When did the Soviet Union first codify the concept of attacking and defending in multiple echelons and when did it become a standard part of Soviet doctrine?

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I know in Triandafillov's book (1929) he mentions the need for multiple echelons in operations.

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Was this pre- or post- implimentation?

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It may have come about because the Soviets saw the necessity of sustaining an operation through its depth.

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Yes, but I am not sure how echelons, by themselves, do that; unless one is attempting to compensate for a lack of a well-developed logistics system and replacement system, by throwing additional waves of troops at the problem.

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This was all coming together following the Russian Civil War which helped to direct Soviet military analyses in that direction (large theaters of operation with small forces and sparse resources, resulting in multiple, successive operations, characterized by large movement).

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And then there is a "undiscussed" lessons of the war, including the inability to defeat forces of equal size (at least I can not recall such a case off the top of my head), the need for armed commissars to maintain loyalty, the use of "shock teams" of leaders to reinforce critical sectors, the sending in of special units to critical sectors ahead of major operations, the lack of any sustainable logistic structure, the lack of any systematic replacement system, etc.

Part of the problem in understanding the development of Russian doctrine is that their propoganda often hides their problems, so it is sometimes difficult to tell if they are making a change to compensate for this undiscussed problem/weakness, or for some other reason.

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About this time in Soviet military literature you will come upon a consistent emphasis for the final phase of an operation, rather than the beginning.

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Not sure what to make of that.

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But, as to when it actually began, I'd have to look into that further, but most likely in the 1920s.

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Now....if the development of attack and defense in echelons developed in the 1920s, this is before the real development of armor. This would tend to lead one to believe that the use of echelons was not due to the development of a mechanized warfare doctrine, but pre-dates the introduction of armor (well not entirely...).

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Okay Greg, I've got a question for you:

When did the Soviet Union first codify the concept of attacking and defending in multiple echelons and when did it become a standard part of Soviet doctrine?

Try - http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/redopart.htm

this is a paper by Dr. Jacob Kipp on this topic, and probably will deal with the question .

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Was this pre- or post- implimentation?

Pre-implementation. Soviet operational art, which was based on deep operations was still mostly a theory when WWII hit. A well thought out theory, but theory nonetheless.

>It may have come about because the Soviets saw the necessity of sustaining an operation
>through its depth.

Yes, but I am not sure how echelons, by themselves, do that; unless one is attempting to compensate for a lack of a well-developed logistics system and replacement system, by throwing additional waves of troops at the problem.

Yes, but how much time do you have? The last thing the Soviets wanted to do was give the Germans any amount of time to react. They would react anyway, so better to plan for what they could throw at you immediately and just preempt the rest. By creating operational echelons for the offensive, the Soviets were insuring that an advance had as little downtime as possible until objectives were met. 1st echelon made the breakthrough, 2nd echelon (optional) secured against substantial enemy reserves, and 3rd echelon (the mobile group) exploited. A logistics system can do wonders for the overall health of an operation, as can replacements, but they can't react with the speed needed. Echelons provided an immediate pseudo-reserve system. What made an echelon's task somewhat easier was they generally knew what they'd be up against beforehand, and had planned their options out, cutting down on C&C load. This required good intelligence, and the Soviets had refined theirs.

>This was all coming together following the Russian Civil War which helped to direct
>Soviet military analyses in that direction (large theaters of operation with small
>forces and sparse resources, resulting in multiple, successive operations,
>characterized by large movement).

And then there is a "undiscussed" lessons of the war, including the inability to defeat forces of equal size (at least I can not recall such a case off the top of my head), the need for armed commissars to maintain loyalty, the use of "shock teams" of leaders to reinforce critical sectors, the sending in of special units to critical sectors ahead of major operations, the lack of any sustainable logistic structure, the lack of any systematic replacement system, etc.

Part of the problem in understanding the development of Russian doctrine is that their propoganda often hides their problems, so it is sometimes difficult to tell if they are making a change to compensate for this undiscussed problem/weakness, or for some other reason.

Propaganda is always a problem with Soviet text, but at the archival level it doesn't impact technical issues as much, at least it's fairly transparent. The Soviets had a logistics structure, but it was tailored to the needs of the operation, so it always varied. Same goes for their replacement system which was somewhat like the German system. They had replacement battalions in military districts for the parent division, and another set of replacement battalions/regiments at the front under army/front HQ command for use within the operation as a whole. There are tactical cases of equal side encounters where the Soviets handled themselves quite nicely. I can think of a mech corps in particular that with only 2/3's of its brigades pushed aside a reserve panzer division counterattack, then continued the advance. As for 'shock groups' of leaders in critical sectors (STAVKA reps?), this was because the Soviets placed most value in the operational level of the three branches of military art. That's where they put all their money, so to speak. And, commissars? Not sure what that's in reference to. Commissars were pretty much a non-issue by 1943. Now, SMERSH was another thing, but they were tasked with counter-intelligence for operational security, which was very tight. Special units in advance of operations I'm not sure of unless you're talking of razvedka (intelligence) operations during operational planning. ‘Special’ troops could be a reference from crack deep recon units to specialized bridge-layers.

>About this time in Soviet military literature you will come upon a consistent
>emphasis for the final phase of an operation, rather than the beginning.

Not sure what to make of that.

Could your response be the indication of an assumption that auftragstaktiks was the only way to go in 20th century total war? Let me use an analogy to try and pose the Soviet alternative. It’s not a good analogy, but it may offer another insight. I don’t know, but here goes.

Wait. Before I do that, let me at least show you where I’m coming from. I see auftragstaktiks as a response to the inability of the field commander to C&C his troops during ongoing military operations. This goes from the tactical level on up to the operational. War just got too big and too spread out for any one command staff to directly manage effectively. The Prussians/Germans of the 19th century came up with the idea of subunit commander initiative during the Napoleonic wars, then continued to develop the theory (not without a lot of resistance, at first) all the way up to WWII. Before too long this was more or less accepted as the method for conducting large scale military operations in the 20th century. Thus, it was generally assumed that direct C&C was impractical for large scale military operations. The Soviets, however, seemed to have disagreed. Okay, time for that (imperfect) analogy.

The analogy is an imperfect one, because it compares chess to checkers. What this analogy does not focus on is the relative complexities of the two games. I would say chess is easily the more complex game, but that’s not the point here. The analogy is one of differences in game play and strategy. The analogy is to compare Soviet military operations to chess, and German (western) military operations to checkers. Oh god, I know, but just keep it down long enough to read the next few paragraphs.

Chess is a game that rewards a player with excellent retentive memory, someone who can see a situation, pull out an appropriate sequence of maneuvers from memory, and execute it. Of course, good players invariably play other good players, so they both know what’s up. Hence, they need to mask their intent through misinformation or diversionary moves. But all this is decided at some point in play, then acted upon. If the plan falls apart, it could mean the game, but if the player discerns the opposing player’s intent soon enough, the original plan might be altered in order to usurp control, and win the game. Thus, the emphasis of chess is to plan ahead and plan well. And, deception can figure heavily in a good chess game.

Checkers, on the other hand, is a game of spontaneity and flexibility. It rewards a player who can capitalize on an immediate situation, yet keep his own pieces relatively safe. Planning is limited to immediately impending situations, so someone who can spot an advantageous situation, and quickly come up with good moves to make the most of it will win a lot of games.

The Soviets never totally gave up on centralized C&C of large scale military operations. They realized that if they could first deceive the Germans, complex planning was not out of the question (having the initiative helped too, no doubt). Also, if enough effective intelligence could be obtained for the military operation, operational plans would be as effective as they were complex. This methodology was more beneficial for offensive operations than defensive, but both facets could benefit from it.

I guess I should probably sit down and read Harrison.

Chris, now you have Hans von Seekt rolling in his grave

Seriously, the link Tangoj posted is probably a good answer to this statement of yours.

As for Harrison, I’ve heard things about Harrison’s last book, but haven’t been told exactly why it’s considered critically flawed. I do know he has some dated views about the German combined arms concept, so his comparisons do little good.

Greg

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
Good question, really. I know in Triandafillov's book (1929) he mentions the need for multiple echelons in operations. It may have come about because the Soviets saw the necessity of sustaining an operation through its depth. This was all coming together following the Russian Civil War which helped to direct Soviet military analyses in that direction (large theaters of operation with small forces and sparse resources, resulting in multiple, successive operations, characterized by large movement). About this time in Soviet military literature you will come upon a consistent emphasis for the final phase of an operation, rather than the beginning.

But, as to when it actually began, I'd have to look into that further, but most likely in the 1920s. Of course, this needs to be qualified, since the Soviets rarely thought 'defensively.' That was politically taboo. Svechin did consider defensive operations, and even though he was probably their foremost military specialist, Tukhachevskii still discredited him on such 'defeatist' doctrine. Hence, echelon in depth for defense was very lightly studied until WWII.

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Whatever att echelon used in finland did not bring the rus to helsinki in 6 days. Any person and army who thinks they could be in helsinki in 6 days during dec winter weather sounds like a mil ignoramous.

Any operation of this type proably needed many experianced officers which were few and far bettween after the purges. Also most of the mil leaders thinking was so warped by communist idelogy that it prevented clear headeness.

The rus army had 3 layers of rif div def and extra mech reserves and it helped little when the ger lauched barbarasso. Defence in too much depth leads to defeat in detail. Especially if thier were large areas to defend along the sides of divs as well. The rus divs in 41 and later were smaller then the 41 ger divs yet had far larger areas to defend.

I mean you could try to blame the initial ger victories on unpreadness of some rus units. Kiev and similar encirclment just in front moscow really point to the ger method being more productive. A strong drive by the ger sword usually broke through the overly diffuse rus defences. Also thier is much to be gained by driving into your opponents rear area in many ways militarially.

The ger method stopped working for reasons besides just that the rus one was better. Lucy spy ring, ultra, fighting two front land war etc...

It was only when the rus conc thier fwd def at kursk that they really weré able to slow the ger enough.

You need to slow down, track and hopefully attrit the attacking forces. To much area around divs does not allow any of these to happen.

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
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I guess I should probably sit down and read Harrison.
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As for Harrison, I’ve heard things about Harrison’s last book, but haven’t been told exactly why it’s considered critically flawed. I do know he has some dated views about the German combined arms concept, so his comparisons do little good.

[This message has been edited by Greg LG (edited 06-26-2003).][/B]

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Originally posted by WWII=interest:

Wait, are you guys talking about Mark Harrison, one of the leading Soviet econom writers to this day?

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I was referring to Richard W. Harrison, author of "The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940."

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Originally posted by Greg LG:
I was referring to Richard W. Harrison, author of "The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940."

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