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Author Topic:   Soviet echelon defenses
Gary Dickson
Senior Member
posted 10-28-2006 09:56 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Gary Dickson     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Another question is the Soviet's use of echeloned defenses. I could be wrong, but I don't think the Germans defended like this. According to Glantz, at the beginning of Typhoon the Germans attacked with almost 2 million men, while the corresponding Soviet fronts had around 1.3 million. Nevertheless, Stalin demanded that their defenses be "deeply echeloned." Wouldn't that leave them open to defeat in detail, line by line?

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Rich
Moderator
posted 10-30-2006 08:38 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Rich     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
quote:
Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
Another question is the Soviet's use of echeloned defenses. I could be wrong, but I don't think the Germans defended like this. According to Glantz, at the beginning of Typhoon the Germans attacked with almost 2 million men, while the corresponding Soviet fronts had around 1.3 million. Nevertheless, Stalin demanded that their defenses be "deeply echeloned." Wouldn't that leave them open to defeat in detail, line by line?

Exactly and that appears to have been what happened to the Sixth Guards Army at Kursk. The whole "echeloned" attack and defense construct is inherently fallacious, it attempts to apply a cookie-cutter, geometric and mathamatical methodology to an inherently chaotic activity.

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Kjetil Aasland
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posted 11-03-2006 07:37 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Kjetil Aasland     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Hello Gary,

Just a nitpick, but the armies of HG Mitte appear to have had slightly more than 1 million men by the end of September. They most certainly did not have 2, that would have amounted to well above two thirds of Ostheer strength.

Regards, K.A.

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Gary Dickson
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posted 11-03-2006 12:57 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Gary Dickson     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Just quoting Glantz, who is quoting other sources.

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Kjetil Aasland
Senior Member
posted 11-05-2006 06:48 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Kjetil Aasland     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
On this point Glantz does not appear to be on very firm ground. Quite simply, there is no room for such a huge concentration of force just in HG Mitte. If you follow the monthly strengths of the AOKs, HG Mitte never at any point amounts to as much as half the Ostheer. The reported strengths of the armies of HG Mitte at the end of september is 1,089,000, though I see that does not include PzGr 4, which had some 130,000 men additionally. Apart from that, there were 837,000 men in HG Süd's armies, and 482,000 in HG Nord. So, either the Ostheer must have been much stronger than any documentation suggests at this time (at least 3.3 million men), or HGs N and S reported far too many men present, or Glantz' figure is wrong by roughly 7-800,000.

Regards, K.A.

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Gary Dickson
Senior Member
posted 11-05-2006 08:38 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Gary Dickson     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
OK, I understand. But that's another topic. This one is about whether or not the Soviets' tactics of defending in echelon left them vulnerable to defeat in detail, or at least excessive losses.

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Kjetil Aasland
Senior Member
posted 11-05-2006 06:47 PM     Click Here to See the Profile for Kjetil Aasland     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
I know, I know, as said just a nitpick. Now, back to the topic.

It might be interesting to look in more detail at the practical and actual differences between "echeloned defence" and the German doctrinal position, which was defense in depth. They both imply defensive deployment in depth and as such to possess much of the same potentiality, but whereas the German concept stressed mobility and concerted counteroffensive action in the defensive depth, the Soviet concept appears to have been both more linear and more static.

Regards, K.A.

[This message has been edited by Kjetil Aasland (edited 11-05-2006).]

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Michate
Member
posted 11-07-2006 06:48 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Michate     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
As i do not have the Glantz work, so I am speculating, but I guess he has taken the figure from Reinhardt's "Moscow the Turning Point", which presents a figure of 1,929,000 men as AG Centre's ration strength in October 1941.

The difference to Kjetil's figures for army strength is due to the much differing strength definitions, as the ration strength included air force personnel (at this specific instance roughly 15% in strength of that of the army, according to one of Mr. Zetterling's JSMS articles), civilian personnel and even enemy prisoners of which there must have been many in autumn 1941.

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Kjetil Aasland
Senior Member
posted 11-07-2006 09:49 AM     Click Here to See the Profile for Kjetil Aasland     Edit/Delete Message   Reply w/Quote
Hello Michael,

That seems very likely, as Reinhardt's is one of the works he quotes for the paragraph in which the strength figure appears.

Rgards, K.A.

[This message has been edited by Kjetil Aasland (edited 11-07-2006).]

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