Here is a short article which appeared about 18 months ago in Russia. If you are interested in receiving the chart which accompanies the article, tell me.

THE MEMORY OF MILLIONS OF FALLEN DEFENDERS OF THE FATHERLAND MUST NOT BE CONSIGNED TO OBLIVION

As the deputy chief editor of this journal I am constantly aware of the polemics which carry on in these pages on the subject of permanent [bezvozratnyy] losses of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War. Having served more than thirteen years in the Central Archives of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation [TsAMO], three of them as chief of the Department for Registering Permanent Losses among Sergeants and Privates, I know the true situation in this area very well.

For some time I have been forced to observe in silence the bitter arguments between my comrades and their opponents. I justified this to myself because on-going research in the archives was not yet finished. But these arguments have reached a culmination, and the work at TsAMO to the count the losses still has several years yet to go, so I no longer have the right to remain silent.

Therefore, following my conscience, as an officer and the grandson of a man who, on 17 November 1941, as a tank mechanic-driver in the 26th Tank Brigade, died defending Moscow, I think it my civil duty to publish this article.

The older generation will well remember that for several decades after the war personnel losses in the Soviet Union were officially given as 20 million persons (this number includes military and civilian losses). With the declassification of many archives in the 90’s, this number grew to 27 million. Then, for the first time, the losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR were publicized. In an interview in March 1990 with the editor of the Journal of Military History [Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, No. 3, 1990, page 14], the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, General of the Army M. A. Moiseyev, stated that during the Great Patriotic War (including the campaign in the Far East against imperialist Japan in 1945) the number of military personnel killed, missing, captured but not returned, died from wounds, sickness, and accident, numbered 8,668,400, of them 8,509,300 in the Army and Fleet, 97,700 in the internal troops, and 61,400 in the border guards. These numbers mentioned by the Chief of the General Staff, were determined by a commission which worked in 1988-1989 with the reports of Fronts, Fleets, Separate Armies, rear services organizations, and checked against the count kept by the General Staff in the entire war.

This same number was given in a large investigation of personnel losses in the Great Patriotic War “Security Classification Removed” [Grif Sekretnosti Snyat] which came out in 1993 under the general editorship of G. F. Krivosheyev, Candidate of Military Science, General-Colonel (retired).

In the present article I would like to talk about another source which contains information about losses in the Armed Forces of the USSR during the war – about documents which are preserved in TsAMO.

On July 9, 1941, within the Chief Directorate for Forming and Outfitting the Red Army (GUFKKA) was formed a Department for Registration of Personnel Losses and Bureau of Letters. The department’s assignment was to keep a register of personnel losses in the Armed Forces, to maintain an alphabetical card file of losses, and to conduct scientific research related to this.

On February 5, 1943 the department became the Central Bureau for Registration of Personnel Losses in the Active Armies, still under the GUGKKA, and on April 19, 1943, it became the Directorate for Registration of Personnel Losses in the Active Armies. It consisted of eight departments: Registration-Statistical, Card File, Letters with Loss Information, Inquiries about Servicemen, Letters with Information for the Card File, Special Projects [prikaznyy], Inspection, and Miscellaneous. Because the responsibility for registering losses among officers was transferred to the personnel agencies of the People’s Commissariat for Defense in June 12, 1943, the Directorate was renamed as the Directorate for Registration of Personnel Losses Among Junior Commanders and Privates of the Red Army, and was put under the head of the Chief Directorate for Rear Services of the Red Army. As of March 26, 1946 the Directorate was subordinated to the Chief Staff of the Land Forces, and after the elimination of this Chief Staff, was turned into the Department for Registration of Killed and Missing Privates and Sergeants as part of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. On December 30, 1965, the Department was put under the Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR (now TsAMO).

The Department preserves reports from active armies dating from the first days of the war concerning servicemen who were killed, missing, died from wounds and other reasons in large and small units as well as various military institutions. At the same time, information about servicemen who died of wounds or illnesses in hospitals or for other reasons came in from districts in the rear.

It must be clarified that, due to the difficult situation at the front, a full accounting of losses was not always possible, especially in the first years of the war. In such cases it was done not by name, but by overall totals. In order to identify the persons in such reports, starting in 1942 a registration was begun on the basis of reports from relatives of servicemen.

There were instances when military units could not conduct burials or include in loss reports permanent losses of dead privates and sergeants. Burial was carried out by the local population after liberation from the fascists, and the territorial military commissariats drew up lists of those interred based on personal documents of the deceased and soldiers’ medallions [a type of dog tag]. Immediately after the war and by 1949 the military commissariats conducted the so-called “canvass of yards” where they went to people’s yards and homes with lists of questions for relatives of frontline soldiers who did not return from the war, with the aim of identifying the missing. Such servicemen make up 60% of the card file. Lists and cards captured in 1944 which identify servicemen who died in captivity and other captured documents received in 1947-48 helped determine the fate of many.

All of the documents listed above make up the collection of more than 32,000 archival files at the Department for Registering Permanent Losses among Sergeants and Privates at TsAMO. On the basis of these, alphabetical cards for each serviceman – killed, died, missing, suicides, etc. - have been created with biographical information. Now in an alphabetical card file, they are the basic informational tool both for answering inquiries and for scientific research.

Additions to the card file as well as systemization and clarification of the information continue to this day. The last addition to the collection was made in 1993, when around 11,000 files with lists of servicemen who died from wounds in hospitals, medical battalions, and other treatment institutions were received from the archives of the Military Medical Museum in St. Petersburg. This resulted in a massive increase to the card file. Many servicemen who were counted as missing were re-categorized as died in hospitals and medical battalions after reviewing these files.

For some servicemen there are several cards. On one he is listed as missing, on another as died, etc. These cards are stapled together and counted as one person.

In the beginning of the 90’s a group was formed to update the card file of permanent losses and to prepare statistical data based on it. The members of this group scrupulously counted the cards by the first letter of the last name and category of loss. The count was divided into the following categories:

1. killed – from reports of military units
2. killed – from reports of military commissariats
3. missing – from reports of military units
4. missing – from reports of military commissariats
5. died in German captivity
6. died of illness
7. died of wounds – from reports of military units
8. died of wounds – from reports of military commissariats

Counts were also made of deserters, servicemen sentenced to correctional labor institutions, servicemen sentenced to death, servicemen removed from the count of permanent losses (i.e. turned out to be alive), servicemen suspected of collaborating with the Germans, and servicemen who were captured but survived.

As of November 1, 2000, last names starting with 20 letters of the alphabet were finished. These charts do not include counts of deserters, those convicted or executed, etc. They only include information from the eight categories listed above.

Preliminary counts have been made for the remaining six letters of the alphabet (B, L, S, T, Ch, Ya). They could change by 30-40,000 persons plus or minus after the work on the card file is completed (see chart).

From the 20 letters which have been counted, 116,513 person were removed from the total of permanent losses because they turned out to be alive according to reports from military commissariats. Of the remaining uncounted letters, it is reasonable to assume that there will be 30-40,000 more such people. The end result will be a number of around 150,000 persons who, according to reports from military units and military commissariats, were mistakenly counted as permanent losses, but who later turned out to be alive. They make up approximately 1.2% of the card file.

The movement and losses of officers of the Red Army was controlled by the Chief Personnel Directorate of the People’s Commissariat for Defense, which also created an alphabetical card file of permanent losses based on lists and reports. This card file is also preserved at TsAMO, and one cannot but agree that these two card files contain the most exact and complete information on personnel losses in the Great Patriotic War, because behind every report which caused a card to be written, at one time stood a live person, not an empty statistic.

At the present time the losses among officers with last names beginning with the letter “A” to the letter “O” have been counted. A preliminary count has been made for the rest of the letters (see chart).

A preliminary count of permanent losses of officers with last names beginning with the letters “P” through “Ya”, subtracting those sentenced to prison or execution, deserters, or who were alive, is around 350,000 persons.

Therefore, officer losses in the Great Patriotic War (killed, missing, died of wounds, illness, or in captivity) is around 1,100,000 persons.

Adding up all losses in the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, we have:

- losses of privates and sergeants in the Red Army, approximately 12,434,398;

- losses of officers in the Red Army, approximately 1,100,000;

- losses of naval personnel (officers and sailors) according to the Central Naval Archives in Gatchina, Leningradskaya Oblast, 154,771 (according to the book “Security Classification Removed”, page 133);

- losses in internal troops (NKVD), 97,700 (according to the book “Security Classification Removed”, page 129);

- losses in border troops 61,400 (according to the book “Security Classification Removed”, page 129).

We end up with a number for permanent losses of our Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of around 13,850,000 persons.

About the author

Sergey Aleksandrovich Il’enkov – Graduated from the Kalinnin Suvorov Military Academy, the Higher Military Academy, the Moscow State Historical-Archival Institute. Assistant chief for scientific work of the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Co author of many scientific works on the history of the Great Patriotic War.

If you want to see an on-line version of the 2001 book and you can read Russian, you can go to:

http://soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/

Regards,

Craig Crofoot

I might (and right now this is only a might) be able to get material from Russia that has each Front's monthly losses borken down by unit and type of casualty.

I am in the process of translating what has already been posted on a Web Site (soldat.ru) for the Karelian Front (the only one listed so far). Once I get any updates, I'll let you know.

Regards,

"There are more articles on this topic from that journal (VIA). And people from the Institute of Military History (IVI) dismiss all that as outright BS. Of course, the only conclusion for now is -- let them finish the work on the database. These preliminary numbers are still full of dupes, and are still demographically impossible -- this new number plus the known number of civilian deaths outstrips the total demographic loss of the Soviet population. Not to mention that it contradicts Krivosheev's balance of manpower usage, and even the revised (by Mikhalev, also somehow connected to VIA) balance. The only thing that's clear is that nothing is clear."

quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
This was posted about this article on a different forum (RMZ):

"There are more articles on this topic from that journal (VIA). And people from the Institute of Military History (IVI) dismiss all that as outright BS. Of course, the only conclusion for now is -- let them finish the work on the database. These preliminary numbers are still full of dupes, and are still demographically impossible -- this new number plus the known number of civilian deaths outstrips the total demographic loss of the Soviet population. Not to mention that it contradicts Krivosheev's balance of manpower usage, and even the revised (by Mikhalev, also somehow connected to VIA) balance. The only thing that's clear is that nothing is clear."

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Except that the first point is not valid. The sov offical figure of excess deaths in WWII is around 27 mil. That figure is calculated in a way that I don't trust but it is thier number not mine. It is calculated to be overally large in my opinon. This number is excess army and civ deaths. If the old figure of army deaths from all causes is correct you end up with a max of 18 mil total civ deaths from all causes. Jews exterminated etc... Now if the new figure of excess army deaths is correct then we would have a max of 13 mil civ deaths from ALL causes. The latter lower number of civ deaths seems more reasonable to me. The soviets have offical estimates of people who have died by variios causes. If you believe there est are 100% accurate then you might not have enough room for everyone of those new deaths. But the sov est are undoubtably at best guesses and the new study might shave a million army deaths before publication.

The latter balance of manpower problem I don't know enough to comment on. One reason as to why the totals in the new study could be higher than the old one is for example there were at least 1 mil people transfered out of the army to NKVD. It could be that many of these people and similar categories died or went missing and were not accounted for in the first army only study but appeared when looking at each idividual soilders card.

You are quite right that the German army did have a name-based reporting system (in addition to the numerical one), but you are mistaken in believing it was accurate. Rüdiger Overmans treats the subject at length, including the various reorganisations of the bodies tasked with executing it. From his account it seems clear that although the system was near-perfect in theory, it's functionality left much to be desired. For the early period of the war, this mainly resulted in nothing worse than delay, but for the latter it was certainly quite incomplete. The system - a very complex one involving numerous instances - as a whole quite simply was not able to handle the workload and friction. Which in the end has neccessitated the sort of demographic methods used by Overmans to calculate deaths.

cheers

quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
You are quite right that the German army did have a name-based reporting system (in addition to the numerical one), but you are mistaken in believing it was accurate. Rüdiger Overmans treats the subject at length, including the various reorganisations of the bodies tasked with executing it. From his account it seems clear that although the system was near-perfect in theory, it's functionality left much to be desired. For the early period of the war, this mainly resulted in nothing worse than delay, but for the latter it was certainly quite incomplete. The system - a very complex one involving numerous instances - as a whole quite simply was not able to handle the workload and friction. Which in the end has neccessitated the sort of demographic methods used by Overmans to calculate deaths.

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It is interesting that the Germans knew very well that the reporting systems were incomplete and inaccurate. A six-page report of 30 August 1944 (NARA T77, R826, F2114~0) by the Ateilung Wehrmactverlustwesen des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht points out some of the problems. And part of that was that there were actually multiple agencies to whom casulaty reporting was made - often for different purposes. Thus, in the field Sanitats Einheiten made one report of casualties, while the unit Ia's made different reports. As usual, most of the discrepencies appeared to exist with respect to those who died-of-wounds and who were missing. Thus, for example, the report shows that for the Westfeldzug (Campaign in France 1940) according to the monthly summaries of the Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (via the Heer Ia reports to the Heeresartz during the campaign) losses in KIA were 26,455. However, the losses as reported by the Sanitats Inspektur totaled 30,267. And finally, the "accepted" number to the date of this report was given as 46,059, with the remark that "these numbers may raise still more as the results of the determination action on the missing."

But that there were inaccuracies in the system is not unexpected, nor was it unique. The reporting of all the nations was faulty. In the case of the US Army, a "final" determination of casualties was not completed until 1949, and even then was only "numerically" complete (at least as late as 1994 IIRC a US Army soldier officially reported as "KIA" was found to be hale and hearty). And that was with much more complete records.

According to Krivosheev, the Soviets had 29,6 million casualties through the war with Germany. According to an OKW summary contained in KTB OKW, vol.4 Teilband 2, p. 1508-11, the Germans had somewhat more than 6 million until the end of March 1945. Of course, the figures for 1945 are known to be unreliable and very likely too low - but considering that we are talking about almost a 1:5 ratio, it still blatantly contradicts the conclusion that emerges from your deaths-based comparison. Also, the Soviet figures for 1941 are also unreliable, and possibly too low.

If we compare casualties for more limited and reliable periods, the picture is very similar. In 1943, if I recall correctly, the Germans had 1.6 million casualties, the Soviets, again according to Krivosheev, had 7,857,503 - very close to 1:5.

It is IMO hard to reconcile the three basic sources we have for this issue - Overmans deaths figures for the Germans, the overall casualties figures in the original documents and Krivosheevs figures for both categories on the Soviet side. Unless the Germans had a much higher proportion of deaths among their casualties, it seems likely that at least one of them has some problems of accuracy, at least from where I'm standing.

The puzzle - if such it is - resides in this (to the extent that I have sufficient knowledge and, annoyingly, writing without book access):

Krivosheev provides 8,7 million dead out of 29,6 million casualties. The percentage of dead is 29,3.

Overmans provides a figure of 3-4 million German dead. German casualty overvies states slightly more than 6 million until March 1945. Even if we add a million or so to compensate for the last month of the war and the inaccuracy of late figures, the percentage would still be in the 50% range.

Theoretically, I can see the following possible explanations for this.

1. Overmans deaths figures are too high
2. The overall casualty figures found in the original documents are too low
3. Krivosheev's Soviet deaths figure is too low
4. Krivosheev's overall Soviet casualties figure is too high
5. The Germans had a much higher fatality rate (as a relative proportion of casualties) than the Soviets.

or, of course, a combination of several.

1. Has been argued by Niklas in an article at his old website, possibly also by others I am not aware of.
2. Is argued briefly by Overmans in Deutsche militärische Verluste im zweiten Weltkrieg, but on this particular point he is I think decisively disproven by Niklas in the abovementioned article. I am not aware of any other serious argument in this direction.
3. The article quoted in the original post of this thread indicates that Krivosheev's deaths figures may not be the final word, as does the continuing general controversy on the subject in Russia.
4. is obviously and intuitively unlikely
5. Firstly, I can see no readily apparent reason why Soviet medical services should have been much better than German. Secondly, the extremely high mortality rate among Soviet POWs should drag the ratio in the opposite direction. Thirdly, while it may be reasonable to assume that an unusually high proportion of German soldiers were killed rather than wounded or taken prisoner in the chaos of 1945, this can hardly in itself account for the vast imbalance in the ratio.

thoughts, anyone?

Rich - I agree with your comments

cheers

There were also another missing million people whose fate has not been determined either way. Both these list of peole by name also continue to be updated although probaly regularly. Most of these missing peole went missing towards the very end and mostly after the war in 45. There was a post war ger commision that found that most of these missing people went missing in soviet custody.

Overmans I have not read but Zetterling seems to think he made a stats error that partly accounts for the much higher figure. Also his definiton of missing is soilders who never collected thier pension. So you can include peole who were alive and well after the war that now are added to the totals becasue they either died or just disappeared afterwards. So even if his stats were corrected his number has less to do with the number who died during or just after the war then some understandably balloning modern number. I´d be a bit carful of using overmans numbers.

Plus death total are only a small part of the entire cas reporting system. Most cas are not dead or mia but wia. Even for rus and ger it was the major source of cas. Eventually someone who was kia or wia but went missing before any report could be made would be reported as mia. So while you can argue about what happened to the three catagories it is the overall cas tied with returning convelesents and replacments that are more important.

And while the ger and US system are known to have been corrected after initially wrong reporting less is known about the soviet reporting practise. It seems they didn´t correct thier 41 losses at least. It also seems likly that the rus when short of peole esp early in the war press ganged civilians into there units directly. Perhaps if these people became cas before they were reported as army personnal they somehow slipped through the cracks. Also the rus partisans were not conuted as active military personnal but any cas they caused the ger are couted as losses to the ger army.

The 1.6 mil ger cas in 43 did not include non combat cas. The total including non combat cas was a litttle over 1.7 mil. The rus number from kirovsyev seems to also include non combat cas. Still over 4 times as many rus cas as ger in 43. And it seeems the ger figure is more complete than any sov figure.

I don't think it would be a sensation if someone ended up revising Krivosheev's figures, but I also think the consensus for the time being is that his figures are the most reliable available.

quote:

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Originally posted by Rich:
It is interesting that the Germans knew very well that the reporting systems were incomplete and inaccurate. A six-page report of 30 August 1944 (NARA T77, R826, F2114~0) by the Ateilung Wehrmactverlustwesen des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht points out some of the problems. And part of that was that there were actually multiple agencies to whom casulaty reporting was made - often for different purposes. Thus, in the field Sanitats Einheiten made one report of casualties, while the unit Ia's made different reports. As usual, most of the discrepencies appeared to exist with respect to those who died-of-wounds and who were missing. Thus, for example, the report shows that for the Westfeldzug (Campaign in France 1940) according to the monthly summaries of the Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (via the Heer Ia reports to the Heeresartz during the campaign) losses in KIA were 26,455. However, the losses as reported by the Sanitats Inspektur totaled 30,267. And finally, the "accepted" number to the date of this report was given as 46,059, with the remark that "these numbers may raise still more as the results of the determination action on the missing."

But that there were inaccuracies in the system is not unexpected, nor was it unique. The reporting of all the nations was faulty. In the case of the US Army, a "final" determination of casualties was not completed until 1949, and even then was only "numerically" complete (at least as late as 1994 IIRC a US Army soldier officially reported as "KIA" was found to be hale and hearty). And that was with much more complete records.

Quite simply it should be recognized that all of these casualty reports, for whatever nation, are only close approximations of reality.

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I was under the impresion the main goal of late war reforms was to streamline and quicken the reporting system rather than to correct any large inacossries.

You have to differentiate between the name-based and the numerical reporting channels and procedures, which were separate. As regards the former, an important reason for late war reform was indeed the need for simplification, but it belongs to this picture that the complexity of the system was an important reason why the WAst was unable to maintain an accurate picture. In theory, the name-based system was supposed to keep track of the fates of ALL German soldiers, including periods of hospital treatment, not just the dead. In practice it was unable to deal accurately and timely with even just the dead, and particularly late in the war.

As regards the latter, internal documentation does seem to reflect concern over accuracy as well as functionality regarding parts of the system.

I suggest you read Overmans, which treats these issues at length. Of course, his treatment relates almost solely to deaths.

"The evaluation of the size of the population of the USSR on 22 June 1941 was done by extrapolating to that date the results of the pre-war census (17 January 1939, with corrections for birth and death rates for the 2.5 years between the census and the attack of fascist Germany. In this way the population of the USSR in the middle of 1941 was determined to be 196.7 million. The number at the end of 1945 was calculated by extrapolating back from the All-Union census of 1959. The statistics were refined using mortality statistics and information on external migration in 1946-1958. The count took into account the changes in the borders of the USSR after 1941. As a result, the population on 31 December 1945 was set at 170.5 million, of which 159.5 were born prior to 22 June 1941, i.e. before the beginning of the war."

[end quote]

Krivosheev then takes 196.7 million (the population of USSR on 6/22/41, subtracts 159.5 million (who were born prior to that date and survived the war), and gets 37.2 million as the number of people who were no longer with us. He then adds to 37.2 million 1.3 million children who died as a result of increased child mortality during the war, then 11.9 million who would have died anyway given the USSR's peacetime mortality rate. This leaves him with 26.6 million people, which he considers to represent the total loss suffered by the USSR in the war, both military and civilian.

It seems to me that basing your losses on statistical analysis invites a lot of error, in, shall we say, imprecision. Problems with Soviet censuses are well known, and if you're off in your birth or death rates, or your census count, then it seems to me that a magnitude of error of a couple of million either way can easily slip in.

The consensus appears to be that Stalin ordered an increase of 6-8 million to cover up the losses suffered from collectivization. This appears to be common knowledge, so why is Krivosheev still using those numbers, hmmm? And that's only the stuff we know about. How about his other assumptions?

quote:

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
The consensus appears to be that Stalin ordered an increase of 6-8 million to cover up the losses suffered from collectivization.

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It the census was inflated by 6-8 million, that would mean that there were 6-8 million less deaths in WWII.

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... so why is Krivosheev still using those numbers, hmmm?

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Possibly because no one really knows what numbers they should use. If I remember Sokolov's arguement, it was based on a couple of sampling censuses done in a few regions in 1941 that established that the original 1939 census in those areas were too low. He then extended that to cover the entire nation (which made me uncomfortable).

quote:

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Originally posted by Gary Dickson:
Let's look at exactly what Krivosheev says about total Soviet losses (2001 Olma-Press edition, p. 228):

"The evaluation of the size of the population of the USSR on 22 June 1941 was done by extrapolating to that date the results of the pre-war census (17 January 1939, with corrections for birth and death rates for the 2.5 years between the census and the attack of fascist Germany. In this way the population of the USSR in the middle of 1941 was determined to be 196.7 million. The number at the end of 1945 was calculated by extrapolating back from the All-Union census of 1959. The statistics were refined using mortality statistics and information on external migration in 1946-1958. The count took into account the changes in the borders of the USSR after 1941. As a result, the population on 31 December 1945 was set at 170.5 million, of which 159.5 were born prior to 22 June 1941, i.e. before the beginning of the war."

[end quote]

Krivosheev then takes 196.7 million (the population of USSR on 6/22/41, subtracts 159.5 million (who were born prior to that date and survived the war), and gets 37.2 million as the number of people who were no longer with us. He then adds to 37.2 million 1.3 million children who died as a result of increased child mortality during the war, then 11.9 million who would have died anyway given the USSR's peacetime mortality rate. This leaves him with 26.6 million people, which he considers to represent the total loss suffered by the USSR in the war, both military and civilian.

It seems to me that basing your losses on statistical analysis invites a lot of error, in, shall we say, imprecision. Problems with Soviet censuses are well known, and if you're off in your birth or death rates, or your census count, then it seems to me that a magnitude of error of a couple of million either way can easily slip in.

It's remarkable to me that they STILL don't know who died. The procedure described in the first post (going from yard to yard in the late 40's to see who's left) appears to me to be more reliable than Krivosheev's. But I'm not an expert.

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quote:

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Originally posted by Kjetil Aasland:
Darrin -

You have to differentiate between the name-based and the numerical reporting channels and procedures, which were separate. As regards the former, an important reason for late war reform was indeed the need for simplification, but it belongs to this picture that the complexity of the system was an important reason why the WAst was unable to maintain an accurate picture. In theory, the name-based system was supposed to keep track of the fates of ALL German soldiers, including periods of hospital treatment, not just the dead. In practice it was unable to deal accurately and timely with even just the dead, and particularly late in the war.

As regards the latter, internal documentation does seem to reflect concern over accuracy as well as functionality regarding parts of the system.

I suggest you read Overmans, which treats these issues at length. Of course, his treatment relates almost solely to deaths.

cheers

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Need to wait for overmans to come out in english...

quote:

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Originally posted by Joseph Scott:
Have any of these people defined "military losses"? As someone already pointed out, the Soviets were throwing anyone and everyone into the line, as late as 43. If, for example,a whole family was killed, between battle and none battle losses,in a country with shaky record keeping a poor literacy, would anybody know about it? Doubly so with whole villages, which were apparrently sometimes conscripted en masse regardless of age. von Mellinthin, for example, on Panzer Battles, speaks of encountering large units made up nearly entirely children under 14 in 1943. Given certain Soviet tactics, like sending unarmed groups as follow on waves, and their armed forces very definate prefence for ammunition and fuel over even food, much less medical supplies, shouldn't we always round Soviet losses far up?

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I would be a bit careful with von Mellenthin's accounts. IIRC he also states that the Germans never managed to destroy a Soviet bridgehead (not so), and that the Russian soldier was good at digging in and camo because he was closer to nature, or something. A look in the Soviet field manual may have told him that maybe it was a matter of training.

There are a number of favourite myths of the Eastern Front in your post that have little basis in reality. Russian medical service was actually quite good, as far as I know, and pretty well organised, according to TM30-430. The unarmed second waves were exceptions early on in the war. Later on a second wave would be Katukov or Rybalko bringing a tank army along.

Generalising from the dark days of 1941 for the whole war is as justified as saying that:

- The Germans used 12-year olds regularly in the frontline
- The Germans sent 60-year olds armed with a PF into the line throughout the war
- The Germans handed out captured weapons with no ammo to scraped up units throughout the war
- the Germans regularly shot anyone away from the frontline, no questions asked

quote:

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Originally posted by Andreas:
I would be a bit careful with von Mellenthin's accounts.

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His maps of the 48th Panzer Corps operations have errors in them...his account of the fighting on the 12th-15th has major omissions....he claims that Panthers have 88mm guns....

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...and that the Russian soldier was good at digging in and camo because he was closer to nature, or something. A look in the Soviet field manual may have told him that maybe it was a matter of training.

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I definately do not have the impression that Soviet infantry training was particularly good or extensive. A larger percent of Russians worked in agriculture and lived in rural areas than the Germans. So on this one, even though I generally consider von Mellenthin's comments to be racist, I don't disagree with the future South African.

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Russian medical service was actually quite good, as far as I know, and pretty well organised, according to TM30-430.

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This does not jive with my understanding. For example, the late Col. Sverdlov (who used to work for us) told us that in 1944 when he was crossing the Nieman, he was wounded in the back from artillery. He went back to the aid station....where he bent over holding his knees while they sowed him up, using no pain killers. The only bed they had was a pile of straw in an open field, so he ended up going back to his unit after laying down for a couple of hours.

Col. Sverdlov was also pretty adamant that there was not a lot of DNBIs (Desease and non-battle injuries) reported....as people who were ill just stayed with their unit until they got better. We did notice that Soviet unit reports, when they report them, do report a lower level of DNBIs than we see from the Germans.

I have gathered some interviews from people who worked in the medical service during Kursk. In one case, they were providing blood transfusions by having the nurses and doctors give 200 milliliters directly from themselves to the patient. I did take the time to cross-check the value of this intervention with a senoir medical expert (with combat field experience) at the Borden Institute.

While at Kursk the Soviets had an established medical structure, their rear area hospitals were still back at the Voronezh area. It does appear that in the first week or two...the forward hospitals were flooded with casualties (overloaded) while the rear area hospitals were still very much under-utilized. This appears to be due to a shortage of transport for evacuation.

It does appear that Soviet medical care was generally inferior for the average soldiers, and sometimes the Generals. For example, I believe Vatutin died from infection.

Can we do anything but speculate about these questions?

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
It does appear that Soviet medical care was generally inferior for the average soldiers, and sometimes the Generals. For example, I believe Vatutin died from infection.

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Chris, the relevant statement in TM30-430 would probably be the opening line for the section: 'The Red Army medical service is well-organised but poorly equipped.' Which would jive with your accounts (lack of morphine, lack of blood plasma). I just reread the (short) chapter, and it looks like they had a very good idea of how it should work. How it did work, may well have been a completely different story though.

Having said that, I am sure that over-loading happened in Allied/German forward hospitals as well, in particular during intense operations, and lack of adequate supplies at the point of need was probably not restricted to the Soviets either. The evidence you provided points towards a systemic failure, but is quite restricted.