I am attempting to hypothesize that nation's with better quality military equipment and better trained military personnel are more likely to initiate war, and intend to use the QJMA to determine the quality of a nation's capabilities.

Can this be achieved? I believe it can as it allows the calculation of weapon lethality and establishes combat variables.

Anyone disagree? Thank-you

An interesting point you raise, because it is “commonly assumed” that war initiation is coldly calculated by aggressive nations after a determination they will prevail. I, however, would claim that such is not the case at all.

Politicians, as leaders of nations (hence making the war initiation decisions) achieved their position of power by emotional appeal. Any study of salesmanship (such as convincing voters to vote for you) will readily affirm that the vast majority of people are swayed by emotional rather than analytical thought processes.

What should be an even greater consideration, beyond the existing Combat Power assessment of ground forces (QJMA level), would be a nation’s ENTIRE war-making capacity. This includes many economic issues, such as self-sufficiency, necessary raw materials, and production capacity. Population mobilization potential should be paramount as well. How one nation’s strengths in these areas grow over time vs. likely opponents should determine the timing of war initiation.

Are such things considered rationally and logically before initiating war? I contend not!

Lets take some well-known examples:

1) Germany, 1939. It is totally understood that the German economy and Armed forces buildup was in no way ready for war. Hitler himself had forecasted war would not occur before the mid 1940s, so that the German Navy, in particular, would have something of significance to participate with, and the German economy would have completed the infrastructure projects (synthetic fuels, petroleum reserves, etc) to enable larger armaments production than the 1939-1941 levels. Additionally, a number of Hitler’s key advisors were vehement in warning that Britain and France, under intense political pressure from powerful internal and international interest groups, would declare war over the Polish question. Cold calculation would in no way allow for a major war with an economy still not fully recovered from the 1920s. Time would actually be on the side of Germany to wait – economic growth, synthetic fuel increases, a navy worth considering, more developed Armaments industry. But Hitler couldn’t wait. Why? Was it his “intuition” the Britain and France would not risk losing millions of lives over Danzig? Or was it that he knew he had Parkinson’s disease, knew he had not many years left, and had to get going? Who knows, but Germany never could recover from the head start of her soon to be opponents in the industrial capacity factor. Yet the 1944 German Production figures, after having completed the huge infrastructure projects in the 1941-1942 timeframe, show the resident potential. Hitler initiated a war with anything but a reasoned calculation of war making power and war-making potential.
2) Great Britain, July 1940. This would apply to war continuation, since Britain already initiated war with Germany by declaration on 3 SEP 1939. In July 1940, after the fall of France, Germany made peace overtures to Britain. Britain rejected the peace feelers; despite knowing they could never defeat Germany without larger and more powerful coalition “partners.” Churchill’s emotional malice towards Hitler dominated his decision-making. As was predicted at this time, Britain had to lose her empire in order to “win” World War II. A case could be made if one compares 1939 Britain with empire vs. 1955 Britain, against 1939 Germany v. 1955 Germany – who really lost the war? Cold, calculating British thought in July 1940 would have said Germany, with its impotent navy is no threat to our sea-based empire, let them do us a favor and terminate Bolshevism. Enter Churchill’s emotion and the result is both loss of empire and ½ of Europe under Bolshevism for decades (including Poland whose “freedom” Britain used as justification for declaring war). Hardly rational, analytical decision-making on whether to war, or not to war.
3) Japan. 1941. The decision of Japan to attack the United States was so illogical and unreasoned; there is no need to belabor the obvious. Not only did the USA have some 3 times the population of Japan, but how many times the productive capacity as well! Then, added to this, was Japan’s current pre-occupation with China – requiring the majority of the Japanese Army, and voila, as bad a war initiation decision example as I can think of. Clearly no rational thought process of War Making Capacity entered this equation.

To be fair, the Communist nations post WWII seemed to do better in their assessments of initiating wars they should be able to win. Certainly 1950 North Korea had the Combat Power to overwhelm South Korea, the question arises as to the likelihood of American intervention, which I believe was discounted with some sense. America’s concern with the Western European Cold War theatre did dominate enough to prevent going for victory at the risk of a widening war, but not enough to prevent intervention. A misjudgment of some degree by North Korea, but not an emotionally driven error as the above examples.

Of course, North Vietnam also had superior war-making capacity vs. South Vietnam. Again, it would be hard to find indisputable fault for not anticipating US involvement, since an expectation of US interest driven decisions would have a real challenge to say Vietnam is where to make a stand. Fortunately for both North Korea and North Vietnam, the US didn’t apply victory driven strategy, so their misjudgment of US involvement didn’t result in would be annihilation.

I don't think I would wholly agree with that.

I think it is hard to generalise about what sort of circumstances need to be fulfilled before a country decides to go to war. Essentially, there would in each case be a weighing of different types of risks, and in some cases the risk and cost of not going to war might outweigh the risk and cost of doing so. Obviously, if the estimation is that your military forces are superior nd you have a good chance of winning, this will always strengthen the case for war.

"Politicians, as leaders of nations (hence making the war initiation decisions) achieved their position of power by emotional appeal. Any study of salesmanship (such as convincing voters to vote for you) will readily affirm that the vast majority of people are swayed by emotional rather than analytical thought processes."

Yes, but it is not "most people" who decide whether war is to be initiated or not . And while I agree that one would do well to keep in mind that many things beside pure calculation nfluences such decisions, I think it is hardly a lesser oversimplification to assume that such decisions are generally made on an emotional or irrational basis.

"1) Germany, 1939. It is totally understood that the German economy and Armed forces buildup was in no way ready for war. Hitler himself had forecasted war would not occur before the mid 1940s, so that the German Navy, in particular, would have something of significance to participate with, and the German economy would have completed the infrastructure projects (synthetic fuels, petroleum reserves, etc) to enable larger armaments production than the 1939-1941 levels. Additionally, a number of Hitler’s key advisors were vehement in warning that Britain and France, under intense political pressure from powerful internal and international interest groups, would declare war over the Polish question. Cold calculation would in no way allow for a major war with an economy still not fully recovered from the 1920s. Time would actually be on the side of Germany to wait – economic growth, synthetic fuel increases, a navy worth considering, more developed Armaments industry. But Hitler couldn’t wait. Why? Was it his “intuition” the Britain and France would not risk losing millions of lives over Danzig? Or was it that he knew he had Parkinson’s disease, knew he had not many years left, and had to get going? Who knows, but Germany never could recover from the head start of her soon to be opponents in the industrial capacity factor. Yet the 1944 German Production figures, after having completed the huge infrastructure projects in the 1941-1942 timeframe, show the resident potential. Hitler initiated a war with anything but a reasoned calculation of war making power and war-making potential."

I strongly question if time was on Germany's side in 1939. Sure, Germany was stronger in 1944 than in 1939, but relative to its adversaries, it was much weaker. They had a temporary lead in modern armaments, which gave them for a time the capacity to defeat their enemies, as events show. I think it is unlikely that her relative position would have done anything other than decline. Not to forget that it is also questionable whther Germany really preferred war in 1939, or if Hitler simply miscalculated the Western response to armed action against Poland.

"2) Great Britain, July 1940. This would apply to war continuation, since Britain already initiated war with Germany by declaration on 3 SEP 1939. In July 1940, after the fall of France, Germany made peace overtures to Britain. Britain rejected the peace feelers; despite knowing they could never defeat Germany without larger and more powerful coalition “partners.” Churchill’s emotional malice towards Hitler dominated his decision-making. As was predicted at this time, Britain had to lose her empire in order to “win” World War II. A case could be made if one compares 1939 Britain with empire vs. 1955 Britain, against 1939 Germany v. 1955 Germany – who really lost the war? Cold, calculating British thought in July 1940 would have said Germany, with its impotent navy is no threat to our sea-based empire, let them do us a favor and terminate Bolshevism. Enter Churchill’s emotion and the result is both loss of empire and ½ of Europe under Bolshevism for decades (including Poland whose “freedom” Britain used as justification for declaring war). Hardly rational, analytical decision-making on whether to war, or not to war."

I would disagree that Britain's continued resistance in 1940 can only be described emotionally. In fact, I think any sober analysis of the factors present at that time would support exactly the same course that was chosen. Here we have a case of the alternatives to war simply being so catastrophic that that continued resistance as long as it was in any way a feasible option was more or less a given. Any peace would have entailed the acceptance of German direct or indirect control of the continent, which would have put Britain in an untenable strategic position permanently. Such a Germany would have been so strong that there is no way the RN or anything else could have protected Britain against her in the long run. There was rationally AFAICS no real option to opposing this. And since this was not the Napoleonic era where you could sign a peace treaty and then re-enter the fray at your convenience, but the modern era where total war required the moral mobilisation of the whole population, the fight had to be carried on there and then.

"3) Japan. 1941. The decision of Japan to attack the United States was so illogical and unreasoned; there is no need to belabor the obvious. Not only did the USA have some 3 times the population of Japan, but how many times the productive capacity as well! Then, added to this, was Japan’s current pre-occupation with China – requiring the majority of the Japanese Army, and voila, as bad a war initiation decision example as I can think of. Clearly no rational thought process of War Making Capacity entered this equation. "

Agreed, but I do not think it can be put down to emotionalism either. The oil embargo more or less forced the Japanese into that course of action - again, less a case of war being really desirable than a case of the alternatives being even worse

"To be fair, the Communist nations post WWII seemed to do better in their assessments of initiating wars they should be able to win. Certainly 1950 North Korea had the Combat Power to overwhelm South Korea, the question arises as to the likelihood of American intervention, which I believe was discounted with some sense. America’s concern with the Western European Cold War theatre did dominate enough to prevent going for victory at the risk of a widening war, but not enough to prevent intervention. A misjudgment of some degree by North Korea, but not an emotionally driven error as the above examples.

Of course, North Vietnam also had superior war-making capacity vs. South Vietnam. Again, it would be hard to find indisputable fault for not anticipating US involvement, since an expectation of US interest driven decisions would have a real challenge to say Vietnam is where to make a stand. Fortunately for both North Korea and North Vietnam, the US didn’t apply victory driven strategy, so their misjudgment of US involvement didn’t result in would be annihilation."

Yep, but unlike in the cases above, in these cases such calculations could be more fundamentally at the heart of decisions because there were no comparably compelling arguments against peace. The decisions they faced were not comparable to those the British in 1940 or the Japanese in 1941 faced, they just had to weigh the possible benefits of war against the risks of war (rather than against the risks of war AND the risks of non-war).

"In summary, rather than concluding war initiation is made after objective and logic driven analysis of ground combat power (and even the more relevant present war making capability, and potential war making capacity) – the way it probably should be made, war initiation is instead made based on some level of emotional decision-making by politicians."

I fundamentally disagree with that. It is neccessary to consider the conditions existing in each case. There is ALWAYS an element of calculation, and therefore analysis (whether good or bad, valid or invalid). Nobody, regardless of which political system we are talking about, rises to national leadership withou a capacity for calculation. I do agree though that decsions of war are not neccessarily and always a direct product of the estimation of own military strength relative to that of the opposition.

regards,

Yes, but it is not "most people" who decide whether war is to be initiated or not .

You seem to have missed my point -- let me explain more clearly as I should have initially. MOST PEOPLE absolutely make decisions on some emotional basis -- looks, appearance, peer pressure, whatever. Such includes VOTING. Also well known is that to be emotionally "tuned in" one must be basically emotionally driven oneself. The computer nerd is not going to generate popular appeal for his election to office -- to use an illustrive exaggeration. Therefore Politicians, to get elected, must be emotionally driven people. Some level of calculation, of course, but emotional considerations will dominate. THAT is why war initiation decisions ultimately result from primarily emotionally driven decision-making.

I strongly question if time was on Germany's side in 1939. Sure, Germany was stronger in 1944 than in 1939, but relative to its adversaries, it was much weaker.

Let me quote from Mark Harrison "The Economics of World War II" pages 154 & 156 --

"... in September 1939 the German war economy was being developed at full speed, but the process was not yet complete -- German industry was not yet ready for war. GIGANTIC PROJECTS such as synthetic oil and rubber programs, chemical facilities for the production of explosives, and other steelworks ... were still far from a state of completion. They absorbed large quantities of capital and labor without contributing to the current output of munitions."

"Thus in 1942 two sources of rationalization of the German war economy came together to expand munitions output dramatically: ORGANIZATIONAL rationalization of the clumsy, counterproductive chain of command in weapons procurement, and TECHNICAL rationalization of the armament facilities now being commissioned at the end of a long gestation period which had begun with the big investment projects begun in the mid 1930s."

In 1944, Germany outproduced the Soviet Union -- in stark contrst to 1942 and 1943. France had no zeal for the war, and did not have war economy expansion potential as shown by the period between SEP 39 and MAY 40. Time was absolutely on the side of Germany to get its own war economy in order before risking major hostilities. Simply consider if Germany had been producing 1200 tanks per month at the time war with USSR broke out, and not the 300 some they were!

Not to forget that it is also questionable whther Germany really preferred war in 1939, or if Hitler simply miscalculated the Western response to armed action against Poland.

This is PRECISELY my point -- Hitler made the gamble based on his thoughts, and did not let calculated objective analysis tell him that the risks of a major European War at this time FAR OUTWEIGHED any advantages of immediate occupation of Poland. How can anyone conclude this was a calculated analytical decision, and not some level of emotional / gambling / intuition driven decision?

I would disagree that Britain's continued resistance in 1940 can only be described emotionally. ...the alternatives to war simply being so catastrophic that that continued resistance as long as it was in any way a feasible option was more or less a given.

Catatrophic? How about the RESULTS of their decision! Empire gone. From a larger economy than the USA in 1938 to 2nd rate power at best. Half of Europe dominated by an avowed enemy, much larger in scope and power relatively than Germany had been -- with only American nuclear deterrance inhibiting their further expansion.

Any peace would have entailed the acceptance of German direct or indirect control of the continent, which would have put Britain in an untenable strategic position permanently. Such a Germany would have been so strong that there is no way the RN or anything else could have protected Britain against her in the long run.

Do you really think Germany was going to cross the channel in the Rhine river barges tney were assembling? The more one looks at what was behind the Sea Lion facade, the more of joke it becomes. Look at the incredible planning and logistical structure it took the US and Britain to launch Overlord. Do you really think Germany could have put that together?

Germany's only peace demand was a return of their colonies. Seeing as how Britain lost ALL her colonies to America or independence movements she was not strong enough to qwell, how much of an "an untenable strategic position" does that really seem?

Had Germany been under direction of a real Stateman, you would be correct. A real German Statesman would have recognized that the real enemy at present is Britain, and that Bolshevism, while more of a threat long term, is not of immediate concern. Had Germany had the intention and will to really go after Britain, and Britain's alternative was complete occupation of the Home Island, well, your assessment of no real alternative would have universal agreement.

But that was not Hitler's interest and intention, much to the demise of his country. Given Hitler's intention of the British empire remaining as a stabilizing force in the world, only wanting to cease fratercidal conflict, Britain's alternatives were vastly less onerous than the eventual results of the war.

The oil embargo more or less forced the Japanese into that course of action - again, less a case of war being really desirable than a case of the alternatives being even worse

Do you really think Japan had no other alternatives? They subsequently seized oil resources in Southeast Asia from Britain. They could have cooperated with Germany in a real Operation Orient with the resultant seizure of Mideast Oil. They could have cooperated with Germany in seizing the USSR, with the Caucasus Oil fields. Lots of possibilities, any of which would be better than challenging a nation they had no hope of defeating.

Like you stated, the war required population mobilization. Do you think the American population could be mobilized to fight for defending the British empire in SE Asia? Hardly! It took Pearl Harbor to get America really mobilized.

I fundamentally disagree with that. It is neccessary to consider the conditions existing in each case. There is ALWAYS an element of calculation, and therefore analysis (whether good or bad, valid or invalid). Nobody, regardless of which political system we are talking about, rises to national leadership withou a capacity for calculation.

Lets agree to disagree!

I've spent a good few years working with politics directly and indirectly, as well as history, and I utterly disagree with this. Some politicians are emotional types, others are not. Even those who are emotional types are generally not analytically weak, at least those who survive to reach high office. In fact, some of history's premier political calculators have also been rather emotional characters, just think of Bismarck. But anyway, what they all have in common is an ability for calculation, which is an almost absolute prerequisite for political survival, to say nothing of advancement to places of prominence and influence. To apply emotional appeal effectively requires exactly calculation of some sort. To borrow your own simile, the politician is the salesman. And what drives the actions of the salesman, emotion or calculation?

"Let me quote from Mark Harrison "The Economics of World War II" pages 154 & 156 --

"... in September 1939 the German war economy was being developed at full speed, but the process was not yet complete -- German industry was not yet ready for war. GIGANTIC PROJECTS such as synthetic oil and rubber programs, chemical facilities for the production of explosives, and other steelworks ... were still far from a state of completion. They absorbed large quantities of capital and labor without contributing to the current output of munitions."

"Thus in 1942 two sources of rationalization of the German war economy came together to expand munitions output dramatically: ORGANIZATIONAL rationalization of the clumsy, counterproductive chain of command in weapons procurement, and TECHNICAL rationalization of the armament facilities now being commissioned at the end of a long gestation period which had begun with the big investment projects begun in the mid 1930s."

In 1944, Germany outproduced the Soviet Union -- in stark contrst to 1942 and 1943. France had no zeal for the war, and did not have war economy expansion potential as shown by the period between SEP 39 and MAY 40. Time was absolutely on the side of Germany to get its own war economy in order before risking major hostilities. Simply consider if Germany had been producing 1200 tanks per month at the time war with USSR broke out, and not the 300 some they were!"

Well, nobody is doubting that Germany would have gotten stronger by waiting. So, however, would everybody else, and I think that a good case could be made that 1939 was all in all not a very bad time for the war to start from the German case. In any case, the point is moot if the war started as a result of political miscalculation rather than choice.

"This is PRECISELY my point -- Hitler made the gamble based on his thoughts, and did not let calculated objective analysis tell him that the risks of a major European War at this time FAR OUTWEIGHED any advantages of immediate occupation of Poland. How can anyone conclude this was a calculated analytical decision, and not some level of emotional / gambling / intuition driven decision"

Of course it was calculation! He did not declare war on Poland on some whim, he made a political assesment that the Western Powers would respond in a certain way. The calculation turned out to be wrong, and it certainly was risky, but it is still a calculation. Not in the "Let's-sit-down-with-a-pen-and-paper-and-work-out-the-factors-dispassionately"-sort of sense, but calculation does not need to be that.

"Catatrophic? How about the RESULTS of their decision! Empire gone. From a larger economy than the USA in 1938 to 2nd rate power at best. Half of Europe dominated by an avowed enemy, much larger in scope and power relatively than Germany had been -- with only American nuclear deterrance inhibiting their further expansion."

As opposed to Empire gone, economic survival at best, ALL of europe dominated by an avowed enemy likely to have become much larger in scope and power than the Soviet Union was and with nothing inhibiting their further expansion

"Do you really think Germany was going to cross the channel in the Rhine river barges tney were assembling? The more one looks at what was behind the Sea Lion facade, the more of joke it becomes. Look at the incredible planning and logistical structure it took the US and Britain to launch Overlord. Do you really think Germany could have put that together?"

Yes, of course the Germans could have successfully invaded Britain eventually, if they were allowed to consolidate their grip on all of Europe! In five, ten, twenty years, that hardly matters from the British perspective. The question is rather whether they would even have needed to - with Germany in stable control of the whole continent, Britain's security position would have become fundamentally and permanently untenable.

"Germany's only peace demand was a return of their colonies. Seeing as how Britain lost ALL her colonies to America or independence movements she was not strong enough to qwell, how much of an "an untenable strategic position" does that really seem?"

Ah, but you are missing the vital point in the peace settlement - it would have amounted to British acceptance of German control over the European continent. That was exactly Hitlers offer, Britain to keep its empire, in return for accepting continental Europe as a German sphere of dominance. What London rightly considered was that this was much too high a price to pay even for the integrity of the Empire.

"Had Germany been under direction of a real Stateman, you would be correct. A real German Statesman would have recognized that the real enemy at present is Britain, and that Bolshevism, while more of a threat long term, is not of immediate concern. Had Germany had the intention and will to really go after Britain, and Britain's alternative was complete occupation of the Home Island, well, your assessment of no real alternative would have universal agreement.

But that was not Hitler's interest and intention, much to the demise of his country. Given Hitler's intention of the British empire remaining as a stabilizing force in the world, only wanting to cease fratercidal conflict, Britain's alternatives were vastly less onerous than the eventual results of the war."

I completely disagree with you I am afraid. Short of outright occupation, I do not think it is possible to envisage any state of affairs more critically detrimental to Britain than a European continent under the control of a single and even potentially hostile power. It is not without reason that the avoidance of this had been a primary objective of British European policy for centuries - basic common sense dictates that any power that controls Europe is also strong enough to defeat Britain if it should choose to pursue such a course. This would have been a far worse outcome than the actual one, and also much worse than the loss of the whole empire.

"Do you really think Japan had no other alternatives? They subsequently seized oil resources in Southeast Asia from Britain. They could have cooperated with Germany in a real Operation Orient with the resultant seizure of Mideast Oil. They could have cooperated with Germany in seizing the USSR, with the Caucasus Oil fields. Lots of possibilities, any of which would be better than challenging a nation they had no hope of defeating."

My point that they did not consider that they had any other alternatives (or at least, none they were willing to consider). Possibly, they were wrong. In fact, it is hard, with hindsight, to envisage any course of action with a worse result . That however does not make it an emotional decision, just one based on bad analysis. I agree though that it is certainly an example of a decision reached not on the basis of a careful evaluation of the warmaking potential of the two opponents.

"Lets agree to disagree!"

Let's agree to discuss instead, it's so much more useful and interesting than merely disagreeing

regards,

"Let's agree to discuss instead, it's so much more useful and interesting than merely disagreeing"

OK!!

"I've spent a good few years working with politics directly and indirectly, as well as history, and I utterly disagree with this. Some politicians are emotional types, others are not. Even those who are emotional types are generally not analytically weak, at least those who survive to reach high office. In fact, some of history's premier political calculators have also been rather emotional characters, just think of Bismarck. But anyway, what they all have in common is an ability for calculation, which is an almost absolute prerequisite for political survival, to say nothing of advancement to places of prominence and influence. To apply emotional appeal effectively requires exactly calculation of some sort. To borrow your own simile, the politician is the salesman. And what drives the actions of the salesman, emotion or calculation?"

We may be having a disagreement over semantics. You see, I work in engineering by trade, and we simply assume ANALYSIS = WORST CASE ANALYSIS! Not simply hoping for an outcome, but making all plans based on the worst outcome.

As you indicate, their may be some level of calculation in trying to figure out a potential opponents response (such as the SEP 1939 scenario), but I would not characterize that as, shall we say, a proper analysis / calculation. One always HOPES for the best, but must PLAN for the worst. I will put forth that Hitler and his immediate political circle forwent such a Worst-Case analysis (what if UK & France declare) and was assuming his intuition would be correct -- regarding what their response would be. I don't consider a failure to make planning provisions for worst-case to be accurately described as calculation / analysis -- but that may be MY semantic problem!

Of course the end result is that if there is not an extremely high probability one will come out way ahead, given the worst-case scenario -- then do not initiate any action that could bring such about. Wait for better circumstances!

"Well, nobody is doubting that Germany would have gotten stronger by waiting. So, however, would everybody else, and I think that a good case could be made that 1939 was all in all not a very bad time for the war to start from the German case."

Without going into heavy numerical support, i will contend that Germany, after 1942 when the huge new armament facilities had finished their gestation and were able to produce, would be able to almost equal the production of USSR & Britain combined -- not quite, but close enough to win given their very significant qualitative advantage (CEV) in the early war years before attrition severly downgraded that qualitative edge. America was the real problem -- not only in and of herself, but the MASSIVE aid to the USSR (trucks & explosives in particular).

Germany, from 1939 to say 1944 potential, was on the order of 4x improvement potential -- far more than either the UK or the USSR. Yes, UK & USSR did improve and get stronger, no doubt, but if one calculates the Slope of Productive Capacity increase, Germany's was way higher, not just slightly higher. Because the war started with even Britain alone outproducing Germany in tanks and aircraft (1940), it became too big a hole to get out of. These are the considerations that a real German Statesman would have looked at and figured -- not simply "calculating" that UK & France will not declare over Poland.

"I completely disagree with you I am afraid. Short of outright occupation, I do not think it is possible to envisage any state of affairs more critically detrimental to Britain than a European continent under the control of a single and even potentially hostile power. It is not without reason that the avoidance of this had been a primary objective of British European policy for centuries - basic common sense dictates that any power that controls Europe is also strong enough to defeat Britain if it should choose to pursue such a course."

Britain's security as a nation, other than outright invasion and occupation of course, was based on sea lanes and her empire -- that was the source of her economic strength -- not the goings on in continental Europe.

We likely have very different views on the difficulty and risk of amphibious operations against a strong opponent. This may be enough to start a whole new thread on, but I will contend even with the MASSIVE Allied superiority for the invasion of Normandy, had the German High Command not totally screwed things up, it would have been defeated. Not with the forces historically on hand of course, but had their been the instantaneous response to move ALL armored forces immediately to the beach head, etc., Night Attacks by 4-5 Panzer divisions, an equal number of Infantry Divisions, by 8 JUN...

Anyway, my point is that with the RNs huge superiority, which there seemed to be no means to overcome, and the RAFs priority buildup, I remain unconvinced that invasion would ever be a real possibility. If the empire's economic strength remained intact, Germany could not have developed the incredible superiority in all areas, AND developed a competence in amphibious operations which were completely foreign, AND had to maintain sizeable forces to east, even if only garrisoning an occupied USSR -- not feasible. True speculation, I know, but I recall my active duty time in the USMC, and the most clear amphibious doctrine is, despite mandatory Air and Naval supremacy (not just superiority) we land where the enemy is not. Its just to risky and/or costly otherwise.

If Britain thought they had to fear occupation / conquest / defeat -- because Germany was in control of continental Europe, they have the Chicken Little syndrome.

"My point that they (Japan) did not consider that they had any other alternatives (or at least, none they were willing to consider). Possibly, they were wrong."

My recent viewing of a History Channel show, I think entitled "The Samurai and the Swastika" put forth that the Japanese Army wanted to join Germany in an attack on the USSR, while the Japanese Navy favored a surprise attack on the US. The only major player both services respected, Admiral Yamamoto, ended up making the call. So there was very clear consideration of the joint attack on Russia alternative. Like you inferred, its hard to imagine what sort of thought process determined an attack on the US was a rational course of action. The show indicated it was as absurd as the Hitler & Poland determination -- that after a few naval defeats America will sue for peace! Yea, right!

I will have to pur forth my semantics again and call for worst-case planning to be a qualifier to call a decision calculated / reasoned / logical -- not simply thinking another nation will respond in a certain manner.

quote:

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Originally posted by J Gilbert:
We likely have very different views on the difficulty and risk of amphibious operations against a strong opponent. This may be enough to start a whole new thread on, but I will contend even with the MASSIVE Allied superiority for the invasion of Normandy, had the German High Command not totally screwed things up, it would have been defeated. Not with the forces historically on hand of course, but had their been the instantaneous response to move ALL armored forces immediately to the beach head, etc., Night Attacks by 4-5 Panzer divisions, an equal number of Infantry Divisions, by 8 JUN...

---

Sorry to jump in on what has been a fascinating read, but at this point I have to cry nonsense!

Any scenario that results in the Germans reacting decisively to an Allied landing in Normandy within 48 hours and with a force of 4-5 panzer divisions and 4-5 infantry divisions would require a near absolute suspension of disbelief. For one, it would require that the number of panzer and infantry divisions capable of reacting be approximately quadrupled. For another, it would require near total German air superiority over the communications lines in France (and, if that were the case, one could ask why the Allies would be so foolish to even attempt such an operation?).

No, this is a non-starter unless you begin by changing so many earlier events in such a way as to make this alternate-history unrecognizable from our own.

quote:

---

Originally posted by JM Serrano:
A large storm on the 7th and 8th of June would have made that possible.

---

So we add in a "large storm" extending over two days to the mix. How does that in and of itself make it possible for the Germans to generate more combat power and - somewhat more importantly - get it to Normandy? Which is what I presume you mean by "that"?

Any scenario that results in the Germans reacting decisively to an Allied landing in Normandy within 48 hours and with a force of 4-5 panzer divisions and 4-5 infantry divisions would require a near absolute suspension of disbelief. For one, it would require that the number of panzer and infantry divisions capable of reacting be approximately quadrupled."

Well, lets review the 6 JUN dispositions, followed by some actual arrival times, and the bungled departure times --

21st PZ DIV – just south of Caen, 15 miles from the invasion shoreline
12th SS PZ DIV – 30 miles NW of Falaise, 30 miles from the invasion shoreline
PZ LEHR DIV – 35 miles NW of Le Mans, just over 100 miles from the invasion shoreline
116th PZ DIV – 20 miles east of Rouen, 90 miles from the invasion shoreline
2nd PZ DIV – Amiens area, 150 miles from the invasion shoreline
17th SS PG DIV – just south of Tours, 200 miles from the invasion shoreline

To become reserves after the above deployed:
11th PZ DIV – NW of Bordeaux
9th PZ DIV – South Coast area
2nd SS PZ DIV – Toulouse area

Not as much detail on INF DIVs --
91st Air Landing Div – there
352nd INF DIV – there
5th PARA DIV (motorized) – 30 miles SW of Rennes, 140 miles from the invasion shoreline
77th INF DIV – TBD
243rd INF DIV – TBD
265th INF DIV – TBD

12th SS PZ DIV was in action of 7 JUN. PZ LEHR was in action on 8 JUN, although not in full attack preparation. The Pz Lehr Div Cmdr wanted to depart at 0230 on 6 JUN -- following recognition of the Parachute assault. Due to bungling, departure did not occur until after 1700 on 6 JUN. Yet they were able to cover the 100 mile distance by 8 JUN -- despite missing out on the daylight drizzle of 6 JUN AM. How so, pray tell?

Figure the other distances as well -- given an appropriate march order by 0200 after recognition that 82nd, 101st & 6th Para Divs are not going to be involved in a sideshow. That would have provided a few hours of darkness followed by the low clouds and drizzly rain of 6 JUN AM -- movement unimpeded by Ait Arttack. Arrival within 24 hours of the alert -- most achievable if the only problem was Allied air. The MUCH bigger problem was the German high Command.

I don’t think it presumptuous to say these divisions were awaiting the invasion, and those inland should be able to react to an invasion, do you? Why should they need days to get ready to move, they’ve had months to prepare? Gasoline stores, pontoon bridges for bombed major bridges, road march planning -- what else should these units have been doing for the last number of months?

The failure to react during the night of 5-6 JUN, plus the low cloud cover throughout the morning of 6 JUN can only be described as major league bungling.

Very unlike Sicily, Salerno & Anzio, this time the Wehrmacht did have the combat power potential within 100 miles to deploy and obtain attack superiority where they chose.

The actual dispositions, actual (bungled) departure times and actual arrival times are clear to me. Where does "quadrupled" come from?

Firstly, I must agree with Rich that given German dispositions, they did not have any realistic chance whatsoever of defeating the Normandy landings. Realistically, only 3 German Panzer divisions (21st, 12th SS, Lehr)could have been anywhere near fully deployed against the landings within that timeframe even under the best of circumstances, and it would not have been enough.

Leaving that matter aside and returning to the original issue:

"We may be having a disagreement over semantics. You see, I work in engineering by trade, and we simply assume ANALYSIS = WORST CASE ANALYSIS! Not simply hoping for an outcome, but making all plans based on the worst outcome."

Clearly! Well, that clears things up a bit. Certainly, you are right that I am not neccessarily talking abou calculation in such a narrow sense. But then - it is not possible to calculate in this way in politics, because politics deals to a large extent with anticipating human reaction, which unlike material factors are not amenable to quantified calculation. That however does not make political calculation "emotional" in the sense that it is devoid of calculation - it is just that calculation in the human sphere deals with less precise entities.

"As you indicate, their may be some level of calculation in trying to figure out a potential opponents response (such as the SEP 1939 scenario), but I would not characterize that as, shall we say, a proper analysis / calculation. One always HOPES for the best, but must PLAN for the worst. I will put forth that Hitler and his immediate political circle forwent such a Worst-Case analysis (what if UK & France declare) and was assuming his intuition would be correct -- regarding what their response would be. I don't consider a failure to make planning provisions for worst-case to be accurately described as calculation / analysis -- but that may be MY semantic problem!"

According to your semantic definition, you would strictly speaking be correct - if war was only made when it could confidently be assumed that the party in question was covered against all foreseeable eventualities, there would have been many, many fewer wars. But I would argue that states rarely have the luxury of being in such a position (or even in a position of possessing an adequate overview of all relevant factors), and that accepting an element of risk is not neccessarily irrational.

"Britain's security as a nation, other than outright invasion and occupation of course, was based on sea lanes and her empire -- that was the source of her economic strength -- not the goings on in continental Europe.

We likely have very different views on the difficulty and risk of amphibious operations against a strong opponent. This may be enough to start a whole new thread on, but I will contend even with the MASSIVE Allied superiority for the invasion of Normandy, had the German High Command not totally screwed things up, it would have been defeated. Not with the forces historically on hand of course, but had their been the instantaneous response to move ALL armored forces immediately to the beach head, etc., Night Attacks by 4-5 Panzer divisions, an equal number of Infantry Divisions, by 8 JUN...

Anyway, my point is that with the RNs huge superiority, which there seemed to be no means to overcome, and the RAFs priority buildup, I remain unconvinced that invasion would ever be a real possibility. If the empire's economic strength remained intact, Germany could not have developed the incredible superiority in all areas, AND developed a competence in amphibious operations which were completely foreign, AND had to maintain sizeable forces to east, even if only garrisoning an occupied USSR -- not feasible. True speculation, I know, but I recall my active duty time in the USMC, and the most clear amphibious doctrine is, despite mandatory Air and Naval supremacy (not just superiority) we land where the enemy is not. Its just to risky and/or costly otherwise.

If Britain thought they had to fear occupation / conquest / defeat -- because Germany was in control of continental Europe, they have the Chicken Little syndrome."

Here I am afraid I think you are completely wrong. Firstly, Britain's fundamental integrity could survive even the complete loss of her empire (as indeed it has!). Secondly, the point about the continent is not that it was the source of her economic power, which of course it wasn't, but that the only realistic threat against Britain's home territories was a continental Europe under the control of a single European power. This was exactly Germany's position in 1940. Ther could of course never be any hope for Britain to single-handedly oppose such a power in the long run, if it was allowed to consolidate itself and choseto pursue a hostile course - it is a simple matter of resources. British naval supremacy might have lasted a decade, the RAF build-up could never hope to contend with the German if they put their infinitely superior resources behind it. Quite simply - an isolated Britain would be fundamentally so much weaker than a Germany with hegemonic power on the continent that it would not in the long run have been any prospect of opposing her successfully, whether the German approach had been blockade, strategic air campaign or invasion, and whether that happened in two, five, ten or twenty years. It is not without reason that the avoidance of hegemonic power on the continent has historically been the key factor in all Britain's entanglements in continental wars during the modern era, and has always been recognised as the key British European concern, even in periods when Britain acknowledged no other interest in Europe.

Britain could of course hope for two things. One was was between Germany and the Soviet Union. But if britain stood outside such a conflict, she would merely either witness a German victory that made them more powerful still, or a Soviet one which would hardly have put them in a better position. So, that hope dictates staying in the conflict. Secondly, they could hope for American support. But that too becomes infinitely less likely if Britain has already caved in and accepted German control of Europe.

In short - they would be avoiding the possible worst case in the short run, at the price of making it virtually certain in the long run. The simple fact was that if Britain was going to have any chance of getting out of the dark hole it found itself in during the summer of 1940, it had no other option than continue to fight. In terms of calculation and analysis, I think there were few cases with an outcome as self-evident as this one, I do not find it hard to understand Churchill's absolute conviction on this point - on a basis of calculation, not emotion.

"I will have to pur forth my semantics again and call for worst-case planning to be a qualifier to call a decision calculated / reasoned / logical -- not simply thinking another nation will respond in a certain manner."

I appreciate your point and do not disagree that any sound calculation includes an adequate notion of what to do if assumptions turn out to be incorrect, but I think that is too simple. For example, any decision of this kind must of neccessity include an assesment of how another nation is likely to react, and such assessments are inherently uncertain. Without them, the scope of action dimishes almost to vanishing point. Also, sometimes in war and politics, it is simply preferable to accept risks. More frequently, it is neccessary to do so. And that is every bit as much calculation as basing decisions on worst-case planning in my book.

regards,

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
[B

"Clearly! Well, that clears things up a bit. Certainly, you are right that I am not neccessarily talking about calculation in such a narrow sense.

Time for me to defend my semantics -- according to Webster's the initial definition of calculation is: "to determine by mathematical methods; compute." the remaining definitions become more vague and can line up with your interpretation. However, I contend my semantics are not at all narrow, and in fact are more in keeping with the mathematical connotation of the word. Not that we want to argue over semantics, but I will use this to more clearly explain a view contrasting to yours.

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

"But then - it is not possible to calculate in this way in politics,..."

Here I must heartily disagree. When a nation's political leaders make decisions that may result in occupation by a foreign power, they damn well owe it to their population to apply quantitative analysis / estimation wherever possible.

Specifically, comparing GNPs, raw material resources, population mobilization potential, internal wealth to support total war production for an indeterminate period, then, the more applicable QJM type items on force strength, type, quantity, etc. that Charlie first mentioned to initiate this thread.

And NOT just if foreign powers (allies, neutrals or opponents) act as predicted, but also if they do not act as expected! Contingency planning is so obviously necessary, that its absence must push decision-making to be in the emotional sphere (devoid of calculation as you refer to) in contrast to a reasoned and thoughtful decision.

Really, how difficult would it have been for Hitler (well, probably impossible for him based on his seemingly intuitive approach to everything -- so say a true German Statesman)to make a simple assessment 1) When we take back Polish territory, Britain and France do nothing 2) When we take back Polish territory, Britain & France declare war. A quantified analysis of Course #2 (per the above listed factors as a start) would have indicated that this is not an acceptable risk -- by 1942 it may be, but not now. Quite simply 1939 Germany was not ready for war with multiple major powers -- so why initiate events that could likely lead to such -- especially when compared to the "gain" of occupying a portion of Poland?

Is common sense that uncommon? Of course one cannot predict with certainty how other human beings will react, but basic contingency planning when tens of thousands to millions of lives are at stake, and foreign occupation of your country is at stake -- is hardly too much to expect of a leader!

QUOTE]Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

"But I would argue that states rarely have the luxury of being in such a position (or even in a position of possessing an adequate overview of all relevant factors), and that accepting an element of risk is not neccessarily irrational."

Very true. But like most everyone else, I choose examples to illustrate points, and even if we disagree on some substantive issues, I doubt you can seriously maintain that for the 3 examples I chose, there were primary, essential, or otherwise relevant factors not fully grasped (or that should have been grasped) by the decision makers.

QUOTE]Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

"... that the only realistic threat against Britain's home territories was a continental Europe under the control of a single European power. This was exactly Germany's position in 1940. There could of course never be any hope for Britain to single-handedly oppose such a power in the long run, if it was allowed to consolidate itself and chose to pursue a hostile course - it is a simple matter of resources."

Lets not forget the Soviet-German issue. Does anyone contend their "alliance" was going to last? Molotov in the NOV 1940 meeting made it most clear that conflict was coming, and shortly! Did not both powers align the majority of their ground forces facing each other beginning in the latter half of 1940? Heinz Magenheimer in "Hitler's War, Germany's Key Strategic decisions 1940-1945" makes a very substantial case that based on archived records available since the 1991 regime change in the former Soviet Union, that Stalin had a plan in place to attack Germany via Poland -- later in 1941 or 1942 if I recall -- with the collateral explanation of why the Red Army was disposed the way it was. Stalin, a more pragmatic leader, didn't believe Hitler would be stupid enough to initiate a 2-front war, and therefore had no fear of non-defensive deployments.

Anyway, Point #1 is that even prior to Barbarossa, Germany's limited resources were somewhat diverted to guard the eastern frontier.

Point #2: How was Germany's power to conduct war (vs. Britain) enhanced by occupying France? Yes, the French Army was no longer in existence, but what resources were enhanced, and at what cost. Do you think the Lorraine iron ore obtained, which was significant in that Swedish deliveries were no longer critically essential -- were worth the occupation forces? How was Germany's war-making capacity increased, vs. the cost in occupation forces?

Williamson Murray, in one of the best (of well over a hundred) books I've read on WWII, "Luftwaffe" put it very clearly on pages 97 & 99:

"The Germans had entered the war with a surprisingly low production rate. However, given the resource limitations under which they worked, production levels reflected economic reality. The victories of 1940 however, fundamentally altered Germay's strategic and economic situation. Not only had the Germans captured large stockpiles of raw materials in France and the Low Countries but the modern industrial plant of those nations was now under their control... with these resources at their disposal, the Germans were in a position to organize the new conquests in tandem with their own war economy in order to increase drastically their armament production. They did no such thing!"

"In the case of France, however (previous paragraph discussed the incorporation of Czech industry for war production), things worked out quite differently. In all of 1941, the French aircraft industry produced only 62 aircraft for the Luftwaffe (Holland only 16), while Czech plants produced 819. The reason is quite apparent: In the case of Czechoslovokia, the Germans were still in a difficult strategic and economic situation, and they, therefore, eagerly incorporated Czech potential into their economic system. The euphoria after victory over France however, led most of the Luftwaffe's leadership to disregard the low production figures for German industry, and to ignore the possible integration of western European economies, including France, into the German war effort."

The book goes on to explain the major labor shortages, and the utterly dismal production for 1941. Germany's 1940 victories did not add to her war making power and resources -- another "accomplishment" of Hitler, Goering and the political leadership circle.

Germany's power position in 1940 and early 1941 was, other than the absence of having to oppose the French Armed Forces, not significanttly increased. The early victories did not create this mega-monster that Britain had to fear.

QUOTE]Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

"British naval supremacy might have lasted a decade, the RAF build-up could never hope to contend with the German if they put their infinitely superior resources behind it."

Well, agreed that if a real Statesman was at Germany's helm, Britain would have been defeated, one way or another -- but not because of some infinite level of resources. Germany could defeat Britain 1-on-1 in 1939 -- the 1940 vicories didn't change resources substantially as explained above. Britain's position vs. Germany had not really changed -- what had changed significantly is that France was out of the equation, and Germany had closer territorial access. But metamorphosis into some huge continental power -- no way!

QUOTE]Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

"The simple fact was that if Britain was going to have any chance of getting out of the dark hole it found itself in during the summer of 1940, it had no other option than continue to fight. In terms of calculation and analysis, I think there were few cases with an outcome as self-evident as this one, I do not find it hard to understand Churchill's absolute conviction on this point - on a basis of calculation, not emotion."

Let me offer different approach, one that a CALCULATING Stateman guided only by Britain & empire interests may have considered:

In a word -- get USA to broker a peace agreement. If the USA was to oversee and guarantee a peace accord between Britain & Germany, it would allow all three to "win" -- the prerequisite for an agreement.
Britain would win by getting "out oif the hole" it was in, and still keep its empire. Its future security would be guaranteed by American intervention in the event of unprovoked German attack. Germany would win by ending the war Hitler didn't want in the first place. They could turn their attention eastward, with some level of assurance that America's guarantee would keep Britain from a future attack. America would win by staying out of another European War. The WWI type intervention would be nullified by the ego-laden President who could claim he was the great peace-maker, keeping America out of a war because he ended it -- with Britain and its empire intact.

REgarding your point about Britain's staying out of a German-Soviet War being a no win situation, given the above peace settlement, let me quote from Col. Albert Seaton's book "The Battle for Moscow" page 263:

"Germany was strong enough in 1941, even without the assistance of allies, to have destroyed the USSR as a political state, but it could have done this only if it had mobilized the whole of its resources. There could be no question of waging, at the same time, a costly air and sea war against Britain, or of leaving fifty divisions behind to garrison Western Europe. And it would have been necessary to gear the whole economy of the Reich to total war. Even if hitler had done all this, the margin between the war strengths of Germany and the Soviet Union was not great."

Therefore, Britain would not face a victorious USSR replacing Germany as the continetal power and not having the peace accord with American guarntees per the above scenario.

A final point --

I should have included Hitler's decision to atack the USSR as yet another ludicrous decision on war initiation. Not that their "alliance" would last much longer, but to mandate a multi-front war with Germany's limited resources boogles the rational mind. Add to that the pure geographical size of the USSR, the complete lack of good military intelligence, and known problems in the logistical system -- and the decision becomes even more puzzling. The Wehrmacht's tactical ability to defend followed by decisive counter-stroke was shown again and again throughout the war -- as long as they did not face opposing Air Superiority. That is how the Eastern Frontier should have been approached until Britain was disposed of or made peace with.

QUOTE]Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:

"Also, sometimes in war and politics, it is simply preferable to accept risks. More frequently, it is neccessary to do so. And that is every bit as much calculation as basing decisions on worst-case planning in my book."

I strongly disagree, regarding war anyway. If one is attacked, well war is forced upon you. But to INITIATE war, I contend risk of defeat is irresponsible and unforgiveable in a nation's leaders. The graver the possible consequences, the less risk is justified.

Regards,