauldron battles failed to destroy the encircled formations. This is however hardly a tenable view - overwhelmingly, the Soviets stayed in the field as a result of the new formations flowing to the front. That notable elements were able to escape is also, it seems, a more or less constant feature of encirclement battles. For the summer 42 battles, there seems to be a widespread assumption that the encirclements hit a lot of empty air and generally produced disappointing results, which, if it was accurate, would be a legitimate argument against the operational approach. But as far as I can see it is not accurate - on the contrary, the severity of the Red Army losses and the POW haul appear to have been every bit as extensive as during the previous year, when one considers that only a part of the front was affected.

Regards, K.A.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
[B]Hello Niklas

It seems to me that the question hinges fundamentally on whether or not one accepts the premiss that operational success implies the destruction of the main enemy force on the battlefield. If you do, it seems obvious that successful encirclement offers better gains than any other way of conducting operations. If however you instead stress the attainment of geographical objectives, the advantage of that approach is no longer obvious - as long as you have the neccessary superiority of force, it may be possible to go directly for chosen objectives while keeping enemy forces sufficiently off-balance to prevent him from interfering decisively with their attainment, despite the absence of the sort of annihilation victory only attainable through envelopment.

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Certainly true that it is easy to take for granted that the annihilation of the opposing forces is the main operational goal. To go directly for a geographical objective might certainly be a better approach in some instances.
In the case of operation Barbarossa, it is hard to identify a geographical object of such magnitude, but if one has to be chosen, Moscow would certainly be one of the candidates. On the other hand, the German army group Centre made its quickest advances towards Moscow while it conducted encirclement battles. During the periods when it did not conduct encirclements, the advance was usually considerably slower. It might be a coincidence, but I guess there is some element of causality here.

In the specific circumstances of Barbarossa there clearly existed neither the neccessary force levels or the logistic capacity to pursue f.e. the capture of Moscow by means of a direct advance leaving the opposing forces more or less intact, so it is hard to see that such an approach was a real option in that instance. To make my point in a different way - I fail to see that the Germans had a better alternative. Where exactly have you encountered the argument, except for Naveh? I am struggling myself to recall where I have seen the counterarguments I referred in my last post, but without much success (Liddell-Hart? Calvocoresci/Pritchard? Fugate?). And I am currently without my books too.

"On the other hand, the German army group Centre made its quickest advances towards Moscow while it conducted encirclement battles. During the periods when it did not conduct encirclements, the advance was usually considerably slower. It might be a coincidence, but I guess there is some element of causality here."

Didn't essentially all of HG Mitte's advance in 1941 consist of encirclement operations? A least until the conclusion of the Vyazma-Brjansk battles in October?

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Oh, I agree. The point is more on the level of general theory really.

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Yes, I supposed so.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
In the specific circumstances of Barbarossa there clearly existed neither the neccessary force levels or the logistic capacity to pursue f.e. the capture of Moscow by means of a direct advance leaving the opposing forces more or less intact, so it is hard to see that such an approach was a real option in that instance. To make my point in a different way - I fail to see that the Germans had a better alternative.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Where exactly have you encountered the argument, except for Naveh?

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Well, this is my problem. I have encountered it, but fail to remember where, except for Naveh. Possibly I have mainly encountered it in discussions, not in print. If so I might perhaps end up fighting what appears to be a straw-man.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

"On the other hand, the German army group Centre made its quickest advances towards Moscow while it conducted encirclement battles. During the periods when it did not conduct encirclements, the advance was usually considerably slower. It might be a coincidence, but I guess there is some element of causality here."
Didn't essentially all of HG Mitte's advance in 1941 consist of encirclement operations? A least until the conclusion of the Vyazma-Brjansk battles in October?

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When Army Group Centre advanced slowly, like in August 1941 or November 1941, large cauldrons were not formed. Granted, there may of course be many factors responsible for that. On the other hand, when the Bialystok-Minsk, Smolensk and Vyazma-Bryansk pockets were created, the Germans advanced at a very impressive rate. Thus they made great strides towards Moscow, while simultaneously encircling large Soviet forces. The mopping up of the pockets of course took time, but not inordinately. Given the strength of the opposition, the Germans could hardly have maintained a significant advnace rate without destroying significant enemy forces.

I realize that I do not take a position diametrically opposed to your views Kjetil. I just want to argue back and forth to see if I can get any ideas for my next book.

Greetings. Sorry I have been invisible for the last year. Been a little overwhelmed with the issue of the day. I do owe a few of you some responses as time gets free. Looks like you guys have been keeping this board active, even during my long period absence. Thanks.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
When Army Group Centre advanced slowly, like in August 1941

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Did they actually advance in August? I thought most of it was grounded due to supply problems, while the rest were fighting a defensive battle at Yelnya.

November is of course a different story, but here the other factors are really determinants. AIUI the German plan in November was to effect a grand encirclement - they just did not manage to do so, and ultimately lost. Which I guess would be an argument in favour of encirclement.

All the best

BTW, I just received a shipment from NARA. Previously I have always received microfilm rolls, but today a much smaller parcel arrived, containing four DVD. All the frames have been scanned and converted to JPEG format. Very convenient.

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
BTW, I just received a shipment from NARA. Previously I have always received microfilm rolls, but today a much smaller parcel arrived, containing four DVD. All the frames have been scanned and converted to JPEG format. Very convenient.

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Wow, when did they start doing that??? I ordered some rolls a couple of months ago and got microfilm. You asked for DVDs, right?

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Army Group Centre did advance slowly towards Bryansk in August and also Guderian advanced in a southeasterly direction, resulting in some small pockets. Panzergruppe 3 attacked in the Toropets region. Overall these advances were small compared to what occurred in June and July.
The battles at Yelnya never tied up particularly many German divisions. According to the situation maps, only three divisions were employed in the Yelnya salient during August. Initially the 15., 268. and 292. Inf.Div., but the 15. was gradually replaced by 78. Inf.Div.
Of course it is conceivable that reserves were also mainitained due to the Yelnya battle, but the number of divisions can not have been great.

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Thanks for that info. I would have thought though that the number of divisions engaged at Yelnya was not the crucial limiting factor, but rather the (in)ability to keep operations on a large scale supplied. So while more divisions were available than were engaged, supply was insufficient to allow these to become engaged.

Also, during the month AG Centre lost Panzergruppe 2 and an AK (mot) of Panzergruppe 3, which would of course limit their ability to carry out any sustained advance.

All the best

Andreas