I would appreciate any help with a few queries about the organisation, strength and losses of 1st U.S. Armored Division and CC B in the Tunisia campaign.According to TO&E 17-1, dated 1 March 1942, with Changes 1 & 2, dated to 29 October 1942, the tank element of a heavy armored division contained 232 medium and 158 light tanks in two regiments of one light and two medium battalions each. Each battalion had 3 companies. There were only two combat commands at this point
My understanding is that each regiment normally had 63 light and 116 medium tanks. These were in one battalion of 58 light and two battalions of 58 medium tanks each, and presumably the other 5 in regimental Hq.
For the advance into Tunisia, CC B Hq merged with the Hq of 13th Armored Regt. According to the divisional history, CC B loaded for Operation Torch with ‘nearly 175’ tanks and the figures of unit strength during the campaign seem to indicate 54 tanks per battalion – 3 coys x 17 each and 3 in battalion Hq. Since there seems to have been a Hq platoon with both regimental and combat command Hq (5 light tanks each?), does anyone have any information on how this figure of 175 or so, was broken down, or what actual unit strength was? The three battalions under CC B were:
1st Bn./1st Armored Regt. (M3 light tanks)
1st Bn./13th Armored Regt. (M3 light tanks)
2nd Bn./13th Armored Regt. (M3 lmedium tanks).
Indications of strength that I have found are as follows:
During the advance into Tunisia, Blade Force included the British 17/21st Lancers (c.64 tanks) and 1st Bn./1st Armored Regt. with Blade Force’s own HQ element of three or five tanks. The whole force is described as having over 100 tanks.
2nd Bn./13th Armored Regt. was initially split between the British 11th and 36th Brigades. On 28th November 1942, it appears to have consisted of the battalion Hq tanks, Coys. D and E and one platoon of Coy F. The remainder of Coy F had not yet arrived from Algiers. Does anyone know when the remainder of Coy F (presumably 12 tanks) arrives with the battalion?
By 29th November 1942 German air reconnaissance reports 135 Allied tanks between Djedeida airfield and Sidi Nsir. This represnts the total for Blade Force, 1st Bn./1st Armored Regt. and 2nd Bn./13th Arm. Regt. (less part Coy F?).
2nd December 1942, CC B Hq. with 13th Armored Regt. Hq. arrives and brings the light tanks of 1st Bn./13th Arm .Regt. (less Coy C left at Oran), A sortie by this unit is noted as having over 30 light tanks. 1st/1st and 2nd/13th are both reported at about half strength.
On 9th December 1942, CC B reported a strength of 62 light and 22 medium tanks + 21 Shermans of a detachment of 2nd Bn/67th Arm. Regt. at end of the day.
On 12th December 1942, US tanks in operation are:
Hq CC B, 5;
Hq 13th Arm.Regt.,5 (another source gives only 5 at CC B Hq);
1st Bn./1st Arm.Regt.,17;
1st Bn./13th Arm. Regt., 6 (but note C Coy still in Oran);
2nd Bn./13th Arm.Regt., 16
= 49 (or 44).
1st/13th was short 25 M3 light tanks, besides its Coy C. It was decided that 1st/1st, should relinquish its vehicles and rejoin 1st Arm. Regt. then arriving in the Oran area, while Coy C 13th Arm. Regt. should come from Oran to Tunisia. 1/1st turned over 25 tanks to 1/13th. Reference is made to replacing ‘the 23 out of 54 mediums which the 2nd/13th lacked’. 12 M3 mediums were found for the battalion. But were these simply the rest of Coy F?
13th December 1942, deficiencies in CC B’s equipment due to the miring and actions of 10th & 11th Dec., to previous engagements and to reduced scales in moving from the UK to Oran, amounted, despite some replacements, to 50 medium and 84 light tanks. Robinett, commander of CC B gives a shortage of 40 medium and 84 light tanks which he says are 72% of the total-'‘Nearly three-quarters of our tanks were lost.’
This is all rather confusing. Does anyone have any solid figures to make some sense of this?
Many thanks in anticipation.
Daniel.