I’ve been looking through a TDI study I obtained several months back called “Rate of Expenditure of Ammunition In Relation to Posture”, March 1973 HERO. Fascinating bit of research focused on artillery ammunition expenditure by the US Army in ETO 44-45. Various types of battles are examined (set-piece, meeting engagements, defensive posture…etc) and the correspondent Artillery ammunition expenditures by weapon caliber are presented.

My question is whether a similar study has been done that focuses on various tank engagements and ammunition expenditure. Ultimately I am interested in what sorts of ammunition expenditure was realistic in tank on tank engagements or tank on anti-tank engagements relative to posture. Moreover during for example Goodwood were the Germans sitting in defense expending less ammunition per tank kill than the British?

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
My question is whether a similar study has been done that focuses on various tank engagements and ammunition expenditure.

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I cannot recall any such study being done by anyone.

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Ultimately I am interested in what sorts of ammunition expenditure was realistic in tank on tank engagements or tank on anti-tank engagements relative to posture.

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Good question, and one that I do not know the answer for. Has anyone else seen anything on this?

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Good question, and one that I do not know the answer for. Has anyone else seen anything on this?

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It seems that there are relatively few reports on tank ammunition consumption in German records. I have rather extensive records for the Korsun operation in february 1944. I shall see if I can find some data on tank ammunition expenditure. I know this was discussed, because the spearheads of III. Pz.Korps had to receive tank ammunition by air drop, due to the extremely poor condition of the roads. This data will however not reveal expenditure in tank vs tank engagements by itself, but will have to be combined with other information to give what you look for. It may, possibly, give an impression of the consumption for a well equipped panzer corps in an offensive action.
Generally it seems that the quartermaster section in the German staffs were more preoccupied with artillery ammunition. The much higher consumption rate of the latter of course posed greater problems of transportation, which may partly explain this.

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Niklas Said: I have rather extensive records for the Korsun operation in february 1944.

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Is this a possible hint as to what the next Niklas Zetterling Book will cover

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I am going to run this very simplistic approach up the flagpole and see if it's worth even a boy scout salute. Indirect approach…very indirect. German wartime production of 88mm Pak 43 armored piercing ammunition:

1943 Pzgr production: 830,00 rounds
1944 Pzgr production: approx 1,000,000 rounds

Original Source is apparently: "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 5, part 1" although I obtained the information from the following URL:

http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/GermWeapProd.html

A quick review of other armored defeating ammunition production stats indicates approx 2,000,000 plus rounds of pzgr or HL gr of 75mm type ammunition was produced per year in 1943 and 1944. Add in say another 1,000,000 plus 88L56 pzgr production for either 1943 or 1944 (Flak 88 and Tiger I 88 combined). Total armored defeating ammunition production of 75mm+ is in the realm of 4,000,000 rounds of pzgr or HL gr for either year.

Soviet and Anglo-American Tank losses for either 1943 or 1944 were what? From my hindend … maybe 15,000 to 25,000? Total AFV (tanks, APC's AC's) losses surely didn't exceed 40,000 to 50,000 per year. Lets say 40,000 because it makes the math convenient. The actual statistics can be refined later if this approach is worthy of more than just a cursory look.

So we are looking at each KO'd AFV requiring some 100 rounds of armored piercing ammunition. No account is made for 50mm pak and Kwk here. Obviously this would inflate rounds required for one AFV kill. Of course this approach also doesn't include AFV's killed via mines, artillery, hand held anti-tank weapons, destroyed by crew, abandoned by crew and captured, tactical air (ok not tactical air ) each of which would act to push rounds of AP per kill upward for any assessment of Tank vs. Tank…or ATG vs. Tank using this gross appraoch. Some AFV kills were doubtless repaired and sent back into combat. This would presumably act to push the ratio of rounds per kill downward again. So maybe 100 to 200 rounds produced to kill one AFV.

My first reaction is an anecdotal approach…i.e. examining after action reports of Tank vs. Tank combat or ATG vs. Tank combat. It is difficult to find first hand accounts of tank crews firing 100 odd AP rounds in a tank vs. tank engagement to get one kill. Perhaps the crews with these questionable gunnery skills were too embarrassed to write memoirs following the war?

In addition 100 to 200 rounds per kill is out of the ball park relative to what most armies gunnery training standards were...Tigerfibel indicates crews should be able to get a kill on a non-moving target out to ranges of 1200m with one or two rounds. Even with some slop thrown in for combat anxiety it is difficult to reconcile 200 rounds produced to get one kill with typical gunnery training standards or AARs detailing tank on tank engagements.

Ok I am ready to get a new @#$-hole torn…what are the obvious flaws with this approach? Any Thoughts?

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Originally posted by Niklas Zetterling:
Generally it seems that the quartermaster section in the German staffs were more preoccupied with artillery ammunition. The much higher consumption rate of the latter of course posed greater problems of transportation, which may partly explain this.

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Exactly. There are often daily reports by division of the basic loads availible by the 5 or 6 most commonly used artillery rounds. I don't recall ever seeing a tank ammo report, other than a message stating they are low, had to withdraw to get more ammunition, or some emergency supplies had been sent.

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I am going to run this very simplistic approach up the flagpole and see if it's worth even a boy scout salute.

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This is what they refer to as "back of the envelope" OR. I think it should be avoided unless there are no other options.

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although I obtained the information from the following URL:

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Suggest you email Jason Long directly. He's an aquantance of mine from about 20 years ago. He may have more detailed data that he has not posted. Are the ammo figures you are using just tank ammo, or tank and AT gun ammo?

OK, problems with your assumptions:

First, half the rounds carried were other than AP rounds. They may have been used more often than the AP. Tanks seem to spend more time shooting at things other than tanks. As such, the non-AP ammunition expenditure is more than 50% of their ammo expenditure and may be more than 75%. Furthermore, not all AP ammo is fired at enemy tanks.

Second, tanks are responsible for probably less than 50% of the tank kills. I do not know if AT guns kill more tanks than tanks do, but I suspect it depends on the posture of the unit (offense or defense). As such, mines are responsible for say 1 to 3%, artillery for 5 to 10%, air for 5 to 10%, etc. Direct AT fire from the ground accounts for 50 to 75% of the kills, but less than half of that may be from tanks. Just to complicate the situation further is mechanical breakdowns. They are sometimes included in loss statistics. They can easily account for 25% of the losses.

3. The majority of tanks are repaired. With the Russians, they seem to repair 40 to 60%, the Americans repair over half, and the Germans seem to repair around 85 to 90%. This greatly confuses the picture of armor losses. So you have to make sure you are getting a count of tanks damaged and destroyed, vice just tanks destroyed. The only way I know of to get a count of "damaged and destroyed" tanks from the German records is to do a comparison of ready-for-action reports for each division for each day (which would also pick up mechanical breakdowns which were not repaired the same day).

These are all "off the cuff" figures, please don't start quoting me ("The Dupuy Institute states definitively that....").

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It is difficult to find first hand accounts of tank crews firing 100 odd AP rounds in a tank vs. tank engagement to get one kill./[quote]

Of course not. The tanks tended to operate with the load that was in the tank for one to three or more days. They often had a reload (it depends on the army) at the battalion level and these were often reloaded at night. If they unit got particularly down on ammo, it could withdraw and re-arm, usually in conjuction with re-fueling. No one is going to fire 100 AP rounds in an engagement, or even the entire complement of AP rounds they carry in one engagement (which is about half the total rounds they can carry). In fact, the load carried in the tank may have to last for several days.

[quote]In addition 100 to 200 rounds per kill is out of the ball park relative to what most armies gunnery training standards were

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This is part of the reason I object to use of "Single Shot Probability of Kill (SSPK)" figures that are used in a number of models by the US Army and various weapons effectiveness manuals, and why I object to some very high "to hit" figures used in some minuture wargame rules.

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Tigerfibel indicates crews should be able to get a kill on a non-moving target out to ranges of 1200m with one or two rounds.

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If your enemy shows themselves and is so accomodating, I don't dispute this figure.

Now, if you go back through, and revise your figures to correct for all factors mentioned above, then you may have an interesting figure. This may take a little research. You will need to focus on "damaged and destroyed" tanks, which greatly complicates things.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Suggest you email Jason Long directly. He's an aquantance of mine from about 20 years ago. He may have more detailed data that he has not posted. Are the ammo figures you are using just tank ammo, or tank and AT gun ammo? <snip>

If your enemy shows themselves and is so accomodating, I don't dispute this figure.

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Uh, Chris, we have the complete German ammo production figures here. Of course, I don't know that I want to go digging them out right now.

As to the Tigerfibel hit expectations they are probably not far off for any experienced gunner of the time. There are quite detailed accounts of excellent work being done with US 3" towed TD at Mortain and in the Bulge. In one case in the Bulge a single 3" gun of the 820th TD Battalion was reliably reported to have knocked out 5 German tanks on 16 December, firing 18 rounds of APC and HE at their flank at a range of 2,000 yards!

I am assuming a fair amount of this these 4 million rounds of armored piercing ammunition for a given year would have disappeared from wastage as well as non-use for any given period examined:

• Destruction in vehicles that brew up
  
• Abandoned or blown up during retreats or captured.
  
• Used up in training.
  
• Used up by jumpy gun crews shooting at shadows
  
• During 44 – 45 a fair amount would perhaps have been lost during rail shipment to the fronts from either air interdiction attacks or partisans.
  
• ditto from above except truck movement of ammunition and loss from air or partisan attacks
  
• Some of the ammo would have been shipped to depots where AP was never used…Yugoslavia, Greece, and Norway.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Is this a possible hint as to what the next Niklas Zetterling Book will cover

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It is one of three options I am working with.

In any case, here is some data:

In the period 12 – 19 february 1944, the following amounts of ammunition was air dropped to the spear heads of III. Pz.Korps: 79,6 tons of Tiger ammunition, 68,6 tons of Panther ammunition and 4 tons of Pz IV ammunition. These weights include the complete rounds and the stuff they were packed into to be air dropped. It seems that these weights correspond to 3800 rounds of Tiger ammo, 4100 rounds of Panther ammo and 300 rounds of Pz IV ammo.

Before the corps jumped off, it reported (10 february) that it had, operational, 34 Pz IV, 81 Panther and 13 Tiger I in its units (1. Pz.Div., 1. SS-Pz.Div., 16. Pz.Div., 17. Pz.Div., 506. Tiger-Bat. and heavy tank regiment Bäke, the latter consisted of one Panther battalion, II./23, and one Tiger battalion, 503). Also the corps had 20 assault guns operational

It is worth noting that supply problems were encountered almost immediately, and it seems that only the Tigers and Panthers pushed on, leaving the Pz IV and StuG in the rear and on the flanks, which may explain the vast preponderance of Tiger and Panther ammunition dropped. The corps had several tanks in workshops and it was explicitly reported that few were victims to enemy fire, rather most were mechanical breakdowns or simply bogged down in deep mud during the preceding week of fighting. Thus further tanks were added, but on the other hand more tanks broke down or got stuck in the mud. The net effect was gradually declining tank strength.

If we look at these deliveries, they represent (if we use the initial tank strength as a yardstick) 7 rounds per day and Panther delivered and 42 rounds per day and Tiger. Obviously the small number of operational Tiger tanks can distort the picture. The Panther strength declined more rapidly and on 15 february there were 28 Panther operational and 11 Tiger (using these strangth figures as a base, we arrive at 21 rounds per Panther and day (49 for Tigers)). But of the Panthers four could only fire with their machine guns (no explanation given, but ammo shortages can possibly have been a factor, because on the following day 20 tons of Panther ammunition was dropped, compared to 6 tons of Tiger ammunition)

The ratio between AP and HE ammo dropped is not clear, but according to what was brought up to the airfields, it seems that the ratio was approximately 1:1, with a slight preponderance for HE ammo.

So, how representative are these figures. First, an unknown part of the ammo dropped was lost, the Germans estimated that 70 – 80 % did get to the units (this has not been accounted for in my calculations above). Second, this was a period of very intensive fighting, the corps had to rescue about 50,000 fellow soldiers from Soviet encirclement and no effort was spared. On the other hand, the difficult ground may have made it difficult to get into action for many tanks. Also, it is not known if the tanks were topped up with ammo before they jumped off.

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Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:

Second, tanks are responsible for probably less than 50% of the tank kills. I do not know if AT guns kill more tanks than tanks do, but I suspect it depends on the posture of the unit (offense or defense).

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Thanks for the Korsun post.

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Niklas Said: The data on claims I have suggest that tanks cause far more losses than AT guns. However, this data is from German forces that have a much stronger tank component than the German army on average possessed.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

This is an interesting claim. I would have thought the exact opposite given the much higher production numbers of AT guns produced relative Panzers. Or are you saying # of kills per weapon was typically much higher for tanks?

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Do your sources provide German tank crew claims as to number of Soviet AFV's KO'd during the III. Pz.Korps advance on Korsun, 12 – 19 February 1944?

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Ok, I think I see what you are saying. Your focus is more upon specific operations rather than a broad generalization for the entire war.

Do your sources provide German tank crew claims as to number of Soviet AFV's KO'd during the III. Pz.Korps advance on Korsun, 12 – 19 February 1944?

I am curious if any sort of inference can be drawn from armored piercing ammunition being supplied to III Korps relative to Red Army vehicle casualties being inflicted by III Korps.

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Possibly, but currently I have not yet delved deeply enogh into our Soviet sources. Overall tank losses can be established, but if it will be possible to pin down the percentage that may have been suffered during this particular part of the operation is yet unclear.

I can only agree with Chris that it is very unusual to find any reference to tank ammunition in the German records, especially any quantitative data. This is the only case I can remember.

Niklas Z

In any event, some brief notes (of limited value) on the issue of AFV ammo expenditure. Carlo D'este's book "Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome" contains information extracted from a report called "Ammo Joe at Anzio" by a Fifth Army Ordnance Officer named General Urban Niblo (?!)

Appendix G in D'este's book lists ammo expenditure by the allies for the duration of the siege of Anzio, about 121 days. working through the numbers, I get the average daily expenditure in rounds for the following equipment as:

3- inch (assumably ATG's): 11
75mm gun: 11
76mm gun: 10

There is no breakdown for ammo type or weapon platform. Of course, these are average daily expenditures and bear no relationship to what would be expended in any sinlge engagement, and so are of limited value.

As points of interest, the by now obsolete 57mm ATG, which used only AP rounds (some controversy I realize) works out to about 0,6 rounds per gun on average per day (the list notes ATG specifically). The 37mm ammo (not AA which is broken out separately) works out to about 3 rounds per day on average. I'm assuming these would be for 37mm guns mounted in M5's and scout cars, and not ATG's which had been replaced by 57mm + weapons (?).

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Originally posted by simon:
"Numbers, Prediction, and War" should be mandatory reading for any gamer.

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Actually, the model was developed as an analytical tool, both for determining what actually occurred in historical combat, and as a wargame for use by the defense community. The commercial wargame community was never a "targeted market".

Unfortunately, the model has never been widely accepted by the Military Operations Research community for a number of reasons. Most of these reasons are not related to an analysis of the model or how it works. Stiull, the model was dismissed by fiat by the US Army in particular, and remains unfunded and unsupported. Therefore, useful developments of the model, like adding a logistics module, have never been done.

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ammo expenditure in an indiviudal engagement would likely be higher than the average daily expenditure, but it is impossible to say how much.

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Of course if would be, and there is considerable data out there on the daily expenditure of ammo. Most armies have preserved their quatermaster files, and one can certianly find out the daily ammo expiditure by division for the US, UK, USSR and Germans.

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Usually when one reads about....

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This is the problem with history books, they tend to note only the exceptional situations, and usually only those at the critical juncture. Military history is often the study of exceptions. Rates of ammunition expenditure, frequency of supply problems, etc., can all be determined, but this must be done from a survey of the unit reports. It cannot be done from secondary sources.

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

In addition 100 to 200 rounds per kill is out of the ball park relative to what most armies gunnery training standards were...Tigerfibel indicates crews should be able to get a kill on a non-moving target out to ranges of 1200m with one or two rounds. Even with some slop thrown in for combat anxiety it is difficult to reconcile 200 rounds produced to get one kill with typical gunnery training standards or AARs detailing tank on tank engagements.

Ok I am ready to get a new @#$-hole torn…what are the obvious flaws with this approach? Any Thoughts?

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-03-2001).]

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Actually I did a similar sort of calculation myself a few months ago. Remember we are talking about rounds needed to kill a tank. Not rounds needed to damage a tank. But maybe we could double the numbers here to account for tanks that were hit and only damage. Or almost 50,000 at least for rus tanks in 43. Not all des and esp damage were done because of AP hits though. The ger produced around 80 75mm+ AP rounds in 43 for each des and dam rus tank.

Even 80 AP rounds to kill each vehicle seems pretty large. There were 24,000 rus tank and AGs des in 43. In 43 it would be much larger if we include over 2 mil 50mm AP rounds. I mean we can be pretty sure most rounds sent to the front did not get affected by air in 43 as well.

Kursk example over the less than 2 months around kursk the rus lost 6000 tanks and AGs des. That is around 100 a day. The ger started with around 2500 almost all operational. They also probably had somewhere around 4000 tanks commited in total over the whole 2 months. But the tank str (op + rep) was never that high. It might have avg 3000 (2500 + other units - des + replacements) not considering many were not operational. Each ger tank on the front might have knocked out 1 sov tank each month! But including ATGs it drops much lower than this. It proably drops to 1 sov tank killed during the whole 2 mo operation per ger tank and ATG!

With operational considerations the lowest the ger tanks fell was 50% of inital str in the south with around 15% des. 50% op of 85% is around 60%. And as other areas and further time is included this would be the only time it got this low. Maybe an avg op rediness of 75% for this time and place. Op rediness would not have decreased damatically the number of tanks on the front. Esp considering that kursk lasted at least 1 week less than 2 months described above.

We are left with gunnary est are hugly over rated. Or tanks just didn't run into each other and ATG very often. But kursk known as the largest tank battle in history where both sides committed huge numbers of tanks and tank units. Not to mention that the ger at least made and premembly used all these AT rounds. I mean how many rounds does traing a tank really tank. 100? Ger made around 10,000 tanks and 15,000 ATGs in 43. That makes 25,000 needing traing or maybe 250,000 rounds. Perhaps some training after issue might be needed but also many weapons were issued to experianced crews meaning less rounds used for intial and coninuing training.

It seems other reasons must be found to explain why the incredible ger tanks could not hit and des thier lesser opponents more easily.

I recently got and read WWII Balistic by lorrin rexford. Although he does not specifically mention this problem at all his book and other peoles comments have given me a few ideas. He presents calculations showing that hitting for a higher elev is actually drastically harder than just firing along the flat. Tanks raely engage each other over flat terrain on known ranges under perfect weather and light cond with the tank and crew in best of shape. And adj from shots that disapper in mud or snow would be much more difficult or tanks moving up and down over hills etc.... If you start adding a 30 deg lateral ang to all those enemy tanks they suddenly become much stronger!

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Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
I am going to run this very simplistic approach up the flagpole and see if it's worth even a boy scout salute. Indirect approach…very indirect. German wartime production of 88mm Pak 43 armored piercing ammunition:

1943 Pzgr production: 830,00 rounds
1944 Pzgr production: approx 1,000,000 rounds

Original Source is apparently: "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 5, part 1" although I obtained the information from the following URL:

http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/GermWeapProd.html

<SNIP>

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I'm pretty sure that a lot of that data comes from the other source listed,

Hahn, Fritz: "Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933-1945"

Hahns book also includes expenditure (Verbrauch) figures, which may be a better starting point.

IIRC there are some references to ammunition expenditure in Jentz: "Panzertruppen", I seem to recall that up to 6 Gr.38 Hl/x were needed to set fire to a non-specified Soviet tank while PzGr.39 could do the trick with about 3 rounds pr. tank. This for 7,5cm weapons. The 5cm KwK took up to 5 rounds per enemy tank destroyed.

I think I have Hahns expenditure figures in a spreadsheet somewhere if you are interested.

Claus B

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Originally posted by Darrin:

Actually I did a similar sort of calculation myself a few months ago. Remember we are talking about rounds needed to kill a tank. Not rounds needed to damage a tank. But maybe we could double the numbers here to account for tanks that were hit and only damage. Or almost 50,000 at least for rus tanks in 43. Not all des and esp damage were done because of AP hits though. The ger produced around 80 75mm+ AP rounds in 43 for each des and dam rus tank.

Even 80 AP rounds to kill each vehicle seems pretty large. There were 24,000 rus tank and AGs des in 43. In 43 it would be much larger if we include over 2 mil 50mm AP rounds. I mean we can be pretty sure most rounds sent to the front did not get affected by air in 43 as well.

Kursk example over the less than 2 months around kursk the rus lost 6000 tanks and AGs des. That is around 100 a day. The ger started with around 2500 almost all operational. They also probably had somewhere around 4000 tanks commited in total over the whole 2 months. But the tank str (op + rep) was never that high. It might have avg 3000 (2500 + other units - des + replacements) not considering many were not operational. Each ger tank on the front might have knocked out 1 sov tank each month! But including ATGs it drops much lower than this. It proably drops to 1 sov tank killed during the whole 2 mo operation per ger tank and ATG!

With operational considerations the lowest the ger tanks fell was 50% of inital str in the south with around 15% des. 50% op of 85% is around 60%. And as other areas and further time is included this would be the only time it got this low. Maybe an avg op rediness of 75% for this time and place. Op rediness would not have decreased damatically the number of tanks on the front. Esp considering that kursk lasted at least 1 week less than 2 months described above.

We are left with gunnary est are hugly over rated. Or tanks just didn't run into each other and ATG very often. But kursk known as the largest tank battle in history where both sides committed huge numbers of tanks and tank units. Not to mention that the ger at least made and premembly used all these AT rounds. I mean how many rounds does traing a tank really tank. 100? Ger made around 10,000 tanks and 15,000 ATGs in 43. That makes 25,000 needing traing or maybe 250,000 rounds. Perhaps some training after issue might be needed but also many weapons were issued to experianced crews meaning less rounds used for intial and coninuing training.

It seems other reasons must be found to explain why the incredible ger tanks could not hit and des thier lesser opponents more easily.

I recently got and read WWII Balistic by lorrin rexford. Although he does not specifically mention this problem at all his book and other peoles comments have given me a few ideas. He presents calculations showing that hitting for a higher elev is actually drastically harder than just firing along the flat. Tanks raely engage each other over flat terrain on known ranges under perfect weather and light cond with the tank and crew in best of shape. And adj from shots that disapper in mud or snow would be much more difficult or tanks moving up and down over hills etc.... If you start adding a 30 deg lateral ang to all those enemy tanks they suddenly become much stronger!

Not to mention that because the ger guns could des enemy tanks at long range they might have waisted their rounds trying this far too often. Or that sights could easily come lose during firing, rough terrin or getting hit. Req more rounds too rezero very often or more wasted ammo due to misalgned sights.

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To add a couple new points to my post since this thread has reawakened. It may be that only half the tanks killed by the ger were killed by tanks or at least PD. The rest were by aircraft, arty including ATGs and inf including panzerfaust et al. And one reason why the ger had higher tank kills then the alllies may have had more to do with having a target rich evironment. Like shooting fish in a barrel. But the allies had to go running around looking for the much more scarce ger tanks.