I have posted this question on the Axishistory forum, but did not get a lot of interest there. I thought I should try again here, since this forum is oftentimes frequented by some very knowledgeable posters (in the spirit of 'Flattery will get me anywhere'):

I have finally managed to look up Directive 51 - only in English unfortunately, if someone could direct me (no pun intented) to a full German version, I’d appreciate that. I did find the key text in German though – if someone could confirm that this is really it, I’d appreciate that too (see below). I would also be very interested in the text of the underlying memo by Keitel, which is apparently reflected in Directive 51.

quote:

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Die Gefahr im Osten ist geblieben, aber eine größere im Westen zeichnet sich ab: die angelsächsische Landung! Im Osten lässt die Größe des Raumes äußersten Falles einen Bodenverlust auch größeren Ausmaßes zu, ohne den deutschen Lebensnerv tödlich zu treffen. Anders im Westen! Gelingt dem Feind hier ein Einbruch in unsere Verteidigung in breiter Front, so sind die Folgen in kurzer Zeit unabsehbar. Alle Anzeichen sprechen dafür, dass der Feind spätestens im Frühjahr, vielleicht aber schon früher, zum Angriff gegen die Westfront Europas antreten wird. Ich kann es daher nicht mehr verantworten, dass der Westen zu Gunsten anderer Kriegsschauplätze weiter geschwächt wird.

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This is translated as follows by US CMH:

quote:

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Fuehrer Headquarters
3 November 1943
Top Secret
The Fuehrer
OKW/WFSt/Op.No. 662656/43 g.K. Chefs
27 Copies
Copy No.____
Directive No. 51
For the last two and one-half years the bitter and costly struggle against Bolshevism has made the utmost demands upon the bulk of our military resources and energies. This commitment was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger, and
the over-all situation. The situation has since changed. The threat from the East remains, but an even greater danger looms in the West: the Anglo-American landing! In the East, the vastness of the space will, as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany's chance for survival.
Not so in the West! If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating our defenses on a wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow within a short time. All signs point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than spring, and perhaps earlier.
For that reason, I can no longer justify the further weakening of the West in favor of other theaters of war. I have therefore decided to strengthen the defenses in the West, particularly at places from which we shall launch our long-range war against England. For those are the very points at which the enemy must and will attack; there-unless all indications are misleading-will be fought the decisive invasion battle.

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I would be interested in a discussion of what the real impact of the Directive was. It is sometimes claimed that it prioritises the west over the east. I am not sure I would agree with that. It seems to attempt to equalise, maybe. But if we look at the actual detailed actions in the Directive, they mostly appear to aim at ensuring a minimum level of equipment to the forces stationed in the west. Down to quite some detail, battalion level in at least one case. It would be interesting to know how much of e.g. German tank/assault gun production did have to be diverted to achieve this minimum level of equipment.

What the Directive certainly does not contain is a restriction on force transfer or reinforcement in the east from new units, and units currently in theatres other than ‘west’ and ‘Denmark’. The restriction for these two theatres is also limited to a requirement for a personal authorisation of Hitler for any force transfer. There is no restriction on sending vehicles, guns, etc. produced above the level mentioned as required for the west in the Directive to the east to reinforce the units there, and there is no mention at all of any restrictions of manpower reinforcement to the east in the Directive at all.

As we see later, when push came to shove in March during the ‘Mud Offensive’, new units were sent east. When shove came close to collapse, even two SS Panzer divisions were sent from the west to shore up the situation in northern Ukraine. So in total, according to Ziemke, eight divisions went (he IDs 100. Jäger and 367.ID, but not the other two infantry divisions), and two (9th/10th SS) of them belonged to the armoured reserve built up against the invasion (and these two would be bitterly missed in Normandy during June).

Basically, I think I am struggling to see this Directive as the key document that accords the west priority over the east. Both because it seems to be aimed more at rectifying past oversights in strengthening defenses in the west, and because the consequences of the Directive were not really in line with what it says. There is lip-service at the start regarding trading territory in the east for forces, but this did not really happen, quite the contrary, as events at Kamenez-Podolzk, Tarnopol, and other places were to show soon enough.

Am I missing something with regards to the importance of this Directive?

Apologies if this has been discussed before, I could not find a thread on it using the search function.

Full text of the Directive from Feldgrau.com:

quote:

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Führer Headquarters

3 November 1943

Top Secret

The Führer

OKW/WFSt/Op.No. 662656/43 g.K. Chefs

Directive No. 51

For the last two and one-half years the bitter and costly struggle against Bolshevism has made the utmost demands upon the bulk of our military resources and energies. This commitment was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger, and the over-all situation. The situation has since changed. The threat from the East remains, but an even greater danger looms in the West: the Anglo-American landing! In the East, the vastness of the space will, as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany's chance for survival.

Not so in the West! If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating our defenses on a wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow within a short time. All signs point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than spring, and perhaps earlier.

For that reason, I can no longer justify the further weakening of the West in favor of other theaters of war. I have therefore decided to strengthen the defenses in the West, particularly at places from which we shall launch our long-range war against England. For those are the very points at which the enemy must and will attack; there-unless all indications are misleading-will be fought the decisive invasion battle.

Holding attacks and diversions on other fronts are to be expected. Not even the possibility of a large-scale offensive against Denmark may be excluded. It would pose greater nautical problems and could be less effectively supported from the air, but would nevertheless produce the greatest political and strategic impact if it were to succeed.

During the opening phase of the battle, the entire striking power of the enemy will of necessity be directed against our forces manning the coast. Only an all-out effort in the construction of fortifications, an unsurpassed effort that will enlist all available manpower and physical resources of Germany and the occupied areas, will be able to strengthen our defenses along the coasts within the short time that still appears to be left to us.

Stationary weapons (heavy AT guns, immobile tanks to be dug-in, coast artillery, shore-defense guns, mines, etc.) arriving in Denmark and the occupied West within the near future will be heavily concentrated in points of main defensive effort at the most vulnerable coastal sectors. At the same time, we must take the calculated risk that for the present we may be unable to improve our defenses in less threatened sectors.

Should the enemy nevertheless force a landing by concentrating his armed might, he must be hit by the full fury of our counterattack. For this mission ample and speedy reinforcements of men and materiel, as well as intensive training must transform available larger units into first-rate, fully mobile general reserves suitable for offensive operations. The counterattack of these units will prevent the enlargement of the beachhead, and throw the enemy back into the sea.

In addition, well-planned emergency measures, prepared down to the last detail, must enable us instantly to throw against the invader every fit man and machine from coastal sectors not under attack and from the home front.

The anticipated strong attacks by air and sea must be relentlessly countered by Air Force and Navy with all their available resources. I therefore order the following:

A) Army:

1.) The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Inspector General of Panzer Troops will submit to me as soon as possible a schedule covering arms, tanks, assault guns, motor vehicles, and ammunition to be allocated to the Western Front and Denmark within the next three months. That schedule will conform to the new situation. The following considerations will be basic:

a) Sufficient mobility for all panzer and panzer grenadier divisions in the West, and equipment of each of those units by December 1943 with 93 Mark IV tanks or assault guns, as well as large numbers of antitank weapons.

Accelerated reorganization of the 20 Luftwaffe Field Divisions into an effective mobile reserve force by the end of 1943. This reorganization is to include the issue of assault guns.

Accelerated issue of all authorized weapons to the SS Panzer Grenadier Division Hitler Jugend, the 21st Panzer Division, and the infantry and reserve divisions stationed in Jutland.

b) Additional shipments of Mark IV tanks, assault guns, and heavy AT guns to the reserve panzer divisions stationed in the West and in Denmark, as well as to the Assault Gun Training Battalion in Denmark.

c) In November and December, monthly allotments of 100 heavy AT guns models 40 and 43 (half of these to be mobile) in addition to those required for newly activated units in the West and in Denmark.

d) Allotment of large numbers of weapons (including about 1,000 machine guns) for augmenting the armament of those static divisions that are committed for coastal defense in the West and in Denmark, and for standardizing the equipment of elements that are to be withdrawn from sectors not under attack.

e) Ample supply of close-combat AT weapons to units in vulnerable sectors.

f) Improvement of artillery and AT defenses in units stationed in Denmark, as well as those committed for coastal protection in the occupied West. Strengthening of GHQ artillery.

2.) The units and elements stationed in the West or in Denmark, as well as panzer, assault gun, and AT units to be activated in the West, must not be transferred to other fronts without my permission. The Chief of the Army General Staff, or the Inspector General of Panzer Troops will submit to me a report through the Armed Forces Operations Staff as soon as the issue of equipment to the panzer and assault gun battalions, as well as to the AT battalions and companies, has been completed.

3.) Beyond similar measures taken in the past, the Commander in Chief West will establish timetables for, and conduct maneuvers and command post exercises on, the procedure for bringing up units from sectors not under attack. These units will be made capable of performing offensive missions, however limited. In that connection I demand that sectors not threatened by the enemy be ruthlessly stripped of all forces except small guard detachments. For sectors from which reserves are withdrawn, security and guard detachments must be set aside from security and alarm units. Labor forces drawn largely from the native population must likewise be organized in those sectors, in order to keep open whatever roads might be destroyed by the enemy air force.

4.) The Commander of German Troops in Denmark will take measures in the area under his control in compliance with paragraph 3 above.

5.) Pursuant to separate orders, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army will form Kampfgruppen in regimental strength, security battalions, and engineer construction battalions from training cadres, trainees, schools, and instruction and convalescent units in the Zone of the Interior. These troops must be ready for shipment on 48 hours' notice.

Furthermore, other available personnel are to be organized into battalions of replacements and equipped with the available weapons, so that the anticipated heavy losses can quickly be replaced.

B) Luftwaffe:

The offensive and defensive effectiveness of Luftwaffe units in the West and in Denmark will be increased to meet the changed situation. To that end, preparations will be made for the release of units suited for commitment in the anti-invasion effort, that is, all flying units and mobile Flak artillery that can be spared from the air defenses of the home front, and from schools and training units in the Zone of the Interior. All those units are to be earmarked for the West and possibly Denmark.

The Luftwaffe ground organization in southern Norway, Denmark, northwestern Germany, and the West will be expanded and supplied in a way that will-by the most far-reaching decentralization of own forces-deny targets to the enemy bombers, and split the enemy's offensive effort in case of large-scale operations. Particularly important in that connection will be our fighter forces. Possibilities for their commitment must be increased by the establishment of numerous advance landing fields. Special emphasis is to be placed on good camouflage. I expect also that the Luftwaffe will unstintingly furnish all available forces, by stripping them from less threatened areas.

C) Navy:

The Navy will prepare the strongest possible forces suitable for attacking the enemy landing fleets. Coastal defense installations in the process of construction will be completed with the utmost speed. The emplacing of additional coastal batteries and the possibility of laying further flanking mine fields should be investigated.

All school, training, and other shore-based personnel fit for ground combat must be prepared for commitment so that, without undue delay, they can at least be employed as security forces within the zone of the enemy landing operations.

While preparing the reinforcement of the defenses in the West, the Navy must keep in mind that it might be called upon to repulse simultaneous enemy landings in Norway and Denmark. In that connection, I attach particular importance to the assembly of numerous U-boats in the northern area. A temporary weakening of U-boat forces in the Atlantic must be risked.

D) SS:

The Reichsfuehrer-SS will determine what Waffen-SS and police forces he can release for combat, security, and guard duty. He is to prepare to organize effective combat and security forces from training, replacement, and convalescent units, as well as schools and other home-front establishments.

E) The commanders in chief of the services, the Reichsfuehrer-SS, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Commander in Chief West, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, the Inspector General of Panzer Troops, as well as the Commander of German Troops in Denmark will report to me by 15 November all measures taken or planned.

I expect that all agencies will make a supreme effort toward utilizing every moment of the remaining time in preparing for the decisive battle in the West.

All authorities will guard against wasting time and energy in useless jurisdictional squabbles, and will direct all their efforts toward strengthening our defensive and offensive power.

signed: Adolf Hitler

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There seems to be a translation issue - I believe Feldgrau is using the CMH translation. Where this one speaks of '20 Luftwaffe Field Divisions', other translations speak of the '20th Luftwaffe Field Division'. One reason why I would like to see it in German. It appears from the discussion over there that the reference to 20th LFD is correct, since this appears to have been in Denmark at the time.

I am having a bit of a hard time figuring out which Panzerdivisionen were under OB West in November 1943, and which in Denmark and Norway.

So far I would have:

9.SS
10.SS
12.SS

21.PD
PD Norwegen
Panzerlehr (from January)

Between these and additional Heerestruppen under OB West, we are talking at most about 2 months of German tank and assault gun production in autumn/winter 1943/4. Probably less. 1943 saw almost 4,000 Panzer IV built (333/month). Equipping these divisions with 93 units each would take two months production. For Panthers it was similar. Give each of them 50 Stugs - a bit more than one month production. And 12 Jagdpanzer IV - one and a half month production in 1944. Equip one (no idea how many there were in the West, I know there was one with the SS-PzK) sPzAbt with 50 Tigers - just under one month production.

Since all this would not have been done immediately, but top-sliced off ordinary production, there would have been sufficient amount of tanks to go east, even once we account for Italy.

Also, when was 25.PD sent east from France? Before or after the Directive was passed? Feldgrau has it in France in November, and in AG S 4th Army in December. Jentz has it going there in November. Also in November & December arrived:

1.PD
16.PD
LSSAH (from Italy)
sPzAbt 509 (from Reich)
sPzAbt 501 (probably typo in Jentz who refers to 509 again in December), but does not mention 501)
I./PzRgt 31 (with 76 Panther)
PzRgt FHH

Then in Jan - April:
I./PzRgt 26 (with 76 Panther)
PzAbt 118 (45 Stugs)
I./PzRgt 11 (79 Panther)
II./SS-PzRgt 5 (79 Panther)
9.SS (from OB West)
10.SS (from OB West)
sPzAbt 507

A total of:
482 Panther
398 Panzer IV
162 Tiger (assuming that the typo meant that another sPzAbt arrived in December with 501, not 509, since they already arrrived in November)
217 Stug (note that Stug in Stug-Brigaden/Abt would be additional to this)
Also:
12 Flakpanzer 38(t)
7 Flammpanzer

Total 1,259 AFVs (excluding the funnies) additional to those available in the east on 31st October (2,085 Panzer ?Stugs), or 50% if we ignore Stugs. To compare, the number of Panzers sent east in the period November to April was 77% of the number of Panzers available on 31st May 1944. By type it is 52% Panzer IV (398/759), 89% for Panthers (482/543) and 305% for Tigers (162/53). Note how the heavier types (which were not explicitly mentioned in the Directive) are preferred for the east. These calculations ignore Panzers sent east as part of normal replacement requests by units, if that took place.

Somehow that does not look like a neglected front to me. Ziemke's assessment that the east had to fend for itself post Directive 51 looks decidedly shaky, judging from these figures.

quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:
I will post the numbers of infantry divisions moving between theatres in the next few days.

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Andreas, you are quite correct in your assessment. And the main problem as I see it is that most historians have tended to treat the different German theaters of war as if they were seperate, when of course they were all part of the same war effort.

So for example 20. LW Feld-division (H) was to be built up as a "Sturm" Division (it also appears the same was intended for 19. LW Feld-Division). But they were both eventually sent to France. After the invasion, 711. ID was transferred - to Southern France! And 198. ID rotated from Russsia to Southern FRance, relieving divisions for the Normandy front.

And at the same time training of the panzer formations went on at Mailly, and while the battle raged in Normandy, those Panther battalions that had completed their training returned to Germany for equipping and the Eastern Front or went directly East.

So Directive 51 did not actually change many assignments, the distribution and movements of the divisions remained similar, but it did result in an upgrading of the capabilities of the divisions in the west and most particularly of the Panzer divisions in the west. At the same time though, the capabilities and especially mobility of the infantry divisions in the west were greatly augmented.

I will see what I have on equipment distributions during this time.

Some initial comments, or perhaps rather contributions, as I do not really address your points directly.

I agree it does not neccessarily establish any general priority for the West over the East. But it is difficult to see how it can be interpreted in any other way than that it orders the strengthening of the Western defences, if neccessary at the expense of the East, within the time frame it relates to (ie, until roughly mid-1944). It does after all describe the danger in the West as “even greater” than that in the East, orders the strenghtening of the defenses there and states that while loss of territory can be endured in the East without this being decisive, the same is not the case in the West.

This is, of course, so far just stated intention, not reality. As for the detailed provisions, I agree with you that the general impression they give is of an intention to upgrade existing formations in the West rather than transfer new ones in. The reality was somehwat different from the intention as far as I can tell. While some of the steps described were taken to a larger or smaller degree, others were not. Also, additional to what is described in it force increase in the West appears to have been due to a combination of unit transfers and a fairly high priority given to these (and to units already forming in the West) in replacements of men and materiel.

During the period when the directive was produced (last quarter of 1943), a fairly major transfer of forces East was taking place, mainly from Italy. 76., 376. and 384. ID were sent East, along with 1., 14., 16., 24. and 25. PZD, 1.SS-PzD, 11.SS-PzGr.D., 14. and 15. SS-Gr.D. and 2.FJD. Withdrawn were 5.Geb.D., 250. ID (actually, disbanded, though it apparently left some 5,000 men in the East) and 162.ID (the Turkoman division). None of these went to OB West.

But in the period following the directive, things seem somewhat different. During the first three months of 1944, fairly modest reinforcements are arriving in the East, while mobile divisions are being withdrawn. 68., 214. and 371. ID went East, along with FHH, 20.SS and 207.Sich.D. 214.ID came from Norway, 371.ID came from the Balkans, 20.SS was newly raised in the East and 207.Sich.D. was also newly raised (do not know where). 68.ID was I think newly reconstituted after being destroyed two months earlier. Only FHH was transferred from OB West. Away went 331.ID, 16.PzGr.D., 2.PzD, 9.PzD, 2.SS-PzD and 8.SS-KD. Of these, except for 8.SS-KD all went to the West, all consumed very large amounts of replacements before being committed and all were next committed in the West. Thus, the exchange of forces in between East and West (as defined in the directive) during this quarter is clearly in the western direction, as far as

During 2q 1944, 349., 357., 359., 361. and 367 ID, 100.JgD, 19.SS, 22.SS-, 3. and 4. KD, 1.SJD and 52. and 391.Sich.D. went East. 100.JgD cam from the Balkans. 349.ID came from OB West, 357. and 359.ID from Germany, 361. ID from Denmark and 367.ID from the balkans. All of these 300-divisions had been forming since November 1943, hence the location they were transferred away from is relatively arbitrary in this connection, and they are perhaps best regarded as newly raised units? The remainder were all also newly formed units. From the East went 98. and 198.ID, 6., 11. and 19.PzD, 1.SS-PzD and 2.FJD. 98.ID went to the Balkans. 6.PzD and 19.PzD went west, but were next committed in the East after refreshing in the West. 198.ID, 11.PzD, 1.SS-PzD and 2.FJD were next committed in the West. In addition to this, 9. and 10.SS-PzD saw action first in the East and then in the West during this quarter.

What this overview does not capture of course is newly raised units that went to other fronts than the East. This overview is the remainder of divisions that appear from December 1943 through June 44 without having been transferred from another front (except from Germany)

41.ID: Balkans
42.JD: Balkans
47.ID: West
48.ID: West
49.ID: West
77.ID: West
84.ID: West
85.ID: West
89.ID: Norway
91.ID: West
92.ID: Italy
133.FstD: Balkans
363.ID: Denmark
16.SS-PzGr.D: Italy
17.SS-PzGr.D: West
18.SS-PzGr.D.: Balkans
21.SS: Balkans
5.FJD: West
Pz.Lehr: West

On this basis we can make the following comparison of 1st half 1944:

East
Period......From other....to other....newly formed
1q..............3......................6.................3
2q..............1......................7(*)............12
Total..........4.....................13...............15
Net divisional movement, + 6
* Of whom two which returned to the East in 3q without having seen action elsewhere, and are thus not counted as reinforcements elsewhere despite being physically in the West for a protracted period.

West+Denmark
Period......From other....to other....newly formed
1+2q..........9..........1..............11
Net divisional movement, +19

9. and 10.SS-PzD are omitted, as they went back and forth within the same quarter.

In sum I think this seems to be consistent with an interpretation that a special emphasis was placed on strengthening the West during the first half of 1944 compared to the East, though it is also clear that there was no major transfer of forces from the East to the West and that this did not preclude simultaneous reinforcement of the East (at least in terms of net unit movement to and from the East). I'm sure there may be mistakes or omissions here and there are other ways of looking at this.

2. This looks only at movements to and from the Eastern Front, and where newly raised divisions went. It does not consider movements between other fronts than the East. This modifies the picture a little bit.

A comparison of number of divisions in November 43 and June 44 (from Ron Klages' figures):

East:177/150
OB West: 53/66
Germany 4/7
Norway: 13/12
Finland: 7/8
Balkans: 22/24
Italy: 23/27

What this catches is of course also the effect of divisions disbanded or destroyed, hence the negative development in the Eastern figure. In any event, these figures also underline a rising tendency in the West.

3. As we all know however, the number of divisions is fundamentally a treacherous measure of strength, especially over a period of active operations.

The German Iststärke in the East appears to have been ~2.6 million men on 1 December 1943. This almost exactly identical to the strength on 1 June 1944, according to the report quoted in Niklas Zetterling's Normandy 1944 (and also according to other sources). It appears that the number of replacements and returning wounded reaching the East in late 1943 and the first half of 1944 was very high, when one considers the strength relative to the losses and the unit movements - certainly at least as many as 6-700,000 between 1 December 43 and 1 June 44, possibly more. In any case, it is clear that in terms of personnell, the Ostheer seems to have been roughly as strong in June 44 as it had been when this directive was issued.

Unfortunately I have no good figures for the West in late 1943, and also it is as I understand somewhat obscure exactly what is included in the various figures in exsitence for May/June 44.

Hope this is of some interest at least, though I am sure there are things here that can be corrected.

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Somehow that does not look like a neglected front to me. Ziemke's assessment that the east had to fend for itself post Directive 51 looks decidedly shaky, judging from these figures.

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Decidedly - at the very least it seems considerably exaggerated. By summer, the German strength had risen perceptibly above the low points of late winter and early spring, and it is clear that as before, the great majority of German replacements must have gone to the East in order for this to have been accomplished.

But there are several possible senses in which one can speak of the West being prioritised, ranging roughly from "receiving more resources than anyone else" to "receiving more resources than they used to". The former would be pretty extreme, considering that roughly two thirds of the Field Army was still in the East and were suffering heavy and constant casualties, while their colleagues in the West suffered none.

On the other hand, the Ostheer does not seem to have gained in strength during the period, while the OB West forces most certainly did.

regards,

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And the main problem as I see it is that most historians have tended to treat the different German theaters of war as if they were seperate, when of course they were all part of the same war effort.
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How true this is! In my experience, applying even a rudimentarily adequate overall perspective of this type invariably has a major impact for many widely argued perpsectives. The same applies, for that matter, to looking at strength development over time for both sides consecutively rather than just for one of them. I think it is essentially impossible to account for German force development in the East without viewing it in a perspective of the German war effort and commitments as a whole, and equally futile to analyse the consequences of that force development without seeing it against the Soviet one, for example.

Distribution of German field army (Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe field forces not included) to theaters of war:

date :: No. of divisions - Actual strength

22. June 1941: East: 144 - 3,206,000 :: all other theaters: 59 - 594,000 :: total: 3,800,000

01. July 1942 East: 173 - 2,847,000 :: all other theaters: 53 - 971,000 :: others: 130,000 :: total: 3,948,000

01. July 1943 East: 168 - 3,115,000 :: all other theaters: 53 - 1,369,000 :: total: 4,484,000

01. July 1944 East: ?? - 2,160,000 :: all other theaters: ?? - 1,840,000 :: total: 4,000,000

If Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe field forces are included, one can find the following figures of German army actual strength:

1. December 1943:
East: 2,619,000 :: West: 648,000

1. June 1944:
East: 2,620,000 :: West: 880,000

If ration strength figures are applied (a shaky measure, of course), one can find the following figures:
October/November 1943:
East: 3,900,000 :: West: 1,370,000
April/May 1944:
East: 3,878,000 :: West: 1,873,000

Sources:

Most data points on actual strength from Müller-Hillebrand, with Zetterling, Magenheimer and the GDR WW2 series as confirmation.

Ration strength figures (last set) from various MGFA publications.

1.
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There seems to be a translation issue - I believe Feldgrau is using the CMH translation. Where this one speaks of '20 Luftwaffe Field Divisions', other translations speak of the '20th Luftwaffe Field Division'. One reason why I would like to see it in German. It appears from the discussion over there that the reference to 20th LFD is correct, since this appears to have been in Denmark at the time.
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Müller-Hillebrand (vol. 3) reproduces most of the directive in German, and Vol. 7 of the KTB OKW reproduces it in full. There is no doubt that it refers to 20.LW-F.D. (in Denmark), not 20 LW Field divisions ("Beschleunigte Umgliederung der 20. Luftwaffen-Feld-Division zu einem Kampfkräftigen" etc). This division was apparently upgraded before moving from denmark, but Rich: Müller-Hillebrand, as well as other sources, has this division going to Italy, not France?

Are there any other possible translation issues?

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Also, when was 25.PD sent east from France? Before or after the Directive was passed? Feldgrau has it in France in November, and in AG S 4th Army in December. Jentz has it going there in November.
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Müller-Hillebrand has it in the East "ab November". It seems likely to me that its deployment wasn't affected by the Directive.

3. Müller-Hillebrand further provides figures for both Iststärke and tanks strength in the West, which may be of interest in addition to the excellent figures posted by Michate:

1. Tanks and StuG/JgdPz:

3112..........656/223
3101..........752/171
2902..........1039/194
3103..........994/211
3004..........1403/219
1006..........1522/310

In other words, a net increase of 866 tanks and 87 SP guns over the period.

Ist Heeresgruppe D (incl. LW Feld and W-SS):

Date.......Strength
010743......746,000
010943......770,000
011143......625,000
010144......686,000
010344......828,000
010544......886,000

These figures also contribute the interesting piece of context that at the time the directive was issued, the strength in the West was at a particularly low ebb.

Particular note: Earlier, when commenting on the 01 Sept 43 figure, MH specifies that it does not include Reserve-divisionen. The other figures must reasonably be seen as on the same basis (they also refer to "Feldheer" specifically).

Thanks for all the replies, this was what I was hoping for. I am sorry I have not been able to post more of the info that in the meantime has been supplied by others - a serious case of Fiancée visit during the weekend affected my Grog time quite severely. Just when I thought I was recovering, a WORK infection reared its ugly head.

In the time since posting this I have also received a copy of MH, at a knock-down price as Michael assures me, so I will have a good look through it as well.

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
These figures also contribute the interesting piece of context that at the time the directive was issued, the strength in the West was at a particularly low ebb.

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Yes, I agree. The sense that I am getting is that Hitler/OKW may have thought that it was time to counter-act this quite dangerous development. Forces built up to counter an invasion in summer will need time to get ready to actually do the job, so just rushing them in at the last moment won't do any good.

I am beginning to think of the Directive as a very sensible order, one that is a credit to the (otherwise sorely absent) strategic capabilities of OKW. They did in fact take their eye off the immediate problem for a second and thought about how they would meet the next big challenge, and not miss it because they were too absorbed in the daily struggle in the east.

Of course, then the Red Army's winter offensive at least partially ruined their plan, by seriously damaging the mobile forces in the east, forcing relocation of forces earmarked for the defense in the west (and those two fresh SS-PD would have come in handy in early June), and splitting the eastern front at the Carpathians.

The key question that I see developing is how neglected the west actually was prior to the Directive?

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Particular note: Earlier, when commenting on the 01 Sept 43 figure, MH specifies that it does not include Reserve-divisionen. The other figures must reasonably be seen as on the same basis (they also refer to "Feldheer" specifically).

cheers

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Just some small comments.

Not sure here - Michael told me in another thread that there was a date when the Reservedivisionen became part of the Feldheer. I check my copy of MH.

Minor point on 9./10.SS - they probably left France in early March (1st Quarter). The earliest order committing them in the east that I have found seems to be 25th March. Give them two weeks transfer time from southern France to Ukraine, and you look at a leaving date in the first decade of March. The drop in tank numbers between 29/2 and 31/3 can probably be taken as a confirmation of their departure.

Regarding the net increase of tanks, I think that is quite interesting. Would I be right in thinking that as a share of production over the same six month period, 866 tanks and 87 Stugs are really not a lot? The annual production for 1944 was considerably above 10,000?

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Rich: Müller-Hillebrand, as well as other sources, has this division going to Italy, not France?

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Correct. Both 20. LW-Feld-Div. (H) and 19. LW-Sturm-Div. were sent to Italy as a response to DIADEM, which had begun on 12 May. 20. went first and 19. was actually in transit on 6 June.

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Also, when was 25.PD sent east from France? Before or after the Directive was passed? Feldgrau has it in France in November, and in AG S 4th Army in December. Jentz has it going there in November.

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Not sure.
Particular note: Earlier, when commenting on the 01 Sept 43 figure, MH specifies that it does not include Reserve-divisionen. The other figures must reasonably be seen as on the same basis (they also refer to "Feldheer" specifically). [/B][/QUOTE]

You have to be very careful with that assumption, since it appears that at different times they counted differently. But on the whole many numerical discrepancies appear to be caused by this.

Rich

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Regarding the net increase of tanks, I think that is quite interesting. Would I be right in thinking that as a share of production over the same six month period, 866 tanks and 87 Stugs are really not a lot? The annual production for 1944 was considerably above 10,000?
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It seems evident enough to me that the bulk of tank deliveries during the first half of 1944 must have gone to the East, though this must be seen in the context of the bulk of the Panzer units also being in the East.

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A question regarding the status of mobile formations sent west. From my quick and dirty research on it, it appeared that 2.PD was probably fully combat worthy, and 2.SS was in reasonably good shape. We know that 1.SS was not. 9. and 10.SS went straight into combat when they returned, and they should have been in good shape. What about the others? They received large amounts of replacements, as was said, but did they have time to absorb it?
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For most divisions, it is true to say that they were very well endowed with men and for the most part also with equipment (though transport was a notable general weakness), but that many had a substantially lower combat value than this indicates because they had not had time to train, re-equip and reorganise properly.

Quick and dirty summation of my own (based largely on Niklas Zetterling's divisional histories in his Normandy book):

1.SS-PzD had 19,618 men on 1 june, but many of these were recently arrived recruits. More than 1,000 of these were specialists who were in Germany for training. It also had 124 operational tanks and StuGs. It was still far from complete when committed in early July, and left behind considerable elements, comprising almost 6,000 men, in Belgium. Thus, it never actually fought as a complete integral division in Normandy.

The situation for 2.SS-PzD was not really much better, if at all. It had absorbed more than 9,000 recruits since arriving in France. It still had serious weaknesses in equipment as late as 15 May, when it was missing about 2/3 of its field artilery, almost all its motorcycles and prime movers, most of its cars and about half its trucks ( and only a small percentage of the trucks it did have were operatinal). It had 125 Tanks and StuGs, and were short 166. The situation however improved considerably after 15 June. nevertheless, it was insufficiently trained and lacking in much equipment when it was sent North. It was never committed as a coherent unit in Normandy, and can perhaps be best described as having been committed in the middle of what effectively amounted to re-forming.

2.PzD appears to have been practically fully up to strength and also fully combat ready. It was 573 men overstrength already on 1 April. It had 96 Pz IVs and 79 Panthers on 5 June.

9.Pzd was amalgamated with 155.Res.PzD in March. It had slightly more than 11,000 men on 15 May. It was also missing the great majority of its motor vehicles and mr ethan half its AFVs. The situation was much improved by 15 June, when it had all its personell, about half its motor vehicles and almost all of its tanks. It wasn't committed until late July, and was not combat ready on 6 june.

9.SS-PzD was not fully up to strength when it arrived in normandy, with almost 16,000 men. It was weak in tanks, with 41 operational Pz IVs and 38 StuGs. It was missing its Panzerjägerabteilung as well as its Pantherabteilung in Normandy, and had about two thirds of its motor vehicles.

10.SS-PzD was also missing its Pantherabteilung and Panzerjägerabteilung(still forming). The division had 39 PZ IV and 38 StuG. Its Grenadier batallions were at 70-80% strength. The division had less than 16,000 men.

Having recently been in combat in the East, these two divisions must be regarded as combat ready, wit the exception of those elements still forming.

12.SS-PzD

The division had 20,540 men on 1 June. However, its Werfer- and Panzerjägerabteilungen were not combat ready and did not accompany the division in normandy, and nor did their FEB. Thus, it probably mustered around 17,000 men for the campaign. It employed 79 Panthers and 115 Pz IVs in normandy. Again with the exception of the mentioned elements, it was combat ready.

17.SS-PzGr.D.Not fully combat ready on 6 June. Its men had between 22 and 25 weeks of training. It had 17,321 men on 1 june, but was short almost 40% of its officers and NCOs. It was also missing the vast majority of its trucks and prime movers, but were otherwise well endowed with equipment it seems.

21.PzD was fully combat-ready and generally up to strength. It had a number of unique features, some for better,some for worse. On one hand it didn't have a Panther batallion, but in its stead a mixed batallion of obsolete French tanks and Pz IVs. This was however in the process of being partially remedied by additional PZ IV shipments at the time of the invasion. On the other, it had two batallions equipped with SPWs and an SP PzJg batallion in addition to its Panzerjägerabteilung. Also, two of its Art.Btl. were SP.

116.PzD were still in the process of forming on 6 june (or rather, of being converted from 16.Pz.Gren.D. to 116.PzD). By 1 July it had well above 14,000 men, by 18 July it had 67% mobility and by 20 July it was ordered committed. When it was, it was hardly properly welded as a unit, but it does not appear to have had serious shortages in equipment or men.

130.PzD (Lehr) can for all practical purposes be considered fully combat ready, except it was missing one of its artillery batallions, which arrived in late june.

Regarding the connection between the different theatres, a chap going by the name of 'Dora' on the axishistory forum has said he has a book fore review with Aberjona on the connection between Normandy and Bjelorussio in 1944. This was in March.

Does anyone know more about it? I did not see it on the Aberjona website.