Here are a few thoughts on how the 40 plus different departments of Homeland Defense might relate to each other in the development of a Homeland Defense Intelligence Agency.

In the homeland defense system, there must be at least 40 Secretariats/Undersecretaries, Departments, Services, Administrations, etc. I tried to think of a clever way to group these dogs and cats into a workable, and logical, information sharing and tasking organization.

I looked at the Intelligence cycle and thought of how these agencies compliment each other as pertaining to the following:

A = Essential Elements of Information (EEI's) or things the boss wants to know but doesn't know
B = Tasking other agencies to collect that information
C = Agencies that might COLLECT information
D = Agencies that might process information
E = Agencies that would analyze information (Intelligence Cells of some type)
F = Agencies that would be involved in the dissemination process

Here is my analysis of our current system.

The Homeland Defense System agency (some 40 or more departments) lends itself to grouping the agencies into five similar divisions.

The first grouping is the "Tasking" Group, those divisions that ask, "what is it I need to know but do not know.”

1. The first group is the Head of Department of Homeland Defense. He is the primary tasker, the Deputy of Homeland Defense = (A&F)

- The primary tasker of what the boss wants to know but doesn't know
- Grouped under this agency are the primary intelligence cell and the Information Analysis Infrastructure Protection Under secretariat. This Agency would use all functions of the intelligence cycle = A, B, C, D, E, and F

Grouped with this agency would be the following departments and their functions:

- Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection: (A&F)
- State and Local Government coordination agency: (ABCD&F)
- Inspector General: (CDEF)
- CIAO: (AB&F)
- National Communication System: (ABCDEF)
- NIPC of the FBI: (CDEF)
- National Infrastructure Simulation Analysis Agency: (B&C)
- Federal Protection Service: (AB&F)
- FLETC (Brunswick, Georgia): (AB&F)
- US Secret Service: (ABCDEF)
- FedCIRC: (ABCF)
- Plum Island Animal Disease Center: (ABCF)

These Agencies, and some from the other groupings, are the primary intelligence tasking agencies, as well as the primary intelligence information collecting agencies. Note, many agencies have analysts and produce an analytical product...all of them disseminate information.

2. The second group, walking closely hand and hand with the Information Analysis Infrastructure Protection Department, is the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. This agency might be considered the "Science and Technological Intelligence" side of information analysis.

- Undersecretary for Science and Technology: (ABCDEF)
- Homeland Research Technologies: (BCDEF)
- Science and Technology National Laboratories: (BC&F)
- Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee: (AB&F)

The Science and Technology agencies are primarily tasking, collecting and reporting agencies. The Undersecretary and Homeland Research Technologies may have analysts that process technical intelligence to share with other agencies.

3. The Third grouping is the Undersecretary for Management. I'm not educated enough to figure this one out all the way, but these groupings seem to fit together:

- Undersecretary for Management: (AB&F)
- General Counsel: (A&F)
- Director of Shared Services: (BC)
- Secretary of Agriculture: (ABCDF)
- Energy Assurance: (ABCDF)
- Domestic Energy Support Team: (ABCDF)

The Undersecretary for Management group tends to lend itself to questions of energy, food services, transportation, and shared management. Almost all of these agencies would task EEI's. All would disseminate information, Sec of Agriculture, Energy Assurance, and Domestic Energy Support Teams could house analysts in an Intelligence Cell.

4. Fourth Grouping is Border and Transportation Security. Here is how I would group them.

- Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security: (ABCF)
- Bureau of Citizenship Immigration Services: (ABCF)
- Commissioner of Customs: (ABF)
- Department of Commerce: (ABF)
- Immigration and Naturalization Service: (ABCF)
- Transportation Security: (BC)

The Border and Transportation Security group can provide intelligence information, but seldom provide analysts or analytical reports. They will disseminate information. The common thread among all these agencies is tasking intelligence analysts with EEI's and then disseminating reports on Border and Transportation security.

5. The fifth grouping is Emergency Response and Preparedness.

- Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Responses: (ABCF)
- Office Domestic Preparedness: (ABF)
- FEMA: (ABCF)
- National Domestic Preparedness Office: (ABF)
- Metropolitan Medical Response: (ABCF)
- National Disaster Medical System: (ABCF)
- Office of Emergency Preparedness: (ABF)

So, there you have a visual of the big picture, quite a monster. So what can we say about developing an integrated intelligence and indications warning cell that supports Homeland Defense? Where do we begin? Who do we start with? And, what do we do with it once we have designed it????

Here’s my take on this mess:

First: almost every division produces Intelligence Taskings. This large volume of tasking will overwhelm smaller intelligence systems. Figuring our Nation spends more money on Consequence Management than on Intelligence Analysts, it's disturbing. All of the above agencies develop or create Essential Elements of Information (EEI’s). Therefore, grouping all of these agencies into five larger categories helps to define how they support each other. The lead agency will be the Information Assurance and Analysis Department. This is where strategic direction will come from.

Secondly, they all disseminate information, in some format. They need to talk to each other. How this is solved will be the greatest Communications problem ever faced by our nation. I am almost sure all of these agencies are NOT talking to each other. They have no real way to figure out how to share information with each other. Fixing this will be as costly, if not more costly, than fielding the number of intelligence analysts necessary for a real homeland defense intelligence infrastructure.

Third, most all the agencies will be involved in tasking other agencies for information. I feel all of these departments may overtask the limited number of intelligence analysts we have available. Thus, terrorists continue to operate under the radar horizon of everyday intelligence study. Since Intelligence Analysts do not receive the stature they deserve in the work force, and are underpaid, and treated with less stature than other professions, it will be difficult to fix the analyst problem. It will take a major change in how we treat our analysts in the work place. I don’t see that happening.

Fourth, There are a handful of agencies that have an intelligence production cell. This would be a department that collects and processes intelligence information. If you regroup them according to their collecting and processing capabilities you get the following:

- CIA
- NSA
- FBI
- DIA
- NMIC (or whomever does the imagery now days)
- Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
- National Communication System
- US Secret Service
- Under secretary for Science and Technology
- Homeland Research Technologies
- Secretary of the Agriculture
- Energy Assurance
- Domestic Energy Support Team
- Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security
- INS/Customs

The information “collecting and processing” departments would provide the primary analysts to an I&W Cell....

The primary Customers of the above collection and processing agencies would be the Emergency Response and Preparedness departments, Law Enforcement Agencies, State and Local Governments. As well as FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and NMIC.

This type of system would compliment each other with intelligence analysis and analytical reports.

In addition, there needs to be a place for analysts to work without too much Bureaucratic Meddling, and a place where analysts can challenge each other. It's healthy to challenge each other and compare notes. Where would you find such a place in this monster? Secondly, it needs to be next or near to the President and Lawmakers, or at least accessible by electronic means. Third, a dissemination system must be designed, developed, and implemented. It is the dissemination of information that is broken when Intel fails to warn of an impending attack.

Finally, I think I'm on to something here, but not quite there yet...

Developing a new HOMELAND DEFENSE Intelligence infrastructure system will be extremely difficult. Looking at the current number of agencies assigned to Homeland Defense, it will be very difficult to understand how the parts compliment each other.

Ken Luikart

[This message has been edited by Lucky (edited 12-10-2004).]