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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
One thing has puzzles me is the decision by the Soviets to eliminate corps headquarters in 1941. Usually this is explained by the need to make is easier for inexperienced commanders to control their units. Glantz, in BARBAROSSA, HITLER'S INVASION OF RUSSIA 1941, writes that Stavka directive No. 1 "ordered Direction, front and army commanders to eliminate the rifle corps link from armies because they were too cumbersome, insufficiently mobile, awkward and unsuited for maneuver. It created new, smaller field armies which the few experienced army commanders and staffs could more efficiently control. These consisted of five or six rifle divisions, two or three tank brigades, one or two light cavalry divisions..."

I just don't see the logic in this. I mean, if you have inexperienced staffs, is it really more effective to saddle them with 8-11 maneuver units with no intermediary command level? It seems to me that such a large span of control would have been very difficult to command.

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On 22 June 1941 the largest Army was the 9th Independent Army with 7 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, four tank divisions, and two motorized divisions, or a total of 15 major subordinate units. The smallest was the 7th Army with 4 rifle divisions. On 1 January 1942 the largest was the 54th Army with 10 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades, 1 tank division, and 2 tank brigades, or a total of 15 major subordinate units. The smallest was the 23rd Army with 3 rifle divisions. Again, they are roughly the same size but the 1941 Armies had intermediary corps-level HQs to assist them.

All in all, I don’t see how anyone can say that the Soviets reduced the size of the Armies to make up for the elimination of the corps headquarters. It’s true that the combat units in 1942 may have been smaller, but regardless, the Army still had to issue orders to them as separate entities because there were no intermediary HQs. They kept roughly the same size Army but cut out the corps to economize on command and staff officers, but at the same time increased the work load on the Army-level staffs by 2-3 times.

(All data is from Boevoy Sostav Sovetskoi Armii. The term “active army” refers to the BSSA term “deistvuyushchaya armiya”, or the part of the army which was at the battlefront.)

There were also Corps HQ (but not as we know them) for the control of Rifle Brigades and Cavalry Divisions, from late 1941, I think.

So on 1st Jan 42 the 77 Rifle Brigades may (I am working from memory) already mostly be organised under a Rifle Corps organisation, meaning you have to divide by at least four (and throw in a Rifle Division as well if the organisation of 6th Rifle Corps in October 1942 is a guide), reducing the number to, say 20 and you need to reduce the number of rifle divisions by the same.

The cavalry divisions again would probably be under a Cavalry Corps organisation, with two or three of them and a tank brigade to a Corps (which would be the rough size of a German infantry division). So you can reduce that number to 10.

So you end up with 255 + 20 + 10 = 285, or 5.3, which is a considerable reduction compared to the average army size in 1941.

Rifle brigades are really just fancy-named regiments. Cavalry divisions are also brigades in size. So in your example, 54th Army would really only have 11 independent maneuver units to control, since the brigades would be assigned to a division for maneuver. But it is in any case too much to control for an army with no sub-command level, and my guess would be that the Army commander found another way of instituting a separate command echelon, by grouping parts of his formations.

Apologies for only giving a rough outline here and for working from memory.

All the best

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Originally posted by Andreas:
You have to keep in mind that following the desaster on the borders, Soviet formations became much smaller than German ones. A Soviet tank 'brigade'in 1942 was really just the size of a German tank battalion, and not an independent maneuver unit.

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Careful about making sweeping statements. Here's the strength of some independent tank brigages on 11 May 1942:

10th: 22
84th: 46
6th Guards: 43
6th: 46
90th: 46
48: 42
5th Guards: 38
38th: 44
37th: 42
7th: 40

Only one of these looks like a battalion. Even if you're talking about January 1942, I'd appreciate something more then a simple declaration.

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There were also Corps HQ (but not as we know them) for the control of Rifle Brigades and Cavalry Divisions, from late 1941, I think.

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According to BSSA, there were almost no rifle corps organizations in January 1942 on the Russo-German front.

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The cavalry divisions again would probably be under a Cavalry Corps organisation, with two or three of them and a tank brigade to a Corps (which would be the rough size of a German infantry division). So you can reduce that number to 10.

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I said "independent cavalry divisions", not "cavalry divisions." There were actually 48 cavalry divisions, 15 of them in 5 cavalry corps.

Tank brigades were not formally part of a cavalry corps. Sure they could sometimes have been attached, but not necessarily.

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Rifle brigades are really just fancy-named regiments. Cavalry divisions are also brigades in size.

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I think that's irrelevant. They were independent units which had to be controlled from Army HQ.

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So in your example, 54th Army would really only have 11 independent maneuver units to control, since the brigades would be assigned to a division for maneuver. But it is in any case too much to control for an army with no sub-command level, and my guess would be that the Army commander found another way of instituting a separate command echelon, by grouping parts of his formations.

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In other words, reinstating a corps-equivalent HQ. Then why claim that corps HQs were eliminiated?

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
One thing has puzzles me is the decision by the Soviets to eliminate corps headquarters in 1941. Usually this is explained by the need to make is easier for inexperienced commanders to control their units. Glantz, in BARBAROSSA, HITLER'S INVASION OF RUSSIA 1941, writes that Stavka directive No. 1 "ordered Direction, front and army commanders to eliminate the rifle corps link from armies because they were too cumbersome, insufficiently mobile, awkward and unsuited for maneuver. It created new, smaller field armies which the few experienced army commanders and staffs could more efficiently control. These consisted of five or six rifle divisions, two or three tank brigades, one or two light cavalry divisions..."

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I've long thought that was a bit of a "fig leaf" explanation, but I also think the truth is buried in the STAVKA directive. The real reason I suspect was that since the heaviest losses from Barbarossa fell on the pre-war army, there were few - if any experienced corps-level commanders and staff officers or their supporting signals units with the experience, training, and capability to replace those lost. By concentrating those few resources they had at army-level they simply made the best of a bad situation. Evidence for that of course is that the corps were reinstituted in early 1942 for the tank corps and then later the infantry corps.

I also suspect that in typical Soviet historigraphical tradition the neccessity became a virtue and a clever decision by the all-knowing leadership in postwar Soviet histories and were then parroted by western historians.

It is interesting to note that the reinstituted tank corps in spring 1942 was not intended to be the same animal as the earlier mechanized corps. Instead of the corps headquarters controlling divisions and a traditional corps infrastructure, the new tank corps headquarters was small, a bare-bones headquarters and signals outfit, controlling three of the redesigned small tank brigades.

So why was it called a corps? The usual explanation seems to be because it was designed to control brigade-entities there was some new naming convention that was used. But in fact the explanation seems to be much simpler - it was intended to be a corps designed to control infantry divisions that would be assigned to it on a mission basis. We actually see that occurring frequently as late as the Kursk battles, especially in the counterattacks on the southern front from 12 July on.

So the tank corps at least initially appears to have been meant to replace the old infantry corps headquarters in offensive roles. Of course that didn't work too well and so they were augmented by their own motorized infantry and a functional field artillery, allowing them to become independent mechanized maneuver units. And that process of course was facilitated by the recreation of the infantry corps.

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Originally posted by Rich:
But in fact the explanation seems to be much simpler - it was intended to be a corps designed to control infantry divisions that would be assigned to it on a mission basis. We actually see that occurring frequently as late as the Kursk battles, especially in the counterattacks on the southern front from 12 July on.

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That's interesting, but is it a theory or a fact? The book DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE SOVIET TANK ARM IN COMBAT IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR, Moscow, 1979, makes no mention of this. The first corps which were formed beginning in March 1942 had only 5,603 men, 100 tanks, and no artillery or repair units. "The headquarters of the corps for all practical purposes was a small group of officers who were intended to coordinate the brigades in battles and operations."

Volume 2 of Charles Sharp's series SOVIET ORDER OF BATTLE - WORLD WAR II, and Glantz's COLOSSUS REBORN also don't mention it.

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
That's interesting, but is it a theory or a fact? The book DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE SOVIET TANK ARM IN COMBAT IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR, Moscow, 1979, makes no mention of this. The first corps which were formed beginning in March 1942 had only 5,603 men, 100 tanks, and no artillery or repair units. "The headquarters of the corps for all practical purposes was a small group of officers who were intended to coordinate the brigades in battles and operations."

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Partly speculation on my part, but it fits the actual employment of the early tank corps, they weren't attached to infantry divisions, but rather vice versa. And even as late as Kursk 31st Tank Corps retained that organization, it was initially apparently intended to be used that way (except that it got thrown into the path of XXXXVIII Pz.K. as one of Vatutin's speed bumps). Later, IIRC all of the tank corps of 1st Tank Army and 6th Guards Army were employed in that way, for the great counterattack of 12 July all the tank corps except Rotmistrov's had one or more infantry divisions attached IIRC.

It's a bit reading between the lines, but it makes sense. As originally formed the tank corps couldn't operate independently, nor could they be grouped in tank armies as independent formations, they were a small command staff designed to be grafted onto another formation for specific offensive roles - and the only formations that they could be grafted to were rifle divisions or rifle brigades. And it had the added advantage of reducing the command span in the attacking armies, the tank corps headquarters acted as a "rump" corps.

So yes, speculation, but I think it follows the actual intent and use of the tank corps. And I can't think of any other logical explanation that fits the facts?

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
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Originally posted by Andreas:
You have to keep in mind that following the desaster on the borders, Soviet formations became much smaller than German ones. A Soviet tank 'brigade'in 1942 was really just the size of a German tank battalion, and not an independent maneuver unit.
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Careful about making sweeping statements. Here's the strength of some independent tank brigages on 11 May 1942:

10th: 22
84th: 46
6th Guards: 43
6th: 46
90th: 46
48: 42
5th Guards: 38
38th: 44
37th: 42
7th: 40

Only one of these looks like a battalion. Even if you're talking about January 1942, I'd appreciate something more then a simple declaration.

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Actually, one of these (10th) looks like an overstrength company. All the others are smaller than a full-strength German Panzerabteilung (which is a battalion).

See here for the organisation of a November 41 medium German tank company with 19 tanks:

http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/kstn/kstn11751nov41.htm

Three of these to an Abteilung (none in the staff company) makes for 57 tanks, stronger than any of the brigades you listed.

All the best

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
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There were also Corps HQ (but not as we know them) for the control of Rifle Brigades and Cavalry Divisions, from late 1941, I think.
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According to BSSA, there were almost no rifle corps organizations in January 1942 on the Russo-German front.

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Thanks for this - how much is 'almost no'?

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
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The cavalry divisions again would probably be under a Cavalry Corps organisation, with two or three of them and a tank brigade to a Corps (which would be the rough size of a German infantry division). So you can reduce that number to 10.
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I said "independent cavalry divisions", not "cavalry divisions." There were actually 48 cavalry divisions, 15 of them in 5 cavalry corps.

Tank brigades were not formally part of a cavalry corps. Sure they could sometimes have been attached, but not necessarily.

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Quite so, and thanks again for the info on the Corps. I overlooked the 'independent'. Still there is a possibility that these independent cavalry divisions would be assigned to existing Cavalry Corps. You are right about the tank brigades, I was thinking of regiments.

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
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Rifle brigades are really just fancy-named regiments. Cavalry divisions are also brigades in size.
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I think that's irrelevant. They were independent units which had to be controlled from Army HQ.

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That may have depended on whether a Rifle Corps HQ, or a Cavalry Corps HQ, was present. These were rare, but not non-existent. Also, in the case of the Rifle Brigades, I would again question whether they were really independent maneuver elements, or not rather a reinforcement force pool to be assigned on a mission basis to a higher HQ, such as a Rifle Division, or a Cavalry Corps.

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
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So in your example, 54th Army would really only have 11 independent maneuver units to control, since the brigades would be assigned to a division for maneuver. But it is in any case too much to control for an army with no sub-command level, and my guess would be that the Army commander found another way of instituting a separate command echelon, by grouping parts of his formations.
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In other words, reinstating a corps-equivalent HQ. Then why claim that corps HQs were eliminiated?

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Because it would not be a permanent institution, but one based on staff from the Army HQ, detached based on the personal estimation of the Army commander when it comes to who would be best to do it, and only set up when the need arises.

All the best

Andreas

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Originally posted by Andreas:
Thanks for this - how much is 'almost no'?

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According to BSSA, in January 1942 there were five rifle corps: one in the Caucasus Front (the 9th), one in the Central Asian Military District (the 58th), and three in the Far Eastern Front (the 26th, 59th, and 39th). I don't think any of those were actually on the front line.

All the best

In fact it allowed the following:

The commander of what was a tank company (but what was called a regiment) to be assigned one (or multiple) infantry battalion(s) in support.

The commander of a tank battalion (called a brigade) to be assigned one (or multiple) infantry regiment(s) in support.

The commander of a tank division (called a corps) to be assigned one (or multiple) infantry division(s) in support.

The commander of a tank corps (called an army) to be assigned one (or multiple) infantry corps in support.

All this without quibbling about who was in charge by rank/function/seniority, and always leaving the mobile formation commander firmly in charge of the show.

See also: http://www.redarmystudies.net/0411030.htm

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In March 1942 the newly formed Armored Forces Administration approved the construction of a higher-level formation intended to act as the mobile group for a combined-arms army.32 Although the Soviets called the new formation a tank corps, with only two tank brigades and one motorized rifle brigade for a total of around 100 tanks, it more closely approximated a division in size. It was, however, commanded by a Major General, due to its designation as a corps; this represented a conscious decision on the part of Stavka to emphasize the importance of these units, as well as to secure the best commanders in the Red Army to lead them. It soon became clear that the three brigade structure would not be sufficient, and in May 1942 a third tank brigade was added to the tank corps organization, which continued to evolve throughout the remainder of the war.33 (See Appendix C)

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All the best