Thanks,

As I am at home, I do not happen to have NPW or Understanding War in front of me, but will post the data tommorrow. Trevor Dupuy produced a score effectiveness of 1.2 to 1.3 in favor of the Germans over the allies. This was almost entirely based upon Italian Campaign engagements from September 1943 to June 1944. As such, it represents the performance differential for those forces at those times. He further broke the score down by division.
Two works have been done independently to back this assessment up. Niklas Zetterling (the author) went back through and independently researched and re-tested some of the Italian campaigns. It turns out that HERO used some secondary sources and estimates for some of their research that resulted in the Germans being credited with more artillery than they actually had early in the campaign. As such, he independently confirmed the disparity, with the conclusion that it was worse than what Trevor Dupuy claimed.
Over the last year, we did an extensive study on Enemy Prisoner of War Captures rates, based partially on WWII data. We re-checked all the Italian data, and then using a non-QJM methodology (instead used a simple statistical comparison) ended up showing that indeed the Germans appears to have a 20 to 30% advantage over the US in Italy when one compares casualties recieved versus casualties caused. It was even worse for the UK forces. This was based upon over 60 engagements.
We also did the same test for Ardennes and Kursk. In the case of Ardennes, we get far less consistent results, and it does appear that at times the allies are performing better than the Germans, and at Kursk we get very lop-sided results. These results are published in our EPW Report for Phase I & II and were presented at ISMOR (International Society of Military Operations Reseachers) in UK last September.
So what is the debate in H-War about?

H-War had been debating a thread related to the relative merits of the U.S. and German Army replacement systems in the Second World War when a reference was made to Col. Dupuy's assertion of the 20% German combat effectiveness value. I made a statement expressing surprise at how quickly the H-War membership appeared to dismiss Col. Dupuy's assertion, which brought forth a variety of replies questioning the validity of the original QJM methodology and and whether or not the original database had been deliberately skewed to produce a particular result. The only detailed criticism leveled thus far concerns the high proportion of elite and mechanized German Army formations in the original QJM database engagements list, which is claimed to skew the CEV result. I can e-mail you the relevant messages thus far if you like. There are also a number of past references to Col. Dupuy and the QJM in the H-War logs.

I have a hardback copy of the original print run of _Numbers_ purchased back in 1980 or 81. When I was in 16 or 17, I created a program in BASIC to run the QJM on my 16k TRS-80. I've been a big fan of Col. Dupuy and the QJM methodology ever since.

I have the information for the score effectiveness rating Col. Dupuy did for the divisions in the original QJM database. I was hoping that an additional score effectiveness calculation might have been done for the 1944-45 Western Front. Unfortunately I have not been able to dig up a tabulation for respective numbers engaged and casualties to run a calculation myself.

I appreciate the message you posted to H-War giving the URL for this website, or else I wouldn't had known that it exists. Great site, and great work!

Cheers,

quote:

---

Originally posted by yadernye:
...I was hoping that an additional score effectiveness calculation might have been done for the 1944-45 Western Front. Unfortunately I have not been able to dig up a tabulation for respective numbers engaged and casualties to run a calculation myself.

---

Although not a 'score', here are the numbers for the Ardenne's campaign from "Hitler's Last Gamble" by Dupuy, Anderson & Bognard:

German Casualties:

Period – KIA – WIA – MIA – Total

16-23 Dec ’44 – 1,844 – 6,096 – 6,481 – 14,421
24 Dec – 1 Jan – 1,515 – 4,974 – 5,622 – 12,111
Jan 2 – 16 ’45 – 2,430 – 7,384 – 8,074 – 17,888

Totals: 5,789 – 18,454 – 20,177 – 44,420

Allied Casualties:

Period – KIA – WIA – MIA – Total

16-23 Dec ’44 – 1,518 – 7,317 – 13,960 – 22,795
24 Dec – 1 Jan – 1,038 – 5,916 – 2,706 – 9,660
Jan 2 – 16 ’45 – 2,407 – 11,941 – 4,002 – 18,350

Totals: 4,963 – 25,174 – 20,668 – 50,805

Add another 1,462 British casualties for a total of 52,257

1. Recent studies by Niklas Zetterling show that the QJM overestimated rather than underestimated German combat strengths (particullary artillery)in the Salerno engagements. Since then I have discovered that the Volturno engagements also overestimated German strength.

2. Trevor was a retired US Army officer and was second to none in his admiration of it's history and traditions. He was also well aware of it's flaws and saw the German General Staff as a model of institution excellence -- which had nothing to do with it's moral shortcomings, which he abhored.

3. The German divisions in Italy, for much of this period were neither "elite" nor "experienced." The 15th PzGD was the renamed "Division Sizilian" which had been created from various ersatz units and a sprinkling of 15th PzD convalescents. It performed well in Sicily and then in early Italian operations when the vast majority of it's troops were as green as the Americans. Ditto Herman Goering which had been so eviscerated in Tunisia and Sicily that it's infantry component during the Salerno and Volturno Campaigns consisted of only two of the original divisional battalions, the rest was the 129th PzG Rgt, detached from 15th PzGD (see above), and the "Naples Battalion" an ad hoc orginization cobbled together from bits and pieces and originally intended to defend the harbor at Naples.

And it is interesting to me that those who cry out about Trevor's "anti-American" fixation always ignore the US 88th Infantry Division. In the HERO case study of that division it was found that this "green" division consistently outfought it's German opposition, including the "elite" Herman Goering Division.

Worse, John Sloan Brown, one of the most virulent critics of the QJM, in his otherwise excellent book on the 88th, failed to even acknowledge Trevor's recognition of the 88th Division's excellence, chosing rather to criticise the QJM. That was a most peculiar failing indeed, considering that when the HERO study "The 88th Infantry Division in World War II: Factors Responsible for its Excellence" was published in 1981, Captain John Sloan Brown was acknowledged in it as one of the persons with whom extensive information on the division was exchanged. However, there is no reference to that study or his involvement in it to be found in turn in Brown's 1986 book.

4. The database that the QJM was derived from is available in many formats -- not least, the HERO Combat Subscription Data Base, which was published concurrent with the development of the QJM methodology. In it are contained ALL of the engagements, with ALL of the data used in the development of the QJM. These are again available in reprint from this website. Other related databases have been used by the Correlates of War Project (the CAA Chase Data Base, derived from a HERO project and incorpoprating transcription errors not found in the HERO original). And of course there is NPR, Understanding War, and all of Trevor's other works that included statistical dat derived from the original battles. I guess the critics of the QJM just have a difficult time finding the data unless it is pre-posted and pre-digested on the web for them.

Cheers,

quote:

---

Originally posted by Rich:

balderdash

---

Nice comprehensive reply Rich, not much I can add to it. The original QJM validation data was first published in 1975 in the Combat Data Subsription Service (HERO Report #50). This was widely distributed. HERO also published its QJM validation data base in 1985 (HERO Report #100). Our independent analysis of the Italian Campaign (and others) is in TDI report number E-3 and my breifing on just the human factors portion is in TDI report number E-4.

All of these reports are publically availible and the HERO ones have been publically availible for decades. See the publications section of our website (www.dupuyinstitute.org).

The various claims made as to the suspiciousness of the data, invention of data, skewing of the data, culling of data, selection of data, etc. are totally unfounded. These claims needs to be backed up with factual evidence of such or graciously withdrawn.

Trevor N. Dupuy's models do meet a rigorous standard for scientific research. The models were built from "real-world data", they have been validated (both by Trevor Dupuy and independently), the validation data is accessable, the results of the recent validations have been published (in The International TNDM Newsletter), the data can been independently tested and reviewed, and the model is transparent and understandable. I do not believe that there is another combat model created in the US defense industry, or the world for that matter, that meets such a standard.

The "great site" is the work of Ralph Zuljan (OnWar.com) who is both extremely competent and a pleasure to work with.

quote:

---

Originally posted by yadernye:
I have no idea which British division to which this comment referred to either, but I will also for clarification in my forthcoming H-War rebuttal.

---

Good luck actually getting an answer. Would love to know the source of these "unattributed" attacks on the data. I have my suspicions, but no evidence.

Here is the reply I posted to H-War on this subject. Thanks again for the clarifications and permission to use them.

Cheers,

Shawn

From: "Shawn Woodford" <yadernye@hotmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 23:19:51 -0600

After two lengthy passes through the aforementioned H-War logs, I still
have been unable to locate discussion of the specific criticism forwarded
by Mr. Lund, although I did encounter several other general objections to
the QJM methodology. I also initiated a discussion on this subject at The
Dupuy Institute (www.dupuyinstitute.org), which fleshed out a number of
details about which I had been unaware.

It is difficult to categorize and address the criticism leveled at Dupuy
and the QJM because so little of it is based on specific, factual evidence.
As far as I can tell, opposition to Dupuy’s interpretations seems to focus
on three specific allegations:

1. that the QJM database was deliberately chosen to demonstrate German
superiority;

2. that the QJM database contained flawed and inaccurate data; and

3. that Dupuy’s assertion of a German combat effectiveness superiority
over American and British forces in World War II is either misleading, or
simply incorrect.

I shall address each of these in order.

Until contrary evidence is provided, I shall stick with the assessment I
made in my April 2nd posting regarding the motivations of those who
compiled the original HERO QJM database. The unfavorable outcome of the
engagements compiled in the database for the German forces involved also
make it extremely unlikely that they were pre-chosen with the idea of
showing a German combat effectiveness superiority.

On Wed, 04 Apr 2001 17:53:31 -0400, Erik Lund wrote:
> Finally, there is a _real_ question over how surprising Dupuy
> in fact found his results --here I point Dr. Woodford to Dupuy's
> eulogy to the German General Staff, which in my opinion
> shows him far gone into Prussophilia.

I’m not quite sure how germane the allegation that Dupuy had fallen victim
to "Prussophilia" is to the matter at hand. Among a wide variety of
subjects, Dupuy wrote extensively on the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and
asserted the existence of a much higher combat effectiveness superiority
for Israeli forces over those of the Arab states. Does this mean Dupuy
should be labeled a "Zionist" as well? I think hard evidence should be
provided of not only the existence of such personal bias - as opposed to
professional admiration - but also that it influenced the data and
methodology before such allegations be given any credibility.

As a member of The Dupuy Institute, Rich, put it in our recent discussion:

"Trevor was a retired U.S. Army officer and was second to none in his
admiration of its history and traditions. He was also well aware of its
flaws and saw the German General Staff as a model of institution excellence
-- which had nothing to do with its moral shortcomings, which he abhored."

> Moreover, someone (I forget whom) singled out several references
> to a British division in these actions that in fact had been
> disbanded more than two years previously. An honest mistake, I'm
> sure, but an unexpected one in such a comprehensive study.

Here are the British divisions listed in the original QJM database: 1st
Infantry, 5th Infantry, 7th Armored, 46th Infantry, 56th Infantry.
(_Numbers_, pp. 106) Can anyone verify if any of these units was, in fact,
disbanded "more than two years" before the period September 1943 to June 1944?

> . . . not to mention a whole bunch of grave factual errors.

On this matter, I quote Rich from The Dupuy Institute:

"The database that the QJM was derived from is available in many formats --
not least, the HERO Combat Subscription Data Base, which was published
concurrent with the development of the QJM methodology. In it are contained
ALL of the engagements, with ALL of the data used in the development of the
QJM. These are again available in reprint from this website. Other related
databases have been used by the Correlates of War Project (the CAA Chase
Data Base, derived from a HERO project and incorpoprating transcription
errors not found in the HERO original). And of course there is NPR,
Understanding War, and all of Trevor's other works that included
statistical data derived from the original battles.

"Finally, since the creation of the original 'Italian' data base of 60
engagements, at least 150 additional engagements from Italy, France, the
Ardennes, and Kursk have been added. The data found in these engagements
has done nothing to contradict Trevor's original findings."

Christopher A. Lawrence, Executive Director of The Dupuy Institute
elaborated further:

"The original QJM validation data was first published in 1975 in the Combat
Data Subscription Service (HERO Report #50). This was widely distributed.
HERO also published its QJM validation data base in 1985 (HERO Report
#100). Our independent analysis of the Italian Campaign (and others) is in
TDI report number E-3, and my briefing on just the human factors portion is
in TDI report number E-4.

"All of these reports are publicly available, and the HERO ones have been
publicly available for decades. See the publications section of our website
(www.dupuyinstitute.org).

"The various claims made as to the suspiciousness of the data, invention of
data, skewing of the data, culling of data, selection of data, etc. are
totally unfounded. These claims need to be backed up with factual evidence
of such or graciously withdrawn.

"Trevor N. Dupuy's models do meet a rigorous standard for scientific
research. The models were built from 'real-world data', they have been
validated (both by Trevor Dupuy and independently), the validation data is
accessible, the results of the recent validations have been published (in
The International TNDM Newsletter), the data can been independently tested
and reviewed, and the model is transparent and understandable. I do not
believe that there is another combat model created in the U.S. defense
industry, or the world for that matter, that meets such a standard.

> Mr. Woodford might want to look at Dupuy's last book which
> covered the Ardennes campaign. If Dupuy still believed that
> the Germans had an inherent tactical superiority, it certainly
> does not show in this account. I have no idea whether Dupuy
> had any second thoughts, but it does seem odd that he would
> not have used this battle to affirm his earlier theories.

I confess to not being as familiar with Dupuy’s later works as I am with
_Numbers_, and I have not yet read his book on the Ardennes, _Hitler’s Last
Gamble_.

Rich from The Dupuy Institute had this to say about the book:

"Specifically, in the Ardennes data contradictory evidence was found of a
possible improvement in U.S. performance versus the Germans during the
later stages of the battle. As Trevor stated in _Hitler's Last Gamble_,
'German relative combat effectiveness values (CEV's) mostly exceed 1.0 and
vary from 0.77 to 1.30.' In the sample he gave from the battle, the average
German CEV was just over 1.0. However, the data is inconsistent and
contradictory, and, as Trevor himself always realized, the sample needs to
be expanded."

With regard to the matter of combat effectiveness, I find it interesting
that none appear to dispute the notion that such a factor exists in the
first place. Nor does anyone seem to have a problem with Dupuy asserting,
for instance, that German forces demonstrated an average 131% combat
effectiveness superiority over Soviet forces on the Eastern Front in World
War II, or that Allied ground forces were 30% more combat effective than
Japanese forces in the Pacific Theatre. HERO’s analysis of the Yom Kippur
War showed Israeli forces with a combat effectiveness superiority between
54 and 250% over the various Arab armies. Dupuy’s most vocal critics
inevitably focus exclusively on his finding that the German Army
demonstrated a 20% combat effectiveness over the Western Allies on the
Italian and Western Front’s in 1944 and 1945.

> Dr. Woodford might benefit from a futher review of the H-WAR
> logs. In these he will find no "internalist" objection to the
> particular HERO methodology, but rather the observation, so
> frequently made since the publication of Dupuy's results, that
> a disproportionate number of the German units involved were
> of comparatively high quality, i.e. paratroop and panzer
> formations, and that this selection skewed the sample.

On this, I defer to Rich from The Dupuy Institute:

"Recent studies by Niklas Zetterling show that the QJM overestimated rather
than underestimated German combat strengths (particularly artillery) in the
Salerno engagements. Since then I have discovered that the Volturno
engagements also overestimated German strength.

"The German divisions in Italy for much of this period were neither 'elite'
nor 'experienced'. The 15th PzGD was the renamed 'Division Sizilian' which
had been created from various ersatz units and a sprinkling of 15th PzD
convalescents. It performed well in Sicily and then in early Italian
operations when the vast majority of its troops were as green as the
Americans. Ditto Herman Goering, which had been so eviscerated in Tunisia
and Sicily that its infantry component during the Salerno and Volturno
Campaigns consisted of only two of the original divisional battalions, the
rest was the 129th PzG Rgt, detached from 15th PzGD (see above), and the
'Naples Battalion', an ad hoc organization cobbled together from bits and
pieces and originally intended to defend the harbor at Naples.

"And it is interesting to me that those who cry out about Trevor's
'anti-American' fixation always ignore the U.S. 88th Infantry Division. In
the HERO case study of that division, it was found that this 'green'
division consistently outfought its German opposition, including the
'elite' Herman Goering Division."

To this I add the list below, which breaks down the German units in the
original "Italy" and "France" components of the QJM Database, followed by
the number of engagements each participated in, and those engagements as a
percentage of the total.

Italy, 1943-44 (61 engagements):
Herman Goering PzD (5; 8.1%)
3rd PzGrD (17; 27.9%)
4th Parachute (5; 8.2%)
15th PzGrD (11; 18%)
16th PzD (7; 11.5%)
29th PzD (3; 4.9%)
65th ID (6; 9.8%)
71st ID (2; 3.3%)
94th ID (8; 13.1%)
362nd ID (3; 4.9%)
715th LID (1; 1.6%)
114th LID (1; 1.6%)
Kampfgruppe Greizer (2; 3.3%)

By type:
PzD: 24.6%
PzGrD.: 45.9%
Parachute: 8.2%
ID: 37.7%
Pz+PzGr+Para: 78.7%
HG+Para: 16.4%

France, 1944 (19 engagements):
11 PzD (4; 21%)
Panzer Lehr PzD(4; 21%)
25 PzGrD (2; 10.5%)
361 ID (3; 15.8%)
XII Corps (1; 5.3%)
XIII SS Corps (5; 26.3%)
LXXXIX Corps (4; 21%)
XC Corps (1; 5.3%)

By type:
Pz: 42.1%
PzGr.: 10.5%
ID: 15.%
Corps: 31.6%

In _Numbers_, Dupuy calculated the combat effectiveness for all American,
British and German formations that participated in at least three
engagements, and then modified that value based on what he called "score
effectiveness," which measured the number of casualties a unit inflicted
per soldier on the enemy. (See _Numbers_, pp. 106 for the full listing.)

According to Dupuy’s criteria, the unit that scored the highest was the
11th Panzer Division, a regular German Army formation. The second highest
scoring unit was the Herman Goering Panzer Division, which nevertheless was
outfought on occasion by the U.S. 88th Infantry Division, which had the
highest score of the Allied formations. And interestingly enough, the
German unit with the third highest average score effectiveness was the 94th
Infantry Division, which was also an average, non-mobile, German Army unit.
The 3rd and 15th Panzer Grenadier divisions tied for the fourth highest
ratings, and were represented in the most engagements on the German side.
The 4th Parachute Division, the only other unit that might be considered
"elite," was the 7th highest rated German unit, and rated below both the
U.S. 88th Infantry Division and the U.S. XII Corps.

It seems to me that the German units in the original QJM database were more
or less broadly representational of the German Army as a whole. In any
case, the combat effectiveness value demonstrated in these engagements was
validated in analyses of engagements in other campaigns.

It also seems to me that the whole issue of this German combat
effectiveness superiority might be better understood if more effort were
devoted to trying to determine exactly what it was and what it might have
meant. I don’t think Dupuy ever used this interpretation as the basis for
asserting that the German Army was "superior" to the U.S. Army, nor did he
use it as a basis for criticizing U.S. Army performance in World War II. It
is too bad that Dupuy himself did not focus more closely on defining what
his findings revealed, because it has given rise to much semantic
confusion. He offered a few possible reasons for his observation "that 100
Germans were roughly the combat equivalent of 120 Americans or British,"
but concluded that "a serious analysis for the reasons for this greater
German effectiveness is an important research requirement." (_Numbers_, pp.
62-63) Other than van Creveld’s _Fighting Power_, I know of no other
attempt to address this question directly. (I would agree with the
contention that the recent literature aimed at redeeming American combat
performance and debunking Dupuy has only addressed part of the question.)

Cheers,

Shawn Robert Woodford
Department of War Studies
King's College London

That Prussophila accusation against Trevor is odd since, like so many, that posters chronology was just a bit off. A Genius for War, the evident source for that rather snide remark, was published in 1977. Unfortunately for the poster, the genesis of the QJM precedes it by at least eight years -- when HERO began work on air interdiction campaigns for the US Air Force. The first document published to mention the QJM preceded Genius by at least a year (The Quantified Judgement Model of Analysis of Historical Combat Data; A Monograph [1976]), while The Combat Subscription Data Service, which detailed the data, was published in 1975.

And these people accuse Trevor of slipshod research.

Rich Anderson
The Dupuy Institute http://dupuyinstitute.org/
_____

Of the historical ilk.

quote:

---

Originally posted by Chris Lawrence:
Anyone care to comment on the Prussian heritage of the name "Dupuy"?

---

Thanks for your efforts. I am sure that your defense of Trevor's work will be met by silence.

So what do you teach at King's College and are you familiar with one of its American alumni (and TDI alumni), Dr. Richard Harrison (The Russian Way of War)?

quote:

---

Originally posted by yadernye:
Sort of a silly question

---

Actually, I had to practice it for a couple of weeks when I first came to work. God forbid you mispronounce the (internationally famous) boss's name.

My favorite mispronouciation was "DOO-pee" (accent on the first syllable).

I began grad school with the intention of pursuing research on the evolution of 20th century U.S. and German maneuver doctrine, but changed topics in pursuit of academic marketability. I have since come to regret that, although I do have a sincere interest in my current work.

It would seem that I have missed a lot over the last decade in terms of new literature and historiographical debate, and I am enjoying the prospect of catching back up. Land warfare and military theory have always been my deep and true abiding interests.

I have also developed a keen interest in complexity theory and the mathematics of chaos. If you haven't already, you should have a look at Dr. Christopher Bassford's website on Clausewitz and chaos at clausewitz.com. He and his colleagues have compiled an extensive amount of literature addressing complexity in warfare.

From: "Markel, Matthew W MAJ ODCSOPS" <Matthew.Markel@Hqda.army.mil>
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 14:44:14 -0400

Dr. Woodford seems to argue that if Dupuy did not select his engagements
with deliberate bias, than the QJM data base is not skewed. The fact
remains that most of the engagements cited by Dupuy occurred prior to the
late summer breakout of Allied forces in France.

As to meticulous research, after trying to track the data myself, I would
counter by saying that it is almost entirely secondary research. That in
itself does not impugn the database; the U.S. Army Official Histories are
quite good. The fact remains, however, that the authors of this series
made no attempt to systematically record a consistent set of data on all
engagements described.

Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 20:41:06 -0400
From: John Sloan <xenophons@mindspring.com>

HI

Guess I better add some comments to Shawn's detailed report and his
discussion with Chris Lawrence. I worked with Trevor as VP of his HERO
outfit in the 1970's and early 80's and consulted with him for years after
- right up to his untimely demise. So I was there long before Chris.

The various component battles and campaigns that constitute the 'database'
were compiled piecemeal within a whole series of special reports under
contact to DA or DAF - mostly with Concepts Analysis Agency. There was and
could not have been any prior selection of the component battles to suit
any preconceived notions or agendas. With each additional funded study,
Trevor and company were able to add not only to the database but also to
generate more insights as a result of uncovering various new bits of
information. As the title indicates, it is Quantified Judgment Model - and
its chief value is in the remarkable NEW insights and judgments Trevor was
able to draw from each new part when added to the growing whole.

I should note that the whole project was generated by officials who were
(and still are) disssatisfied with the state of simulations, modeling, and
wargaming as done by the services. I can state for sure that NONE of the
models then being used to generate the POM or any other decisions were
based on any kind of VALIDATED historical basis in fact.

Along the way we created also the Military Conflict Institute - still in
existance - to bring together modelers, mathmaticians, historians and
interested parties concerned with this situation. Among the products that
came out of that is a Theory of Combat published by the Institute and the
NPGS. Trevor's work was absolutely fundamental to this process.

Among the last products Trevor supervised was the study of Ardennes - under
contract with CAA. And this was well received. But it was in turn generated
by a even more massive study of Kursk for which Chris was the lead project
officer. He and the rest of the American team worked for several years with
distinguished Russian military officer historians who had unprecedented
access to the Russian archives. Chris may not have mentioned it, but his
book based on this study and report should go a long way toward changing a
lot of perceptions about that battle.

Trevor was asked to predict the outcome of the Desert Storm campaign. He
published the only analysis and prediction that I know of prior to the
start that indicated there would be practically no casualties on the U.S.
side. He also predicted the end run campaign around the Allied right flank,
but I believe that was suppressed for a while at least.

Some set-in-their-ways mathmaticians complain about the QJM because it has
various 'fudge factors' built into it. But we operate on the fundamental
premise that the stronger party in a battle is by definition the victor. We
do not buy the common argument that the scenario and model community poses
when they say, "Gee wiz, the weaker side won." What this means is that the
analyst did not know how to evaluate the relative strengths, if he thinks a
'weaker' side could EVER win a battle.

Also, Trevor and company were and are the least likely to want to cook the
books. In fact, one of the other reasons we were called in and that I later
spent years on the Army "Red Team" was due to weapons project officers and
other Army or Airforce agencies wanting to cook the books so their weapon
or program would appear more effective than it really was.

Well, enough for now.

best wishes

quote:

---

Originally posted by yadernye:
I began grad school with the intention of pursuing research on the evolution of 20th century U.S. and German maneuver doctrine, but changed topics in pursuit of academic marketability.

---

Academic marketability......an interesting concept.

quote:

---

Has the Dupuy Institute investigated the possibility of incorporating complexity theory concepts into the TNDM?

---

No, and unfortunately, I am not familiar enough with it. Will take at look at the website. Right now, as no one is funding it, work on the model is on hold.