You may find some useful information on British/Commonwealth artillery at:

http://members.tripod.com/~nigelef/index.htm

Within George Blackburn's memoirs ("The Guns of Normandy", "The Guns of Victory") can be found descriptions of British/Commonwealth artillery practices which should dispel any illusion of inefficiency.

http://salts.britwar.co.uk/mod.php?mod=fileman&menu=8&PHPSESSID=5fbe18b9696fb47212722f6b59e03957

best regards

And I'm afraid Gooderson may be guilty of some imprecise language if he describes Allied barrages as being World War I-like. Certainly both the US and British artillery could use prodigious amounts of artillery ammunition, but its is actually rare to find more than a few hundred rounds expended for any one single fire mission. On the other hand, ammunition supply restrictions often limited the numbers of rounds that could be fired at any one time, especially for the US artillery in the fall of 1944.

A low altitude "glide" attack became the most favorite method utilized by Allied fighter bombers in World War II. It did not require specialized aircraft or pilot skills, but did require quick reaction times if any kind of accuracy was to be found. It was found that this type of attack had a linear accuracy (that is accuracy from the aimpoint along the path of the aircraft) of between 250 and 350 meters, depending on the skill of the pilot, which is probably the sourve of Gooderson's remark. It was accurate to within about 10 meters to either side of the line of flight though, which made it an excellent method of attack against railroads, roads, bridges, and other linear targets. This was also the chosen method of attack using rockets, which unfortuntely die to their physical characteristics, increased the inaccuracy of htis form of attack.

>But it is important to remeber that the >situation for the Finnish artillery was >quite differen from that of the US, British >or even German artillery. The Finnish >artillery was firing from what was probably >the most precise geographical survey >around. They also had an excellent, >redundant and secure communications system >that facilitated rapid and precise calls >for fire. Those are both things that were >noy available to the Allied artillery in >Europe or the Mediterranean. I have no >doubt that the Finnish artillery was more >accurate, but then given the circumstances >it is hard to imagine why they should not >have been, nor why or how the Allied >artillery could have been much more >accurate.

What Rich writes above is exactly what happened. It should also be remembered that Finnish artillery in the Winter War was not the same as Finnish artillery in the beginning of the Continuation War or at the end of the Continuation War. In summer 1944, but not necessarily before that time, Finnish artillery was probably the best in the world what comes to firing methods, communication system and concentration of fire. But it was still partly plagued by outdated cannons, which meant that range of fire was shorter than that of Soviet artillery.

The only thing I would like to "correct" in Rich's assesment is the note that the Finnish system worked only on areas mapped before the war. This is not quite true as the topographic service of the army had a very high standard and it could make accurate temporary maps very fast based on aerial photographs. This method was used when Finns advanced into Russian Karelia before better maps were made available.

It should also be remembered that it was by no means self evident that Finnish artillery should be developped as it was. The road chosen was very much dependent on the personality of the inspector of the artillery, general Nenonen. He was more a scientist than an officer and he managed to convince his officers on the benefits of using the best possible methods. Those who were not convinced he transferred to infantry;-) Very little was left to chance and scale of approval started from 100%. Nenonen was very strict commander and if things did not go as they should have, flaws were systematically ironed out be it in the methods used or in the training. He was always looking for ways of doing things better and he encouraged or rather demanded his officers and men to do the same.

Nenonen's spirit is still strong in artillery training today. A couple of years ago in the yearly main training camp of the field artillery, a reserve officer cadet responsible for making concentrated fire plan made a small timing error. This resulted in his heavy mortars starting fire 20 seconds later than the rest of the batteries under his command. The poor chap made it to headline news both in TV and national press because similar error had last taken place 30 years ago.

To Jukka, I would like to comment that 5 minutes of fire was hardly ever used. 1 minute was the standard duration of strike but often 30 seconds or even 15 seconds was used as well. One 12 gun battery of 75 mm guns delivered in 1 minute 120 shells and one 12 gun 150 mm battery 72 shells to the target. Target size was usually 100*300 m.

Regards,

What Rich writes above is exactly what happened. It should also be remembered that Finnish artillery in the Winter War was not the same as Finnish artillery in the beginning of the Continuation War or at the end of the Continuation War.

Meaning what exactly ? The doctrine remained the same from 1930's until 1945 (and beyond). The only real changes between Winter War and Continuation War were the infusion of better ordnance and the development of the korjausmuunnin.

In summer 1944, but not necessarily before that time, Finnish artillery was probably the best in the world what comes to firing methods, communication system and concentration of fire.

What made the communications system so good ? I always though that was the Weakest Link in the Finnish arty during the war..

And if you have actual proof of that (preferably in English) please reveal your source.

But it was still partly plagued by outdated cannons, which meant that range of fire was shorter than that of Soviet artillery.

IIRC the lack of range issue was remedied only in the 1990's.

The only thing I would like to "correct" in Rich's assesment is the note that the Finnish system worked only on areas mapped before the war. This is not quite true as the topographic service of the army had a very high standard and it could make accurate temporary maps very fast based on aerial photographs. This method was used when Finns advanced into Russian Karelia before better maps were made available.

On average 48h from the recce flight to distributing the maps to the troops.

I think he alluded to that when he stated
"The Finnish artillery was firing from what was probably the most precise geographical survey around."

Very little was left to chance and scale of approval started from 100%. ....
Nenonen's spirit is still strong in artillery training today. A couple of years ago in the yearly main training camp of the field artillery, a reserve officer cadet responsible for making concentrated fire plan made a small timing error. This resulted in his heavy mortars starting fire 20 seconds later than the rest of the batteries under his command. The poor chap made it to headline news both in TV and national press because similar error had last taken place 30 years ago.

Our coastal arty cadet did not fare quite that bad when he used 5 salvos instead of 4 before ordering fire for effect. But he did have his butt chewed by the CO.

Target size was usually 100*300 m.

I was always under the impression the most usual form of fire was a fire strike with a target area of 100*100 m and not the barrage (100*300 m).

<The only real changes between Winter War <and Continuation War were the infusion of <better ordnance and the development of the <korjausmuunnin.

In my understanding the calculation method was improved continuously during the war and Korjausmuunnin was the end result that combined all the small changes made to the system. But what I really meant was the greater number of artillery pieces (up from 450 to 1.800) and other equipment plus the increase in artillery personnel (50.000 at the end of the war). Espeacially important was harmonisation of equipment within single units. No more mixed equipment battalions or batteries. Use of FO's was also changed but here see below.

<What made the communications system so <good ? I always though that was the Weakest <Link in the Finnish arty during the war..

First ingredient was the development and purchases of radios. In winter war Finnish army had voefully few radios and even those that existed were both clumsy and unrealiable. Captured equipment, purchases from Germany and domestic production gradually improved that situation by 1944 and in the summer that year FO's had a decent number of radios at their disposal.

The use of FO's was changed during continuation war. Initially FO's knew which units (one or more) fire they were directing. The big change was the idea of combining all FO's in a certain area into one information network that used both radio and field telephones in giving fire commands. The FO's did not need to know any more which units were firing. The artillery commander made that decision and the only thing the FO had to do was to give fire commands and corrections to the network. This meant that all of the sudden there was a "surplus" of FO's and radios, and that they could be placed in to the best possible spots, usually at the flanks of the most important sectors. If an FO was lost almost anyone could give the fire commands if he had access either to radio or field telephone. And now there was also a reserve of FO's from the "surplus".

The above system was created in the 6th division in 1943 and when they arrived to Ihantala the artillery commander of the division immediatley created a centralised information network with radios and telephones for the whole sector. This was then quickly extended to other sectors as well. This system as far as I know was unique and created an "information edge" that made it possible to further increase the effect of the artillery. I don't know of any references of the above in English. Nenonen's biography has some information on most things conserning artillery development, methods and use.

Finnish communication equipment were certainly not any better than most other armioes, probably the contrary. But the army tried to use them as economically as possible and get as much effect out of them as possible. As long as the front was not moving too fast this was possible.

The above does not mean that everything worked smoothly or that artillery fire was always available. Russians were extremely good in pinpointing Finnish FO's positions by locating their radios when they were used. Use of radio usually meant receiving a quick salute from the opposition and many FO's were killed or wounded this way. But now there was the next FO in the neighbouring sector...

The biggest weakness of Finnish artillery were mobility and on average shorter firing range than that of Soviet artillery. Especially mobility was a big problem and many cannons were lost on Isthmus due to lack of pulling machines before the front could be stabilized at VKT line.

<I was always under the impression the most <usual form of fire was a fire strike with a <target area of 100*100 m and not the <barrage (100*300 m).

The standard was 100*100 m as you corrctly state. However, with concentrated fire even a strike could be shot at 100*300 m or even at 100*600 m target to have more effect. For example in Tali-Ihantala one minute of fire with the whole arsenal meant 30 tons of ammunition in one minute. Quite a lot for 100*100 m so it was better to divide the fire to 100*300 m area. My understanding is that batteries just got one of the three 100*100 m targets. But all depended of course on how much time there was to prepare the fire plan. In quick situations 100*100 m was probably always used but I doubt that the whole artillery force was ever needed in that sort of an action. But theoretically it was there to use.

Regards,

Jari

I have to correct my yesterdays post. Korjausmuunnin was a radical change in to the calculation methdod. It was introduced in 1943. Nenonen took the credit for it but it was not his invention. This is a stain in an otherwise exceptional career.

Prior to the reform FO had to know which batteries were shooting and what their position was. Corrections were made in parts of degrees (piiru in Finnish). After korjausmuunnin was invented FO did not need to know anything about the batteries shooting. The idea was that the FO gave his commands as if the guns were right behind his back shooting over bare sights. All corrections were made in meters. Korjausmuunnin was then used to convert corrections given by the FO into values that were used to aim cannons.

Regards,