I know that the Russian offensive phase of the Kursk battle is relevant to Chris's book, but here's an interesting (well, maybe not to YOU) quote from Tank Strike - the Experience of the Tank Army in Front Offensive Operations in the Great Patriotic War by A. I. Radzievskiy, Moscow, 1977, page 212:"For example, the Belgorod-Kharkov operation created favorable conditions for pursuit of the enemy and reaching the Dnepr. On 27 August 1943 the commander of the Steppe Front, General I. S. Konev, ordered the 5th Guards Tank Army together with the 5th Guards Army to drive the enemy away from Kharkov to the south-west. At that time the units of the 5th GTA had only 66 tanks in service, i.e. 12% of its initial strength. (footnote: On 3 August 1943 the 5th GTA had 550 tanks [archive file reference]) The corps headquarters' staffing did not exceed 30-35% of officers. There were large losses in communications equipment - in a number of units it reached 75%. Almost 85% of the company and battalion commanders were out of action."
It goes on to say how the commander of the 5th GTA merged understrength brigades together to get something close to full strength - one brigade in each of the three corps.
Things were similar if not as bad in the 1st Tank Army. On 23 August 1943 it had 141 tanks.
The 5th GTA really gets whipped around. Trashed on July 12th, resusitated by August 3rd, trashed again by 27 August...
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posted 03-16-2003 03:15 PM
